Russia’s strategy in Syria is moving forward.

Posted on May 28, 2012 | Comments Off on Russia’s strategy in Syria is moving forward.

By Bronco,  SyriaComment
28 May 2012

Russia has decided to change the international perception that it blindly supports Bashar Al Assad and his regime. It is now coming out with more ambiguous declarations that are immediately picked up and stripped from their context by the media to be presented in sentences like these” Russia condemn Syria’, “Russia ready to dump Bashar Al Assad”, “Russia is distancing from Bashar al Assad”

Russia’s strategy seems to work as now Russia does not appear as a biased and blind support of the Syrian regime and therefore could gain more acceptance from the Syrian opposition and the international community.

In perspective, Russia has succeeded in transforming the ‘regime change’ plan concocted by Qatar, Turkey and the SNC into a ‘peace plan’ under UN control that includes a dialog between the opposition and the Syrian regime.
Russia is now working on the next step which is to eliminate any opposition group that refuses the dialog with the regime.
The SNC is dead, The Friends of Syria too, the supporters of the hardline, France, is weaker. Turkey is isolated as even Qatar and Saudi have calmed down from verbal attacks on Bashar al Assad.

The aim of the Russians now is to evaluate the FSA capabilities and willingness to take over the opposition representation and move into the dialog part of the six-point Annan plan.
If the FSA shows its acceptance of that role, than Russia will lower its rhetoric on Bashar Al Assad as to gain the trust of the FSA.
In view of the new tone of Russia toward Bashar, I think the step two has started. More pressure is being applied both to the FSA and to Bashar to accept the dialog with the FSA as part of the opposition.
Of course elements loyal to the SNC and its sympathizers as well as some die hard within the Syrian regime are trying to prevent this dialog to happen. Bombs attacks and the massacre in Al Houla are part of these attempts to derail the plan.
Contrary to the USA, Russia’s strategy has been well thought and consistent. It is working patiently toward its aim that happens to coincide with UN Annan plan.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=14746&cp=7#comment-311698

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Posted in Russia, Syria, Syrian Opposition

Salafis gravitate towards the Brotherhood’s political pole

Posted on May 21, 2012 | Comments Off on Salafis gravitate towards the Brotherhood’s political pole

–
May 21, 2012-
Any Egyptian Muslim who does not vote for Mohammed Morsi will be bitten by a serpent in his grave for four years. That fatwa, attributed to a Salafi cleric last week, made headlines in the Arabic-language media because of its absurdity. There is no such punishment in Sharia, let alone one exacted for failing to vote a certain way in a presidential campaign.

But statements such as this, which are increasing during Egypt’s election season, merit a closer look. They underline two significant facts about Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: first, the two groups share more in common than either side would like to acknowledge. Second, the rift within the Salafi movement over which candidate to endorse shows that some factions are in many ways closer to the Muslim Brotherhood than to Salafism.

It is, of course, not surprising that Salafis endorse either Mr Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, or Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, after they failed to qualify an Islamist candidate of their own. But it is one thing for Salafis to endorse a Brotherhood candidate to ensure the implementation of Sharia, and quite another to campaign for the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious group. The Brotherhood, after all, has historically been the Salafis’ putative enemy.

A quick look at the history of Egyptian Salafism helps to explain these dynamics. It started as a grassroots movement in the late 1920s, a few years after the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, based on the promise to cleanse Egyptian society of newfangled, un-Islamic practices. The movement, known as Ansar Assuna Al Mohammadiyya, considered the Muslim Brotherhood’s political organising, underground activism and allegiance to a figurehead other than the ruler as un-Islamic. Nasser Addin Al Albani, who is considered the father of Egyptian Salafism, went so far as to say the Muslim Brotherhood was not part of Sunni Islam “because they flout the traditions”.

The Salafis’ confrontation with the Brotherhood reached an apex in the 1970s. During that period, dubbed the “Golden Age” of Egyptian Salafis, former president Anwar Sadat gave Salafis a free hand in universities to counter the creep of communism. After the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, the Brotherhood was allowed to organise in public after decades of repression. The rivalry between the two groups in the public sphere intensified.

The focus of Salafi attacks was on the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, which were considered too moderate. But in the universities, the Brotherhood demonstrated a superior organisation, and tried to prevent Salafis from holding public events. This prompted the Salafis to better organise themselves.

Shortly before Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the state again clamped down on the Brotherhood, and remained hostile for the duration of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. But up until 2002, Salafis continued to have a free hand in society. Meanwhile, Egyptians who wanted to study Sharia outside the state curriculum turned to Salafi clerics. Many Egyptians who were not necessarily Salafis frequented their mosques to study religion away from the state institutions.

To escape government persecution, even Muslim Brotherhood members joined Salafi mosques. Many devout Egyptians are closer to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood despite the influence of their Salafi teachers.

The contemporary movement known as Salafi Call, and its political offshoots Al Noor Party and Al Wasat Party, which have endorsed Mr Aboul Fotouh, all belong to the traditional Salafi movement. Although these groups have recently been involved in politics, they are still true to their rivalry with the Brotherhood. One of the stated reasons for endorsing Mr Aboul Fotouh is to check the Brotherhood and prevent its political monopoly.

Page 2 of 2

Another Salafi group that was formed last year, known as the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (ILBRR), along with its offshoots the Fadhila Party, Asala Party and Islah Party, have all endorsed Mr Morsi. The ILBRR, in fact, has striking similarities with the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of political tactics and organisation.

The group has been criticised by other Salafis for its inclination towards the Brotherhood. Mohammed Abdel Maqsoud, deputy chairman of ILBRR, has been accused by Salafis of “defending the Muslim Brotherhood as though he were one of its clerics”. In a rally for Mr Morsi on Saturday, Safwat Hijazi, a member of both the ILBRR and the Asala Party, said: “Not only do we support Mohammed Morsi but also the group [the Muslim Brotherhood] and its party.”

As a group, Salafis are still repositioning themselves ideologically in light of the fall of Mr Mubarak, which explains why Salafi members have rebelled against their own parties over the endorsement of Mr Aboul Futouh or Mr Morsi. It is also hard to tell whether some figures, such as Mr Hijazi, belong to the Brotherhood or to the Salafi movement.

It has been said that Islamist groups tend to splinter as they approach political power. This appears to apply to Salafis more than the Muslim Brotherhood. More Salafis are moving closer to the Brotherhood as so many of the differences between the two groups have collapsed after the downfall of the Mubarak regime and the Salafis’ involvement in politics. Now, Salafi scepticism about the Brotherhood, entrenched over decades, is further eroding as Salafis campaign for their lifelong rivals.

 

hhassan@thenational.ae

On Twitter: @hhassan140

One-page article

Any Egyptian Muslim who does not vote for Mohammed Morsi will be bitten by a serpent in his grave for four years. That fatwa, attributed to a Salafi cleric last week, made headlines in the Arabic-language media because of its absurdity. There is no such punishment in Sharia, let alone one exacted for failing to vote a certain way in a presidential campaign.

