Ask anyone in Tunisia and they will tell you that Islamists, represented by their largest organisation, Al-Nahda Party headed by Sheikh Rashed Al-Ghanoushi, are going to be partners in ruling the country following the January revolution.
Taxi drivers, who habitually have their radios tuned to the Quran, a station ironically established and owned by businessman Sakhr Al-Matri, son-in-law of deposed President Zein Abidine Ben Ali, average citizens in cafes or on the street, and even politicians and intellectuals agree. Al-Nahda, which was banned since its creation under the name “Islamist Outlook Movement” in 1981, until the revolution of 14 January 2011, will be the leading party in Constituent Council elections on 23 October.
Today, Al-Nahda issues its own weekly newspaper Al-Fajr, and the party’s main headquarters on a side street off Kheireddin Pacha Street in the capital is located in a six-storey building once owned by a wireless telephone company. The front of the building is modern and elegant, the glass covered façade reflects the open space before it. In the entrance lobby is hung a picture of Al-Ghanoushi’s books lined up.
Al-Ghanoushi, 70, studied philosophy at Damascus University and is a prominent thinker of “political Islam” in our times. His books are for the first time being sold in public in Tunisia and with locally printed editions.
Al-Ghanoushi met me in his office. He spoke slowly, as if weighed down by years of exile and travel that lasted 21 years and finally ended in London. He avoided answering direct questions about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, although all his answers, in my opinion, challenged the Brotherhood’s posture and its nascent Justice and Freedom Party.
The founder and leader of Al-Nahda Party (which dropped “Islamist” from its title) began his answers by invoking the religious phrase praising the Prophet Mohammed. Then he said:
“I was honoured to be in Egypt as a young man in my 20s to study in a country that represented the aspirations of the youth in pan-Arabism, authenticity and pride. I emigrated there in 1964 and registered to study at the Agricultural College at Cairo University, but this did not last long because of political circumstances.
“Relations between Abdel-Nasser and Borqeba (Egypt’s and Tunisia’s presidents, respectively, at the time) were tense and we benefited from this dispute, but soon they reconciled and about 40 Tunisian students in Egypt paid the price—and I was one of them. The Tunisian embassy in Cairo asked for the names of students who rebelled against the Westernisation tendencies of the time. Borqeba was keen on sending students to the West not the East, which he viewed as a source of suspicion and revolution. As Tunisian students in Egypt, we found ourselves expelled from university although we were very enthusiastic and greatly admired Nasserist Egypt. Then they began handing us over to the embassy for deportation; some went back while others — like me—fled elsewhere.”
Al-Ghanoushi went to Damascus and studied philosophy, remained a devout Nasserist, and joined a Nasserist group called “The Socialist Union” until it became a political Islamic group after the 1967 defeat, according to his autobiography The Islamist Movement Experience in Tunisia.
When referring to Borqeba you used the term “Westernisation”, but some people in Tunisia do not view him as secular. What’s your opinion and what is your definition of secularism?
Borqeba was a secular fanatic, not a moderate. Secularism does not necessarily mean that it opposes religion, but in many cases it co-exists with religion such as the Anglo-Saxon culture. The French roots of secularism, however, have a heritage in opposition of religion which makes it biased. In such a scenario, the state is not neutral towards religion but in conflict with it. Hence, for example, the hijab problem and banning the head scarf was never an issue in Western secular thought except in France. In Britain, on the other hand, they designed Islamic police uniforms for Muslim female officers.
Borqeba’s secularism was extremist and even fascist; it did not believe in democracy but the dominance of the state over society and dismantling its religious structure and identity. This is completely different from a neutral stance by the state towards religion.
So you believe the state should maintain a neutral position towards religion?
I believe the state should sponsor all religions and express the will of society, and not be a guardian over society.
Did you revise your position regarding your proximity to Ben Ali at the beginning of his rule, as stated in the book by Nicolas Beau and Jean Pierre Tuquoi, Notre ami Ben Ali?
When Ben Ali deposed his boss Borqeba on 7 November 1987, our necks were almost in the noose with 10,000 men behind bars. The country was being led by a senile old man and we were in something similar to a civil war and political life was being strangled. We were among the opposition movements that welcomed change but were more pessimistic than optimistic. We knew that the man had previously served as chief of security and former minister of interior, which meant that he took part in the suppression campaigns of 1978, 1984 and 1987. But he came in declaring there is no presidential term for life and promised to reinstate democracy, pan-Arabism and release political prisoners.
