Category Archives: US-Syria

Why Syria’s Splintered Opposition Is Assad’s Real Ace In The Hole

Analysis: Bashar al-Assad has benefited from Russian and Chinese support to stay in power. But from neighboring Turkey, where many top Syrian exiles are based, one observer says the splintering of the opposition may be the real force to ensure Assad’s survival.

By Fehim Tastekin
RADIKAL/Worldcrunch

ISTANBUL – Hafez al-Assad massacred the city of Hama in 1982. Yet this atrocity did not make Assad a ‘butcher’ in the eyes of many Syrians. In fact, after the massacre, hundreds of thousands poured into the streets of Damascus to cheer the Syrian leader for his tough response to what was perceived as an Islamist challenge to public order.

Bashar al-Assad is now on the same path as his father, but with one important exception: while Bashar has no qualms about stepping into his father’s combat boots, he is still attempting to walk a reformist line.

With the defeat of rebel forces in Homs last week, crowds came out to celebrate Bashar’s victory and show support for the regime. And though these demonstrations may look like a throwback to his father’s era, the iron fist no longer guarantees regime survival.

Still, Bashar has two important dynamics working in his favor: first, even if the opposition refuses to admit it, reforms have shored up the basic pillars of his regime. Second, infighting amongst opposition leaders has cast doubts on their ability to present a unified front against Assad.

Syrian opposition leaders established the Syrian National Council last January in Istanbul. The SNC’s ostensible goal was to implement a strategy similar to the one that eventually toppled Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. But now the SNC is in crisis, faced with internal divisions and inching ever closer to irrelevance. On February 26th, a group of 20 members broke-off from the SNC, citing dissatisfaction with the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. This group has since formed its own opposition movement, the Syrian Patriotic Group. Then on March 13th, three key players – Kamal al-Labwani, Haitham al-Maleh, and Catherine al-Talli – announced their opposition to the SNC, criticizing it for not doing enough to support the Free Syrian Army. Al-Labwani came out with scathing criticisms of the SNC, saying that, “Some are in it for personal gain and the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to monopolize aid and weapons to gain popular influence on the ground. We don’t want to replace the current dictator with a new one.”

By March 17th, five different groups had broken from the SNC and organized under a new umbrella, advocating for a humanitarian corridor for refugees and weapons for the Free Syrian Army. Kurdish parties are similarly wary of the SNC, viewing it as a stooge of the Turkish government. Another important organization, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, views the SNC as little more than a body of armchair oppositionists.

Falling in a trap

Syrian divisions have landed the Friends of Syria – a group of foreign nations that support regime change in Syria – in a difficult position. This coalition remains committed to upholding the Syrian National Council’s legitimacy, even as the organization deteriorates into a shell of its former self. The insistence on regime change in Syria has effectively paralyzed the international coalition and caused Russian and Chinese overtures to fall on deaf ears. Even UN and Arab League initiatives have foundered in this environment.

Widespread claims equating the Assad regime with the rule of the Alawite minority have further worsened the situation and triggered some ugly ‘Sunni’ reflexes. These interpretations fail to capture the nuances underlying the uprising.

After all, Sunni forces were used in the Hama crackdown and Assad’s notorious Shabiba militia includes Sunni members as well as Alawites. However, there are also many Alawites who do not support the Assad regime, but fear for their security in a post-Assad Syria.

Many of the prevailing views on Syria fail to grasp the political dynamic of violence in the country. It is often forgotten that the jihadist “Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant” instigated its armed uprising on January 23, 2011, before peaceful protests had gained momentum. This sudden outbreak of violence pulled many would-be reformists back into the Assad camp.

Unfortunately, stopping the bloodshed does not seem to be the priority for the parties involved in this conflict. Arab League General Secretary Nabil Al-Arabi puts it bluntly: “The Syrian opposition believes that the way out of this crisis is only possible through the ‘Libyan scenario,’ and negotiation attempts with the president Bashar Assad will lead to nothing.”

