Posted onApril 17, 2012|Comments Off on Alawites for Assad, why the Syrian Sect Backs the Regime
Leon Goldsmith LEON GOLDSMITH is a Middle East Researcher at the University of Otago in New Zealand.
Since the start of the revolt in Syria, the country’s Alawites have been instrumental in maintaining President Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power. A sect of Shia Islam, the Alawites comprise roughly 13 percent of the population and form the bulk of Syria’s key military units, intelligence services, and ultra-loyalist militias, called shabiha (“ghosts” in Arabic). As the uprising in Syria drags on, there are signs that some Alawites are beginning to move away from the regime. But most continue to fight for Assad — largely out of fear that the Sunni community will seek revenge for past and present atrocities not only against him but also against Alawites as a group. This sense of vulnerability feeding Alawite loyalty is rooted in the sect’s history.
The Alawites split from Shia Islam in ninth-century Iraq over their belief in the divinity of the fourth Islamic caliph, Ali bin Abi Talib, a position branded as heresy by the Sunnis and extremist by most Shias. The community began as a small collection of believers, and over the following centuries it suffered almost constant discrimination and several massacres at the hands of Sunni Muslims. In 1305, for example, following a clerical fatwa, Sunni Mamluks wiped out the Alawite community of the Kisrawan (modern Lebanon). As late as the mid-nineteenth century, in retaliation for the rebellion of an Alawite sheikh, the Ottomans ruthlessly persecuted the Alawites, burning villages and farms across what little territory they held.
Despite this long-standing persecution, the Alawites fought to integrate into modern Syria. In 1936, as the French mandate waned, Alawite religious leaders convinced their anxious followers to incorporate themselves into the new, overwhelmingly Sunni, Syrian state. Over the next several decades, Alawites moved away from the mountains to pursue educational and employment opportunities in the cities. Between 1943 and 1957, Alawite migration tripled the population of Hama, and between 1957 and 1979 it quadrupled the size of Latakia.
Many Alawites also joined the military. Since Ottoman times, Sunni Arabs had largely spurned army careers, but Alawites welcomed the opportunity for stable income. By 1963, they made up 65 percent of noncommissioned officers in the Syrian army. The rise of Alawites in Syrian society throughout the 1960s was assisted by political infighting among the Sunnis and the Baath Party coup of 1963, which united working-class Alawites and Sunnis under one banner.
Although Sunnis initially tolerated the growing clout of the Alawite community, resentment resurfaced when Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite and the father of the current president, seized power in 1970. When he proposed a new constitution three years later that mandated a secular state and allowed the presidency to be awarded to a non-Muslim, Sunnis protested across the country. In early 1976, with religious tensions flaring, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood launched its uprising against what it called the “heretic” Alawite regime. The Alawites, harboring their long-standing fear of rejection and persecution by the Sunni community, rallied around Assad. The two sides hardened for battle, and over the next six years Assad relied on his sect to beat back the Brotherhood revolt.
In February 1982, the struggle reached its climax in Sunni-dominated Hama. Seeking to end the rebellion, Assad massacred the Sunni population of the city, killing as many as 20,000 residents. Alawites blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the disaster, largely convinced that Sunnis had and would always reject their efforts to integrate. Even liberal Alawites, who criticized Assad’s aggressiveness at the outset of the revolt, remained silent in the aftermath of the Hama massacre. They had been transformed from victims into perpetrators….
Posted onApril 3, 2012|Comments Off on Syria: As His Adversaries Scramble for a Strategy, Assad Sets His Terms
By Tony Karon | @tonykaron | April 3, 2012 | 4
That which has not been achieved on the battlefield can rarely be achieved at the negotiation table, and the harsh reality facing Syria’s opposition is that the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has not been defeated, nor is it in danger of imminent collapse. Assad has promised, former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan announced Monday, to begin a partial implementation of Annan’s peace plan by withdrawing troops and heavy weaponry from opposition-stronghold cities on April 10. In response, Western powers were left warning of unspecified “consequences” for failure to do so, and citing the history of Assad breaking promises. Skepticism from opposition activists on the ground was hardly surprising, but had little effect — they haven’t exactly been party to shaping Annan’s plan, which in itself is a reflection of their relative weakness in the power equation right now. Formulating a strategy in response to Assad appears to be the role of the Western and Arab powers who’ve backed the exile-based Syrian National Council, and after last weekend’s inconclusive Friends of Syria meeting in Istanbul, they don’t appear yet to have achieved a strategic consensus.
The Assad regime may, in fact, be feeling pretty smug: Its foreign adversaries were unable to prevent its brutal pummeling of cities controlled by opposition fighters, which scattered those fighters and forced the rebels to abandon an insurrectionist strategy of seizing control of whole towns in the hope of prompting mass defections that would bring down the regime. It has proved impossible, thus far, for the rebels to hold ground against counter-offensives by regime forces whose advantage in weaponry is overwhelming. Instead, the insurgency is on its back foot, struggling to find the arms and ammunition to sustain the confrontation, and reduced to waging a more diffuse campaign of guerrilla attacks and terror strikes. The regime, meanwhile, has remained largely intact with its core security forces remaining focused and motivated by the sectarian dimension of the war. Nor does the regime appear likely to collapse internally in the near term, even if the repression it has unleashed precludes it restoring long-term stability.
(PHOTOS: Escape from Syria: Photographs by William Daniels)
The Annan peace plan reflects the reality that the opposition and its international backers have been unable to impose terms on Assad on the ground. Western and Arab powers have been forced to walk back from the demand that Assad stand down as a pre-condition for resolving the crisis; Annan’s plan involves a cease-fire, demilitarizing the conflict and creating space for peaceful political opposition, but its key dimension is the recognition that the political negotiations over Syria’s future will be conducted with the regime, rather than after it has been dispatched.
Negotiating with Assad remains unpalatable to the opposition after a year of sacrifice and bitter struggle in which some 9,000 people have been killed, but the opposition hasn’t had a major say in developing the plan — not least because it hasn’t manifested itself in the form of a single, organized body with sufficient strength on the ground to have forced its way into a more dominant position in Annan’s reckoning.