When Ben Ali received me on 6 November 1988, he promised to recognise the Islamist movement but asked for some patience. I believed him until the 1989 elections, and the people began to sympathise with the Islamist movement which threw things off balance — it even took us by surprise. The people punitively voted against the ruling party; we misread that, we admit it. Not only were we mistaken about our optimism about Ben Ali, but we were also mistaken because we did not practice democracy was well as we do today.
I will also add, yes, Ben Ali deceived the Islamist leadership and grassroots.
Your campaign in the Constituent Assembly elections seems more modern and open to society, the world and the age. But my observation of the tone of Al-Nahda leadership is contrary and dissimilar to the beliefs of its base and supporters, some of whom are calling for an Islamist state while others want Friday to be the weekend holiday, not Sunday. How is that?
The modern outlook that you noticed is not a decision by the leadership, but the natural progression of the Islamist Outlook Movement and Al-Nahda Movement. In the founding statement of the Outlook Movement in June 1981, there is a clear position for adopting democracy without discrimination or elimination of any party or trend, including the Communist Party. That was an unusual position for an Islamist group to take in those days.
At the time, we were asked at a news conference what would we do if the Communist Party was elected by the people? We did not hesitate and responded: “We have no other choice but to accept the outcome of the ballot box. Then we will go to the people and ask them to revise their choice in the next elections.”
In reality, since the end of the 1970s, we have been coordinating with the leaders of the opposition, including the communist, socialist and democratic parties. Although we suspended coordination for a while because Ben Ali coerced some secular currents and convinced them to fear what he called “Islamist terrorism”, there is consensus among all Tunisian political hues about the type of society, equality between sexes, pluralism that does not exclude anyone and building a civic state. I believe the moderate Islamist trend in general in Morocco, Algeria and even Egypt is heading in this direction, despite differences between one party and another.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, currently support a civic state.
But some of their leaders are still calling for the application of Sharia.
I believe what they mean is that Sharia is the main source of legislation, but the civic state will issue the laws. After the Brotherhood in Egypt proposed the creation of a body of Al-Azhar scholars to revise laws, they withdrew the idea and adopted the notion of a civic state. This means that the people are represented by members of parliament who will write and debate laws. In all honesty, in Islam there is no authority to govern over the people, which is why Sharia is a philosophical and intellectual source for MPs, thinkers and scholars to rely on, but without the guardianship of any entity.
Your campaign does not mention that Sharia is the source of legislation.
The constitution which Tunisians agree on does not mention a secular state but an Islamic state! The previous constitution (of 1959) states that “Tunisia is a free independent state; Arabic is the official language and Islam is the official religion.” No one wants to change this text. Hence, our constitution states that the state’s religion is Islam; it is not a state without religion, which means that religion is a source of all policies and all cultures.
At the same time, no one has the right to claim he represents religion; neither Al-Nahda nor anyone else. Society, through its own dynamic, is the one to formulate and translate religion into policies, laws and culture. The door for debate remains open when we need legislation or policies. This dynamic continues until there is consensus about the opinion of religion on this issue and that. This is a form of interaction with religion that is open to individuals and groups.
In your writings you make it clearer by stating: “There is no religious state in Islam, but a civic state”.
No one in the Islamist trend, at least among the moderates, is calling for a religious state — namely a state that speaks in the name of God. An Islamic state is not a religious one, meaning that it is the state of a Muslim people who are keen for the policies and laws of the state not to contradict the beliefs and values of the citizens, but enforce them. But no one is saying they can be the sole interpreters, or that they speak in the name of Islam.
Are you satisfied with the transition to democracy since the 14 January revolution?
Tunisians today agree on this path. There is consensus that translating the goals of the revolution requires the election of a Constituent Council to write a new constitution. This body will be formed soon. In the year of independence in 1956, the Tunisian state began its work by electing a constituent assembly, and today we all realise that the path we took since that date [1956] was mistaken, misguided and led us to disaster when it concluded by creating a dictatorship, and even a “mafia” type regime.
When Tunisians realised that conditions were beyond reform they revolted; we needed major surgery to rebuild the state to excise single-handed rule. Al-Nahda believes in a parliamentary regime to avoid the causes that led the independent state to the disaster of single-handed rule, although unfortunately this format is rooted in our heritage.
As for the transition after 14 January, I believe that despite criticism progress is being made towards a bright place and decisive period, the election of the constituent assembly. If we arrive there safely, Tunisians will have successfully passed the test.
What are your predictions about the assembly’s composition?
It will be divided among many forces because of the many differences on the political scene and as a result of the electoral system that encourages that.
How many votes will you receive?
We believe we are undoubtedly the largest party, and everyone agrees. All polls state that. How many votes will we win? That will depend on the reliability of the electoral process.