But because of the Chinese and Russian veto, the Libyan scenario will not work in Syria. With this option off the table, the Friends of Syria are looking to topple Assad by stoking a civil war.

Turkey has landed center-stage in these efforts, with its slogan of “regional solutions to regional problems.” It should come as no surprise that this policy has led to claims that Turkey has taken the role of unofficial NATO enforcer in the region. Turkish officials were also angered when Guardian writer Jonathan Steele compared Turkey’s situation to Honduras, which opened its border to Contras fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

In the end, a quick unraveling of the Assad regime is looking more distant by the day. In February, defecting General Mustafa al-Sheikh claimed that the Syrian army had dwindled to 30-40% of its former capacity and was bound to collapse by March. That isn’t going to happen. Now the big question is whether the Friends of Syria meeting – due to be held on April 2nd in Istanbul – will lead to constructive dialogue, or simply a renewed effort to arm the opposition and escalate the civil war.

http://www.worldcrunch.com/why-syrias-opposition-assads-real-ace-hole/4939

New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit

By: Sharmine Narwani [1] –

Published Wednesday, March 21, 2012 –

In recent weeks, there has been a notable shuffle in the positions of key external players in the Syrian crisis. Momentum has quite suddenly shifted from an all-out onslaught against the Assad government to a quiet investigation of exit strategies.

The clashes between government forces and opposition militias in Baba Amr were a clear tipping point for these players – much hinged on the outcome of that battle. Today, the retreat of armed groups from the Homs neighborhood means one thing: the strategy of militarizing the conflict from within is no longer a plausible option on which to hang this geopolitical battle. Especially not in an American or French election year, when anything less than regime change in Syria will look like abject failure.

And so the external players are shifting gears – the more outspoken ones, quietly seeking alternative options. There are two de facto groups that have formed. Group A is looking for a face-saving exit from the promised escalation in Syria. It consists of the United States, European Union and Turkey. Group B, on the other hand, is heavily invested in regime-change at any cost, and includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and some elements of the French, US, British, and Libyan establishments.

Before Baba Amr, these two groups were unified in maximizing their every resource to force regime change in Syria. When the UN Security Council option was blocked by Russia and China, they coalesced around the General Assembly and ad-hoc “Friends of Syria” to build coalitions, tried unsuccessfully to bring a disparate opposition fighting force (Free Syrian Army) under central leadership, pushed to recognize the disunited Syrian National Council (SNC), and eked out weekly “events” like embassy closures and political condemnations to maintain a “perception momentum.”

But those efforts have largely come to a standstill after Baba Amr. A reliable source close to the Syrian regime said to me recently: “The regime eliminated the biggest and most difficult obstacle – Baba Amr. Elsewhere, it [eliminating armed militias] is easier and less costly at all levels. Now both political and military steps can continue.”

Dealmaking Begins in Earnest

The first clear-cut public sign of this new phase was the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN envoy to Syria. Annan is an American “concession” that will draw out this dealmaking phase between the Syrian government, opposition figures and foreign governments potentially until the May 2012 parliamentary elections.

This phase is what the Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and other BRIC countries have sought from the start: the creation of a protective bubble around Syria so that it has the time and space necessary to implement domestic reforms that will not harm its geopolitical priorities.

The European Union (EU) kicked things off in March in a joint foreign ministerial communique rejecting military intervention in Syria. This was swiftly followed by Kofi Annan’s strong warning against external efforts to arm the Syrian opposition, with various Americans making similar soundings in his wake.

One very prominent Syrian reformist who has remained engaged with both sides of this conflict, confided that the externally-based Syrian opposition are now “looking over each other’s shoulders – none yet dares to speak out.” The fact is, says the source, “they are getting military assistance, but nowhere near enough. They need much, much more that what they are getting, and now the countries backing this opposition are developing conflicting agendas.”

Three high-level defections from the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) were announced within days of that conversation, hinting further at the fundamental policy shifts occurring in all circles, behind the scenes.

