American Exceptionalism and the Universality Fallacy

September 30, 2011–

In his speech this week at the Reagan Library, New Jersey governor Chris Christie posited a concept he called “earned American exceptionalism,” which seemed to favor influencing other countries through American example rather than assertive efforts to remake them in the American image. Christie said, “There is no better way to reinforce the likelihood that others in the world will opt for more open societies and economies than to demonstrate that our own system is working.”

This could be a welcome departure from the kind of “nation-building” adventurism that George W. Bush pursued in Iraq and which, under Obama, was placed at the heart of the American mission in Afghanistan. But it still seems to commingle sentiments of American exceptionalism with the idea of the universality of American values.

Could it be otherwise? Could America bask in its exceptionalism without being driven by universalist convictions that all peoples of the world should live under systems similar to ours? Perhaps not. But perhaps there is merit in pondering the sentiments of the people and leaders of Rome during the glory days of the Roman Republic, which lasted for five hundred years before it ran aground upon the rocks of an ongoing crisis of the regime.

There are some striking similarities between the stories of the two republics. Both got fed up with the tyrannies of monarchy and threw over their kings. Both then crafted delicate new systems based on principles of popular sovereignty. Both had, in the beginning, a narrow definition of popular sovereignty and then spent decades, even centuries, struggling to expand that definition. Both consolidated their natural geographic territories through expansion and then set out into the world. Both entered epic foreign struggles to protect weak allies from threatening aggressors (for Rome, the Punic Wars with Carthage, 264 BC–146 BC; for America, the struggle to save Europe, 1918–1989). Both ultimately triumphed in their epic struggles and found themselves the lone superpower in a unipolar world.

And like Americans of our day, Romans of the Republic considered their civic system to be a work of genius and utterly exceptional. Unlike Americans of our day, however, few in the Roman Republic felt their system should be, or could be, embraced by others in the mysterious ancient societies of the East.

In pondering this dichotomy, I am reminded of a scene in one of Colleen McCullough’s six magisterial historical novels recounting the last century of the Roman Republic. These narratives are, of course, fictional, but they are based on exhaustive research and probe with minute accuracy all aspects of Roman society, culture, customs and social mores. The scene in question involves Lucius Cornelius Sulla, a brilliant general who was of the generation just before the great Caesar. Sulla had a powerful personality and huge appetites and ambitions, and he wasn’t above resorting to violence in the pursuit of those ambitions. We might say he was cut from the same cloth as Tony Soprano.

We know from history that Sulla, during his days on the rise as a Roman senator and general, took an army to the Euphrates River. He went east because of problems in Asia Minor perpetrated by Mithridates VI of Pontus, who had designs on territory within Rome’s sphere of influence. So Sulla took his army to the Euphrates and then crossed into the territory of the Parthians. There he encountered the satrap of the Seleucians, Orobazus, who answered to the king of kings of Parthia.

McCullough, knowing this conversation took place but of course not knowing precisely what was said, manufactures the exchange. But, while the words are made up, the sentiments are entirely accurate as expressions of the two powerful men and the cultures that had nurtured them.

Orobazus greets Sulla by addressing him by his full name, Lucius Cornelius Sulla. Sulla says to the king, “Lucius Cornelius will do,” but Sulla himself takes pains to address Orobazus respectfully as “Lord Orobazus,” in keeping with his standing in his own territory.

Then Orobazus errs again, addressing Sulla as “my lord Lucius Cornelius.” So Sulla corrects him again: “Not ‘my lord,’ just plain Lucius Cornelius. In Rome there are no lords and no kings.”

Orobazus is puzzled. “We had heard it was so,” he says, “but we find it strange. You do follow the Greek way, then. How is it that Rome has grown so great, when no king heads the government?” For Orobazus, a lack of kings normally means small entities that end up warring against one another, as in Greece. But Rome had real power and yet no king. It was incomprehensible.

Sulla: “Rome is our king, Lord Orobazus. . . . We Romans subordinate ourselves to Rome, and only to Rome. We bend the knee to no one human, any more than we bend to the abstraction of an ideal. Rome is . . . our king.” Sulla offers himself as an example. He was not there on his own behalf but on behalf of Rome. “If we strike a treaty, it will be deposited in the temple of Jupiter . . . and there will remain—not my property, nor even bearing my name. A testament to the might of Rome.”

McCullough has Orobazus’s fellow Parthians listening rapt to these concepts, but totally confused. Orobazus says, “But a place, Lucius Cornelius, is jut a collection of objects! . . . How can a place generate such feeling, such nobility?”

Sulla: “For a while Rome was actually ruled by kings, until the men of Rome rejected the concept that a man could be mightier than the place which bred him. . . . No Roman man is greater than Rome.”

Finally, Orobazus lifts his hands in what McCullough calls the “age-old gesture of surrender” and says, “I cannot understand what you say, Lucius Cornelius.”

So Lucius Cornelius says, “Then let us pass to our reasons for being here today.” He proposes that Rome should allow the Parthians to hold sway over the territory east of the Euphrates. And Rome, because it needed to deal with Mithridates, would be able to have a sphere of influence in the territory to the west. And that, as history tells us, was the deal that was struck that day.

Perhaps this represents a worthy lesson from the West’s classical heritage. Romans considered their societal structures to be exceptional—and far superior to any other in the world. But they brought to their dealings with other societal leaders a respectful regard for their separate cultural values and the influences of their distinct cultures.

In short, they separated Roman exceptionalism from any thought of its universality. Rome’s hallowed traditions, developed by Romans, were for Romans. And other peoples would naturally operate according to their own hallowed traditions.