But statements such as this, which are increasing during Egypt’s election season, merit a closer look. They underline two significant facts about Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: first, the two groups share more in common than either side would like to acknowledge. Second, the rift within the Salafi movement over which candidate to endorse shows that some factions are in many ways closer to the Muslim Brotherhood than to Salafism.

It is, of course, not surprising that Salafis endorse either Mr Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, or Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, after they failed to qualify an Islamist candidate of their own. But it is one thing for Salafis to endorse a Brotherhood candidate to ensure the implementation of Sharia, and quite another to campaign for the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious group. The Brotherhood, after all, has historically been the Salafis’ putative enemy.

A quick look at the history of Egyptian Salafism helps to explain these dynamics. It started as a grassroots movement in the late 1920s, a few years after the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, based on the promise to cleanse Egyptian society of newfangled, un-Islamic practices. The movement, known as Ansar Assuna Al Mohammadiyya, considered the Muslim Brotherhood’s political organising, underground activism and allegiance to a figurehead other than the ruler as un-Islamic. Nasser Addin Al Albani, who is considered the father of Egyptian Salafism, went so far as to say the Muslim Brotherhood was not part of Sunni Islam “because they flout the traditions”.

The Salafis’ confrontation with the Brotherhood reached an apex in the 1970s. During that period, dubbed the “Golden Age” of Egyptian Salafis, former president Anwar Sadat gave Salafis a free hand in universities to counter the creep of communism. After the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, the Brotherhood was allowed to organise in public after decades of repression. The rivalry between the two groups in the public sphere intensified.

The focus of Salafi attacks was on the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, which were considered too moderate. But in the universities, the Brotherhood demonstrated a superior organisation, and tried to prevent Salafis from holding public events. This prompted the Salafis to better organise themselves.

Shortly before Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the state again clamped down on the Brotherhood, and remained hostile for the duration of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. But up until 2002, Salafis continued to have a free hand in society. Meanwhile, Egyptians who wanted to study Sharia outside the state curriculum turned to Salafi clerics. Many Egyptians who were not necessarily Salafis frequented their mosques to study religion away from the state institutions.

To escape government persecution, even Muslim Brotherhood members joined Salafi mosques. Many devout Egyptians are closer to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood despite the influence of their Salafi teachers.

The contemporary movement known as Salafi Call, and its political offshoots Al Noor Party and Al Wasat Party, which have endorsed Mr Aboul Fotouh, all belong to the traditional Salafi movement. Although these groups have recently been involved in politics, they are still true to their rivalry with the Brotherhood. One of the stated reasons for endorsing Mr Aboul Fotouh is to check the Brotherhood and prevent its political monopoly.

Another Salafi group that was formed last year, known as the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (ILBRR), along with its offshoots the Fadhila Party, Asala Party and Islah Party, have all endorsed Mr Morsi. The ILBRR, in fact, has striking similarities with the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of political tactics and organisation.

The group has been criticised by other Salafis for its inclination towards the Brotherhood. Mohammed Abdel Maqsoud, deputy chairman of ILBRR, has been accused by Salafis of “defending the Muslim Brotherhood as though he were one of its clerics”. In a rally for Mr Morsi on Saturday, Safwat Hijazi, a member of both the ILBRR and the Asala Party, said: “Not only do we support Mohammed Morsi but also the group [the Muslim Brotherhood] and its party.”

As a group, Salafis are still repositioning themselves ideologically in light of the fall of Mr Mubarak, which explains why Salafi members have rebelled against their own parties over the endorsement of Mr Aboul Futouh or Mr Morsi. It is also hard to tell whether some figures, such as Mr Hijazi, belong to the Brotherhood or to the Salafi movement.

It has been said that Islamist groups tend to splinter as they approach political power. This appears to apply to Salafis more than the Muslim Brotherhood. More Salafis are moving closer to the Brotherhood as so many of the differences between the two groups have collapsed after the downfall of the Mubarak regime and the Salafis’ involvement in politics. Now, Salafi scepticism about the Brotherhood, entrenched over decades, is further eroding as Salafis campaign for their lifelong rivals.

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/salafis-gravitate-towards-the-brotherhoods-political-pole

hhassan@thenational.ae

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Posted in Egypt, Religion, US Middle East Politics

Qatar’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood affect entire region

Posted on May 18, 2012 | Comments Off on Qatar’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood affect entire region

By: Ahmed Azem-
May 18, 2012-
The alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar is becoming a noticeable factor in the reshaping of the Middle East. There are several striking aspects to this evolving and deepening relationship.

First, note that the Brotherhood is barely involved in Qatari domestic affairs. The arrangement is akin to the one between Qatar and Al Jazeera, the biggest Arab television channel, which is based in Doha. The station covers news throughout the Arab world but refrains from covering controversial events in Qatar.

As a formal organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar dissolved itself in 1999. Jasim Sultan – a former member of the Qatari Brotherhood – has explained in a television interview that this decision was justified because the state was carrying out its religious duties.

Mr Sultan supervises the Al Nahdah (Awakening) Project, which involves training, publishing and lecturing about public activism. Last August, he wrote an article asking Egyptian Islamists to change their discourse and move towards “partnership thought” instead of concentrating on “infiltrating the society to control it”. Mr Sultan is active in training Islamists in Egypt and other countries on how to function within the institutions of democracy.

The second point of interest about Qatar and the Brotherhood is that the relationship was formed and is maintained largely through personal ties, which play a vital role. Doha has hosted individual activists, providing them with refuge and employment.

Yusif Al Qaradawi, a Qatari national and resident of Egyptian origin, is a good example. He is the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, and his television programme on Islamic laws and principles has made him a star on Al Jazeera. His current relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood is not clear, but he has been a leading member, and is highly respected by its members around the world.

One striking example of his influence is a recent photograph of him with Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minster of Hamas in Gaza. (Hamas is an arm of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.) In the image, Mr Haniyeh, during a recent visit to Qatar, is bowing and kissing Mr Al Qaradawi’s hand in a show of respect.

To better understand the role of Qatari-Islamist harmony in the Arab revolutions, consider the Academy of Change, headed by Hisham Mursi, an Egyptian paediatrician and British national living in Doha. News reports identify him as the son-in-law of Mr Al Qaradawi.

Mr Mursi has been active in Egypt’s revolution from the very beginning. When he was arrested in the early days of the protests, Muslim Brotherhood websites campaigned for his release. His organisation takes a special interest in non-violent protest tactics; he has written manuals on the subject. He acknowledges, on the Academy of Change’s website, that he benefits from the cooperation of Mr Sultan.

Another example of personal ties involves Rafiq Abdulsalaam, Tunisia’s foreign minister. He is the son-in-law of Rashid Al Ghanouchi, the head of Ennahda, Tunisia’s Muslim Brotherhood party. Mr Abdulasalaam was formerly the head of the Research and Studies Division in the Al Jazeera Centre in Doha.

An example from Libya is Ali Sallabi, described last December by The Washington Post as the “chief architect of Libya’s most likely next government”. Mr Sallabi has lived in Qatar for several years.

