Posted onMarch 9, 2012|Comments Off on Kofi Anan visit in Syria’s main objective: A secular Syria
By Bronco
8th March 2012
The fall of Bab Amr, the failure of the Friends of Syria have been signs to the US that it is time to play low key and change the original objectives. The US has been increasingly worried not only about al Qaeda but about Egypt who seems to be antagonizing the USA and whose Moslem Brotherhood seem to present a looming threat to Israel.
I think the US’s priority is now a secular Syria. They don’t want to take the chance that another direct neighbor of Israel become under the influence of MB or salafists. The US is realizing that Syria’s new Constitution actually denies religious parties. It is therefore a much better guarantee than a “regime change” where religious leaders and movements may take the control (The fall of Iran shah is still in the mind of the US )
Even if Bashar al Assad leaves, the US does not want to see the MB or a religious Sunni majority ruling that they suspect will rapidly fall
under the control of radical Islamists.
The SNC has failed to offer enough guarantees that it will not be taken over by the Moslem Brotherhood. Therefore it has been reduced to just a small parameter of the equation.
I don’t think Anan’s visit has anything to do with Iran. Syria has
become a very weak link and is more of a liability to Iran than a asset.
The mission of Kofi Anan is to make sure that the reforms and especially the new constitution is applied after weapons are silenced, and that the fate of Bashar Al Assad be decided through early elections.
I think the message is clear : The regime must remain secular at all
cost even if it means keeping the old guard with the new constitution
that prevents a religious party taking over, thus guaranteeing the
protection of Israel and balancing the radicalization of the other Arab countries.
Posted onMarch 8, 2012|Comments Off on Syria: Straining credulity?
By Alastair Crooke-
The UN Secretary General was reported on March 3 saying that he had received “grisly reports” that Syrian government forces were arbitrarily executing, imprisoning and torturing people in Homs after retaking control of the Baba Amr district from insurgents. Did he really believe this; or was he just “saying it”?
“One of the defining bifurcations of the future will be the conflict between information masters and information victims” the US officer assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Intelligence), charged with defining the future of warfare, wrote in the US Army War College Quarterly in 1997.
“But fear not”, he writes later in the article, for “we are already masters of information warfare … Hollywood is ‘preparing the battlefield’ … Information destroys traditional jobs and traditional cultures; it seduces, betrays, yet remains invulnerable. How can
you [possibly] counterattack the information [warfare] others have turned upon you? [1]
“Our sophistication in handling it will enable us to outlast and outperform all hierarchical cultures … Societies that fear or otherwise cannot manage the flow of information simply will not be competitive. They might master the technological wherewithal to watch the videos, but we will be writing the scripts, producing them, and collecting the royalties. Our creativity is devastating.”
This information warfare will not be couched in the rationale of geopolitics, the author suggests, but will be “spawned” – like any Hollywood drama – out of raw emotions. “Hatred, jealousy, and greed – emotions, rather than strategy – will set the terms of [information warfare] struggles”.
Not only the US army, but it seems mainstream Western media insist that the struggle in Syria must be scripted in emotional image and moralistic statements that always – as the War College article rightly asserts – trump rational analysis.
The UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry condemns the Syrian government of crimes against humanity, but only on the basis of what the opposition says, and without having investigated evidence of opposition “crimes”: and then proceeds to “charge” the Syrian government with this process based simply on “reasonable suspicion”: Do they really believe what they have written, or is it just a part of “writing the script”? [2]
Having quite forgotten what US Marines did to Falluja in 2004 (6,000 dead and 60% of the city destroyed) when armed insurgents there also sought to establish a Salafist “Emirate” – the Western media focus on Homs gives vent to the indignant cry that “something must be done” to save the people of Homs from “massacre”. The question of what effect exactly that something – whether external military intervention or providing heavier weapons for the insurgents – might be, and what its wider consequences might entail, meanwhile recedes entirely from view. Those with the temerity to get in the way of “this narrative” by arguing that external intervention would be disastrous, are roundly condemned as complicit in President Assad’s crimes against humanity.
This school of journalism – the Guardian and Channel Four are good examples of this “I-was-there” reporting – that emphasizes the reporter as participant, and indeed victim, a co-sufferer amid the charged, heart-tugging emotional sufferings of war, uses emotive images precisely to underline that “something must be done”. By focussing on mutilated bodies and weeping bereaved women they assert and determine that the conflict must be viewed as being of utmost moral simplicity – one of victims and aggressors.
“In Baba Amr. Sickening. Cannot understand how the world can stand by. Watched a baby die today. Shrapnel: doctors could do nothing. His little tummy just heaved and heaved until he stopped. Feeling helpless”. [3]
Those who try to argue that Western intervention can only exacerbate the crisis, are confronted by this unanswerable riposte of dead babies – literally. As the War College article so rightly states: how can you counter attack this manner of “information warfare” unleashed against the Syrian government who are on the receiving end of those “writing the scripts, producing them, and collecting the royalties”?
