Damascus Focuses on Containing Foreign Intervention

The Syrian regime’s military crackdown against armed rebel groups clearly enjoys Russian support. Moscow believes that President Bashar Assad is obliged to carry out this crackdown for a number of reasons, not least to reduce his foreign enemies’ room to maneuver.

The focus is currently on Homs, but that does not mean that there are no plans by the military to extend it to other areas.

The strength of the armed groups in some areas is not the main difficulty facing this campaign. Nor is a lack of local public support, other than in areas such as Zabadani, some villages in the province of Damascus Countryside, and Hama. It is that the Syrian leadership wants the task accomplished with the minimum number of casualties.

That means two types of casualties.

First, the civilians who get caught up in such battles, whatever their politics.

Not that the regime is solely to blame for civilian deaths – which is the impression given by the Arab and Western media outlets engaged in the war to topple the regime. The armed groups have caused the deaths of many civilians as well as military and security personnel. Some have committed atrocities.

The armed groups have become the new regime in some areas where they have succeeding is asserting their control, forcing out all agencies of the state – whether traffic police, security personnel, or public officials. They have violently enforced their dictates, whether for general closures at times of their choosing, or for contributions to the revolution’s coffers.

These demands are presented as religious strictures. One prominent Idlib clergyman tells of being question by locals about their religious obligation to pay money to the armed groups. They asked for his help in ensuring that the regime’s corrupt security agencies are not replaced by these groups that commit clear crimes and seem to include growing numbers of non-Syrians.

The manner in which these groups are dealt with is the regime’s second consideration.

It believes, on the basis of its intelligence assessments, that only about 30 percent of its armed opponents are ideologically-motivated. They appear prepared to fight it to the death, along with their supporters among the population.

The remaining 70 percent are thought to be anti-regime protesters who took up arms, but without training or organization. Some high level officials believe such people acted “impulsively” and can be dissuaded. They favor mediation via their families or other go-betweens, to urge them to surrender themselves and their arms, and benefit from a general amnesty that will be issued as soon as security is restored.

Syrian officials make clear, accordingly, that the military campaign currently underway is not an all-out assault.

They acknowledge that the security forces carried out a harsh crackdown in Damascus Countryside. They argue that it was imperative to prevent any creation of enclaves near the capital.

But they say the army is employing other methods in Idlib and Homs. These are mainly joint security-military operations, based on intelligence gathered about armed groups, to destroy their fortified locations, or launch surprise attacks on their gatherings. The armed forces then withdraw and redeploy.

In other words, military operations in these areas are to be based mainly on “attrition” in confined neighborhoods. They will also be accompanied by attempts to negotiate via intermediaries. Such negotiations have led to the surrender of tens of gunmen in different parts of the country, with the mediation of families or clan elders. These have not been covered by the media.

Media coverage is still not treated as a major part of this battle by Syrian security and military chiefs. Media outlets engaged in the campaign to pressurize Syria are unconcerned about the accuracy of their coverage or the reality of the situation as witnessed by people on the ground. But journalists close to or supportive of the regime complain that it fails to provide them with enough detailed information to help them counter that campaign.

Nevertheless, it is reported that some military units protested against the “new level of constraints” which they have been ordered to observe. These are said to have resulted from consultations with the Russians and Iranians. The thinking is that Assad, while acting to reassert the authority of the state, could not re-consolidate his rule in a country with huge numbers of bereaved families.

The Russians believe they are providing Syria with support it needs to counter attempted external political or other intervention against it. Western diplomats accuse Russia of going further, and providing it with intelligence support to track the movements of armed groups.

Russia has not made any comments on this matter. Its focus now is on how the regime can achieve successes on the ground which would restrict the protests to peaceful demonstrations in areas and districts from where it does not feel threatened. That would better enable it to conduct the political struggle.

Moscow is convinced that the regime must implement its reform program quickly and appoint a new government, even if the opposition does not take part in it. There is a belief there, as in Iran, that applying the reforms would have a tangible effect on the public, and affect attitudes to both the offshore opposition and the question of stability – which is today’s overriding preoccupation for most Syrians.

In the opposing camp, the regime’s foreign enemies appear to be inching closer to a game of Russian roulette. The various means of pressure they have applied to date – propaganda, political, and diplomatic, even meddling on the ground – have failed to achieve the desired outcome. That forces stark choices on them, including to risk a major military or security action, directed either against the army or leading regime figures.

This prospect prompted Russia and Iran to send messages to all parties concerned, notably Turkey, France, and some Arab states. Some of these messages were delivered on the ground, visibly or otherwise.

Moreover, the approach taken to the Syrian crisis by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in his latest speech, implies he is not alone in wanting to stop members of the March 14 coalition from aiding Assad’s opponents, especially his armed opponents.

What is being hatched on borders?

Some time ago, Lebanese security agencies attached to different government ministries gathered intelligence about what was going on at the border. Their work was not fully co-ordinated. The Information Branch did not share its data with Army Intelligence Directorate or the General Security Department.

Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from some of this intelligence by the Lebanese army, and by some political figures, was enough to ring an alarm bell.

Patches of territory along the eastern and northern borders were being turned into military zones and training camps. Many of these lie in barren areas (east of the village of Aarsal in the Bekaa valley), or open country. Some are in villages in the district of Akkar, where “Future Movement Islamists” wield powerful influence.

The reports spoke of cooperation between local smugglers and these armed groups. It also documented people coming and going, while they collected various types of weapons and ammunition to sell to them. The money available seemed to increase by the day. Some operatives based in Beirut and other cities would be tasked with purchasing communications and photographic equipment.

Copies of some of these reports evidently reached Damascus. It cross-checked them with its own intelligence, and put together a dossier, which was then sent to Lebanese officials.

This was done either by the Syrian Ambassador in Beirut Ali Abd al-Karim, or the Secretary-General of the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council, Nasri Khoury. They sent copies to the president, prime minister, speaker of parliament, relevant ministers, and military and security chiefs.

The dossiers were accompanied by a formal request from Syria to Lebanon: that it take measures, in accordance with the binding agreements to which it is party, to prevent its territory from being used as a conduit for violent or illegal activity against Syrian territory.

Army commander Jean Kahwaji did not secure clear, official, and full political backing for an extensive military and security operation to secure the border areas in question. He employed other means to disrupt the armed groups, but that fell short of meeting the Syrian demands.

The failure to provide political backing, it is said, was because some in authority feared clashes could result between the army and Lebanese groups allied with the Syrian gunmen. Ominously, some officials quietly suggested to military commanders that the problem could be left for the Syrian army to deal with itself.

It later became apparent that this is precisely what was hoped for by the Arab/Western “operator“ of the political-military assault on Syria. The Syrian army could be lured into a military operation on the Lebanese border, which might force it at some point to advance into Lebanese territory, even if only by a few meters or kilometres. That would be used to justify a diplomatic outcry, aimed at getting UN resolutions issued to extend the mandate of UN forces in the south to cover the northern and eastern borders too.

That would present us with a quite different dossier.

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.