Compromise solutions to violent political conflicts are more likely to be successful when the combatants find themselves locked in a stalemate where each side recognizes that while it can survive the attacks of its opponent, its own attacks are unable to eliminate that opponent. But there’s no such symmetry currently at work on the Syrian battlefield — the rebels remain able to harass the regime, but their attempts to hold territory have largely failed. While it can be militarily pegged back, however, the rebellion’s greater strength lies in its political support — and its best hope may lie in an outcome that allows it to bring that factor more directly into play, which it could certainly do if Annan’s peace plan, which requires the regime to permit peaceful protest, were fully implemented.
(PHOTOS: Syria Under Siege: Photographs by Alessio Romenzi)
But it’s a safe bet that Assad will seek to implement the deal on his own terms, relying on the political and strategic disarray among his opponents — both domestic and foreign — to shape the outcome. Last weekend’s “Friends of Syria” meeting in Istanbul appeared to confirm that disarray, with a hasty effort by Turkey and Qatar to cobble the fractious exile-based Syrian National Council (SNC) into the single legitimate voice of the Syrian rebellion failing to camouflage the doubts among Western powers over whether the group represents a credible alternative with sufficient influence on the ground to warrant throwing its weight behind the group. Western governments also remain reluctant to support the Gulf Arab powers’ calls to arm the rebels and accept an escalation of what would likely be a protracted civil war, although non-lethal aid has been stepped up and the opposition claimed that the largesse of the oil sheikhs would provide salaries for rebel fighters.
Western powers display a palpable lack of enthusiasm for any strategy of ratcheting up the military challenge to Assad because of the grim prospects and potentially dire consequences across the region. So when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warns of “consequences” for failure to implement the Annan plan, the regime can’t but notice that its Western, Arab and domestic foes doesn’t have a coherent plan to bring such consequences to bear.
Assad will likely seek to take advantage of that disarray to implement a version of Annan’s plan on his own terms. Thus the comment by a regime spokesman last Friday that the security forces would not withdraw from cities in which they have operated against rebels until “normal life” had been restored, although others have claimed that the military campaign is largely over and that the regime is simply “mopping up.” Either way, the April 10 date allows for at least another week of that — and, of course, there’s no guarantee that rebel units on the ground will comply, which regime forces would take as a pretext to continue their operations.
(MORE: The Need to Bear Witness in Syria)
Even if the “Friends of Syria” had agreed on a strategy to reverse the imbalance between the regime and its opponents, such a strategy would take many months to have much effect. It’s not going to happen before the Annan plan goes into effect. And the balance of forces on the ground, and internationally, is such that Annan’s best leverage in persuading Assad to do his bidding is the support of China and Russia for his mission. The Russians, however, have made clear they are sympathetic to Assad’s insistence that a restoration of peace puts an onus on rebels to halt their armed actions. The regime’s game will be to stay onside with Moscow, and Annan may have to devote much of his energy to persuading the Russians to back his vision on implementing the plan.
One way to ensure compliance would be to insert peacekeeping forces, but the regime is unlikely to accept foreign troops on its territory, and it has not been sufficiently weakened to be compelled by international pressure to do so. Much will depend on how it conducts itself in the coming weeks, as it seeks to implement the peace plan on its own terms to ensure that it stays on top. But it remains vulnerable to political opposition. Indeed, the most dangerous aspect of the Annan plan for the regime may be the requirement that it allow space for a resumption of political protest, under international monitoring. Right now, Assad may have more to fear from massive crowds protesting in his cities than he does from insurgent fighters. After all, his forces had opened fire on those protesters long before the opposition turned to arms.
Posted onMarch 27, 2012|Comments Off on Why Syria’s Splintered Opposition Is Assad’s Real Ace In The Hole
Analysis: Bashar al-Assad has benefited from Russian and Chinese support to stay in power. But from neighboring Turkey, where many top Syrian exiles are based, one observer says the splintering of the opposition may be the real force to ensure Assad’s survival.
ISTANBUL – Hafez al-Assad massacred the city of Hama in 1982. Yet this atrocity did not make Assad a ‘butcher’ in the eyes of many Syrians. In fact, after the massacre, hundreds of thousands poured into the streets of Damascus to cheer the Syrian leader for his tough response to what was perceived as an Islamist challenge to public order.
Bashar al-Assad is now on the same path as his father, but with one important exception: while Bashar has no qualms about stepping into his father’s combat boots, he is still attempting to walk a reformist line.
With the defeat of rebel forces in Homs last week, crowds came out to celebrate Bashar’s victory and show support for the regime. And though these demonstrations may look like a throwback to his father’s era, the iron fist no longer guarantees regime survival.
Still, Bashar has two important dynamics working in his favor: first, even if the opposition refuses to admit it, reforms have shored up the basic pillars of his regime. Second, infighting amongst opposition leaders has cast doubts on their ability to present a unified front against Assad.
Syrian opposition leaders established the Syrian National Council last January in Istanbul. The SNC’s ostensible goal was to implement a strategy similar to the one that eventually toppled Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. But now the SNC is in crisis, faced with internal divisions and inching ever closer to irrelevance. On February 26th, a group of 20 members broke-off from the SNC, citing dissatisfaction with the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. This group has since formed its own opposition movement, the Syrian Patriotic Group. Then on March 13th, three key players – Kamal al-Labwani, Haitham al-Maleh, and Catherine al-Talli – announced their opposition to the SNC, criticizing it for not doing enough to support the Free Syrian Army. Al-Labwani came out with scathing criticisms of the SNC, saying that, “Some are in it for personal gain and the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to monopolize aid and weapons to gain popular influence on the ground. We don’t want to replace the current dictator with a new one.”
By March 17th, five different groups had broken from the SNC and organized under a new umbrella, advocating for a humanitarian corridor for refugees and weapons for the Free Syrian Army. Kurdish parties are similarly wary of the SNC, viewing it as a stooge of the Turkish government. Another important organization, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, views the SNC as little more than a body of armchair oppositionists.
Falling in a trap
Syrian divisions have landed the Friends of Syria – a group of foreign nations that support regime change in Syria – in a difficult position. This coalition remains committed to upholding the Syrian National Council’s legitimacy, even as the organization deteriorates into a shell of its former self. The insistence on regime change in Syria has effectively paralyzed the international coalition and caused Russian and Chinese overtures to fall on deaf ears. Even UN and Arab League initiatives have foundered in this environment.
Widespread claims equating the Assad regime with the rule of the Alawite minority have further worsened the situation and triggered some ugly ‘Sunni’ reflexes. These interpretations fail to capture the nuances underlying the uprising.