I too, saw such terrible sights in Afghanistan in the 1980s: It does of course create an emotional abyss into which the helpless spectator slips; but do these reporters really believe that innocents and children are not always the victims of conflict? Do they believe their personal distress to be somehow so primary that it must set aside all complexities, and all potential possibilities? Is more conflict the answer to the awful death of an infant?
This reductionist, emotional ardor is but a form of concealed political advocacy – little different to that of an information “warrior” such as AVAAZ, who help write and produce those info-war videos. [4] And while nobody openly endorses such “journalism of participation”, this approach seems to have triumphed in certain journalistic quarters. And indeed it is creeping further: increasingly we see even certain Western diplomats acting as though they are “activists” and participants in the internal struggles of the states to which they are posted. What sort of reporting must their governments be getting?
Are we now to understand that the armed opposition, who originally brought Western journalists to Homs – and then insisted to exfiltrate them perilously, and at the cost of many lives, via Lebanon, rather than through the good offices of the Red Crescent to the nearest airport, were not motivated by a desire to advocate, and impel the argument for externally-imposed humanitarian corridors to be opened to Homs? In other words, were not witness to the construction of une piece de theatre in favor of a type of external intervention? Will a Kosovo-type solution will make things better in Syria?
What has become so striking is that, whilst this “information warfare” may have been almost irreversibly effective in demonizing President Assad in the West, it has also had the effect of “unanchoring” European and American foreign policy. It has become cast adrift from any real geo-strategic mooring. This has led to a situation in which European policy has become wholly suggestible to such “advocacy reporting”, and the need to respond to it, moment-by- moment, in emotive, moralistic blasts of sound-bites accusing President Assad of having “blood on its hands”.
In one sense the West inevitably has fallen hostage to its own information warfare: it has locked itself into a single understanding, stuck to a “singleness” of meaning: a simplistic victims-and-aggressor meme, which demands only the toppling of the aggressor. Europe, in this manner, effectively is cutting itself off from other options – precisely because the humanitarian theme, which policy-makers may have thought would suffice to see Assad easily deposed, now impedes any shift towards other options – such as a peaceful negotiated outcome.
But does anyone really believe American and European objectives in Syria were ever purely humanitarian? Is it not the case – given that the turnout of events in the Middle East are taking such an ominous and dangerous turn – that it has now becoming somewhat awkward openly to admit that their info-war was never primarily about reforming Syria, but about “regime change”, and that it was that even from before the first protest erupted in Dera’a?
In his recent interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic, [5] given in advance of President Obama’s American Israel Public Affairs Committee speech, the president, inter alia, was questioned about Syria. His response was very clear:
GOLDBERG: Can you just talk about Syria as a strategic issue? Talk about it as a humanitarian issue, as well; but it would seem to me that one way to weaken and further isolate Iran is to remove or help remove Iran’s only Arab ally.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Absolutely.
Do these Western interventionist proselytizers really believe that the onslaught on Syria is only about democracy and reform? Obama said it plainly. It was always about Iran. And, as Europe and America increasingly become bystanders to a Qatari and Saudi frenzy to overthrow a fellow Arab leader by any means it takes, do these “apostles” truly think that these absolute Arab monarchies simply share the Guardian’s or Channel Four’s nice humanitarian aspirations for Syria’s future? Do these reporters really believe that the armed insurgents that Gulf states are financing and arming are nothing more than well-intentioned reformists, who have simply been driven to violence through Assad’s incalcitrance? Some perhaps do, but others perhaps are simply “saying these things” to prepare the battlefield?
Alastair Crooke is founder and director of Conflicts Forum and is a former adviser to the former EU Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana, from 1997-2003.
Posted onFebruary 27, 2012|Comments Off on Do Moslems know what the Gospels represent for the Christians?
I have noticed that very often Moslems confuse the Bible (The Old Testament), dated 4,000 years ago, with the Gospels (the New Testament), dated 2,000 years ago, when they refer to the beliefs of the Christians.
The Holy Koran dated 1,400 years ago, actually mentions many episodes and important individuals of the Bible, such as Abraham, Isaac etc… It also mentions episodes and individuals contemporary to Jesus-Christ, such as Saint Mary, or the prophet John the Baptist, yet it never refer to the teachings of Jesus-Christ that are present in the Gospels written by the Apostles. The Koran also eludes the death and resurrection of Jesus-Christ, events fundamental to the Christian religion. This is probably why many Moslems do not know about the existence and the importance of the Four Gospels in the Christian beliefs.
The Four Gospels relating the life, the teachings and the death of Jesus-Christ are the essence of the Christian religion.
Therefore it is fundamental to understand that the core and the dynamic of the Christian religion is not the Bible (The Old Testament) but the Gospels. The Bible stories are the historical foundation of monotheism for Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Sabian religion ( Ahl al Ketab) in the Middle East. The Gospels, the Koran, the Tora and other sacred books have greatly overhauled and complemented the Bible’s teachings.
If monotheists religions share a similar base, the Bible, they differ greatly in many areas. They do not oppose to each other, but among other differences, they have a different philosophy of the notion of sin and a different perception of the relation between a human being and God and human beings among each others.