A third point to understand is what Qatar provides for the Brotherhood. There are strong indications of media help, political training and financial support. The role of people like those named above offers circumstantial evidence of such support. Further, key staff members of Al Jazeera have had – and maintain – close connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. These include the previous general manager, Waddah Khanfar, the head of the Amman office, Yasser Abu Hillaleh, and the Egyptian TV presenter, Ahmad Mansur.

Last August, Nevin Mus’ad, a politics professor at Cairo University, told the Egyptian daily Al Shorouq that she was surprised to notice that the university was offering a training course on democracy and human rights, organised by the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar. She said bearded men wearing the jilbab (Islamist dress) were organising the entrance of participants, most of whom were wearing Islamist dress. The women were veiled.

In Libya, Mr Sallabi – who is known also for his connection to Mr Al Qaradawi – told reporters that he had asked the Qatari leadership for assistance during the early stages of the Libyan revolution.

Last year Al Akhbar, a Lebanese newspaper close to Hizbollah (Damascus’s strong ally), said the rift between Qatar and the Syrian regime occurred when Doha attempted to convince Syrian President Bashar Al Assad to form an interim ruling council including Muslim Brotherhood representation.

The fourth factor helpful in understanding the Qatar-Brotherhood alliance involves what Qatar stands to gain.

First, the relationship ensures that Islamists will not criticise Qatari government policies or be active there. Second, as Islamists head towards power in several countries, Qataris are in position to expect special economic and political treatment in each. Third, Qatar will be well-positioned to mediate between Islamists and their rivals, and also between Islamists in general and the West. The Afghan Taliban, for example, are now expected to open an office in Qatar. Such developments offer Qatar greater international influence.

Dr Ahmad Jamil Azem is a visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge’s faculty of Asian and Middle East studies

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/qatars-ties-with-the-muslim-brotherhood-affect-entire-region#full

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Posted in Religion

‘Dubaiziation’ versus… what?

Posted on May 12, 2012 | Comments Off on ‘Dubaiziation’ versus… what?

By: Ece Temelkuran-

Published Friday, May 11, 2012-

“So do you think Turkey is being Islamized?”
Although my speech was more or less a detailed account of Turkey’s domestic politics, I was expecting this classical and rather shallow question from the audience. Last week at the Bruno Kreisky Forum in Vienna, our topic of the day was the rising authoritarianism in Turkey. Yet again, Islamization is still inevitably the most juicy topic for some European audiences. Not only because it is easier to ask about and almost impossible to answer, but also because their expectations for Eastern European and Middle Eastern democracies are so low that they prefer to stick to the good old horrors of Islamization when talking about Turkey. My answer was “Maybe and maybe not. But that is not the real problem.” I still think that the real problem is not the rising conservatism or Islamization of society, but the “Dubaization” of the country’s landscape, and therefore the shopping malls.

This whole mall-show becomes painfully ironic when the shopping mall is located in the largest Kurdish town of Diyarbakır, which is a symbol for the Kurdish political struggle. Among several shopping malls in town, there is one that hosts a big men’s clothing shop called “The Identity”. Kurdish people who still suffer due to the lack of an “official identity” can freely go to the shop and dress themselves in “Identity” completely according to their personal tastes.

The AKP officials and the Prime Minister prefer to refer to the shopping malls as the sign of a prosperous country. If you are not a visitor to this parallel life, if you are not fine with freedom to consume or the illusion of consumption then there really must be something wrong with you. This automatically means that you are excommunicated from “society” and become an outsider, which, as we are very well taught, means invisibility on a good day and teargas on a not so good day. “Come to our very own Dubai” they say, “What more do you want, for God’s sake!”

Syria is still in question. USA officials constantly make statements that it is impossible to “do it” without Turkey. If the unspeakable happens and Turkey eventually becomes the enforced “leader of the region”, the model will become the social and economic project for the entire Sunni world. As the two powers and their rhetoric -one owned by Qatar and Turkey, the other by Iran and Syria- clash in the region, one can not stop but wonder about another big question. It might be horrifyingly limited and apparently not so brilliant, but the Sunni world has an international societal and economic project for the region. What has Iran got?

Ece Temelkuran is a political commentator, novelist and author of several books published in Turkish and English.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar’s editorial policy

Source URL:http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/%E2%80%98dubaiziation%E2%80%99-versus-what

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Posted in Religion, Turkey

Egypt’s Presidential Vote: US Picks Its Favorite

Posted on May 10, 2012 | Comments Off on Egypt’s Presidential Vote: US Picks Its Favorite

Elie Chalhoub -Published Thursday, May 10, 2012-

The upcoming presidential elections could determine Egypt’s future political positioning in a volatile region. Major world powers including the US are monitoring developments with great interest.

It has become clear that the intensification of the presidential election contest in Egypt is not only due to rivalries between the domestic political forces competing over the top job in the country.

Many issues are also at stake at the strategic level, including Egypt’s future regional role and its policy on key issues. These are deemed vital by various players both inside and outside the country, notably the US and Israel, whose policies in the region have been inextricably linked for decades.

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, which raised the banner of anti-imperialist national liberation struggle and resistance to Zionism, turned Cairo into a regional superpower that wielded formidable influence throughout the Arab world.

Anwar al-Sadat’s Egypt, which aligned itself with the US and made peace with Israel, was isolated and ostracized by the Arab and Islamic world.

Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, which so aligned itself with Israel that its president became Zionism’s “strategic treasure”, turned in on itself. Its aspirations were confined to sustaining the regime, which the masses brought down in Tahrir Square.

 

 

 

What will tomorrow’s Egypt be like? Which of these models will it adopt? The behaviour of the military establishment will doubtless be important in this regard. Egypt’s economic needs are also a factor that cannot be ignored. But the decisive say will be with the political authority that finally emerges from the belly of the active popular forces that brought down the previous regime.

 

The forthcoming presidential elections have become the principal arena in which this battle is being fought. Virtually every regional and international power with a stake in the outcome has been exerting whatever influence it can in a bid to secure victory for the candidate it thinks most attuned to its interests.

The major player in this regard may be the US, given its long-established relations in Egypt – with the former regime, the military, and civil society alike – and the enormous influence it wields over the regional actors who are involved in this game.

Regarding this issue, Arab diplomatic sources point to a report that was prepared by US intelligence agencies for the Obama administration, and passed on by the State Department to a number of regional governments. The document both assesses the Egyptian presidential election campaign and makes recommendations for US policy and actions.

The report acknowledges that there is widespread public feeling that Egypt has hitherto been prevented from playing its natural role in the Arab and Islamic world, and that it should take a stronger stand against the US and Israel. It sees the spate of bombings of the pipeline supplying Egyptian natural gas to Israel as a manifestation of this, and warns that it might eventually result in the abrogation of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.

Accordingly, the report argues that the Muslim Brotherhood should be prevented from winning the presidential elections by all means – including by aggravating rivalries with other Islamist groups, including the Salafis and al-Qaeda sympathizers. The diplomatic sources suggested that the recent violent clashes at the defense ministry headquarters may have been an early manifestation of this.