After all, Sunni forces were used in the Hama crackdown and Assad’s notorious Shabiba militia includes Sunni members as well as Alawites. However, there are also many Alawites who do not support the Assad regime, but fear for their security in a post-Assad Syria.
Many of the prevailing views on Syria fail to grasp the political dynamic of violence in the country. It is often forgotten that the jihadist “Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant” instigated its armed uprising on January 23, 2011, before peaceful protests had gained momentum. This sudden outbreak of violence pulled many would-be reformists back into the Assad camp.
Unfortunately, stopping the bloodshed does not seem to be the priority for the parties involved in this conflict. Arab League General Secretary NabilAl-Arabi puts it bluntly: “The Syrian opposition believes that the way out of this crisis is only possible through the ‘Libyan scenario,’ and negotiation attempts with the president Bashar Assad will lead to nothing.”
But because of the Chinese and Russian veto, the Libyan scenario will not work in Syria. With this option off the table, the Friends of Syria are looking to topple Assad by stoking a civil war.
Turkey has landed center-stage in these efforts, with its slogan of “regional solutions to regional problems.” It should come as no surprise that this policy has led to claims that Turkey has taken the role of unofficial NATO enforcer in the region. Turkish officials were also angered when Guardian writer Jonathan Steele compared Turkey’s situation to Honduras, which opened its border to Contras fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
In the end, a quick unraveling of the Assad regime is looking more distant by the day. In February, defecting General Mustafa al-Sheikh claimed that the Syrian army had dwindled to 30-40% of its former capacity and was bound to collapse by March. That isn’t going to happen. Now the big question is whether the Friends of Syria meeting – due to be held on April 2nd in Istanbul – will lead to constructive dialogue, or simply a renewed effort to arm the opposition and escalate the civil war.
Posted onMarch 26, 2012|Comments Off on Turkey cool to UN efforts on Syria
SEMİH İDİZ-
The evolving situation in Syria continues to pose unexpected problems for Turkey. As pointed out in this column before, Ankara never expected Bashar al-Assad to last this long. Without al-Assad absenting himself, in line with Turkish expectations, it appears Ankara may have not only to live with him, but to find ways to cope with him in the future if developments continue as they are.
That will clearly be a hard one to swallow since Turkey more or less severed all political ties with al-Assad on Monday by recalling its ambassador in Damascus and closing its embassy. All lines of overt diplomatic communication between the two countries have thus been severed for an indefinite period.
But while this was happening, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was continuing with his efforts to bring al-Assad and opposition representatives together, in order to try and end the bloodshed in Syria and find a political settlement to the problem.
The statement adopted last week at the UN Security Council, which was also accepted by Russia and China this time, has also bolstered Annan’s mission by supporting it openly and calling for this track to continue. This, however, is not to Ankara’s liking at all.
That was made amply clear by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan on Saturday in Almati, where his plane did a stopover to refuel before flying off to Seoul for the Nuclear Security Summit. Talking to reporters in the Kazakh city, Erdoğan said they “did not approve of the Security Council statement,” adding, “There is no justice in getting the opposition to sit down with the regime.”
Pointing at the number of civilians killed by the regime, he also expressed displeasure over Kofi Annan’s efforts by pointing out that the former secretary-general has had talks in Damascus without going to the parts of Syria that are suffering under al-Assad’s forces to see for himself what is going on.
Erdoğan also accused Russia, China and Iran indirectly when he said al-Assad was managing to stay in place because of the support he was receiving from these countries. Given that he will be travelling on to Tehran from Seoul later this week, it will be interesting to note the nature of the conversation he will have with Iranian officials, who in turn are not exactly enamored of Turkey’s stand on Syria.
It is clear from Erdoğan’s remarks that Ankara is angry because the Security Council, with pressure from Russia and China, has effectively upgraded al-Assad’s status by accepting him as a potential interlocutor. This is not what Ankara wants. What it wants is al-Assad to go and the regime there to change.
In other words Turkey is in the somewhat contradictory situation of having opposed other countries’ efforts to bring about regime changes in the region in the past, but has now landed itself in the position of wanting regime change in Syria.
Spokesmen for the Syrian opposition continue to insist they will never sit down to talks with al-Assad. But it is not as if the Syrian opposition is an organized and coherent force. If one is to go by press reports there are even serious divisions among Syrians in the refugee camps in Turkey.
This suggests that with Russia pushing from one side and the West from the other, elements of the opposition, if not every one, may in time come around to accepting the notion of negotiating with al-Assad. At any rate what is clear is that developments are not to al-Assad’s disadvantage.
With Russian backing he feels much more secure now. He also is availing of the divisions within the opposition. In addition to this he can use the bombs that have started going off in Damascus to argue that the opposition is nothing but a gang of terrorists. This is no doubt why the opposition is trying to distance itself from those bomb attacks.
All of this is very much out of keeping with how Turkeywants things to go in Syria.
Posted onMarch 26, 2012|Comments Off on Interview: Russian envoy to Lebanon on the Syrian crisis
Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: Alexander Zasypkin– Sunday 25 March 2012– By Tha’ir Abbas-
Beirut, Asharq Al-Awsat- Asharq al-Awsat recently met with the Russian Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, to discuss his country’s position with regards to the ongoing Syrian crisis. During the interview, Zasypkin outlined the principles of Russia’s stance focusing on a political solution in Syria, and what steps are now required in order to implement this. He also dismissed reports of Russian involvement on the ground in support of the al-Assad regime, stressing that his country wholly rejects foreign military interference.
The following is the text of the interview:
[Asharq Al-Awsat] What is Russia’s genuine position towards the current events in Syria?
[Zasypkin] The constants of the Russian stance toward the internal conflict are known, and they have not changed throughout the past incidents. These constants focus on the need for all parties to cease violence, organizing comprehensive national dialogue between the authority and the opposition, and reaching an agreement on all the reforming steps in Syria to attain a democratic regime in this country. We seek to achieve these objectives and need the assistance of the international community to start the political process in Syria.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Can we speak about an “internal crisis” when the opposition is complaining of “violence from one side”, carried out by the authorities through a strong and disciplined army? Is it possible to talk about two kinds of violence?