As for the Bible predictions, they are complex and difficult to decipher therefore there has been several interpretations of their meaning.
There has also been several versions of the Bible, which makes the predictions even more esoteric.
This probably applies to the new version of the Bible just found in Turkey claiming that the arrival of the prophet Mohammad was announced too.
Posted onFebruary 26, 2012|Comments Off on Qatar attempts to rehabilitate Sunni islam
It’s been a while that the Qatari have appointed themselves the “rehabilitators” of the misjudged Sunnis in the region. They have been offering a hand to all the Sunni extremists with the hope that they would moderate them and bring them into the mainstream of the consumption society. This is similar to the approach of Turkey in taming religious extremism. While it has apparently been successful in Turkey, any false move or a faltering economy may bring extremism back in the front.
The attempt of the Qataris is laudable in view of the harm that Saudi Arabia has done to the Sunnis by creating monsters like Al Qaeda and salafi fanatics in all the countries they put their hands on. Afghanistan and Pakistan are example of the Saudi Wahhabi negative influences.
Will the Qatari succeed? They have been helped tremendously by Al Jazeera spread in all Arab homes. Yet, Al Jazeera is increasingly criticized for dishonest reporting. In addition the Qataris have made several mistakes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria by supporting too obviously religious groups against minorities or secular groups. They are looked upon increasingly suspiciously by Arab seculars who suspect that they have another hidden agenda close to Saudi Arabia’s religious proselytism and to the USA’s dedication in protecting Israel. These agenda may appear disguised into calls for democratic practices that neither the Qataris nor the Saudis are practicing or intend to practice in the short term.
It’s an long term experimentation, heavily supported by the USA that want to see the end of Moslem terrorists that not only threatens them at home and in the region but also threatens their increasingly isolated ally in the region, Israel.
As long as the question of Israel is not solved, the efforts of the Qatari will be stained with suspicion. So it’s a complex game where it is not easy to win.
Bronco on Syriacomment.com
The Syrian regime’s military crackdown against armed rebel groups clearly enjoys Russian support. Moscow believes that President Bashar Assad is obliged to carry out this crackdown for a number of reasons, not least to reduce his foreign enemies’ room to maneuver.
The focus is currently on Homs, but that does not mean that there are no plans by the military to extend it to other areas.
The strength of the armed groups in some areas is not the main difficulty facing this campaign. Nor is a lack of local public support, other than in areas such as Zabadani, some villages in the province of Damascus Countryside, and Hama. It is that the Syrian leadership wants the task accomplished with the minimum number of casualties.
That means two types of casualties.
First, the civilians who get caught up in such battles, whatever their politics.
Not that the regime is solely to blame for civilian deaths – which is the impression given by the Arab and Western media outlets engaged in the war to topple the regime. The armed groups have caused the deaths of many civilians as well as military and security personnel. Some have committed atrocities.
The armed groups have become the new regime in some areas where they have succeeding is asserting their control, forcing out all agencies of the state – whether traffic police, security personnel, or public officials. They have violently enforced their dictates, whether for general closures at times of their choosing, or for contributions to the revolution’s coffers.
These demands are presented as religious strictures. One prominent Idlib clergyman tells of being question by locals about their religious obligation to pay money to the armed groups. They asked for his help in ensuring that the regime’s corrupt security agencies are not replaced by these groups that commit clear crimes and seem to include growing numbers of non-Syrians.
The manner in which these groups are dealt with is the regime’s second consideration.
It believes, on the basis of its intelligence assessments, that only about 30 percent of its armed opponents are ideologically-motivated. They appear prepared to fight it to the death, along with their supporters among the population.
The remaining 70 percent are thought to be anti-regime protesters who took up arms, but without training or organization. Some high level officials believe such people acted “impulsively” and can be dissuaded. They favor mediation via their families or other go-betweens, to urge them to surrender themselves and their arms, and benefit from a general amnesty that will be issued as soon as security is restored.
Syrian officials make clear, accordingly, that the military campaign currently underway is not an all-out assault.
They acknowledge that the security forces carried out a harsh crackdown in Damascus Countryside. They argue that it was imperative to prevent any creation of enclaves near the capital.
But they say the army is employing other methods in Idlib and Homs. These are mainly joint security-military operations, based on intelligence gathered about armed groups, to destroy their fortified locations, or launch surprise attacks on their gatherings. The armed forces then withdraw and redeploy.
In other words, military operations in these areas are to be based mainly on “attrition” in confined neighborhoods. They will also be accompanied by attempts to negotiate via intermediaries. Such negotiations have led to the surrender of tens of gunmen in different parts of the country, with the mediation of families or clan elders. These have not been covered by the media.
Media coverage is still not treated as a major part of this battle by Syrian security and military chiefs. Media outlets engaged in the campaign to pressurize Syria are unconcerned about the accuracy of their coverage or the reality of the situation as witnessed by people on the ground. But journalists close to or supportive of the regime complain that it fails to provide them with enough detailed information to help them counter that campaign.