It might be politically impossible for any politician in today’s America to actually express a distinction between American exceptionalism and its universality. But it certainly would enhance American diplomacy if that distinction were allowed to serve as a greater guide in U.S. dealings with the great nations and leaders of other civilizations and other cultures.

Robert W. Merry is editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policy.


Obama’s Hollow Words on Palestine

September 26, 2011

President Barack Obama struggled to explain his planned veto of UN recognition of a Palestinian state just a year after he welcomed the idea. His speech was a painful example of a leader knowing what is right and calculating that he can’t do what is right, notes Lawrence Davidson.

By Lawrence Davidson

On Sept. 21, President Barack Obama delivered his latest message to the United Nations: “I would like to talk to you about a subject that is at the heart of the United Nations – the pursuit of peace in an imperfect world.”

Actually, one thing that makes the world imperfect is the lopsided power distribution at the UN. This allows the permanent members of the Security Council (particularly the U.S.) to decide when peace does or does not get pursued.

But Obama did not call attention to this problem. Instead he pointed to Libya and the alleged achievement of freedom, security and peace in that North African land. Actually, what Libya amounted to, at least in part, was the destruction of a nation with a standard of living approaching that of Spain.

This destruction happened not because it was ruled by “the world’s longest serving dictator,” but because that particular dictator had a 40-year record of being an incredible pain in the rear end of the Western ruling elites.

Be that as it may, Obama was stuck with the conundrum that the people of Libya (and Tunisia and Egypt and maybe Yemen and Syria but, of course, not Bahrain) deserve self-determination and peace, while the Palestinians are apparently still out in the cold.

Obama explained that “I believe … that the Palestine people deserve a state of their own.” However, they only can have it if they follow a course which, over the last 20 years, has proved utterly bankrupt.

Indeed, Obama saved his most emphatic language for the moment when he insisted that bankruptcy is the only way to national success for the Palestinians: “Ultimately it is the Israelis and the Palestinians – not us – who must reach agreement … that is and will be the path to a Palestinian state.”

Very odd. The President tells us that Washington won’t dictate national self-determination, but it damn well can dictate the route the Palestinians must take to get it. Even if that route has proven worthless and will, most likely, lead them to their ultimate destruction.

Two Critics

Robert Fisk, the famous reporter for the British newspaper The Independent, wrote a scathing report on President Obama’s speech. Here is part of what Fisk said:

“After praising the Arab Spring … the man [Obama] dared to give the Palestinians 10 minutes of his time, slapping them in the face for daring to demand statehood from the UN. Obama even – and this is the funniest part his preposterous address to the UN — suggested that the Palestinians and the Israelis were two equal ‘parties’ to the conflict.”

Fisk is angry and frustrated and one can only empathize with those feelings. But his piece leaves a lot unexplained. So let us look at Uri Avnery, founder and leader of Israel’s Gush Shalom peace movement, who commented on the speech this way:

“A wonderful speech. A beautiful speech. The language expressive and elegant. The arguments clear and convincing. The delivery flawless. A work of art. The art of hypocrisy. Almost every statement in the passage concerning the Israeli-Palestinian issue was a lie.

“A blatant lie: the speaker knew it and so did the audience. … Being a moral person, he [Obama] must have felt the urge to vomit. Being a pragmatic person, he knew that he had to do it if he wanted to be re-elected.”

Now that is more to the point. Avnery tells us why Obama was lying. Because in a land of the deceived, only really good liars get … what? Get elected and then re-elected?

Well, that is probably true. However, in this particular case things are a bit more complicated. This might sound a bit shocking but, taken literally, Avnery is inaccurate. You can be critical of Israel and even sympathetic to the Palestinians and still, at least potentially, get elected to office in the United States.

Consider a recent poll by the Pew Research Center. It indicates that 42 percent of Americans are in favor of U.S. recognition of Palestinian statehood as against 26 percent opposed. Nearly one-third, 32 percent, had no opinion.

That means an energetic and savvy politician running for national office, who is also publicly in favor of Palestinian statehood, would have a pool of 74 percent of American voters to work on.

The numbers are even more impressive when considering only Democratic voters. There 54 percent are in favor of Palestinian statehood and only 14 percent opposed. These are telling numbers for a politician with pro-Palestinian sympathies– if the voters are really the end game here.

Neglected Voters

Unfortunately, they are not. Voters are only important at the actual time of election. At all other times the politicians’ constituencies are special-interest groups. It is the special interests that supply the resources the politicians actually use to manipulate the voters at election time.

The political parties know this very well. They know that what political suicide actually consists of is putting forth a candidate that displeases the special interests. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, 95 percent of the time both Democrat and Republican parties won’t even nominate a candidate who expresses opinions favorable to the Palestinians.

Therefore, such candidates hardly ever reach the voters. So, it is not quite as Avnery puts it, that Obama speaks lies so as to be re-elected. More accurately, he speaks lies so he can be re-nominated.

There is no politician in America capable of getting a presidential nomination who could or would have made a speech more sympathetic to the Palestinians than the one given by Barack Obama.

The conclusion one can draw is that on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, public opinion presently has no leverage.

And, for it ever to actually have leverage, it must reach a point where it overwhelms the standard factors of special-interest influence: giving campaign funding to a candidate or choosing to give it to his or her opponent; generating lots of TV air time in favor of the candidate or creating negative attack ads against him or her; and the overall control of the information on the subject of interest to the special interest that goes to the candidates and their staff.

In other words, unless you can get the public riled up on this subject to the point where millions see it as a voting issue, politicians and their party leaders won’t respond to polls such as that recently put out by Pew. Such information simply does not indicate a level of public focus that will sway the party choices of candidates at the nomination level.