The report recommends that the US support the candidacy either of Amr Moussa, the former foreign minister and Arab League secretary-general, or ex-premier Ahmad Shafiq. The diplomatic sources, however, said that the Americans are aware that Shafiq lacks the charisma, popularity and legitimacy needed to stand any chance of winning, and are in practice backing Moussa. They said a team of British intelligence operatives had been formed to covertly support his candidacy.

The sources stressed that this does not mean this team is working with Moussa, or that he approves or is even aware of it. Yet he remains Washington’s preferred choice because it believes that while he may talk tough on Egypt’s role, Arab solidarity and Palestine, he will not have the power to carry out any promises he makes.

 

 

 

According to the sources , the report adds that if victory cannot be secured for Moussa or Shafiq, the preferred alternative candidate would be independent Islamist candidate Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh. It reasons that as he broke off from the Brotherhood, he lacks the mass social base he would need to restore Egypt’s leading regional role, and his victory would also undermine the Brotherhood’s public standing generally. The sources suggest that the disqualification of the Brotherhood’s original candidate, Khayrat el-Shater, may have been the first step towards realizing this scenario.

 

Although the Brotherhood has kept a low public profile concerning Israel and the peace treaty, the Americans still worry about it, on the grounds that it is the only political force with enough of a mass base and sufficient historical and religious legitimacy to lead Egypt on to a new course in foreign policy. Its traditionally anti-imperialist approach and record of support for the Palestinian cause give it much in common with the Iran’s Khomeinist Islamists in this regard.

“The American priority is, therefore, firstly to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from reaching the presidency, because they carry these characteristics and these ideological genes, and secondly to undermine the appeal of the broader Islamic project, assisted by the weakness of the Brotherhood’s own stands,” the sources said.

These sources also said there were signs that movements were afoot within Egypt to encourage the three Islamist presidential candidates to join forces with Nasserist hopeful Hamdeen Sabahi and rally their supporters behind a single agreed nominee. The aim would be to ensure that a supporter of the Islamist/ Arab nationalist project made it through the first round, thus enabling the country’s two largest popular forces to make their influence felt in determining Egypt’s future place on the region’s geostrategic map.

Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)

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Posted in Egypt, US Middle East Politics

UN Mission Chief in Syria Offers Cautious Hope

Posted on May 5, 2012 | Comments Off on UN Mission Chief in Syria Offers Cautious Hope
 May 5th, 2012 –

The following is a transcript of an interview with the Head of the U.N. Supervision Mission in Syria, Norwegian General Robert Mood, done in Damascus on May 5, 2012 by VOA Middle East Correspondent Elizabeth Arrott.

Elizabeth Arrott: U.N. officials have said they’ve seen signs that there’s been a reduction in violence under the plan, but we’re still seeing these amateur videos of really quite horrific attacks. What can you quantify in terms of a reduction in violence since you have been here?

General Robert Mood: I arrived six days ago, on Sunday, so the mission has been on the ground for six days. What is very important to note is that where we go, currently, with forty unarmed observers, but we are spreading out into different cities – so we are on the ground in Homs, in Hama, in Idlib and Daraa and Rif Damascus – we see that we have a calming effect on the situation, so we have seen in these places a significant reduction in shelling. We have seen a significant reduction in shooting. We cannot be in all places obviously with that amount of observers, but I can indeed can verify that in six days we have seen a calming effect and a reduction in violence where we have people deployed on the ground.

Arrott: Specifically, do you see things like the Syrian army not firing unless it is being fired upon. Have you have seen the withdrawal of tanks, of troops back to their barracks and if so that they’ve stayed there and it’s continued after your team has left. Is there a way to monitor that?

Mood: What I can verify in a couple of instances, in several instances that my observers already on the ground have engaged with both elements from the Syrian army and with elements from the opposition and they have taken the advice of the observers to move to a different location because this would be seen as something that would be challenging the agreement and the commitment that has been made by the parties. So, we are seeing very specific, concrete steps on the ground that the arrival of the observers have an effect and their advice on the ground is being respected.

Arrott: And again, how can you ensure that is held after you leave the area?

Mood: Our challenge indeed that we are currently have forty observers and we will become 300 observers I hope by the end of the month if not earlier. We cannot obviously be in every hot spot all the time, and whether you have 300 or several more hundred observers that is going to continue to be the case. So, what we are working on is a specific plan where you can go back to the specific site where you had an engagement, where you gave an advice and to verify that the advice when it was taken is respected also twelve hours or twenty four hours or two days later.

Arrott: The point of the mission is to get to a point where it’s calm enough that serious political talks can take place, presumably that would be Mr. Anan’s call when that is being reached, but from a military stand point, what are you looking for?

Mood: We are specifically looking, in UNSMIS (UN Supervision Mission in Syria), at the violence, at the cessation of violence, at the calming effect and of course we are combining that with the talks we have with all parties, with leaders from many factions. I have myself left what we could name government controlled areas and had engagement locally, on the ground, with the opposition, with the armed opposition and received commitments from them. And a common message, a very strong common message from the government and from the opposition is that they would like to see Kofi Annan succeed with his Six Point Plan. I get the sense that there is a willingness. We should not overestimate it. It is too early to judge how big this opportunity is. But I get a sense that all the players are eager to see this move forward on the basis of political solutions because they see that the alternative – more violence, more kids being killed, more trouble for families in these hot spots – is a very bad alternative.

Arrott: So you’re hearing from the Free Syrian Army people here that they want to abide by the plan, but we’re also hearing from the opposition, especially outside, that they want to have the military wing of the opposition armed.

Mood: There is an element of fragmentation in all this that obviously is a challenge. But what I can tell you from my engagement is that whomever I meet, they tell me that they want to move on the basis of Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan, and that includes the Free Syrian Army locally, and that includes Local Coordination Committees. I am fully aware that there are others with different agenda, that have other ideas, but I have yet to see a credible alternative to Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan. So one way to put it is that it’s for now the only game in town. That means everyone involved, whether we are talking about the observers on the ground, whether we are talking about Kofi Annan, whether we are talking about the Syrian government, the opposition, everyone, they need to work together and to try, each of them, to widen these opportunities and then we have a choice. We can move in a direction of a political solution, slowly, step by step. Not in six days, not in twelve days, but step by step in a direction where we will have the political dimension being dominating instead of the violence being dominating.

Arrott: There seems to be an additional wild card thrown into this: the emergence of some jihadist groups like Jabhat al Nusra. How serious do you think the threat is that they could scuttle the plan by making it impossible for the Syrian government to stand down?

Mood: I’ve heard, I’ve been given these messages by several people. I cannot verify that there are other groups on the ground but I’m receiving the same messages. Now the message from me, from the mission, from the U.N. and I believe in this context I could also add from the other players involved is we are not going to serve the aspirations of the Syrian people by more weapons, by more bombs, by more violence. We are going to serve the aspirations of the Syrian people and the families and the children of Syria by choosing the other route. So whomever, whomever sees more guns, more bombs, more violence as a solution in Syria should refrain from putting that into the situation and give the Syrian people the opportunity to move forward without violence.