Nevertheless, it is reported that some military units protested against the “new level of constraints” which they have been ordered to observe. These are said to have resulted from consultations with the Russians and Iranians. The thinking is that Assad, while acting to reassert the authority of the state, could not re-consolidate his rule in a country with huge numbers of bereaved families.
The Russians believe they are providing Syria with support it needs to counter attempted external political or other intervention against it. Western diplomats accuse Russia of going further, and providing it with intelligence support to track the movements of armed groups.
Russia has not made any comments on this matter. Its focus now is on how the regime can achieve successes on the ground which would restrict the protests to peaceful demonstrations in areas and districts from where it does not feel threatened. That would better enable it to conduct the political struggle.
Moscow is convinced that the regime must implement its reform program quickly and appoint a new government, even if the opposition does not take part in it. There is a belief there, as in Iran, that applying the reforms would have a tangible effect on the public, and affect attitudes to both the offshore opposition and the question of stability – which is today’s overriding preoccupation for most Syrians.
In the opposing camp, the regime’s foreign enemies appear to be inching closer to a game of Russian roulette. The various means of pressure they have applied to date – propaganda, political, and diplomatic, even meddling on the ground – have failed to achieve the desired outcome. That forces stark choices on them, including to risk a major military or security action, directed either against the army or leading regime figures.
This prospect prompted Russia and Iran to send messages to all parties concerned, notably Turkey, France, and some Arab states. Some of these messages were delivered on the ground, visibly or otherwise.
Moreover, the approach taken to the Syrian crisis by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in his latest speech, implies he is not alone in wanting to stop members of the March 14 coalition from aiding Assad’s opponents, especially his armed opponents.
What is being hatched on borders?
Some time ago, Lebanese security agencies attached to different government ministries gathered intelligence about what was going on at the border. Their work was not fully co-ordinated. The Information Branch did not share its data with Army Intelligence Directorate or the General Security Department.
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from some of this intelligence by the Lebanese army, and by some political figures, was enough to ring an alarm bell.
Patches of territory along the eastern and northern borders were being turned into military zones and training camps. Many of these lie in barren areas (east of the village of Aarsal in the Bekaa valley), or open country. Some are in villages in the district of Akkar, where “Future Movement Islamists” wield powerful influence.
The reports spoke of cooperation between local smugglers and these armed groups. It also documented people coming and going, while they collected various types of weapons and ammunition to sell to them. The money available seemed to increase by the day. Some operatives based in Beirut and other cities would be tasked with purchasing communications and photographic equipment.
Copies of some of these reports evidently reached Damascus. It cross-checked them with its own intelligence, and put together a dossier, which was then sent to Lebanese officials.
This was done either by the Syrian Ambassador in Beirut Ali Abd al-Karim, or the Secretary-General of the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council, Nasri Khoury. They sent copies to the president, prime minister, speaker of parliament, relevant ministers, and military and security chiefs.
The dossiers were accompanied by a formal request from Syria to Lebanon: that it take measures, in accordance with the binding agreements to which it is party, to prevent its territory from being used as a conduit for violent or illegal activity against Syrian territory.
Army commander Jean Kahwaji did not secure clear, official, and full political backing for an extensive military and security operation to secure the border areas in question. He employed other means to disrupt the armed groups, but that fell short of meeting the Syrian demands.
The failure to provide political backing, it is said, was because some in authority feared clashes could result between the army and Lebanese groups allied with the Syrian gunmen. Ominously, some officials quietly suggested to military commanders that the problem could be left for the Syrian army to deal with itself.
It later became apparent that this is precisely what was hoped for by the Arab/Western “operator“ of the political-military assault on Syria. The Syrian army could be lured into a military operation on the Lebanese border, which might force it at some point to advance into Lebanese territory, even if only by a few meters or kilometres. That would be used to justify a diplomatic outcry, aimed at getting UN resolutions issued to extend the mandate of UN forces in the south to cover the northern and eastern borders too.
That would present us with a quite different dossier.
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Ibrahim al-Amin
Comments Off on Damascus Focuses on Containing Foreign Intervention
Posted onFebruary 19, 2012|Comments Off on Bitter Tears for the loss of the Syrian Christian Community
Bitter tears for the loss of the Christians and the minorities
In the middle east where there is variety of religions and ethnicities, I have observed that the ruling majority is always suspicious of the minorities’ foreign allegeance and tend to radicalize and often ostracise them. We see that in Iran, in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, in Soudan etc..
This is why generally, minorities feel more reassured when the country ruler is also from a minority.
In Lebanon the Christians have managed to obtain some sort of guarantee to keep significant political rights through an unwritten agreement of power sharing. This seem unthinkable for most Moslem Syrians. The fact that the Arab Sunnis will ultimately take the power from a minority will be seen ass a sign to non-Moslem or non-Arab ethnic minorities that they will become second class citizens with little power, no protection and no guarantees. They will be systematically discriminated.
In these conditions, either they’ll fight back to get their recognition included in the Constitution or through a political agreement like Lebanon or they’ll create an autonomous areas like Iraq Kurdistan or they will leave the country.