[Zasypkin] Of course there is the regular Syrian Army, which has the military superiority over the armed groups. At the same time, when we speak about halting violence, this relates to all parties because should the authorities alone stop the violence, then this would lead to armed groups seizing their positions, and this would not calm down the situation.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How can a peace process be reached in Syria in light of the opposition’s strong rejection of dialogue with a regime it considers to be criminal, and due to the brutality of this regime?
[Zasypkin] The opposition should agree to hold dialogue with the regime without preconditions. As for the role of the international community, we view the presidential statement issued by the Security Council yesterday as support for the UN envoy Kofi Annan’s mission, which aims to cease violence and start the political process in Syria. We hope that all the foreign parties will make efforts to influence the parties to the conflict in Syria to sit at the negotiations table.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you mean that foreign parties are having a negative influence on the Syrian issue?
[Zasypkin] Throughout this period, we have been trying to change the situation from a confrontation to a political process. We wanted to benefit from the Arab League’s initiative and the observer mission, but the task of the mission was curtailed soon after it began its work. We consider this as having an adverse impact on the political settlement. The second thing is that we believe that the sanctions are not beneficial because they do not influence the policy of the regime, but they increase the burden on the people. And now when we seek anew to activate a political settlement through Annan’s mission, we hear talk about new sanctions and calls for international and Arab interference and measures such as the recalling of ambassadors. All these things are not beneficial. Anyway, since yesterday, we have taken a concerted stance at the Security Council and we want to rely on it to unify the efforts of the international community.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Russia has directed criticism towards the Syrian authorities. Why was that?
[Zasypkin] Since the beginning, we have been adhering to a balanced and open stance. When the popular protests and peaceful demonstrations took place, we pointed out that the regime’s reactions to these demonstrations were unacceptable. At the same time, we also highlighted the provocative actions of the armed elements, within the context of demonstrators, since April last year.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you think that the policy the authorities are following in terms of confronting the demonstrations and the protests is appropriate?
[Zasypkin] We see mistakes, and at the same time we see the measures that have been taken over the past months, such as the issuance of laws and the holding of municipal elections and the referendum on the constitution, and now there are elections scheduled for the People’s Council, and we consider all these to be positive steps.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you think that the Syrian Government is moving on a positive track then?
[Zasypkin] Once again, I repeat that the reactions represented in the response to the demonstrations and the delayed reforms are unacceptable. At the same time, the reforms that have been implemented are positive steps.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There is talk that Russia is risking its Arab relations as a result of its stance on the Syrian issue?
[Zasypkin] We are very concerned with preserving our traditionally good relations with all the Arab countries. At the same time, in light of the developments taking place at present, we adhere in the first place to the UN Charter and international legitimacy to a great extent, and we consider principles such as the sovereignty of the state and respecting the rights of people to self-determination to be more important than the temporary considerations in the relations with any state in the region. We think that this approach is better than playing for self-interests. The values related to the nature of international relations are more important than passing economic or military interests.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The Russian Foreign Minister yesterday spoke about concerns of “Sunni rule” in Syria. What did he mean by this?
[Zasypkin] We want to keep away from sectarian conflicts, and during the developments taking place in the region, we seek to preserve the fraternal coexistence among all ethnicities and sects in the Middle East. We in Russia give a great attention to this issue because Russia is a country that has multi ethnicities and sects, and we hope that no problems emerge among the sects in Syria or in other countries.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The same as the Christians are the majority in Russia, the Sunnis are the majority in Syria. Is their rule of the country not something normal in any democratic process?
[Zasypkin]We are putting forward a set of principles, including one that says that democracy means respecting the rights of all the sects in this society, and this is the most important thing.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] To what extent Russia is involved in the Syrian issue? We hear talk about shipments of Russian weapons to the regime and military warships paying visits to Syria. To what degree are you ready to defend your stance on the ground?
[Zasypkin] All that has been said about Russian ships calling at Syrian ports to support the regime is untrue. The first ship visited Syria to receive supplies of food and fuel, and the other ship that has recently paid a visit did so for the same purpose. It is participating in an operation against the pirates in the Gulf of Aden along with NATO and European Union. As for Russian weapons, they have been possessed by the Syrian Armed Forces for decades. And as for defending our stance, we rely on political action and no other means.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The Syrian opposition talks about direct Russian support for the regime in terms of training, drones, and other services?
[Zasypkin] All this is talk within the framework of a media war that is taking place at present. We deny such talk on a daily basis and consider it untrue, like the talk about Russian warships.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How do you assess the Lebanese stance toward the Syrian crisis?
[Zasypkin] We are aware of the peculiarity of the Lebanese situation concerning what is going on in Syria. We share the Lebanese officials’ opinion that the Lebanese should as much as possible avoid the negative impacts of the Syrian conflict. We positively appreciate the measures that the Lebanese Government and the commanders of the Lebanese Army are adopting to safeguard Lebanon’s sovereignty and unity. We also believe that the political forces in Lebanon are adhering to the security and stability in the country, and this is positive.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you have information about the smuggling of weapons and fighters from Lebanon to Syria?
[Zasypkin] We have information from various sources that weapons are coming into Syria from the neighboring countries regardless of the stances that the authorities in these countries are adopting and without a decision by them. We know that among the measures adopted by the Lebanese leadership are moves to tighten the monitoring of weapons smuggling, and we are confident that this policy will continue.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] It has been said that Russia has learned from two previous lessons, in Iraq and Libya, and it does not want to lose Syria. Do you seek a price in return for abandoning al-Assad?
[Zasypkin] The main lesson from what happened in Iraq and Libya is that the world should have to witness the tragic results of the occupation of these two countries. Therefore, we do not accept the repetition of the NATO operations or any foreign military interference in Syria, and this is a principled position for Russia. As for the talk about the stance toward the Syrian regime, it has been and continues to be the same. The priority for us in Syria is to cease the fighting and ensure the democratic option for the Syrian people, including selecting a leadership through fair and transparent elections. We do not decide the stance toward the Syrian president and leadership because this is an internal Syrian affair, and it is not the right for any foreign party to try and impose its will on the Syrians.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Who can ensure the integrity of the elections?
[Zasypkin] We are now seeking to arrange dialogue on the steps for reform, including the presidential elections, and this is one clause that the Syrian authorities can agree on with the opposition, so that the dialogue can then focus on the principles and the details. In light of the attention focused on Syria by the international community, it is possible to secure good international monitoring, and there would be no doubts about the results of these elections. I am explaining this subject on an assumption basis because we are now at the beginning of the political settlement. As for these steps, they are going to be followed by other steps later on.