Arrott: Have you heard reports about the emergence of these groups, presumably from the government, but also from the opposition side?

Mood: I have heard the argument from several sides that there are, might be someone in the country that come from the outside and to be quite frank, I’ve also received the message from almost the same players across the spectrum that they don’t want to see the future of Syria a very proud, warm, hospitable people being dictated by groups from the outside, having different agendas. They want the Syrian people to decide their direction on the basis of Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan.

Arrott: On a practical matter, we’ve heard reports that sometimes when people opposed to the government come and speak to the monitors when they’re traveling around, that there have been reprisals against them afterwards. What steps do you take to make sure that while you’re trying to help that you don’t actually make the situation worse for certain individuals?

Mood: There’s obviously a risk when we are in a situation where you have what you could call an abyss of suspicion. Not surprisingly and understandable from whichever direction you look at it, that you the fear of how information might be used and you have different reports on these things going on. So, what we are doing on the ground is to make sure that when we engage with people that we are doing that in a place, in a setting where, to the extent possible, we can hope, we can believe, we can verify that risk is minimized. And we also take very strong care that we are using names, we are using any information in a way that will not put anyone at a greater risk.

Arrott: The mission, obviously, is to work for the cease-fire but there are other elements involved including the release of detained, arbitrarily detained people, the easing of the humanitarian situation. You’re stretched so thin on the monitoring level, how do you prioritize these other areas?

Mood: The mission of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria can be described, simplified in two dimensions. We are focussing on monitoring the cessation of armed violence in all its forms. We’re doing that by presence on the ground, by pushing out and by engaging in a dialogue building trust with the parties. The second part of it, which is secondary, is to support the other elements of the Kofi Annan’s plan. On these issues you have the humanitarian issues, you have the detainees issues, you have other issues on these issues, we report, based on listening, seeing, going to places and observing and when we collect that information, we make sure that that assessment, that evaluation, that information is received by the agencies that have a delivery responsibility in Syria. Key players being the Syrian Red Crescent, key players being the other agencies, delivering on this. Our role is to report and then try to give them, or verify the information to them so that they can take care of the delivering aspects of those points of Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan.

Arrott: In your time previously in Syria, you’ve spoken about the warmth of the Syrian people. Among the people that you built relations with, were any of them opposed to Assad and being able to in what you call the abyss of suspicion in previous times?

 

Mood: I left Syria last time in February 2011. It was a very different situation. I think it’s key for any audience, if I might use that term, outside Syria to understand that the Syria we meet on the ground is very different from the Syria they see through the dramatic headlines in the media and through the reports in the written media. The Syrian people, they are proud, they are warm, they are extremely proud of their history. They are also proud of the secular characteristics of their society. And they are scared about the alternative, many of them, because that alternative for them is seen as a collapse and a direction that would lead to even more violence and more suffering.

So at the surface of it, in Syria today, the amount of normalcy, to put it that way, across the country is rather surprising. And the highways, they’re all very high quality, so you can, if you travel in Syria avoiding, let’s say, the hotspots, you can get a feel for a very, very normal, open, hospitable country almost a normalcy. But then you have almost a black and white change, because when you go into the hotspots, you meet children, families, individuals that have been through a terrible amount of suffering and that are living under conditions that are not conditions any human beings should be living under. So it’s a different situation.

But I think it’s fair to say that the Syrian people, they are now at a very, very important crossroads they Syrian government and the opposition alike. There is a possibility. We have a choice. We can move this country together the observer force, the government, the opposition, the politicians in the direction of less violence and a political solution. The other choice is not something I want to talk about and address, but it’s a choice that I hear all the parties being skeptical to and fearing. That provides some hope for the future of this mission and and the future of the Syrian people and their aspirations.

http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/05/05/un-mission-chief-in-syria-offers-cautious-hope/

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Posted in Syria, Syrian Opposition, United Nations

“Sunni” Turkey and the containment policy failure

Posted on April 26, 2012 | Comments Off on “Sunni” Turkey and the containment policy failure

