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The Islamic case for a secular state

Posted on September 20, 2011 | Comments Off on The Islamic case for a secular state

20 Sept 2011  MUSTAFA AKYOL –

When Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promoted the secular state last week during his trip to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, many were surprised. Especially ultra-secularist Turks, who are used to calling Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party, or AKP, “Islamist,” could not believe their eyes.

I was much less surprised, though. Because I knew that what I call “the AKP’s transition from Islamism to post-Islamism” was real. I even tried to explain its reasoning in a series of pieces titled “The Islamic case for a secular state,” which appeared in this very column some four years ago.

Here is a long excerpt from one of those pieces:

“In June 1998, a very significant meeting took place at a hotel near Abant, which is a beautiful lake in the east of Istanbul. The participants included some of the most respected theologians and Islamic intellectuals in Turkey. For three days, the group of nearly 50 scholars discussed the concept of a secular state and its compatibility with Islam. At the end, they all agreed to sign a common declaration that drew some important conclusions

“The first of these was the rejection of theocracy. The participants emphasized the importance of individual reasoning in Islam and declared, ‘No one can claim a divine authority in the interpretation of religion.’ This was a clear rejection of the theocratic political doctrines — such as the one established in the neighboring Iran — which granted a divinely ordained right to a specific group of people for guiding society.

“The second important conclusion of the Abant participants was the harmony of the principles of divine sovereignty and popular sovereignty. (Some contemporary Islamists reject democracy by assuming a contradiction between the two.) ‘Of course God is sovereign over the whole universe,’ the participants said. ‘But this is a metaphysical concept that does not contradict with the idea of popular sovereignty, which allows societies to rule their own affairs.’

“The third argument in the declaration was the acceptance of a secular state that would ‘stand at the same distance from all beliefs and philosophies.’ The state, the participants noted, ‘is an institution that does not have any metaphysical or political sacredness,’ and Islam has no problem with such political entities as far as they value rights and freedoms.

“In sum, the ‘Abant Platform,’ as it became known, declared the compatibility of Islam with a secular state based on liberal democracy. This was a milestone not only because the participants included top Islamic thinkers, but also because the organizers were members of Turkey’s strongest Islamic community, the Fethullah Gülen movement.”

In the following years, some of the participants of this Abant Platform became ministers in AKP Cabinets, and the ideas they articulated guided the AKP on matters of religion and politics. (In that sense, both the Gülen Movement, and the Said Nursi tradition that it sprang from, deserve credit for helping create the AKP.)

So, you might ask, what was the big war over secularism that haunted Turkey in the past decade?

Well, it was a war between those wanted a secular state and those who wanted to preserve the secularist one, which was not based on neutrality but on hostility toward religion. In the same series of pieces on Islam and the secular state, I noted:

“Today the big question in Turkey is whether our republic will be a secular or a secularist one. Our homegrown secularists have never gone as far and radical as Mao, but some of them share a similar hostility toward religion. And they have every right to do so as far as they accept to be unprivileged players in civil society. But they don’t have the right to dominate the state and use the money of the religious taxpayers in order to offend and suppress their beliefs.”

Today, Turkey is more secular but less secularist. And that is why it is making more sense to Arabs and other Muslims.

* For all writings of Mustafa Akyol, including his recent book, “Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty,” visit his blog at www.thewhitepath.com. On Twitter, follow him at @AkyolinEnglish.

© 2011 Hurriyet Daily News
URL: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-islamic-case-for-a-secular-state-2011-09-20

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Turkey Predicts Alliance With Egypt as Regional Anchors

Posted on September 20, 2011 | Comments Off on Turkey Predicts Alliance With Egypt as Regional Anchors

19 Sept 2011 By ANTHONY SHADID , NYT -ANKARA, Turkey — A newly assertive Turkey offered on Sunday a vision of a starkly realigned Middle East, where the country’s former allies in Syria and Israel fall into deeper isolation, and a burgeoning alliance with Egypt underpins a new order in a region roiled by revolt and revolution.