In recent weeks, there has been a notable shuffle in the positions of key external players in the Syrian crisis. Momentum has quite suddenly shifted from an all-out onslaught against the Assad government to a quiet investigation of exit strategies.
The clashes between government forces and opposition militias in Baba Amr were a clear tipping point for these players – much hinged on the outcome of that battle. Today, the retreat of armed groups from the Homs neighborhood means one thing: the strategy of militarizing the conflict from within is no longer a plausible option on which to hang this geopolitical battle. Especially not in an American or French election year, when anything less than regime change in Syria will look like abject failure.
And so the external players are shifting gears – the more outspoken ones, quietly seeking alternative options. There are two de facto groups that have formed. Group A is looking for a face-saving exit from the promised escalation in Syria. It consists of the United States, European Union and Turkey. Group B, on the other hand, is heavily invested in regime-change at any cost, and includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and some elements of the French, US, British, and Libyan establishments.
Before Baba Amr, these two groups were unified in maximizing their every resource to force regime change in Syria. When the UN Security Council option was blocked by Russia and China, they coalesced around the General Assembly and ad-hoc “Friends of Syria” to build coalitions, tried unsuccessfully to bring a disparate opposition fighting force (Free Syrian Army) under central leadership, pushed to recognize the disunited Syrian National Council (SNC), and eked out weekly “events” like embassy closures and political condemnations to maintain a “perception momentum.”
But those efforts have largely come to a standstill after Baba Amr. A reliable source close to the Syrian regime said to me recently: “The regime eliminated the biggest and most difficult obstacle – Baba Amr. Elsewhere, it [eliminating armed militias] is easier and less costly at all levels. Now both political and military steps can continue.”
Dealmaking Begins in Earnest
The first clear-cut public sign of this new phase was the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN envoy to Syria. Annan is an American “concession” that will draw out this dealmaking phase between the Syrian government, opposition figures and foreign governments potentially until the May 2012 parliamentary elections.
This phase is what the Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and other BRIC countries have sought from the start: the creation of a protective bubble around Syria so that it has the time and space necessary to implement domestic reforms that will not harm its geopolitical priorities.
The European Union (EU) kicked things off in March in a joint foreign ministerial communique rejecting military intervention in Syria. This was swiftly followed by Kofi Annan’s strong warning against external efforts to arm the Syrian opposition, with various Americans making similar soundings in his wake.
One very prominent Syrian reformist who has remained engaged with both sides of this conflict, confided that the externally-based Syrian opposition are now “looking over each other’s shoulders – none yet dares to speak out.” The fact is, says the source, “they are getting military assistance, but nowhere near enough. They need much, much more that what they are getting, and now the countries backing this opposition are developing conflicting agendas.”
Three high-level defections from the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) were announced within days of that conversation, hinting further at the fundamental policy shifts occurring in all circles, behind the scenes.
The game has changed along Syria’s borders too. Turkey, a ferocious critic of the Assad government this past year, is reconsidering its priorities. A participant in a recent closed meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reveals the emptiness of Turkish threats to form a “humanitarian corridor” or security zone on their Syrian border. Davutoglu, says my source, insisted in private that “Turkey will not do anything to harm Syria’s territorial integrity and unity because that will transfer the conflict into Turkish territory.”
Recent deliberations with Iran also seem to have resonated with the Turks. During Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s January visit to Ankara, a source tells me that an understanding was reached. The Iranian FM is said to have warned Turkish leaders that they were leveraging a lot of goodwill – painstakingly built up in the Muslim/Arab world – in return for “no clear benefit” in Syria. According to my source, the Turks were encouraged to strike a bargain to regain their regional standing – the key concession being that Assad would stay through the reform period.
A Hard Dose of Realpolitik
Although Turkey has backtracked from its belligerent public posture, there are still elements in the country that remain rigid on Syria. The same is true for the US and France. The fact that 2012 is an important election year in both countries plays a part in the strategy shuffle, but there are other pressing concerns too.
One major worry is that there aren’t a lot of arrows left in the quiver to fire at Syria. Without the UN Security Council granting legal authority to launch an offensive against Syria, there are only piecemeal efforts – and these have all been tried, if not yet exhausted: sanctions, demonstrations, arming militias, cyberwarfare, propaganda, diplomatic arm-twisting, and bribing defectors. But a whole year has passed with no major cracks in support from the regime’s key constituencies and that has caused some debate about whether this kind of tactical pressure may ultimately backfire.
In Washington in particular, alarm bells have been ringing since militant Islamists infiltrated the Syrian opposition militias, some pouring in from Iraq where they were only recently targeting American interests. The US has spent the better part of a decade focusing its national security apparatus on the threat from Al Qaeda and militant Islam. The execution of Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda-related figures was meant to put a seal on this problem – at least in the sense that the organization has shriveled in size and influence.
But Syria threatens to blast open a Pandora’s Box of newly-motivated “soldiers of God.” And while sectarian anger may be the fuse, the conflagration will take place on a major geopolitical fault line in the Mideast, at a delicate time, on one of Israel’s borders – and changing winds could fan those flames right back in the direction of the United States and its allies.
That is a red line for the US military and a sizeable chunk of the Washington political establishment. There are other Americans, however, who are unable to view the Syrian crisis outside the prism of Iran and its growing regional influence. US Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, who has spent years now orchestrating the defeat of the Iran-led “Resistance Axis,” is one such player in the capital.
Feltman is part of Group B, alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The battle in Syria has become an existential one for Group B. They have played too hard and revealed too much, to be able to re-assert themselves into any impartial regional role in the future – unless there is a changing of the guard in Syria.
As Group A moves toward a face-saving exit from the crisis, we are going to witness a re-telling of events in Syria. The Western “mainstream media” and major international NGOs, which have served as little more than propaganda tools for various governments seeking to escalate the Syrian crisis and vilify the Assad government, are suddenly “discovering” dangerous elements in the Syrian opposition. This scene-setting is just as deliberate as the false narratives we have witnessed from Group A since the start of the crisis.
Group B, on the other hand, remains unable to take its eye off the Syrian brass ring and may continue to employ increasingly brazen and foolhardy tactics to stimulate chaos inside the country. Syria may be Group B’s graveyard unless they are brought into these deals and promised some protection. I suspect, however, that they will instead be utilized as a valuable negotiating tool for Group A – brought into play if dealmaking is not working to their advantage.