Thursday 26 April 2012–
By Adel Al Toraifi-

When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Tehran in May 2010, to offer support for the Brazilian project regarding the Iranian nuclear file, the conservative press in Iran described Erdoğan as an example of wise leadership in the region. Some newspapers also devoted extensive column inches to Erdoğan’s statements in support of Iran, particularly his critical stance towards Israel and the Western world’s view of Muslim states. Some commentators even considered Turkish-Iranian relations to be a model of stability and cooperation, arguing that since the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin – or the Treaty of Zuhab as it is known in Turkey – in 1639 between the Ottoman and Safavid empires, borders have continually been respected; this agreement remains the basis for all border treaties between the two countries.
Over the past ten years, the government of the Turkish Justice and Development Party [AKP] has been able to converge with Iran and Syria, to the extent that Iran supported Turkey’s military campaign against the strongholds of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party [PKK] in 2006, and to the extent that Syria retracted its position regarding the Iskenderun region, and abolished the need for visas to travel between the two countries. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its economic ties with both Syria and Iran to exceed record figures in just a few years; even obtaining Iranian concessions in the oil and gas sectors. Perhaps this is what prompted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to preach of a pro-resistance Iranian-Syrian axis including both Turkey and Iraq, in the face of what he considered to be the counter forces of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf States (al-Hayat newspaper, 26 October 2010).
In truth, Turkey let down the expectations of observers after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime; it did not seek to fill the Sunni vacuum caused by the rise of Shia political Islam to power in Iraq, nor did it show any desire to restore its Ottoman heritage in old spheres of influence. On the contrary, Turkey’s Islamists adopted a more conciliatory tone with the Syrian Baathist party, and were less sensitive towards Iranian revolutionary activities in the region, perhaps because the “containment policy” [towards Syria and Iran] that Erdoğan and his party take pride in had reaped substantial benefits for Turkey. However, in the last year, this policy has been exposed to a sizeable tremor, forcing Turkey to significantly re-evaluate its relations.
When the popular uprisings began in some Arab capitals in early 2011, Turkey tried to wait before declaring its support for the masses, but showed resistance to foreign intervention in Libya, and Erdoğan himself issued strong criticism towards NATO. Even when the uprising began in Syria, Turkey dispatched its diplomats to Damascus in an attempt to contain the situation and convince al-Assad to conduct reforms, but with the rising death toll on the Syrian streets, Ankara issued a series of statements condemning the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Not long afterwards, Turkey was compelled to participate – logistically at least – in NATO operations in Libya, and this damaged its relations with Tehran significantly. Turkey’s stance seemed hesitant; while Erdoğan was releasing statements threatening direct military intervention, and threatening al-Assad with the same fate met by Gaddafi, Turkey’s diplomatic apparatus appeared more cautious and less zealous than the speeches of the Turkish leader. This prompted many observers to say that Turkey was witnessing a divide, either in the military institution or in the foreign affairs department, regarding the danger of intervention or regime change in Syria due to security reasons, and because of dimensions of ethnicity and sectarianism, which could extend into Turkey itself if Syria turned into a scene of sectarian warfare between Turkey, Iran and other Arab parties.
In order to understand the shift in Turkish foreign policy, we need to review some historical facts, and here I am alluding to three historical stages:
First: It is not true that the history of Turkish-Iranian relations has always been stable, as claimed by the Turkish advocates of rapprochement with Iran, because Turkish-Iranian relations remained troubled and unstable until the last decade. In his book “Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey” (2007), Soner Cagaptay indicates that there is an illusion with regards to the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, confirming that the tension inherent in Turkish-Iranian relations is based on nationalist and sectarian reasons, which have remained constant even after the emergence of a modern state in both countries. In fact, the Turkish-Iranian clash goes far beyond the four major wars between the two parties. It is true that Reza Shah was an admirer of Ataturk’s secular nationalist project, but at the same time both countries fought a war in 1930 that led to the amendment of the border treaty between them. After that, Turkey broke off contacts with Tehran, in order to orientate towards the West at the expense of the region.
Second: The Turkish position was clear in its rejection of the Iranian revolutionary model, and Turkey played a prominent role as a member of NATO in addressing Iran’s aspirations to export its revolution. Perhaps for this reason the Khomeini regime supported left-wing Kurdish, Armenian and Islamist armed groups, such as the Turkish Hezbollah, against Ankara during the 1980s, and the late Turkish Prime Minister Turgut ضzal led a clear policy in support of Pakistan during the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Turkey remained skeptical of the intentions of the Iranian regime. The 1990s witnessed the assassination of several secular Turkish intellectuals and journalists, and Ankara accused Tehran of being involved.
Third: The idea of rapprochement with Tehran was the initiative of Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, who is considered the godfather of converging relations with the Islamic Republic. He paved the way for the visit of President Mohammad Khatami, and the signing of oil and security agreements between the two countries. This approach was opposed by some leaders of military and secular institutions, who saw it as an attempt by the Islamists of Turkey to repeat the Khomeinist model in their own country. Perhaps this explains Erbakan’s visit to Tehran after his political ban was lifted in 2009, and also explains Ali Velayati, Iran’s former Foreign Minister and adviser to the Supreme Guide, saying that Erbakan has always been a friend of Iran.
Such historical milestones are important in order to explain the Turkish shift from a policy of containment towards Iran and Syria between 2003 and 2010, and the current state of verbal sparring between the two sides. In recent months, Erdoğan has received several opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani, [Iraqi Vice President] Tariq al-Hashemi and Iyad Allawi. He has gone even further than this and accused al-Maliki of adopting a dictatorial and sectarian trend, whereby he excludes his opponents. In return, al-Maliki reacted to Erdoğan’s move by visiting Tehran, condemning what he termed the ”sectarian” – meaning Sunni – interference in his government in Iraq, branding Turkey as a “hostile” state in the region.
There can be no doubt that Turkey is re-evaluating its relations with Iraq and Syria. Yet, at the same time, I must emphasize that there are two currents within the Turkish policymaking sphere: one is eager to confront the Syrian-Iranian axis, and the other current – which includes figures from within Erdoğan’s own party – continues to warn against abandoning the containment policy that has been adopted towards these two countries.
Recent events have proven that the historical differences between the two parties still exist; no matter how Turkey has tried to use its containment policy, it has eventually been forced to resort to its “Sunni” identity and “Turkish” nationalism, even if indirectly. This is nothing new. When the Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in February 1988 between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the Southern Caucasus, Iran and Turkey adopted contrasting positions towards the crisis, which sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries. Iran had sought to embrace the Azerbaijanis with open arms, welcoming them as Shiites and revolutionaries, whilst Turkey was wary of the expansion of Khomeini’s influence in the Southern Caucasus. This prompted Prime Minister Turgut ضzal to overtly declare, during his visit to the US in 1990, that “the Azerbaijanis are Shia, unlike the Turks, and hence, of more concern to Iran, since Turkey does not have pan-Turkic ambitions.”
Today, Turkish-Iranian disagreements over Syria are being renewed. The Turks have made no secret of their feeling that their interests will be jeopardized so long as the Bashar al-Assad regime remains in power. As for Iran, it considers the Turkish stance – especially Turkey’s sponsorship of the Syrian Transitional Council and the asylum it is granting to the displaced Syrian Sunnis – to represent a hostile approach towards its strategic interest, namely the survival of its Baathist ally.
There is no doubt that, for the most part, politics is governed by interests, which may explain Turkey reconsidering its containment policy towards the Iranian-Syrian axis, for its interests are now at stake. The Turks fear the danger of the Syrian Kurds rising to power after al-Assad is overthrown, and they fear that relations with the Alawite minority in Turkey may become strained, and they are therefore now seeking a Muslim Brotherhood alternative to rule Syria.
In 1985, Turgut ضzal expressed his disappointment at the future of Iran under the rule of the mullahs, and the Iranian press reacted by saying “Turkey is nothing more than a pawn for US interests.” 25 years later, Erdoğan directed similar words of criticism towards Iran, and this prompted the Iranian press to react by saying “Turkey is implementing an American agenda to spread the Turkish model of political Islam.”

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=29406

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Posted in Iran, Middle East Geopolitics, Turkey

The Turkish model, all or nothing

Posted on April 23, 2012 | Comments Off on The Turkish model, all or nothing

Monday 23 April 2012–
By Hussein Shobokshi-

The political model extolled by all those belonging to Islamist political currents in our region is the one that has been achieved by Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. This model is the argument that is put forward whenever anybody questions Islamist political currents’ readiness to lead governments.
However, the political scene in Egypt, especially where the Muslim Brotherhood and its official political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party – not to mention the Salafist al-Nour party– are concerned, seems to be highly tumultuous. Their reckless performances, not to mention their “distance” from the sought-after Turkish political model, have been cited as the cause of this chaos, and this is because what the Islamist political parties in Egypt are advocating ultimately has nothing to do with the Turkish model.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a man who is implementing democracy to its fullest extent, without enforcing any control, transgression or elimination of others. Despite his Islamist doctrine, Erdogan does not deprive other sects and denominations from their equal right to practice full citizenship without question or decrement. They are not judged by double standards. Moreover, there is true economic freedom which allows progress and development for all sectors. Over and above, there is respect for freedom of speech, freedom of expression and media freedoms. Thanks to this healthy political climate, we have not seen extremist figures in Turkey try to assassinate a Nobel Laureate, for example, as happened in Egypt with the attempted assassination of Naguib Mahfouz.
Turkey is a civil state that is ruled by an Islamist-flavoured party, which also enjoys a parliamentary majority. However the Turkish state and government respect the rights of the Turkish people; they respect [diplomatic] agreements and the rights of others. This is a state of law; it is the criteria and rule, it is the means through which noble goals are achieved. This is something that the Islamist movement ruling Tunisia understands, whilst the Islamist movements in Syria who are seeking power also eventually understood this. However their counterpart movements in Egypt – as well as other countries – have failed to fully appreciate this.
The Erdogan model should be taken as it is, because Erdogan himself is the product of the political atmosphere in Turkey, and it was this same atmosphere that allowed for the formation of political parties, as well as the freedom to stand for elections and participate in politics, so long as people’s rights are not infringed upon or violated. More than this, and I am certain this next statement will provoke the Armenians in particular, but it is the truth: there is more tolerance and coexistence today in Turkey than there is in Armenia itself. People there live in their shells, isolated from the outside world, no matter how much they try to coexist with others. Indeed, the Armenians today even refuse to marry outside of their Church.
We may be glad of the Islamist parties desire to imitate the Turkish mode, but they must take this model in its entirety. Turkish civilization possessed a degree of tolerance which allowed Mimar Sinan, the Christian Armenian architect, to become the most famous builder of Istanbul mosques. This same tolerance allowed Turkey’s Muslim clerics to become a marja [Islamic reference] for tolerance and coexistence, away from hard-line attitudes and extremist behaviour. Again, this tolerance enabled Turkish culture to be a point of intersection for all world civilizations in a unique manner without elimination or offense.
Some Islamist movements were shocked today after it became clear that they are unable to adopt the Turkish political model in full, and so they have become a deformed and underdeveloped creature, and this represents the core of the problem they are facing today for when the Turkish model could not be completed, it turned bitter.