The portrait was described by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey in an hourlong interview before he was to leave for the United Nations, where a contentious debate was expected this week over a Palestinian bid for recognition as a state. Viewed by many as the architect of a foreign policy that has made Turkey one of the most relevant players in the Muslim world, Mr. Davutoglu pointed to that issue and others to describe a region in the midst of a transformation. Turkey, he said, was “right at the center of everything.”

He declared that Israel was solely responsible for the near collapse in relations with Turkey, once an ally, and he accused Syria’s president of lying to him after Turkish officials offered the government there a “last chance” to salvage power by halting its brutal crackdown on dissent.

Strikingly, he predicted a partnership between Turkey and Egypt, two of the region’s militarily strongest and most populous and influential countries, which he said could create a new axis of power at a time when American influence in the Middle East seems to be diminishing.

“This is what we want,” Mr. Davutoglu said.

“This will not be an axis against any other country — not Israel, not Iran, not any other country, but this will be an axis of democracy, real democracy,” he added. “That will be an axis of democracy of the two biggest nations in our region, from the north to the south, from the Black Sea down to the Nile Valley in Sudan.”

His comments came after a tour last week by Turkish leaders — Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Mr. Davutoglu among them — of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the three Arab countries that have undergone revolutions this year. His criticism of old allies and embrace of new ones underscored the confidence of Turkey these days, as it tries to position itself on the winning side in a region unrecognizable from a year ago.

Unlike an anxious Israel, a skeptical Iran and a United States whose regional policy has been criticized as seeming muddled and even contradictory at times, Turkey has recovered from early missteps to offer itself as a model for democratic transition and economic growth at a time when the Middle East and northern Africa have been seized by radical change. The remarkably warm reception of Turkey in the Arab world — a region Turks once viewed with disdain — is a development almost as seismic as the Arab revolts and revolutions themselves.

Mr. Davutoglu credited a “psychological affinity” between Turkey and much of the Arab world, which was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for four centuries from Istanbul.

The foreign minister, 52, remains more scholar than politician, though he has a diplomat’s knack for bridging divides. Cerebral and soft-spoken, he offered a speech this summer to Libyan rebels in Benghazi — in Arabic. Soon after the revolution in Tunisia, he hailed the people there as the “sons of Ibn Khaldoun,” one of the Arab world’s greatest philosophers, born in Tunis in the 14th century. “We’re not here to teach you,” he said. “You know what to do. Ibn Khaldoun’s grandsons deserve the best political system.”

That sense of cultural affinity has facilitated Turkey’s entry into the region, as has the successful model of Mr. Davutoglu’s Justice and Development Party, whose deeply pious leaders have won three consecutive elections, presided over a booming economy and inaugurated reform that has made Turkey a more liberal, modern and confident place. Mr. Erdogan’s defense of Palestinian rights and criticism of Israel — relations between Turkey and Israel collapsed after Israeli troops killed nine people on board a Turkish flotilla trying to break the blockade of Gaza in 2010 — has bolstered his popularity.

Last week, Mr. Erdogan was afforded a rapturous welcome in Egypt, where thoroughfares were adorned with his billboard-size portraits. (“Lend us Erdogan for a month!” wrote a columnist in Al Wafd, an Egyptian newspaper.)

Mr. Davutolglu, who accompanied him there, said Egypt would become the focus of Turkish efforts, as an older American-backed order, buttressed by Israel, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, prerevolutionary Egypt, begins to crumble. On the vote over a Palestinian state, the United States, in particular, finds itself almost completely isolated.

He also predicted that Turkey’s $1.5 billion investment in Egypt would grow to $5 billion within two years and that total trade would increase to $5 billion, from $3.5 billion now, by the end of 2012, then $10 billion by 2015. As if to underscore the importance Turkey saw in economic cooperation, 280 businessmen accompanied the Turkish delegation, and Mr. Davutoglu said they signed about $1 billion in contracts in a single day.

“For democracy, we need a strong economy,” he said.