Sunnis alone then will be responsible to move Syria into ‘democracy’. As there are no example of Sunni Arab Moslem working democracy, it will be trial and errors and under the advices and financial influence of rich non-democratic countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the GCC and some western-educated expats
Soon the economy will be in shamble, therefore many young educated Christians who could claim to be discriminated, will be welcomed in the Western countries and there will be a real brain drain.
Because the Islamic extremists are also Sunnis, it will be very difficult for a Sunni government to control them and Syria will fall prey to countries that would want to use it for their own interests. Israel will have no incentive to give the Golan back ever.
The loss of the Christian community and the loss of confidence of of the Kurds, the Alawites, the Assyrians in their role in a society from now on dominated by the Sunnis will transform Syria into a monochrome country at the mercy of the rich Sunni Gulf countries and the western countries and therefore, like Tunisia. will become weak and dependent.
A gloomy future that many Syrians are fighting for.
Bronco on Syriacomment.com
Comments Off on Bitter Tears for the loss of the Syrian Christian Community
Posted onFebruary 7, 2012|Comments Off on What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East?
by Patrick Seale
Released: 23 Nov 2009
British journalist Brian Whitaker has written a provocative and disturbing book about the Middle East. His title is the one I have put at the head of this article. His book is not kind to the Arabs, since it exposes the profound contradictions and weaknesses in their society. But it should, nevertheless, be translated into Arabic as a matter of urgency and be required reading by Arab elites from the Atlantic to the Gulf.
His aim, he says, is to stimulate debate. If the Arab world is to catch up with the rest of the developed world, it would do well to ponder Whitaker’s conclusions and heed his recommendations.
Whitaker has travelled widely in Arab countries and was Middle East editor of the Guardian newspaper for seven years. He evidently knows the region intimately. His strength, in researching this book, is that he has not restricted himself, as most journalists do, to seeking the views of political leaders and government officials, but has instead moved outside the strictly political sphere to interview a great many thinkers, academics, students, opinion-formers, bloggers, and ordinary people in many countries across the region. He has looked beyond Arab regimes to society as a whole. That is the originality of his book.
So, in a word, what does he say is wrong with the Middle East? In chapter after chapter, he dissects the “stultifying atmosphere where change, innovation, creativity, critical thinking, questioning, problem-solving… are all discouraged.” And that is not the end of it. To this list he adds “systematic denial of rights that impinge on the lives of millions: discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality or family background; inequality of opportunity, impenetrable bureaucracies, arbitrary application of the law; and the lack of transparency in government.”
Whitaker’s first powerful chapter deals with the failure of education in the Arab world — which he says is central to the region’s problems. If change is to be meaningful, he declares, it must begin in people’s heads. He quotes the 2004 Arab Human Development Report in saying that teaching methods in the Arab world — especially rote learning — “do not permit free dialogue and active, exploratory learning and consequently do not open the doors to freedom of thought and criticism.” On the contrary, “the curricula taught in Arab countries seem to encourage submission, obedience, subordination and compliance.”
The result is a “knowledge deficit,” hampering the development of a well-educated, technically skilled workforce.
Whitaker’s recommendation is that “Arab countries need to reform their educational systems and prepare themselves for the future.” But, he adds pessimistically, “the high value placed on conformity in Arab societies is suffocating change.” His controversial conclusion is that “the Arab countries cannot develop knowledge-based societies without radical social and political change.”
Another of Whitaker’s targets is asabiyya — solidarity between members of a family, clan or tribe. Such solidarity can provide security and protection for individuals but the reverse of the coin is that (in the words of the Arab Human Development Report) it “implants submission, parasitic dependence and compliance…”
Whitaker argues that the obsession with kinship in the Arab world undermines the principles of meritocracy and equality of opportunity. Nepotism hampers economic development and places Arab countries at a disadvantage in relation to those parts of the world where such practices are less prevalent.
His conclusion is that “Arabs cannot emerge into a new era of freedom, citizenship and good governance while their society continues to be dominated by the obligations of kinship, whether at a family or tribal level…” This, he affirms, is the central challenge the Arabs face today.
Another of Whitaker’s provocative chapters deals with the relationship between citizens and their governments. The typical Arab regime, he declares, is both authoritarian and autocratic — authoritarian because it demands obedience and autocratic because power is highly centralised and concentrated around the head of state.
He acknowledges that there has been much talk of reform and modernisation in Arab countries to keep pace with the rapid world changes, but he remarks gloomily that “actual reform, as opposed to mere talk of it, has been far more limited… Much of what passes for reform is just window-dressing for the sake of international respectability.”
One of Whitaker’s most controversial chapters is entitled “The politics of God,” and deals with the tide of religious fervour that has swept across the Middle East during the last thirty or forty years. Religion, he argues, is one response to what has become known as the “Arab malaise.” For millions of believers, religion provides a comfort zone of certainty and hope in a world of doubt and despair.
He quotes his sources as suggesting that the lurch towards religion began with the Arabs overwhelming defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967. But further impetus to the trend was given by the success of the mujahideen in driving out Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and by the success of Hizbullah in driving Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 after 22 years of occupation. The idea took root that military success was achievable when inspired by religion.