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=29363

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Posted in Egypt, Turkey

Fears of extremism taking hold in Syria as violence continues

Posted on April 23, 2012 | Comments Off on Fears of extremism taking hold in Syria as violence continues

By , Published: April 22-

BEIRUT — As Syria’s revolution drags into its second year amid few signs that a U.N.-mandated cease-fire plan will end the violence, evidence is mounting that Islamist extremists are seeking to commandeer what began as a non-ideological uprising aimed at securing greater political freedom.

Activists and rebel soldiers based inside Syria say a small but growing number of Islamist radicals affiliated with global jihadi movements have been arriving in opposition strongholds in recent weeks and attempting to rally support among disaffected residents.

Western diplomats say they have tracked a steady trickle of jihadists flowing into Syria from Iraq, and Jordan’s government last week detained at least four alleged Jordanian militants accused of trying to sneak into Syria to join the revolutionaries.

A previously unknown group calling itself the al-Nusra Front has asserted responsibility for bombings in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo using language and imagery reminiscent of the statements and videos put out by al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in Iraq, although no evidence of the group’s existence has surfaced other than the videos and statements it has posted on the Internet.

Syrian activists and Western officials say the militants appear to be making little headway in recruiting supporters within the ranks of the still largely secular protest movement, whose unifying goal is the ouster of the regime led by President Bashar al-Assad.

But if the United Nations’ peace plan fails to end the government’s bloody crackdown and promises of Western and Arab help for the rebel Free Syrian Army do not materialize, activists and analysts say, there is a real risk that frustrated members of the opposition will be driven toward extremism, adding a dangerous dimension to a revolt that is threatening to destabilize a wide arc of territory across the Middle East.

“The world doing nothing opens the door for jihadis,” said Lt. Abdullah al-Awdi, a Free Syrian Army commander who defected from the regular army in the summer and was interviewed during a visit he made to Turkey. He says that he has rebuffed several offers of help from militant groups in the form of arms and money and that he fears the extremists’ influence will grow.

“This is not a reason for the international community to be silent about Syria. It should be a reason for them to do something,” Awdi said.

Flow of jihadis reported

U.S. officials and Western diplomats in the region, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject, say they have seen several indications that al-Qaeda-like groups are trying to inject themselves into the Syrian revolution, although they stress that the Islamist radicals’ impact has been limited. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on “mujaheddin” to head to Syria in support of the rebels earlier this year, and Western diplomats are convinced that operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda carried out a string of bombings in Damascus and Aleppo between December and March.

The diplomats say dozens of jihadis have been detected crossing the border from Iraq into Syria, some of them Syrians who had previously volunteered to fight in Iraq and others Iraqi. There may also be other foreign nationals among them, reversing the journey they took into Iraq years ago when jihadis flowed across the border to fight the now-departed Americans.

The Syrian government facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq for many years, and there are widespread suspicions that it may be covertly reactivating some of those networks to discredit the revolutionaries, deter international support for the opposition and create conditions under which the harsh crackdown by authorities will appear justified.

The regime portrayed the uprising as the work of radical Islamists in its earliest days, and the reports that extremists are surfacing in Syria only play into the official narrative, said Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar.

“This drip, drip, drip of extremists across the border . . . there are signs the regime is aiding and abetting it,” Shaikh said. “And it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.”

It is also plausible that these groups, adherents of a radicalized form of Sunni Islam, have turned against their former benefactors and are making their way back to Syria motivated by religious and sectarian zeal. Although many Syrian opposition activists insist that their revolution is not sectarian, a majority of Syrians are Sunnis, while Assad, along with most leading figures in the regime and in the security forces, belongs to the Shiite-affiliated Alawite minority, lending a sectarian dimension to the populist revolt.

Syrian activists and rebels insist that the extremists are not welcome in communities that have long prided themselves on their tolerance of the religious minorities in their midst, including Christians, Alawites, Druze, Kurds and Ismaili Shiites.

A rebel leader in northern Syria who asked to be identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Mustafa, described how he and his men drove out a group of about 15 radicals, all of them Syrian but none of them local, who arrived in a northern village in January. Led by a commander who identified himself as Abu Sulaiman, the group tried to recruit supporters for an assault on the nearby town of Jisr al-Shughour.

Abu Sulaiman “had money, he had weapons, and he sent a guy to negotiate with me, but I refused,” Abu Mustafa recalled in an interview in Turkey. “We asked him to leave, but he didn’t, so we attacked him. We killed two of them, and one of our men was injured. Then he left, but I don’t know where he went.”

“The good thing is that Syrians are against giving our country to radicals,” Abu Mustafa added. “But these groups have supporters who are very rich, and if our revolution continues like this, without hope and without result, they will gain influence on the ground.”

A largely secular revolt

There is a distinction between the naturally conservative religiosity of Syrians who come from traditional communities and the radicalism of those associated with the global jihadi movement, said Joseph Holliday, who is researching the Free Syrian Army at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington and believes extremists are a small minority.

“While there are elements [in the opposition] that are very conservative, they are not the driving force,” he said. “There is definitely an argument to be made that this will increase over time, because insurgencies often become more extremist over time, but for now the driving force behind this revolution is secular.”

Adherents of the strict Salafi school of Islam have emerged in many Syrian communities and are playing a role in the opposition, but they, too, are to be distinguished from the jihadis, said ­Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.

“People who are local and pious and moving in an Islamist direction and are taking up guns don’t have the same organization and are not necessarily the same thing as jihadists, who are not necessarily al-Qaeda,” he said. “There’s a range of different directions and trends.”