Other countries — Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel — would undoubtedly look upon an Egyptian-Turkish axis with alarm. Just a year ago, Egypt’s own president, Hosni Mubarak, viewed Turkey, and Mr. Erdogan in particular, with skepticism and suspicion. But in the view of Mr. Davutoglu, such an alliance was a force for stability.

“For the regional balance of power, we want to have a strong, very strong Egypt,” said Mr. Davutoglu, who has visited the Egyptian capital five times since Mr. Mubarak was overthrown in February. “Some people may think Egypt and Turkey are competing. No. This is our strategic decision. We want a strong Egypt now.”

The phrase “zero problems” is a famous dictum written by Mr. Davutoglu, who served as Mr. Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser before becoming foreign minister. By it, he meant that Turkey would strive to end conflicts with its neighbors. Successes have been few. Problems remain with Armenia, and Turkey was unable to resolve the conflict in Cyprus, still divided into Greek and Turkish zones. Turkey’s agreement to host a radar installation as part of a NATO missile defense system has rankled neighboring Iran.

Most spectacularly, its relations with Israel collapsed after the Israeli government refused a series of Turkish demands that followed the attack on the boat: an apology, compensation for the victims and a lifting of Israel’s blockade on the Gaza Strip.

“Nobody can blame Turkey or any other country in the region for its isolation,” he said of Israel. “It was Israel and the government’s decision to isolate themselves. And they will be isolated even more if they continue this policy of rejecting any proposal.”

Caught by surprise by the Arab revolts — as pretty much everyone was — Turkey staggered. At least $15 billion in investments were lost in the civil war in Libya, and Turkish diplomats initially opposed NATO’s intervention. For years, Turkey cultivated ties with Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, seeing Syria as its fulcrum for integrating the region’s economies. Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Assad counted themselves as friends.

Syria’s failure to — as Mr. Davutoglu put it — heed Turkey’s advice has wrecked relations, and Turkey is now hosting Syrian opposition conferences and groups.

Last month, in meetings that lasted more than six hours, Mr. Davutoglu said Mr. Assad agreed on a Turkish road map — announcing a specific date for parliamentary elections by year’s end, repealing a constitutional provision that enshrined power in the ruling Baath Party, drafting a constitution by the newly elected Parliament and then holding another election once the constitution decided between a presidential or a parliamentary system. Despite face-to-face assurances, Mr. Assad did not follow through.

“For us, that was the last chance,” Mr. Davutoglu said.

Asked if he felt betrayed, he replied, “Yes, of course.”

Mr. Davutoglu accused Mr. Assad of “not fulfilling promises and not telling the truth.”

“This is the illusion of autocratic regimes,” he said. “They think that in a few days they will control the situation. Not today, but tomorrow, next week, next month. They don’t see. And this is a vicious circle.”

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20 Sept, 2011 Syria’s Muslim brotherhood: No dialog with regime

Posted on September 20, 2011 | Leave a comment

London, Asharq Al-Awsat- Ali Sadraldin al-Bayanuni, former head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, has stressed that, “The moderate Islamic trend is present in all Syrian governorates.” Al-Bayanuni points out that the Muslim Brotherhood has direct communications with all the coordination councils at home as well as the Syrian opposition abroad. Al-Bayanuni, who is also known as Abu-Anas, explained to Asharq Al-Awsat that: “We do not have bases at home because of the unjust Law No. 49 of 1980 that sentences those affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood to death.”

Al-Bayanuni, who is in Turkey participating in the Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council meetings, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “It is too late for any political or reformist solution in Syria; therefore, there is no solution now other than the departure of the regime. This has a price that the people will pay in order to achieve their aims of freedom, justice, and democracy.”

Al-Bayanuni reiterates that the demonstrators in the beginning raised slogans demanding reform and freedom, “but the way the regime dealt with the demonstrators pushed them into raising the ceiling of their demands, and they will not stop until the regime goes.”