Religion, Whitaker notes, provides a sense of identity, of belonging and of solidarity in the face of threats from outside. But he warns that treating religion as a badge of identity can lead to a heightened emphasis on its outward, physical aspects at the expense of spirituality and ethics.
Moreover, as the religious tide swept across the Middle East, more extreme versions of Islam gained in prominence, more rigid in their interpretations of scripture and less tolerant of alternative views. This has sometimes bred growing intolerance, and even acts of violence like the occasion when, in 1994, the 82-year old Egyptian man of letters, Naguib Mahfouz, was stabbed in the neck outside his house. He survived, but his right arm was partly paralysed.
Equal rights, Whitaker argues, cannot exist without freedom of religion. In the Arab countries, this is probably the biggest single obstacle to positive change. In his view, freedom of religion requires a state which is religiously neutral. Separation of religion and state is therefore essential, he believes, to any serious agenda for reform.
Whitaker’s book contains a lively discussion of corruption and illegal commissions in Arab society, as well as the phenomenon of wasta, that is to say the use of connections, influence or favouritism. There is also a long and well-informed section on the Arabic media, which is too rich to be summarised in a line or two.
Whitaker wants the Arabs to break free from a culture of dependence and helplessness and for westerners, in turn, to break free from their history of colonial rule and military intervention, so that both sides can set their relationship on a productive footing of inter-dependence.
This book will anger some and excite others. It is one of the most ambitious attempts in recent years by a western writer to analyse what is really wrong with the Middle East.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.
Posted onJanuary 28, 2012|Comments Off on Syrian Kurd Leader: Revolution Won’t Succeed Without Minorities
By Michael Weiss-
Jan 20 2012, 7:15 AM ET-
What Syria’s largest minority means for the uprising, for the opposition leaders, and the country’s future
It’s hard to know just how many Kurds are in Syria. The last census was taken 50 years ago, though demographers today tend to predict that Kurds number between 3.5 million and 4.6 million, or about 15 to 20 percent of Syria’s total population. Anyone with a nodding acquaintance with the struggles and strategies of this nationless people will know that they have been a decisive force in the federalist system of postwar Iraq and an ever-present human rights challenge for Turkey’s hopes for European Union accession. If the revolution in Syria is to have any chance at success, the Syrian Kurds will mostly likely play a major role.
Dr. Abdulhakim Bashar is the Secretary-General of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria — the sister party to Massoud Barzani’s Iraqi counterpart — as well as the Chairman of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a newly formed umbrella organisation representing ten Syrian-Kurdish parties. Bashar was arrested in 2008 before a Kurdish protest slated to take place outside the Syrian parliament in Damascus. He lives in Syria but gave me an hour or so of his time on a weeklong visit to London, where I met him in my office. We talked about minority rights in Syria, Turkey’s role in the Syrian opposition, and the prospect of Western intervention to hasten the end of the Assad regime.
What’s your relationship like with the Syrian National Council [the aspiring government-in-exile]?
I’ve been in contact with [SNC Chairman Burhan] Ghalioun several times, there has been engagement. However, their proposal is still very vague, and doesn’t meet our full demands for participation. For example, the SNC says it endorses lifting the “pressure” on the Kurdish people. What does that mean? We said in the KNC that we advocate lifting all the discriminatory policies that have been applied to the Kurdish people such as the Arabization policies in Syria, the Arabized name changes of existing towns and villages and demographic changes. These were all deliberate policies applied by the Ba’ath Party.
The SNC also offers a “democratic” solution without any clear meaning. What does “democratic” mean? It might imply private schooling to learn the Kurdish language or opening satellite stations for the Kurds.
Such as Turkey has implemented.
Yes. However, we demand our cultural freedoms categorically.
“The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by sectarian interests”
Do you want to see Syria adopt the Iraq model, a federalist system based on power sharing, with broad autonomy granted to the predominantly Kurdish region? Kurds are more widely distributed throughout Syria than they are in Iraq, so that might be difficult to achieve.We demand the right to self-determination in a form that would be decided in a national Kurdish referendum, but also within the integrity and unity of the Syrian land. When Syria was formed, it was formed by the Sykes-Picot agreement, it wasn’t our choice. But we want to keep the current borders. With a new social contract between ourselves and all the Syrian components.
Second, if we talk about federalism in the Kurdish areas, from the northeastern part of Syria, up to the border with Iraq until Afrin, near where Aleppo is — the Kurds form about 75 percent of the population of that region. That land is the Kurdish land.
I’ve heard Yekiti and Azadi [Syrian Kurdish parties] have pulled out now or are threatening to do.
All Syrian Kurdish groups decided in Irbil in October to freeze any participation of Kurdish groups in the SNC. This applies to all Kurdish parties, from the Damascus Declaration on, and will continue until and unless the SNC listen to our demands. My party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, had an SNC member: we actually froze his membership before the conference in Syria that formed the KNC.
Of course, we cannot stop individual Kurds from participating in the SNC, although I suspect that as time goes on and nothing changes, they too will freeze their membership or quit altogether.
So what are the Kurdish National Council’s preconditions for joining the SNC fully?