To make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a voting issue within the American political milieu is a tough goal, but it is not an impossible one. A growing number of local and national organizations are already engaged in this effort seeking to change public attitudes to the point that American voters will react to Israeli behavior as they once reacted to apartheid South Africa’s policies.

To name just three, there are the U.S. Campaign Against the Occupation, the Council on the National Interest, and Jewish Voices for Peace. Many others are active as well. In Europe, the effort to build public opinion to the point that it has voting leverage is also going on apace.

About ten years ago, I had a heated conversation with the Charge d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Israel. He told me that if I believed that the U.S. Congress could be freed from the influence of the Zionist lobby I was crazy.

“It will never happen” he told me. I disagreed with that sentiment then, and still do today.

The Pew Poll numbers show that there is fertile ground for an eventual sea change in popular opinion. And, with a lot of hard grassroots work, that change will have a powerful political impact. One must never say never.

Lawrence Davidson is a history professor at West Chester University in Pennsylvania. He is the author of Foreign Policy Inc.: Privatizing America’s National Interest; America’s Palestine: Popular and Offical Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood; and Islamic Fundamentalism

A win-win strategy for the Palestinians

A win-win strategy for the Palestinians
In any bargaining game, the key to success is leverage. Thus, even if their bid for statehood through the U.N. fails, the Palestinians still win.

By Barbara F. Walter and Andrew Kydd
September 29, 2011
Everyone knows that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ bid for statehood through the United Nations Security Council will fail. Even if the Palestinians get the nine votes needed , the United States will veto it. And yet the strategy is brilliant. Why? Because the Palestinians win even if they lose.

To understand how this seemingly doomed effort is designed to work, one has to recognize the strategic game Abbas is playing. Abbas knows that time and public opinion are on his side. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can denounce the move, President Obama can end it, those opposed to it can call it foolish and self-defeating. But world reaction to Abbas’ request has been overwhelmingly positive and will become increasingly so with every move by Israel and the U.S. to block it.

The Palestinians are playing a long-term bargaining game, and any move toward the goal of statehood has to be considered a victory. Statehood will not come immediately, or when a vote is taken in the Security Council. What will happen is that support for it will slowly and surely increase among average citizens around the world. The extreme positions of Israel and the United States — their refusal to pursue real efforts to allow Palestinians to rule themselves and be free of military occupation — will be increasingly revealed, and tolerance for these positions, even among Israelis and Americans, will decline. Going to the Security Council knowing the bid will be publicly and persistently rejected, therefore, is an inspired strategy. Palestinians appear peaceful and reasonable. Israel and the United States do not.

In any bargaining game, the key to success is leverage. The Palestinian Authority has two broad sources of leverage. It can implicitly condone violence under the assumption that the more costly the conflict, the more likely Israel is to make concessions. Or it can pursue a nonviolent strategy mixing protest and diplomatic pressure.

For more than five years, the Palestinian Authority has pursued a disciplined nonviolent strategy against Israel. It has focused on building a state within the West Bank and rebuilding the infrastructure that was destroyed in the second intifada. The Palestinians have engaged in security cooperation with Israel to root out terrorists, and their security forces have been U.S. trained and supported. Certainly, the Palestinians have work to do. They still need to figure out their relationship to Hamas, as well as the Palestinian Authority’s willingness to tolerate violence. But Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are as good as they get. These West Bank Palestinians are the long-hoped-for partners that Israel needs to have a secure and lasting peace.

The nonviolent strategy, however has failed to generate sufficient leverage against Israel to motivate concessions. Many Israelis attribute the current lack of violence to the wall they constructed to fence off the West Bank, ignoring the equally important shift in the Palestinian Authority’s strategy. Believing that the security problem has been solved by concrete and barbed wire, most mainstream Israelis feel no real need to negotiate. With the center demobilized, Israeli hard-liners have a clear field. The result is that Israeli maximalist dreams about ruling indirectly over a quiescent Palestinian population — or even better, gradually easing them off to Jordan — go uncontested because of the lack of urgency.

These dreams, however, will never lead to peace. Many, if not most, Palestinians are willing to settle for less than the 1967 border, less than full sovereignty in security terms and less than a full right of return for refugees. However, they will not settle for nothing, and the rest of the Muslim world, newly awakened by their spring and summer revolts, will support them. This leaves the Palestinian leadership in a familiar quandary. Palestinians can continue to pursue nonviolence, but this has failed to bring any movement from the Israelis. They can return to violence, which is temporarily popular and puts pressure on Israel but is immoral and self-defeating in the long run.

What Palestinians need is a third strategy that is nonviolent yet generates significant pressure on Israel to negotiate. Going to the U.N. is designed to do just that.

By asking for recognition at the U.N. while scrupulously avoiding violence, the Palestinians are, finally, pursuing an intelligent foreign policy that has the prospect of isolating their adversary and bringing international opinion on their side. If recognition as a state is achieved, the whole international context of the struggle shifts and the Israeli occupation becomes starkly anomalous. If the bid fails, public opinion will shift in the Palestinians’ favor and greater pressure will be placed on the U.S. and Israel to seek resolution on statehood. This is why Israel is fuming and Washington is frantically trying to divert attention back to the stalled peace process. Absent this move by the Palestinians, the U.S. would not even be talking about the topic. Now it dominates the international agenda.

The U.S. response has been reactive and hapless, as it was in the Arab Spring. President Obama’s political position is relatively weak, and his mild effort to pressure Israel to halt settlement expansion was resoundingly defeated. In fact, Israel this week approved plans to built more than 1,000 housing units in East Jerusalem despite pleas from U.S. and European diplomats. The political strength of Israel’s supporters in the U.S. ensures that there will be no political daylight between U.S. policy and that of the sitting Israeli prime minister. This is especially true if Republicans turn support for Israel into a partisan issue.