While negotiations plod on over Syria, we can be assured that most external players have little or no consideration for actual Syrians. The regime will be focused on the long haul, which includes ridding the country of armed groups, ensuring that major roadways are free of IEDs and snipers, implementing a watered-down reform program with token opposition members to give lip service to progress, and becoming even more entrenched in the face of regional and foreign threats.
Meanwhile, the West and its regional allies will happily draw out a low-boil War of Attrition in Syria to keep the Syrian regime busy, weakened and defensive, while further seeking to cement their hold on the direction of the “Arab Spring.” They will pull levers to create flare-ups when distractions or punishments are warranted, with nary a care to the lives and livelihoods of the most disenfranchised Syrians whose blood is this conflict’s main currency.
It will never be certain if there was a revolution in Syria in 2011. The country became a geopolitical battleground less than a month after the first small protests broke out in various pockets inside Syria. And it is not over by a long stretch. Syria will continue to be the scene of conflict between two regional blocs until one side wins. This may be a new phase in Syria today where players are converging to “cut some losses,” but be assured that they are merely replenishing and repositioning their reserves for a broader regional fight.
Sharmine Narwani is a commentary writer and political analyst covering the Middle East. You can follow Sharmine on twitter @snarwani [2].
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar’s editorial policy.
Sharmine Narwani
http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/5483
Comments Off on New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit
Posted onMarch 21, 2012|Comments Off on Text of UN Security Council statement on Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria agreed on Wednesday
2:17PM GMT 21 Mar 2012
“The Security Council recalls its Presidential Statement of 3 August 2011 and its Press Statement of 1 March 2012.
“The Security Council expresses its gravest concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria which has resulted in a serious human rights crisis and a deplorable humanitarian situation. The Security Council expresses its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria.
“The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
“The Security Council welcomes the appointment of Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, following the General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States.
“The Security Council expresses its full support for the efforts of the Envoy to bring an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, secure humanitarian access, and facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian oppositio
“To this aim, the Security Council fully supports the initial six-point proposal submitted to the Syrian authorities, as outlined by the Envoy to the Security Council on 16 March 2012, to:
1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;
2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilise the country.
To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres.
As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.
Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;
3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level.
4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organising access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;
5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;
6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.
“The Security Council calls upon the Syrian government and opposition to work in good faith with the Envoy towards a peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis and to implement fully and immediately his initial six-point proposal.
“The Security Council requests the Envoy to update the Council regularly and in a timely manner on the progress of his mission. In the light of these reports, the Security Council will consider further steps as appropriate.”
Various parties have been assessing the outlook for the crisis in Syria based on the evidence on the ground. The domestic scene is set to remain polarized for a long time. National understandings that can restore the country’s political unity and a cohesive national identity cannot be expected any time soon. The external scene has meanwhile become more complicated in light of the intensifying battle between the two camps over who will take hold of Syria, or who will wield the most influence in it.
On the domestic front, sources recently in Damascus say the political split is as sharp as ever. The pro-regime camp is holding together and its members have become more politically hard-line in their intolerance of all moves made by any opposition group. They deem the battle to be one against groups that have been armed – not just militarily but also in the political, propaganda, and economic senses – to target Syria, and not just its regime. They see President Bashar Assad as a symbol, and they want him to make no concessions at present. This loyalty has been accompanied by mobilization which has a minority, sectarian, and confessional dimension, though this is not fully reflected in the big cities.
On the other side, opposition groups loudly trumpet their rejection of any kind of dialogue with the regime. Indeed, they have moved on to refusing to deal with the regime’s institutions, conflating the state with the regime. They have thus started justifying attacks by gunmen on policemen and police stations or public institutions, or the bombing of vital infrastructure, as well as seeking to maximize pressure on the Syrian pound. They have also become increasingly virulent in their verbal attacks on people in the regime, and also on sects and denominations, betraying their need to keep tensions high.
A third group, which grows in size by the day, fears for Syria. This includes people who refuse to be asked where they stand. They are no longer prepared to get into a debate about who is right and who is wrong. Their concern is for the country’s unity and stability, and that priority overrides all others – even while they concur that this view ultimately works to the advantage of the regime at present.
Moreover, many Syrians who used to support the uprising for change have stepped back because of their abhorrence of the behavior of opposition groups – whether the armed groups inside Syria, or the offshore opposition groups that are trying to summon foreign military intervention in the country, without concern for the potentially catastrophic consequences of such a step.
Abroad, meanwhile, one year after the start of the crisis, plans are being reviewed. Miscalculations have been made, especially by those of the regime’s enemies who – with extreme optimism born of chronically deficient political judgement – expected that it would fall in a few weeks or months. Their disappointment and dismay shows, both on their faces and in statements. It is also apparent from the behavior of their diplomats, political allies, media, and security agencies.
This dismay is not only due to the inability of the internal opposition to bring about change within Syria. It is also because of their own failure to devise practical plans capable of achieving their goal of toppling the regime. They can now see in practice that the militarization of the civic protests in Syria created a major public credibility crisis for the opposition, and that going further as in Libya, or even Yemen, would only make people wearier.
Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and its leaders have shown no sign of collapse. Despite several months of applying security, media, economic, diplomatic, and political pressure, it is clear to the regime’s enemies that it remains cohesive, as do its military and security forces. Nor have state institutions, for all their weakness, witnessed the kind of collapse that would obviate the regime’s need for them. Moreover, the regime’s enemies can see it has managed to restore control on the ground in many parts of the country, and has dealt powerful blows to its opponents – especially the armed groups which believed in the military overthrow of the regime.
Alongside these developments, the position of Russia and China, along with other regional and world powers, provided the regime with strong support against the foreign adversaries seeking to intervene to overthrow it. This is evident from the discussions currently taking place, and even the resort to the game of envoys and go-betweens, which nobody believes will arrive at any result in the foreseeable future.
All of this further narrows the options available to the Syrian regime’s enemies. But that won’t necessarily make them give up or back down. Rather, their increasingly hostile behavior suggests they are considering other means of achieving their objective.
Among the options said to be under discussion by these countries – and which other capitals have warned against – is action to persuade senior officers to mount a coup against the regime, or to make them feel personally under threat. It also seems that the insane among the Syrian regime’s enemies have started contemplating insane actions, namely, getting rid of Assad personally.