We have four main demands, and they’re not necessarily all going to be fulfilled: First, political decentralization of the government. Syria is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-ethnic country. If it keeps to the same governing style as now — one central government — there is a possibility of civil war. Second, a secular state. Third, constitutional recognition of the Kurdish issue, a constitutional assurance that the Kurdish people are on their historic land. And the lifting of all discriminatory policies that have been deliberately applied to the Kurdish people. Fourth, the right of self-determination within Syria’s unity and integrity — that’s our condition to remain within Syria.
If the SNC fully recognizes the Kurdish Bill of Rights, we will join the SNC fully. Because we are very concerned that the SNC is so much influenced by Turkey now, they may postpone guaranteeing our rights until after the regime falls. Therefore we ask for a recognition of these rights in order to become a draft for a new constitution.So you want a written guarantee from the SNC?
We want a guarantee written and published internationally. The important thing to realize is that if we get our full rights, Turkey will be obliged to grant full rights to Turkey’s Kurdish population. If the Kurds were to get recognition in the Syrian constitution, Turkey will give similar if not more rights to the Kurds in Turkey. Syria is the key player.
Change in Syria means change in Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran. Iran will be isolated because Iran’s connection with Hezbollah would not be so much facilitated as before [by the Assad regime]. The new Syrian government would not be an ally of Iran.
Ghalioun said this in his interview with the Wall Street Journal two months ago, though he’s gone back and forth on partnering with Hezbollah recently.
Ghalioun wants to be diplomatic. In fact, I believe, the SNC would completely cut ties with Hezbollah.
Recently, university students [in Syria] have said that Lebanese are enrolled in Syrian universities who aren’t of university age. This is from student sources. Students have said that these are Hezbollah members.
The SNC has not been recognized by world governments, apart from Libya’s, as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. If it were, would you be more willing to join?
If the international community recognized the SNC at this stage, that would be a very quick decision. It still represents only one side of the Syrian opposition, it doesn’t include Kurds as Kurds. We are united and we have agreements. If we were to join the SNC fully, we’d do so from a unified political standpoint on this issue.
Is the KNC all in for regime change or are you entertaining a possible reconciliation with the Assad regime?
We are part of this revolution, we are not neutral. One of the main points in the KNC statement is that we don’t want the present dictatorship and we refuse to accept any future dictatorships. We don’t accept an Islamic government or a Muslim Brotherhood-led government. We will refuse that very firmly.
We have also decided not to have any dialog with the regime separately from the Syrian opposition. For example, if the international community decided all the opposition groups had to have a dialog with the regime, we’d support that, in case the current regime asks for negotiations for a transition of power, just like in Yemen. But that’s unlikely.
When I’ve asked SNC members about the poor representation of Kurds as a bloc in the Council, they usually reply by saying something like, “Well, we don’t want to give the Kurds their own bloc as we see the SNC as a non-sectarian political entity. Kurds are fairly represented in strictly political groupings that reserved seats in the Council, such as the Damascus Declaration bloc and the Local Coordination Committees bloc.” Is that just an excuse for exclusion, in your opinion?
Yes. It’s not just about Kurds, however. Arabs, Druze, Ismailis, Alawites, Christians have been ignored by the SNC, which is responsible for these minorities failure to participate as united communities in the revolution. Also, if the SNC says that Local Coordination Committees are very active in the SNC, I’d like to add that the Committees have very little participation of Alawites and Druze; only the elites of these communities are involved in them.
In my opinion, Syrian Alawites would not accept working in a central government with Sunnis because the regime has succeeded in sowing fear amongst [Alawites].
This is why we ask for political de-centralization in Syria. The regime has succeeded in convincing minorities that any change would mean a new Islamic system coming to power and the rights of these minorities would be lost completely. In order for the SNC to convince minorities to take part in the revolution and hasten the fall of the regime, it must send a clear message to these minorities to participate. Transitioning to democracy in such a country is very difficult; it can’t happen in one day. You have to give guarantees and assurances to each minority as these fit their rights and benefits.
You seem to be arguing that the Syrian opposition is doing the regime’s propaganda work for it, by not convincing minorities of the multicultural nature of this revolution.
Yes, exactly. Let me give you an example. In Qamishli [a predominantly Kurdish city in Syria], Assyrians have formed a pro-democracy organization, however they can’t gather even ten people to demonstrate in the Kurdish region. Why? Because the Church is playing a major role in turning Syrian Christians into shabbiha [pro-regime death squad] thugs for the sake for regime preservation.
The French ambassador to Syria has told me personally that he see loads of Christians every day telling him that their lives would be at risk if this regime changed. This is evidence that the SNC is still not able to be clear with other minorities to show their rights will be guaranteed.
The SNC is mainly focusing on things on the ground — the number of people killed, how to topple the regime — but not a political program to address the issue of minorities.
By taking what concrete steps, apart from guaranteeing Kurdish rights as you already discussed?
The SNC should, in my opinion, keep in contact with all the minorities and be positive about their demands within the unity and integrity of Syria. For Christians, the [SNC should emphasize] freedom of religion. It should reassure Alawites, Ismailis and Druze that they are equal in belonging to Islam, they are not outsiders to the faith. There must be a very clear program for each and every ethnic group.