If the U.S. were more concerned with peace in the Middle East (and in protecting its interests) than with domestic politics, it would support the Palestinian bid for statehood. If the Palestinians see that nonviolent strategies can produce real results, and the Israelis face reality that despite the lull in terrorist attacks there is a growing price to be paid for continued occupation, the increasingly untenable stalemate will be one step closer to resolution.

Barbara F. Walter is a professor of political science in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at UC San Diego. Andrew Kydd is an associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-walter-palestinianbid-20110929,0,320923.story?

 

Who is the Syrian Opposition?

Dp-News September 30, 2011 —

SYRIA- Since mid-March, Syria has been shaken by an unprecedented pro-democracy protest movement that the Assad regime has sought to crush using deadly force. More than 2,700 people have been killed in the unrest, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva.

On the political front, Anti-regime activists inside Syria oppose the Syrian National Council, an opposition body formed in Turkey last month, because it favours foreign intervention, prominent activist Michel Kilo said on Thursday.

A Prominent dissident Michel Kilo said anti-regime forces inside Syria oppose the Syrian National Council, an opposition body formed in Turkey last month, because it favours foreign intervention.

“The opposition within the national council are in favour of foreign intervention to resolve the crisis in Syria, while those at home are not,” Kilo claimed in remarks to AFP at his home in Damascus.

“If the idea of foreign intervention is accepted, we will head towards a pro-American Syria and not towards a free and sovereign state,” he said.

“A request for foreign intervention would aggravate the problem because Syria would descend into armed violence and confessionalism, while we at home are opposed to that.”

And diplomats in Damascus told AFP that Ankara asked Damascus this summer to offer the banned Muslim Brotherhood government posts in exchange for Turkey’s support in ending the unrest, an offer rejected by President al-Assad.

Michel Kilo, 71, a writer who has opposed the ruling Baath party since it came to power in 1963, was jailed from 1980 to 1983 and from 2006 to 2009.

He is a member of the National Committee for Democratic Change (NCDC), which was formed on September 17 and groups Arab nationalists, socialists, Marxists, members of the Kurdish minority and independents such as Kilo.

He said the NCDC has a central committee of 80 members, of whom 25 percent are from the “young revolutionaries” who spearheaded protests against President Bashar al-Assad that broke out in mid-March.

Kilo said the opposition figures in Turkey have not consulted the NCDC and offered it only three representatives among the 71 of its members coming from inside the country.

The Syrian National Council (SNC) was set up in August and consists of 140 people, half of whom live in Syria. The names of its members inside Syria have not been released for security reasons, the council said.

It is dominated by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood which is banned in Syria, but it includes liberals and Syrian notables.

The group is to meet this weekend in Istanbul in a bid to unify the fragmented opposition movement, a spokeswoman said on Tuesday.

“All our efforts now are not to appear as a movement that wants to eliminate others, we’re trying to offer a national framework,” Bassma Kodmani said.

Opposition movements behind the protests against Assad’s regime have been fragmented and difficult to measure. They are largely split along three lines: Arab nationalists, liberals, and Islamists.

Syrian opposition groups are calling for the first time for an international intervention to protect civilians from President al-Assad regime’s ongoing military onslaught, including the establishment of a United Nations-backed no-fly zone.

The opposition’s formal calls drew a tepid response Wednesday from the Obama administration and European governments, who said there is currently little appetite to reprise the type of air campaign that helped dislodge long-serving Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi last month.

The intervention call came Tuesday, when a coalition of leading Syrian opposition groups called on the U.N. and international community to play a greater role in protecting civilians from Syrian security forces.

They called for an internationally supervised arms embargo against Damascus, the establishment of a U.N. monitoring mission and the enforcement of a no-fly zone.

The groups, which presented their petition at a press conference in Washington, include the Syrian Revolution General Commission, a grassroots body working among activists inside Syria; the Damascus Declaration of leading Syrian dissidents; the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood; and the Syrian Emergency Task Force, made up of Syrian-American activists.

“The Syrian Revolution General Commission does seek international intervention in the form of a peacekeeping mission with the intention of monitoring the safety of the civilian population,” said the coalition in a statement released Tuesday.

The Syrian National Council, a body appointed earlier this month to try to lead the opposition, didn’t join Tuesday’s call. But it said civilian protection was a priority it would discuss on Oct. 2 in Istanbul, at its first general assembly meeting.

“In general, the SNC membership are on the same page as those on the ground in Syria and who have been asking for civilian protection for a while,” said council member Yaser Tabbara, a U.S.-based lawyer.

Radwan Ziadeh, another council member, said one proposed scenario for a no fly-zone would cover a 10-kilometer (six-mile) area inside Syria’s northern border with Turkey that would serve as a safe haven. It would be modeled on the U.N.-mandated safe haven in northern Iraq in 1991.

Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, opposes the idea of a no fly-zone because it would encourage the rise of an armed rebellion rather than peaceful resistance.

In Turn, Leaders of Syria’s large minority Kurdish population show signs of organizing against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Several young Kurds have been active in protests and are members of the alliance of young activists that organizes demonstrations, but the cities in predominantly Kurdish areas have been largely quiet.

Kurdish activists and analysts say that in the past three weeks, members of the 11 unofficial Kurdish political parties have met with Kurdish activists from the Local Coordination Committee, an alliance for young protest organizers.

These Kurdish parties plan to name a special committee and hold a conference in Syria within the next few weeks.

Such a Kurdish group would be unrelated to the recently formed Syrian National Council, the country’s largest opposition umbrella. While Kurds say they share the opposition’s overall goal of a democratic Syria, many Kurds have also expressed frustration at what they see as protesters’ Arab agenda, and also say they aspire to greater autonomy within Syria.