Regarding the confessions of Lt-Col Hussein Harmush, which was aired on Syrian Television under mysterious circumstances after his dissent from the army in June 2011, the former head of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We do not have detailed information. However, we support the statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry that denies handing over the dissident Syrian Lieutenant Colonel to the authorities in Damascus.

Al-Bayanuni points out: “The oppression by Bashar al-Assad’s regime has caused the death of more than 3,000 Syrian citizens, and the arrest of no less than 15,000 others, who according to human rights organizations are in the Syrian prisons and detention camps exposed to all kinds of torture and humiliation.”

Al-Bayanuni says: “The Muslim Brotherhood is in solidarity with the revolution at home and abroad, and we will not accept anything less than the toppling of the regime.” Al-Bayanuni stresses that the Muslim Brotherhood Group “does not and will not accept the idea of sharing power with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.”Al-Bayanuni says: “There is no truth whatsoever in the circulating claims about the possibility of a settlement between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Assad’s regime with Turkish sponsorship and US blessing. This is unfounded. Neither the Turks are pursuing this, nor have we any information about it. All these are leaks by some pillars of the regime.”

Al-Bayanuni adds: “We do not participate with criminals. This is a criminal regime, and it ought to go. Whatever the temptations through promises, posts, or reforms might be, we will not participate with the killer of the people, and there is not even the intention to engage in a dialog with him. The dialog with him is rejected and prohibited, and we have taken our decision about this.”

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=26648

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Sept 19, 2011 Syria: Convergence of US, Turkey Regional Interests

Posted on September 20, 2011 | Leave a comment

Ensuring security, controlling energy resources and protecting Israel are major strategic goals of the United States in the Middle East. If achieved, they will pave the way for US’ supremacy over its traditional and emerging rivals.

During the Cold War and following US failures in Southeast Asia, Korea and Vietnam, Washington tried to achieve those goals by forming regional alliances and giving active role to a powerful regional ally. Conclusion of such treaties as Baghdad (CENTO) and bolstering Iran’s role as regional gendarme could be explained along the same lines.

Following the Islamic Revolution and invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union, US strategic interests were faced with a major challenge. Increased resistance from Iran and the threat of dominating the Persian Gulf oil resources by the Soviet Union made the United States change its tactics. Instigating Iraq to attack Iran and providing unbridled support for the Baathist regime during the Imposed War in addition to backing Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet army with the help of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were examples of new tactics.

After termination of the Cold War, expulsion of Russian troops from Afghanistan and subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States became an unrivaled power which supposed it could defend its worldwide interests single-handedly. Therefore, new US Middle East policy unraveled fast. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait provided Washington with a golden opportunity to play the role it dreamed of. Finally, the United States’ interventionist policy reached its acme following 9/11 with military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Since that time, however, the realities on the ground have proved that the US power is stalled by with many restraints in the region and unilateralism cannot continue for long. The Middle East is actually the starting point and finishing line of US unilateral policy. American statesmen experienced the bitter taste of defeat right in the same region which had helped them savor victory.

For the American statesmen, reduced ability of Washington to influence Middle Eastern developments has offered a complicated challenge on the way of designing an efficient Middle East strategy. The United States had enough power to protect its regional interests without caring for balance of power between Iran and Iraq from 1991 to 2006.

Before that, Washington sought to establish a desirable balance of power between Iran and Iraq by first supporting the former Iranian Shah and then backing Iraq in its war against Iran during 1980s. From early 1990, however, forceful expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait and disintegration of the Soviet Union completed the US dominance over the region. The Clinton Administration was able to pursue its interests without caring much about balance of power between Iran and Iraq. The dual containment policy could be tolerated and Clinton was greatly successful in both isolating Iran and Iraq, and forging a peace deal between Arabs and Israelis.

After Clinton’s term ended, the Republican Bush changed course in favor of unilateralism. However, final failure of Bush in changing the region through regime change or democratization brought US under tremendous pressures from three sides.