The current path is the one that Islamists are taking in the SNC, not the liberal representatives.
Are there enough liberal representatives in the SNC to alter its approach to the minorities question?
The liberals are not enough to influence the SNC. That’s also our responsibility as Kurds. It’s the international community’s responsibility to pressure the SNC, and the Muslim Brotherhood, to guarantee the rights of minorities. And also — most important — for the international community to pressure Turkey not to take one side of the opposition over all others.
The Kurds are Syria’s largest minority, larger even than the Alawites. Would it be fair to say that there is no Syrian revolution without their full and wholehearted participation?
We are more organized and recognized as a society within Syria and other Arab countries than other minorities. If we do participate more actively, other minorities will feel more assured and follow suit. The regime has tried to convince the world that the conflict is between them and the Arab Sunnis. We want to prove that wrong. The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by sectarian interests.
Posted onJanuary 25, 2012|Comments Off on Is anyone in the Syrian leadership brave enough to ask the question?
Wednesday 25 January 2012-
By Ali Ibrahim-
According to a news piece carried by the official [Syrian] news agency, an official source reported that the Syrian regime has rejected the new Arab initiative, which had drawn up a roadmap similar to what happened in Yemen to ensure a semi-peaceful transfer of power there. This, however, has caused several questions to be raised, most prominently: What will happen next? Will the next step be an international solution?
Indeed, the Syrian regime’s rejection itself raises questions, firstly: Is this the regime’s final stance? Or will the door be left ajar for negotiations? Based on our experience of Arab initiatives towards Syria so far, the regime in Damascus has been known to adopt contradictory stances. The latest of these initiatives was the Arab observer mission – considered at first [by the Syrian regime] to be a violation of Syrian sovereignty – yet following weeks of inquiries, exchanged messages and replies between Damascus and the Arab League, and following several amendments to the Arab protocol, observers were finally sent to Damascus, and now they themselves are the subject of endless controversy.
It would not be surprising if future events follow a path similar to the Arab initiative that was proposed after the recent Arab ministerial meeting, with the Syrian regime attempting to negotiate, make inquiries and then carry out amendments, as was the case with the observer mission, in a bid to buy time.
Let us be frank here, the decision to accept the Arab observers in Syria was nothing more than al-Assad’s submission to the pressure being mounted upon him, and an attempt to buy more time, hoping that his security apparatus would succeed in quelling the revolution and the numerous hotbeds of unrest. This is clear considering the increasing rate of killings and attacks on cities, which continued to escalate until the death toll in the presence of Arab observes rose to several hundred.
Therefore, we can observe that pressure is a catalyst for action, and the new Arab initiative – which raised the ceiling of Arab mobilization with regards to what is happening in Syria – has mounted further pressure on the al-Assad regime. However, the door has still been left ajar for a safe exit [for Bashar al-Assad] along the lines of what happened to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This was represented by the advice offered by the Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki, during the interview he gave to Asharq al-Awsat, when he touched upon the subject of Syria and al-Assad by saying “we must not put four walls in front of a wounded tiger. There must be a way out for him”. Of course, it is important that this message is taken on board, and that al-Assad understands what is meant by a way out.
We are now facing the final scene of the Syrian revolution, and this has become clear for everyone to see, whether inside Syria or outside, whether as part of the regime or the opposition, the regional parties; Arab and non-Arab, and the international powers. Al-Assad has been given several respites and plenty time, but nevertheless he has failed to present any real solutions. Furthermore, he has failed to destroy a revolution that has broken through the fear barrier, and has now begun to confront the regime’s weapons with arms of its own. Now the situation on the ground is changing but not to the advantage of the regime, which has begun to lose control of entire cities and districts.
It is a fact that no one can know what is happening within the corridors of power, or inside Syria’s governing institutions, but it is also a fact that the Arab initiative has thrown a stone into the ruling regime’s water, and we do not know whether this is stagnant or not. Surely officials and key figures within the regime’s institutions will begin to wonder: Is keeping the President worth the destruction of the country and its institutions, the continual bloodshed, the killings, and the continual divisions within the army and the security apparatus? I hope they will come to the rational answer, provided these officials have a sense of responsibility and the courage to ask themselves such questions.
Is there anyone within the Syrian leadership who can ask such questions? This will become apparent in the days to come.
Posted onJanuary 23, 2012|Comments Off on Arab plan schedule to Syrian regime change
This is the schedule of events in the Arab plan:
1) Bashar al Assad and the opposition agree to the plan. Would they? how long would it take to get a response? What incentives are they offered to agree?
2) Bashar al Assad opens a dialog with the opposition ‘within two weeks’ ( after they agree, I guess) Would the opposition accept?
3) Within two months, Bashar Al Assad designates a new government including members of the opposition
3) Once done, Bashar al Assad passes his power to the Vice president
4) Three months later: Free elections Presidential? Parlementary? what happened to the Constitution?
Comments Off on Arab plan schedule to Syrian regime change