“Syrian Kurds are not looking to separate from Syria—though of course the idea of a Kurdistan is a dream,” said Meshal Tammo, the spokesman for the Kurdish Future Movement, a political grouping in northeastern Syria.

“The Kurds are no different from anyone else in Syria—they are scared of what will come afterwards,” said Mr. Tammo.

“It was a question of respect: Obviously there are greater issues than Kurdish grievances at stake, but Kurds need to be assured that they are an important part of a future Syria,” said Massoud Akko, a Kurdish author and activist exiled in Norway, who was among those who left.

In early September, about 50 Syrian Kurds held a solidarity conference in Stockholm and issued a statement that said, “The Syrian revolution will not be complete without a just solution to the Kurdish cause.”

Arab officials at UN said that just the possibility of establishing a no-fly zone over a stretch of Syrian territory could it turn into a “safe haven” that may spur more defections from the Syrian military amid growing indications that lower-ranking officers are deserting.

“There are more and more discussions of this scenario to encourage more and more soldiers’ defections, yet it sounds still difficult” without U.N. backing, said an Arab diplomat.

http://www.dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=98286

Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to Allah

Friday, September 30, 2011The Libyan revolution, which put an end to Moammar Gadhafi’s 42-year-long tyranny after a chaotic civil war, has an interesting motto: “There is no god but Allah, and Gadhafi is his enemy!” This is quite ironic, though, because the now-dethroned Libyan colonel had also been referring to God to justify his dictatorial rule. A mantra of his regime bluntly read: “Allah, Moammar, Libya: that’s all we need!”

The image of Allah, in other words, seems to have shifted in the minds of many Libyans from a pillar of authoritarian rule to a beacon of liberty.

A similar transformation seems to be unfolding in Syria as well, which used to have its own version of the authoritarian Arab trinity: “Allah, Syria, Bashar – that’s all we need!” But the peaceful Syrian protestors who have been raising their voice against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad and co., despite all the killing and torture they face, are now using a different motto: “Allah, Syria, Freedom: that’s all we need!”

It is perfectly understandable that such religious themes within the Arab Spring are confusing, if not worrying, to Islamo-skeptic Westerners who assume that all political manifestations of Islam will lead to tyranny. However, the history of Muslim civilization shows that Islam has been understood in many different ways, and while it sometimes has been used to support tyrants, it more often than not challenged them.

In fact, one of the very early theological splits in Islam was precisely on this issue. The successive caliphs of the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750 AD) promoted a theory of divine predestination, which implied that the corrupt Umayyad rule was predestined, and thus willed by God. The opposing theologians, who defended humans’ freewill, argued that rulers were responsible to both God and the people.

After a few centuries of debate, the Sunni view on this matter settled on a middle position, which valued strong rulers, but also expected them to be just and lawful. In the Ottoman Empire, the ritualistic expression of this idea was a popular slogan that common people would say to the sultans after Friday prayers: “Don’t be arrogant my sultan, God is greater than thou!”

In the modern age, however, traditional Islamic law, whose functions included constraining arbitrary power, failed to update itself, and was gradually rendered ineffective via “modernization.” As Harvard law professor Noah Feldman demonstrates in his book, “The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State,” this process produced not the liberal democracy of the West, but various secular (and sometimes fiercely secularist) autocrats – such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah in Iran, or Gamal Abdal Nasser in Egypt.

Islamism, the totalitarian ideology that aspires for an “Islamic state,” was more of a reaction to this modern crisis, rather than a direct continuation of the Islamic tradition. It was also based on an export of the worst ideas of the West. One of the founders of the Islamist ideology, Pakistani thinker Sayyid Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi, had openly acknowledged that his “Islamic state” would “bear a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communist states.”

Here is the key question for today: If Mawdudi and his followers synthesized Islam with totalitarianism, can others synthesize it with liberal democracy?

The answer does not look as grim as some suspect. It’s not just the symbolic combination of “Allah” and “freedom” in the minds of the Arab masses, but the discussions among Muslim parties in Egypt and elsewhere are also raising hopes for a liberal future.

To be sure, the transformation of the Muslim mind from authoritarianism to liberalism would be a very challenging process. But was the political evolution of Christianity any easier? It certainly took a lot of effort to move from the Spanish Inquisition and the “divine right of kings” to the liberating motto of the U.S. founder Benjamin Franklin: “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.”

Islam is just no less capable of going the same distance.

© 2011 Hurriyet Daily News
URL: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=rebellion-to-tyrants-is-obedience-to-allah-2011-09-30

Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State

# The New York Times
Reprints September 29, 2011

By ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK

CAIRO — By force of this year’s Arab revolts and revolutions, activists marching under the banner of Islam are on the verge of a reckoning decades in the making: the prospect of achieving decisive power across the region has unleashed an unprecedented debate over the character of the emerging political orders they are helping to build.

Few question the coming electoral success of religious activists, but as they emerge from the shadows of a long, sometimes bloody struggle with authoritarian and ostensibly secular governments, they are confronting newly urgent questions about how to apply Islamic precepts to more open societies with very concrete needs.

In Turkey and Tunisia, culturally conservative parties founded on Islamic principles are rejecting the name “Islamist” to stake out what they see as a more democratic and tolerant vision.

In Egypt, a similar impulse has begun to fracture the Muslim Brotherhood as a growing number of politicians and parties argue for a model inspired by Turkey, where a party with roots in political Islam has thrived in a once-adamantly secular system. Some contend that the absolute monarchy of puritanical Saudi Arabia in fact violates Islamic law.

A backlash has ensued, as well, as traditionalists have flirted with timeworn Islamist ideas like imposing interest-free banking and obligatory religious taxes and censoring irreligious discourse.