Do they think assassinating Assad will give them a chance to take hold of Syria?
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Posted onMarch 16, 2012|Comments Off on Syria: Regime Reclaiming the Initiative
By: Elie Chalhoub -Published Thursday, March 15, 2012-
Insiders say the Syrian regime is confident it is getting a grip on the crisis, but expects no early end to unrest.
It took us more than one hour to pass through the Masnaa border crossing from Lebanon into Syria because of heavy traffic. “Spring” is returning to Syria, as a senior official puts it, while noting that he uses the term literally. “People are tired. There is a great yearning for normal life,” he adds.
Last Saturday, residents of Damascus were out and about in green spaces and on sidewalks.
Sources close to the regime insist that the situation “is better than before.” They add: “This is Damascus and this is Syria. We are not saying that things couldn’t be better. But it is not on the verge of collapse as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya claim. The situation is improving by the day. Even Saudi media admitted defeat: ‘Assad Wins the First Round!’” – a reference to the the title of a recent column in the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat by its former editor Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed.
Diplomatically, Syria remains on the defensive, trying to fend off incessant attacks. The regime had tried to prevent the crisis from being internationalized and to keep it within an Arab framework, but to no avail. Its intention was clear from the way it dealt with various Arab initiatives, last of which was the Observer Mission led by Lieutenant General Mustafa al-Dabi. The Syrian authorities afforded him maximum cooperation, but his report ended up being ignored by the Arab states.
When they brought the Syrian crisis file to the UN Security Council, the Syrian regime decided to confront them in the same arena. Damascus seems comfortable with the framework of the international game and the limits drawn by Russia and China through their decisive vetoes: “no” to any military intervention in Syria, including under the guise of “humanitarian corridors.”
The conversation is a little different behind closed doors. Sources say that the proposal which Annan presented when he met President Bashar Assad was essentially the same as the Arab proposal which Syria rejected – minus the clause requiring Assad to step down. It speaks of a cease-fire, the release of detainees, dialogue under UN auspices in Geneva, and allowing international organizations to transfer relief supplies to Syria and investigate claims of war crimes.
According to the same account, Assad replied to the latter point: “Some disobeyed orders and some made mistakes. We arrested those about whom we received complaints, we carried out investigations and there will be trials. But I ask you Mr. Annan, are you willing to do the same with the other side?”
Assad also said he welcomed all mediation attempts and was willing to engage the opposition in dialogue and reach agreement with it. But he questioned how any agreement could be implemented in the presence of armed groups, asking Annan: “Could you guarantee that these groups would commit to what we agree on?”
Assad also urged Annan to investigate who was funding and arming these groups, remarking that someone must be behind the money and weapons flooding into the country.
According to the same account, Syria is taking its time in responding to Annan’s proposals as it wants to coordinate the details with Russia and is mistrustful of the UN and Annan.
Its suspicions were reinforced by reports that after leaving Damascus, Annan flew to Qatar to meet its Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasem Al Khalifa. Perhaps he considers Qatar part of the war on Syria and went there to engage it in dialogue.
Rewarding Aleppo
Discussions with Syrian officials indicate that after the parliamentary elections scheduled for next May 7, a new “crisis-management” government is expected to be formed. It is likely to be headed by a figure from Aleppo in acknowledgement of the loyalty shown by the city to the regime. Damascenes are also likely to feature prominently in the government, reflecting the regime’s gratitude for their role in protecting it, especially the business and merchant class.
Sources close to Assad revealed that he turned down a suggestion made by his advisers to form a new political party. He told them: “I am a Baathist and I will remain one.”
On the Offensive
While the defensive diplomatic battle continues, the military and security battle on the ground has seen the regime increasingly take the offensive.
Sources close to the regime confirm that the Syrian army has re-established control over the city of Idlib in the north, and is poised to attack Jabal al-Zawiya. Estimates indicate that the operation there might last many months. However the regime has set itself a target of trying to “win militarily in the main cities and towns before the end of this month,” as well as securing the country’s main highways between population centers, in light of assessments that reasserting full security control “is going to take a long time.”
One hears debates in Damascus about how the issue of armed groups should be dealt with. Some still contend that Assad has been too lenient, and demand that he crack down harder. They argue that if that had happened at Daraa when the unrest began there, the turmoil would not have spread to other provinces.
An informed source says Assad opted for a different approach: “The president was right. The military solution required the correct political circumstances in addition to preparing the Syrian army for this kind of fighting and training it in urban and street warfare.”
According to this source, these tactics were employed in the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr, and “accomplished the mission with the least possible losses. The principle was adopted of controlling the neighborhood one house at a time. The army did not behave like a regular army that enters and establishes centers that turn into targets for gunmen. It used the style of commandos.”
The source indicates that Assad was convinced from the outset that the crisis would have to be dealt with “like a skin rash. In other words it cannot be remedied before it completely plays out. All one can do is reduce it and contain it to prevent it from spreading.”
Sources close to the regime say an effort is underway to restructure the 17 security agencies and place them – depending on the specialization of each – under the control of either the interior ministry, the army command, or the presidency. Combined, they will make up a new National Security Council. Assad wants this council to be truly accountable to the new parliament’s security and intelligence committees, which are to play a full role comparable to that of their counterparts in Western countries.
The sources say Assad is also keen to keep the security forces and the military out of civilian affairs and the media. All military and security personnel have been directed to stop dealing with the media and leave such matters to the relevant civilian officials.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Posted onMarch 15, 2012|Comments Off on Is the Arab Spring Bad for Women?
Overthrowing male dominance could be harder than overthrowing a dictator.
BY ISOBEL COLEMAN | DECEMBER 20, 2011
In many ways, 2011 has been the Year of the Arab Woman. From the earliest days of upheaval that started in Tunisia last December, women have been on the front lines of protest, leading public demonstrations, blogging passionately, covering the unrest as journalists, launching social media campaigns, smuggling munitions, and caring for the wounded. This month, when Tawakkol Karman became the first Arab woman to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, she gave an enthusiastic shout-out to her many Arab sisters who have struggled “to win their rights in a society dominated by the supremacy of men.”