Many activists fear, however, that the influence of the extremists is growing as Syrian rebels who have for months appealed in vain for Western military intervention look for help elsewhere.

“Of course it is growing, because no one is doing anything to stop it,” said a Syrian activist who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he fears retribution from some of the radicals he has encountered while attempting to organize the opposition in many northern communities.

“They have rules,” he said. “They say: If we give you money, you have to obey our orders and accept our leadership. Some of my friends drink alcohol, and they aren’t like this. But when they find no other way to cover their expenses, they join these groups and then they follow them.”

Special correspondent Ranya Kadri in Amman, Jordan, contributed to this report.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/fears-of-extremism-taking-hold-in-syria-as-violence-continues/2012/04/22/gIQA8CInaT_print.html

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Posted in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Syrian Opposition, US Middle East Politics

Iran to Annan: We’re With You, but Assad Stays

Posted on April 17, 2012 | Comments Off on Iran to Annan: We’re With You, but Assad Stays

By: Elie Chalhoub – Published Tuesday, April 17, 2012-

The Iranians warned the UN-Arab League envoy that Syria’s Arab and Western adversaries were out to foil him and that the consequences of failure would be devastating for Syria and the region.

Iran views Kofi Annan’s plan for Syria as a last chance to resolve the crisis there peacefully and is backing it to the hilt – as long as it provides President Bashar Assad with enough of a chance to enact the political reforms he has promised.

This, according to well-placed Iranian sources, was the message conveyed by Iranian officials to the joint UN-Arab League envoy when he visited Iran last week.

The sources explain that Iran was a “partner” in the formulation of Annan’s plan, and discussed it extensively with both him and the Syrians before Damascus formally signed up to it.

Accordingly, Tehran is committed to the plan’s success, “though we know for certain that there are regional and international parties, which we do not want to name although they are known to all, who want to abort it,” the sources say.

Iran sees the Annan plan as a success both for Iranian diplomacy and “Syrian steadfastness,” in that it seeks to “transfer the crisis from the ground to the negotiating table, and from military resolution to a political solution.” Tehran endorsed it willingly, “whereas others accepted it because they were forced to, and agreed to it reluctantly, because they found themselves bankrupt on the ground and had no more cards to play,” they remark.But Iran’s support for the plan is not unconditional. When Annan was in Tehran, Iranian officials presented him with what the sources describe as a “road map” which they urged him to follow. They stressed to him that this was the “only way” he could produce a successful initiative. Moreover, they offered to assist him in any way he requested provided that he can abide by those terms. They also warned him, according to the sources, that Syria’s adversaries “want you to fail, and are trying hard to turn you into a second Dabi” – a reference to the former head of the short-lived Arab League observer mission to Syria, the Sudanese general Mustafa al-Dabi.

The Iranian “road map” consists of six main points that were impressed on Annan.

1. Assad is a “red line” as far as Iran is concerned, and “the Islamic Republic of Iran will not permit anyone to overthrow the legitimate president of the Syrian Arab Republic.”

2. Any political change in Syria must be initiated, addressed, and carried out within the framework of the reform process begun by Assad, and which it would only be possible to continue under his auspices.

3. Any proposed solution that does not take the above into account, or pursues a “reckless, irrational, and unprincipled” approach to the Syrian crisis, will have destructive implications and consequences through the region.4. Nobody is entitled to disregard the legitimate rights of the Syrian people, but these can only be achieved by giving Assad a sufficient chance to implement the reforms he has promised.

5. There must be an immediate end to interference in the domestic affairs of Syria – including incitement to violence, funding, and fueling of armed conflict, and demanding Assad’s overthrow or resignation – by regional states that have made no secret of their meddling.

6. The only solution to the Syrian question lies in all parties adhering to democratic principles.

In Iran, Annan was received in turn by Deputy Foreign Minister Amir Abdallahian, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, National Security Council chief Saeed Jalili, and finally President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The sources say all of the former UN secretary-general’s interlocutors “made sure to confirm from him that he understood the six points well.” Annan also asked for a meeting with Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, but was told, in effect, that the talks he had held would be sufficient if he were serious about achieving a successful outcome.

Ahmadinejad’s meeting with Annan was held at the airport of the Gulf island of Qeshm, off the port of Bandar Abbas, where the president was visiting at the time. Observers believe this was deliberate, arguing that the Iranian president could have returned to the capital, or Annan’s stay could have been extended by one day. The venue, close to the Strait of Hormuz, may have been chosen to signal to Annan the high regional stakes involved in the Syrian crisis, and that he must not seek to achieve through diplomacy what Syria’s adversaries have failed to by means of their interventions on the ground.

Annan was reportedly pleased with the way his talks with Iranian officials went. He also shared their view of Syria’s geopolitical importance. He even went to the extent of declaring publicly, at the joint press conference he held with Salehi in Tehran, that demands for Assad’s overthrow or resignation are a breach of UN rules, and run counter to the purpose of his mission.

“Tehran considers this to be a final opportunity for all who may want to absolve themselves of responsibility for intensified blood-letting, strife and internal fighting in Syria,” the Iranian sources warn. Having reached this point after many hardships and sacrifices, it provides a chance for a new-look Syria to emerge that “meets the aspirations of the Syrian people and at the same time preserves the state and its resistance and steadfastness.”

To the Iranians’ mind, Syria’s adversaries “from Qatar to Saudi Arabia and France, to the US and Israel, and others, want to plunge this region into the unknown. They want to build their plans on this unknown. But their plans do not meet the aspirations of the Syrian people. On the contrary, they promise them destruction, steal the initiative from them, place them outside the game, and trade in them for other reasons.”However, the same sources say, these players have now fallen “hostage” to the Annan plan, which has become the only one on the table. “If Annan’s mission succeeds, they will have failed. And if he fails, they will also have failed, because they will have been exposed. Annan’s failure can only result from him being debilitated or by the presence of parties that wish him ill,” the sources explain. While the failure of the Arab League initiative on Syria was a failure for its Saudi and Qatari authors, Annan’s plan is the international community’s plan. It remains to be seen, the sources add, whether the world would allow the foiling of his bid to resolve the Syrian crisis and be willing to put up with the consequences.

As for Turkey, the Iranians deny that their diplomatic efforts to lure it out of the anti-Assad camp have failed, as evidenced by renewed talk by Turkish officials of the possibility of establishing an exclusion zone along the border.

“We were not naive enough to hope that Turkey would revert to its honeymoon with Syrians,” the Iranian sources say. “We never expected Turkey to return to its senses fully. We are well aware that it is an inseparable part of NATO, and that it has made a strategic decision and is pursuing it in a manner we disagree with.”

What Iran sought was to prevent Turkey from embarking on an interventionist “adventure” in Syria, the sources explain. “We used advice, persuasion, inducements, threats, warnings, and every possible means to achieve this aim,” the sources say. “It worked, at least so far. We put a halt to its direct interventions in the game. We hope things will continue that way.”

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

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Posted in Iran, Middle East Geopolitics, Russia, Syria, Turkey, United Nations