The debates are deep enough that many in the region believe that the most important struggles may no longer occur between Islamists and secularists, but rather among the Islamists themselves, pitting the more puritanical against the more liberal.

“That’s the struggle of the future,” said Azzam Tamimi, a scholar and the author of a biography of a Tunisian Islamist, Rachid Ghannouchi, whose party, Ennahda, is expected to dominate elections next month to choose an assembly to draft a constitution. “The real struggle of the future will be about who is capable of fulfilling the desires of a devout public. It’s going to be about who is Islamist and who is more Islamist, rather than about the secularists and the Islamists.”

The moment is as dramatic as any in recent decades in the Arab world, as autocracies crumble and suddenly vibrant parties begin building a new order, starting with elections in Tunisia in October, then Egypt in November. Though the region has witnessed examples of ventures by Islamists into politics, elections in Egypt and Tunisia, attempts in Libya to build a state almost from scratch and the shaping of an alternative to Syria’s dictatorship are their most forceful entry yet into the region’s still embryonic body politic.

“It is a turning point,” said Emad Shahin, a scholar on Islamic law and politics at the University of Notre Dame who was in Cairo.

At the center of the debates is a new breed of politician who has risen from an Islamist milieu but accepts an essentially secular state, a current that some scholars have already taken to identifying as “post Islamist.” Its foremost exemplars are Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey, whose intellectuals speak of a shared experience and a common heritage with some of the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia. Like Turkey, Tunisia faced decades of a state-enforced secularism that never completely reconciled itself with a conservative population.

“They feel at home with each other,” said Cengiz Candar, an Arabic-speaking Turkish columnist. “It’s similar terms of reference, and they can easily communicate with them.”

Mr. Ghannouchi, the Tunisian Islamist, has suggested a common ambition, proposing what some say Mr. Erdogan’s party has managed to achieve: a prosperous, democratic Muslim state, led by a party that is deeply religious but operates within a system that is supposed to protect liberties. (That is the notion, at least — Mr. Erdogan’s critics accuse him of a pronounced streak of authoritarianism.)

“If the Islamic spectrum goes from Bin Laden to Erdogan, which of them is Islam?” Mr. Ghannouchi asked in a recent debate with a secular critic. “Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban or the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models, models that combine Islam and modernity?”

The notion of an Arab post-Islamism is not confined to Tunisia. In Libya, Ali Sallabi, the most important Islamist political leader, cites Mr. Ghannouchi as a major influence. Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who is running for president in Egypt, has joined several new breakaway political parties in arguing that the state should avoid interpreting or enforcing Islamic law, regulating religious taxes or barring a person from running for president based on gender or religion.

A party formed by three leaders of the Brotherhood’s youth wing says that while Egypt shares a common Arab and Islamic culture with the region, its emerging political system should ensure protections of individual freedoms as robust as the West’s. In an interview, one of them, Islam Lotfy, argued that the strictly religious kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the Koran is ostensibly the constitution, was less Islamist than Turkey. “It is not Islamist; it is dictatorship,” said Mr. Lotfy, who was recently expelled from the Brotherhood for starting the new party.

Egypt’s Center Party, a group that struggled for 16 years to win a license from the ousted government, may go furthest here in elaborating the notion of post-Islamism. Its founder, Abul-Ela Madi, has long sought to mediate between religious and liberal forces, even coming up with a set of shared principles last month. Like the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, he disavows the term “Islamist,” and like other progressive Islamic activists, he describes his group as Egypt’s closest equivalent of Mr. Erdogan’s party.

“We’re neither secular nor Islamist,” he said. “We’re in between.”

It is often heard in Turkey that the country’s political system, until recently dominated by the military, moderated Islamic currents there. Mr. Lotfy said he hoped that Egyptian Islamists would undergo a similar, election-driven evolution, though activists themselves cautioned against drawing too close a comparison. “They went to the streets and they learned that the public was not just worried about the hijab” — the veil — “but about corruption,” he said. “If every woman in Turkey wore the hijab, it would not be a great country. It takes economic development.”

Compared with the situation in Turkey, the stakes of the debates may be even higher in the Arab world, where divided and weak liberal currents pale before the organization and popularity of Islamic activists.

In Syria, debates still rage among activists over whether a civil or Islamic state should follow the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, if he falls. The emergence in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria of Salafists, the most inflexible currents in political Islam, is one of the most striking political developments in those societies. (“The Koran is our constitution,” goes one of their sayings.)

And the most powerful current in Egypt, still represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, has stubbornly resisted some of the changes in discourse.

When Mr. Erdogan expressed hope for “a secular state in Egypt,” meaning, he explained, a state equidistant from all faiths, Brotherhood leaders immediately lashed out, saying that Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey offered no model for either Egypt or its Islamists.

A Brotherhood spokesman, Mahmoud Ghozlan, accused Turkey of violating Islamic law by failing to criminalize adultery. “In the secularist system, this is accepted, and the laws protect the adulterer,” he said, “But in the Shariah law this is a crime.”

As recently as 2007, a prototype Brotherhood platform sought to bar women or Christians from serving as Egypt’s president and called for a panel of religious scholars to advise on the compliance of any legislation with Islamic law. The group has never disavowed the document. Its rhetoric of Islam’s long tolerance of minorities often sounds condescending to Egypt’s Christian minority, which wants to be afforded equal citizenship, not special protections. The Brotherhood’s new party has called for a special surtax on Muslims to enforce charitable giving.

Indeed, Mr. Tamimi, the scholar, argued that some mainstream groups like the Brotherhood, were feeling the tug of their increasingly assertive conservative constituencies, which still relentlessly call for censorship and interest-free banking.