Firstly, collapse of the Iraqi government in the war with the United States clearly changed the balance of power in favor of Iran at a time that Washington claimed invincibility of its policies and universality of its values.

Secondly, US emphasis on democracy would lead to election of anti-US governments and faced Washington’s policy with a theoretical paradox. Popularity of Islamist parties such as Muqtada Sadr in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine practically invigorated the policy of resistance in those countries without giving any support to political groups advocating Western liberalism.

The aforesaid parties and groups, which were more organized than rivals, made the most of election mechanism to keep their main cadres intact and promote anti-American messages which also targeted US’ lackey regimes in the region. So, they succeeded to erode the influence of West-dependent political groups in Iraq and Lebanon as well as the Palestinian Authority while promoting their own agendas.

The third issue is inattention to Arab-Israeli peace accord by the United States which played an essential role in election of Hamas. Withdrawal of Israel from parts of the occupied territories further strengthened the claim of Hamas and Hezbollah that resistance was the best way to get concessions from Israel. This subsequently undermined Palestine Liberation Organization because it pursued negotiations with Israel on a two-state solution.

The United States’ endless problems in Afghanistan and Iraq; increased resistance pivoted around Iran, especially in Lebanon and Palestine; economic brunt of war; expansion of domestic dissatisfaction; and Arab world uprisings with possible loss of traditional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have put the United States at a difficult situation. Undoubtedly, soft and hard power sources of Washington will not be able to help it weather the existing dire straits by keeping up unilateral policy of the past. Even if domination over regional oil and gas resources is still possible, protection of Israel would need a powerful regional ally which in addition to having power must be popular too. Such an ally must revive interaction-minded currents in the face of resistance and play the role of an intermediary in localizing US goals in the region.

In return, the United States will promise to support ambitions of such an ally even when it aims to become a regional power. Such support would hinge on convergence of strategic interests.

Now, in view of regional developments and the loss of traditional allies, Turkey under the rule of Justice and Development Party is in the best situation to accept such a role at regional and international levels. Therefore, Ankara is the United States’ candidate number one for the revival of old policy of balance of powers with reliance on a regional power.

New conditions following September 11, 2011, gradually provided grounds for Turkey to assume the role assigned to it by the United States.

Those conditions include:

A) Successful management of the country in a democratic way and avoiding of extremism;

B) Solving problems with neighboring countries and winning regional countries’ trust by assuming mediatory roles in such issues as Iran’s nuclear case and also by taking part in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and elsewhere;

C) Maintaining strategic relations with the United States through NATO;

D) And the most important test: taking position in support of Palestinians while maintaining strategic relations with Israel despite early tensions.

Of course, Turkey’s role in Palestine will be second-handed and mostly of a propaganda nature. Turkey will take no initiative in Palestine.

The United States was originally against election of an Islamist political current in the 1990s’ Turkey. However, following 9/11 and US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, political approach of Justice and Development Party seemed more desirable than those of Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza, Saudi Salafis, al-Qaeda or the Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile, the United States needs a trustworthy ally to set direction of future trends in the region and create balance of powers against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thus, after failure of the US unilateral policies in region, the United States is shaping new balance of powers around Turkey as the main axis.

Grounds provided by Justice and Development Party in the country as well as at regional and international levels will pave the way for Turkey to play a more active role in regional developments and pursue its ambitious foreign policy goals.

On the whole, facilitating factors for Turkey’s new regional policy are as follows:

A) Relative isolation of Iran and Ankara’s good relations with Tehran though at a safe distance;

B) Saudi Arabia’s involvement in regional developments, especially in Bahrain and Yemen;

C) The Arab Spring and new opportunities for Turkey to interfere in regional developments;

D) Concurrence of Turkey’s efforts with new US approach to strengthen a regional ally in order to sway influence on current and future developments and create a counterbalance to Iran’s regional power; and

E) Success of the Islamist government to put domestic affairs in order and reduce Turkish army’s intervention in politics.

http://www.newsnow.co.uk/A/520541378?-16531

 

 

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