How many do you deserve, in your opinion?
If elections are honest and according to legal procedures, it is not unlikely that we would win the majority of votes; more than 50 per cent of ballots. How will this be translated into seats, I don’t know. According to the electoral process you might need 80 or 70 or 60 per cent to have 51 per cent of the seats on the constituent assembly.
There is ambiguity about major issues in the political arena. There is almost no discussion so far (end of September) about the outline of the new constitution and how institutions will operate in the second interim phase, which begins after the assembly is elected and the constitution written within one year.
The major political forces signed an agreement called the “roadmap” (the Declaration of the Transitional Path) for 24 October, the day after elections day. According to this document, Interim President Fouad Al-Mobzie will invite the Constituent Assembly to convene, and the assembly will choose its chairman and decide on the new transitional administration for the country. It can also elect a new president or approve the incumbent.
The president would then ask the leader of the majority bloc in the council to form a government that would be presented to the Council and offer its programme there for approval. Within one year, the Constituent Council must conclude its mission [of writing a new constitution] as well as monitoring the government and approving the budget.
What is your vision of the features of the new constitution, institutions and regime, and guarantees for public and individual freedoms?
These are all up to the Constituent Council, and no one in Tunisia is willing to repeat the model of an all-powerful president. The only debate is between those calling for a parliamentary system, like Al-Nahda, and others who want an amended presidential system that guarantees balance between powers.
What will the president’s mandate be during the new interim period?
The state administration decree will decide the outline of this stage. The Constituent Assembly will issue this decree that will feature the mandate of the president and cabinet.
Will you propose any ideas on this topic at this point?
No, but we will not go to the Constituent Assembly on 24 October empty handed or without ideas. We will make proposals and a plan for government policies. I believe the cabinet will be formed on 26 October. Anyone who feels they could win must prepare their vision. Already, dialogue has started about the formation of a coalition government, and we are active in this. We believe the country needs a coalition government led by Al-Nahda Party.
What is the point of convergence or consensus for such a cabinet?
The notion of democracy is unanimous; second, is confronting the unemployment problem. These are two fundamental issues for the country.
Do you believe in a free economy?
We prefer a free economy within a humanitarian social framework. Members of the new government must find common ground in the programmes of the three or four parties that will form the government and draw up a plan.
Concerning regional and international conditions, do you feel that the Tunisian experiment in transitioning to democracy, and participation by Islamists in the regime, could be unsettling? Do you feel any pressure?
I doubt any new cabinet will make any serious changes in foreign policy. The top priority will be to address domestic issues such as unemployment, security and development. No doubt, the government will uphold Tunisia’s international agreements; it might amend some things but this is not a priority in any way. The priority now is creating an investment-friendly environment to attract local and foreign capital, and reassure everyone.
There is a sense that the interests of the Tunisian revolution right now are similar to the interests of foreign powers, including Algeria, where the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the elections in 1991 but the results were voided and the country launched into a long civil war.
Yes, Algeria included. The solution is to stabilise conditions in Tunisia. Stability benefits everyone and there is no alternative or guarantee in the shadow of a police or military state. Stability is the only way to ensure the transition to democracy will be successful. It would be a disaster if the process fails and the state collapses.
Hundreds of thousands of young Tunisians will go to the other bank of the Mediterranean (Europe). This is unacceptable and unbearable. Hence, there is a joint interest for everyone to make the democratic transition in Tunisia a success.
Are there open channels between Al-Nahda and the Algerian authorities?
I visited Algeria in August and met with officials there. I sensed that they keen on making our march to democracy a success.
Will this be reflected in the relationship between the Algerian regime and the banned FIS?
That is up to the Algerians. I told them that the Tunisian revolution is not for export, and even if we were to export it, it wouldn’t be to Algeria because Algerians already have a deep culture of revolution, and they don’t need any more input.
The US is said to have given a green light to Islamists in the region and reached compromises to safeguard its interests.
We don’t need a green light from anyone. In our meetings with the Europeans and Americans we reached a common conviction that making the democratic transition successful is in everyone’s interests. The alternative is disastrous.
When did you realise that the Americans want to have a dialogue with you?
After the revolution the Americans began sending messages and contacts were made. Everyone is betting on democracy.
Did they offer guarantees that they would uphold the outcome of elections?
Everyone said that, and they do not object to anyone who comes to power through the ballot box. There is no doubt, however, that everyone prefers a national coalition government that includes Islamists.
By everyone, you mean the Americans and French as well?
Yes. Europeans, in general.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/24061.aspx