“Is democracy the voice of the majority?” asked Mohammed Nadi, a 26-year-old student at a recent Salafist protest in Cairo. “We as Islamists are the majority. Why do they want to impose on us the views of the minorities — the liberals and the secularists? That’s all I want to know.”

Anthony Shadid reported from Cairo, and Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Cairo, Tunis and Tripoli, Libya. Heba Afify contributed reporting from Cairo.

U.S. at Cross-Purposes in the Middle East

September 29, 2011 -Posted by Greg Scoblete  —

Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby have a long essay on America’s fading position in the new Middle East:

Taken together, these trends have called into question a number of strategic concepts on which American diplomacy in the Middle East has rested for decades:

• that a prosperous and democratic Turkey, anchored in the West, would, by example, draw other Muslim countries westward;

• that the failures of fascism, communism, and Shia theocracy, coupled with the enticements and pressures of a global economy, would in time lead the region, with Western help, to realign toward a liberal future in the broader community of nations;

• that the peace Israel reached with Egypt and Jordan would in time radiate outward into peace with other Arab states, and thus minimize the prospects of a major regional war;

• that the world community would prevent states in the region from getting nuclear weapons; and

• that regional divisions and American strength would prevent forces hostile to the US from dominating the region.

I think what’s evident from the above checklist of regional priorities is that they had failure baked in. The U.S. has had a mixed track record when it comes to preventing a major regional war – there was one almost every decade since 1970 – and two of them involved the United States. Nor is it clear why Washington expected that the Middle East would, with “Western help,” realign to a “liberal future” as it simultaneously stopped hostile states from dominating the region and prevented them from acquiring nuclear weapons. “Western help” was (and is) directed toward illiberal states in the region as a bulwark against “forces hostile to the United States.” The process of doing one thing undermines the other.

Put in more concrete terms: is there anyone who sincerely believes that you can support the Saudi monarchy to check Iran while simultaneously “helping” that same monarchy dissolve itself in the name of Western liberalism? It’s sounds like a self-evidently absurd position and yet, it’s being held up as something Obama has failed to do…

The US uncomfortable reality in Syria

By Tony Badran, September 29, 2011

The Obama administration is slowly coming to grips with the uncomfortable reality that its preferred scenario of a peaceful transition in Syria is looking less likely. As much as it had hoped to avoid it, the administration finds itself having to develop contingency plans as signs of armed resistance to Bashar al-Assad’s regime are becoming increasingly visible.

Commenting on this development in the Syrian uprising, State Department spokesman Mark Toner remarked on Monday that “the longer the regime continues to repress, kill and jail these peaceful activists, the more likely that this peaceful movement’s going to become violent.” It’s a matter of self-defense, Toner explained; “It’s not surprising.”

To read more: http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=316485#ixzz1ZNavTJCf

Alevi / Alawi, what are the differences?

While there are apparent  similarities, they are quite different in their history and  the details of their doctrine. Like most moslem sects they are very complex to understand and even more difficult to summarize!

Alevis  and Alawis have in common that , to a certain degree they consider themselves to be part of the wider Shi`a movement, who revere Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law) and the Twelve Imams of his house (Ithna’shari).

According to Yaron Friedman, distinct Alawi/Alavi beliefs include the belief that prayers are not necessary, they don’t fast, nor perform pilgrimage, nor have specific places of worship.

1. Syrian Alawis are a prominent mystical and syncretic religious group centered in Syria who are often described as a branch of Shia Islam.  The sect seems to have been organized by a follower of Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who died in Aleppo about 969.  It has integrated doctrines from Ismaili Islam and Christianity ( i.e celebration of Chritsmas …).

A fatwa by Imam Musa al Sadr declares them  Shi’a Muslims, that is Ithna’shari (Twelve Imams). He said: The Alawis are of the Shi’a and the Shi’a are of the Alawis. The most obvious difference between Alawites and Shi’ite Muslims, is that Alawis believe the Sunni Caliph and Shi’ite Imam Ali is an incarnation of one of the persons of God and wholly divine, along with Jesus Christ, The Prophet Muhammad and many other eastern holy men

2. Turkish Alevism’s origin is controversial. It goes back to Shah Ismail (founder of the Safavid dynasty in Azerbajian, Iran). His father Sheikh Haydar was part of a  Sufi order and the leader of the growing Shia community in Azerbajian, the Qizilbash.

The Turkish Alevis ( originally called Qizilbashi )  have complex theological beliefs derived from Shiism but with some particularities, one of them is the belief of the unity of Allah, Mohammad and Ali. They also believe in the Twelve Imams but with a different interpretation of their symbols. They behave more like a Sufi order minus shari’a. There are many branches among them with different doctrines.  Some go to  Qom in Iran to study in Shia religious schools.

Turkish_Alevis_Today.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Turkey’s Elephant in the Room: Religious Freedom.

Osman Orsal/Reuters –

With his triumphant tour of the countries of the Arab Spring this month, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has managed to set up Turkey on the international stage as a role model for a secular democracy in a Muslim .The only trouble is that he has yet to make that happen for Turkey.

The relationship between religion and the state, ever the sore spot of Turkish identity, is one of the most explosive issues of the debate on the new constitution that Mr. Erdogan has pledged to give the country in the new legislative term that opens Saturday.

That debate will have to deal with the elephant in the room: the total control that the state exerts over Islam through its Religious Affairs Department, and the lack of a legal status for all other religions in a predominantly Sunni Muslim society.

“Turkey may look like a secular state on paper, but in terms of international law it is actually a Sunni Islamic state,” Izzettin Dogan, a leader of the country’s Alevi minority, charged at a joint press conference with leaders of several other minority faiths last week in Istanbul.