Across the region, though, Arab women are grumbling that overthrowing dictators is proving easier than overturning the pervasive supremacy of men. Gamila Ismail, a prominent Egyptian activist and politician, summed it up when she quit Egypt’s parliamentary race in disgust after learning that she would be put third on the list in her district — not a winning position. “We women had a very important role before, during, and after the revolution, and it does not work for us today, to accept this,” she complained in a television interview. (She ran and narrowly lost as an independent candidate.) In Tunisia, disgruntled women activists have formed the October 24 Front to defend women’s rights in the aftermath of the Islamists’ electoral victory there. “We want a constitution that respects women’s rights and doesn’t roll back the advances we’ve made,” said one Tunisian protester.
Arab women are embattled on multiple fronts. First and foremost are the deep-seated patriarchal customs that constrain women. Patriarchy is certainly not unique to Arab lands, but it runs deep. It doesn’t help that for decades, the women’s rights agenda was closely associated with the now-discredited authoritarian regimes: Egypt’s Suzanne Mubarak ran a state-affiliated women’s NGO; Leila Ben Ali, Tunisia’s much-hated hairdresser-cum-first lady, was president of the Arab Women Organization, an intergovernmental body sponsored by the Arab League; and both Syria’s Asma al-Assad and Jordan’s Queen Rania have been active on women’s issues. The rise of politically empowered Islamist parties that contest existing laws for women on religious grounds also pose serious complications for women. Although women’s activism has clearly been important to the Arab revolts, there is no guarantee that women’s rights activists will be able to turn their engagement into longer-term economic, social, and political gains. In fact, in some countries, there is reason for concern that women will see their rights erode.
Libya is a case in point. At the ceremony marking Libya’s official liberation in October, one of the first announcements from Mustafa Abdel Jalil, leader of Libya’s National Transitional Council, was that any laws that contradicted sharia would be annulled. He specifically mentioned that, going forward, polygamy would be legal, drawing cheers and celebratory gunfire from the mostly male crowd. Libyan women expressed surprise and disappointment and wondered why, with all of Libya’s pressing issues, reinstating polygamy should be on the front burner. (NATO leaders wondered the same.) Although polygamy was technically legal under Qaddafi, it was discouraged and today is not practiced widely in Libya, but that could change. Female university students, who largely describe themselves as pious, vow to fight this regression.
In Egypt, a number of developments over the past year underscore women’s rights as a flashpoint in society. The inspirational images of gender solidarity in Tahrir Square in the early days of the revolution quickly gave way to ugly episodes of targeted harassment. A hastily planned demonstration on March 8, International Women’s Day, attracted a few hundred women but was marred by angry men shoving the protesters and yelling at them to go home, saying their demands for rights are against Islam. Around the same time, the Egyptian military rounded up scores of women demonstrators and, in a show of raw intimidation, subjected many of them to “virginity tests.” On the political level, women have been excluded from major decision-making bodies since the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, and it appears that few, if any, will win seats in the ongoing parliamentary elections. Their low success rate was not helped by the military’s decision to eliminate a Mubarak-era quota ensuring women 64 seats. This was a setback for women’s political participation, even though the quota enjoyed little credibility because it had been used to reward Mubarak loyalists.
The strong showing of Islamists parties in the first round of Egypt’s parliamentary elections has women’s groups worried. The ultraconservative Salafi groups, which took a surprising 20 percent of the vote, openly question a modern role for women in society. One Salafi leader refused to appear on a political talk show on television until the female host put on a headscarf. Another denounced the military government’s requirement to include women on electoral lists as “evil,” though Emad Abdel-Ghafour, head of al-Nour, the leading Salafi party, stated that the party does accept women candidates. Yet the Salafi women who did run demurred from showing their pictures on campaign materials, instead replacing their faces with pictures of flowers; moreover, the party deliberately clustered them at the bottom of its lists, making them unlikely to win seats. One Salafi sheikh recently issued an opinion that women should not wear high-heeled shoes in public. Along with Salafi statements of intent to ban alcohol and limit beach tourism, these swipes at women unnerve liberals.
Yet liberals have not been stalwarts of women’s rights in Egypt either. The 2000 decision to grant women the right to no-fault divorce (prior to this, they had to jump over the onerous legal hurdle of proving abuse or abandonment) was denounced not only by Islamist groups but by secular ones too — for undermining the family. Other changes to the personal-status laws in the past decade that have benefited women, particularly an expansion of custody rights, are coming under increasing attack. Critics discredit the reforms by derisively calling them “Suzanne’s Laws,” after Suzanne Mubarak. They claim the laws were intended to accommodate the wealthy friends of the former first lady, and they blame those statutes for a rise in the country’s divorce rate. Given the criticism of these laws from all sides of the political spectrum, it is likely that they will be amended by the new parliament, and not to women’s benefit.
Women seem to be faring better in Tunisia. Liberals and secularists have been deeply wary of the rise of al-Nahda, the country’s leading Islamist party, warning that it could mean a reversal of women’s rights. Since the 1950s, Tunisian women have enjoyed the most expansive legal rights in the region, including relatively progressive marriage and divorce laws and access to birth control and abortion. Since returning to Tunisia in the beginning of this year, Rached Ghannouchi, al-Nahda’s leader, has strived to convince Tunisians that his party will not seek to change the country’s personal-status laws. Some, however, have accused al-Nahda of obfuscating its real intentions behind moderate rhetoric — a charge that did not prevent the party from surging to victory with 41 percent of the vote in October’s election. Thanks to electoral rules requiring favorable placement of women on party lists, women gained 23 percent of the seats in parliament, a higher share than in the U.S. Congress. Most of the women are from al-Nahda and will likely reflect their party’s traditional views on women, but their participation in such large numbers at least normalizes an active political role for women. Moreover, Ghannouchi and other al-Nahda leaders so far have been purposefully focused on efforts to jump-start the economy, produce jobs, and reassure foreign investors. Al-Nahda has forged a coalition with liberal parties, and to maintain that coalition, it will have to continue to focus on the economy and human rights rather than getting bogged down in divisive culture wars.
Ghannouchi seems to understand that while rolling back gains for women can score points among Islamic conservatives, ultimately al-Nahda will win or lose on economic grounds, and women are important economic actors. With high rates of literacy and relatively low fertility, women constitute nearly a third of Tunisia’s workforce. Economic reality simply demands a pragmatic approach toward women. Let’s hope that Ghannouchi can get that message through to his Islamist brothers across the region. Otherwise, Arab women might soon be channeling their Iranian sisters, who have complained that Iran’s Islamic