Mr. Dogan is honorary president of the Federation of Alevi Foundations, which represents many of what it claims are up to 30 million adherents of the Alevi faith, an Anatolian religion close to Sufi Islam but separate and distinct in its beliefs and practices.

“The state collects taxes from all of us and spends billions on Sunni Islam alone, while millions of Alevis as well as Christians, Jews and other faiths don’t receive a penny,” Mr. Dogan said, referring to the $1.5 billion budget of the Religious Affairs Department. “What kind of secularism is that?”

A bureaucratic juggernaut with its own news service and a dedicated trade union, the Religious Affairs Department employs more than 106,000 civil servants, according to its latest annual report, including 60,000 imams and 10,000 muezzins, all of them trained, hired and fired by the state.

At the institution’s ministry-size headquarters in Ankara, state-employed astronomers calculate prayer times around the world, while state-educated theologians pore over the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad in the library and issue the religious rulings known as fatwas.

The department writes the sermons for Friday Prayer in mosques across the country as well as the textbooks for the religious instruction that is mandatory in schools. It publishes books and periodicals in languages including Tatar, Mongol and Uygur, and issues an iPhone app featuring Koranic verses and a prayertime alarm. The department has a monopoly on Koran courses in the country, and it organizes the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, right down to the vaccination of pilgrims.

So centralized is the department’s control that its new president, Mehmet Gormez, is considered innovative for announcing his intention to train preachers to deliver sermons in person, instead of having them piped into the mosque from the department over a public-address system.

“In Turkey, Islam does not determine politics, but politics determine Islam,” Gunter Seufert, a sociologist, concluded in a 2004 study of the department entitled “State and Islam in Turkey.”

“Run by a state agency, religion serves the nation state for the purpose of unifying the nation and Westernizing its Muslims,” he added.

With historical roots in the Ottoman Empire, where state and Islam were linked in the union of sultanate and caliphate, the Religious Affairs Department was founded early in the Turkish Republic, in March 1924, on the day the caliphate was abolished.

Charged by law with managing Islam, the department has been enshrined in the Constitution ever since the country’s first military coup in 1961, with the present Constitution, a relic of the 1982 coup, explicitly charging it with the task of furthering national unity.

Ministering to Sunni Islam of the Halafi school, the department does not recognize non-Sunni communities like the Alevis or Caferis as distinct religious faiths, subsuming them under the common label of “Muslim,” the basis for the depiction of Turkey as a religiously homogenous country that describes its population as “99 percent Muslim.”

While the distribution of believers among the faiths encompassed by that term is contested, a 2007 survey by the Konda institute, a public opinion research company in Turkey, found that 82 percent of Turks describe themselves as Hanafi Sunni Muslims.

The new constitution, Mr. Dogan of the Alevi federation demanded, must do away with their privileged status. “The state must be impartial and treat all religious communities equally and maintain equal distance to all of them,” he said. “These definitions must be written into the new constitution verbatim.”

Mr. Dogan was speaking at the presentation of a report on the “Shared Problems and Demands of Turkey’s Religious Communities,” prepared by Ozge Genc and Ayhan Kaya, political scientists at Istanbul Bilgi University.

The report is based on research in the Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant Armenian communities, the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches as well as the Jewish community and Bahai, Yezidi, Shiite, Alevi, Mevlevi, Caferi and other groups.

As the report underlines, these communities all suffer from lack of legal status in Turkey, which renders it difficult for them to conduct even the most basic affairs and forces them into a shadowy existence at the mercy of political fashions and whims.

The 1,700-year-old Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, for example, has come to the brink of extinction since its seminary in Istanbul was closed down 40 years ago, drying up its source of clergymen. The Patriarchate hopes that the new constitution will “create the conditions for a reopening of the seminary,” its spokesman, Pater Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, said by e-mail this week.

This will require a redefinition of the concept of secularism in Turkey, or simply a definition of the term in the Turkish constitution, as Mustafa Akyol, author of “Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty,” points out.

“The present constitution states that Turkey is laic, secular, but does not define the term,” Mr. Akyol said by telephone this week. The interpretation has been left up to the constitutional court, he said, which has traditionally defined secularism as the complete absence of religion from the public sphere, as seen in its ban on head scarves for university students. It was that ban, among other things, that triggered the current secularism debate in Islamist circles, Mr. Akyol said.

“They began to see nuances in Western secularism. They saw that religious freedoms not available to them in Turkey, like the head scarf or the freedom to join Muslim orders, were available in America and many European countries, excepting France,” he said. “They began to criticize the self-styled Turkish secularism, and to call for a redefinition of secularism.”

While the debate still rages in Turkish society, “I think Erdogan made it clear that he is sincere” in his call for secularism, Mr. Akyol said. “That is how we would like to have it defined in the new constitution,” he added, referring to Mr. Erdogan’s remark that all religions should be equal.

But the Religious Affairs Department may not be so easy to sideline. While most of the proposals for the constitution prepared by nongovernmental organizations for the debate agree that the department cannot continue in its present form, none suggests abolishing it.

Even Tesev, an independent research institute in Istanbul, argues that “dissolving the Religious Affairs Department is not considered possible under present conditions.” It suggests that other religious groups should be given equal status and privileges instead.

Other constitutional proposals suggest that the department’s reach should be extended to include other faiths, an idea unlikely to sit well with all communities.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople, while declining to comment on the proposal, has strenuously resisted previous proposals to incorporate its seminary into the theological faculty of a state university, arguing that it cannot relinquish control over its training.

While the Religious Affairs Department may face change, it is unlikely to be abolished, Mr. Akyol said. “Society is so used to it, so many people work for it,” he said. “I don’t expect it to change with the new constitution.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/europe/turkeys-elephant-in-the-room-religious-freedom.html?pagewanted=all