The game has changed along Syria’s borders too. Turkey, a ferocious critic of the Assad government this past year, is reconsidering its priorities. A participant in a recent closed meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reveals the emptiness of Turkish threats to form a “humanitarian corridor” or security zone on their Syrian border. Davutoglu, says my source, insisted in private that “Turkey will not do anything to harm Syria’s territorial integrity and unity because that will transfer the conflict into Turkish territory.”

Recent deliberations with Iran also seem to have resonated with the Turks. During Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s January visit to Ankara, a source tells me that an understanding was reached. The Iranian FM is said to have warned Turkish leaders that they were leveraging a lot of goodwill – painstakingly built up in the Muslim/Arab world – in return for “no clear benefit” in Syria. According to my source, the Turks were encouraged to strike a bargain to regain their regional standing – the key concession being that Assad would stay through the reform period.

A Hard Dose of Realpolitik

Although Turkey has backtracked from its belligerent public posture, there are still elements in the country that remain rigid on Syria. The same is true for the US and France. The fact that 2012 is an important election year in both countries plays a part in the strategy shuffle, but there are other pressing concerns too.

One major worry is that there aren’t a lot of arrows left in the quiver to fire at Syria. Without the UN Security Council granting legal authority to launch an offensive against Syria, there are only piecemeal efforts – and these have all been tried, if not yet exhausted: sanctions, demonstrations, arming militias, cyberwarfare, propaganda, diplomatic arm-twisting, and bribing defectors. But a whole year has passed with no major cracks in support from the regime’s key constituencies and that has caused some debate about whether this kind of tactical pressure may ultimately backfire.

In Washington in particular, alarm bells have been ringing since militant Islamists infiltrated the Syrian opposition militias, some pouring in from Iraq where they were only recently targeting American interests. The US has spent the better part of a decade focusing its national security apparatus on the threat from Al Qaeda and militant Islam. The execution of Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda-related figures was meant to put a seal on this problem – at least in the sense that the organization has shriveled in size and influence.

But Syria threatens to blast open a Pandora’s Box of newly-motivated “soldiers of God.” And while sectarian anger may be the fuse, the conflagration will take place on a major geopolitical fault line in the Mideast, at a delicate time, on one of Israel’s borders – and changing winds could fan those flames right back in the direction of the United States and its allies.

That is a red line for the US military and a sizeable chunk of the Washington political establishment. There are other Americans, however, who are unable to view the Syrian crisis outside the prism of Iran and its growing regional influence. US Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, who has spent years now orchestrating the defeat of the Iran-led “Resistance Axis,” is one such player in the capital.

Feltman is part of Group B, alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The battle in Syria has become an existential one for Group B. They have played too hard and revealed too much, to be able to re-assert themselves into any impartial regional role in the future – unless there is a changing of the guard in Syria.

As Group A moves toward a face-saving exit from the crisis, we are going to witness a re-telling of events in Syria. The Western “mainstream media” and major international NGOs, which have served as little more than propaganda tools for various governments seeking to escalate the Syrian crisis and vilify the Assad government, are suddenly “discovering” dangerous elements in the Syrian opposition. This scene-setting is just as deliberate as the false narratives we have witnessed from Group A since the start of the crisis.

Group B, on the other hand, remains unable to take its eye off the Syrian brass ring and may continue to employ increasingly brazen and foolhardy tactics to stimulate chaos inside the country. Syria may be Group B’s graveyard unless they are brought into these deals and promised some protection. I suspect, however, that they will instead be utilized as a valuable negotiating tool for Group A – brought into play if dealmaking is not working to their advantage.

While negotiations plod on over Syria, we can be assured that most external players have little or no consideration for actual Syrians. The regime will be focused on the long haul, which includes ridding the country of armed groups, ensuring that major roadways are free of IEDs and snipers, implementing a watered-down reform program with token opposition members to give lip service to progress, and becoming even more entrenched in the face of regional and foreign threats.

Meanwhile, the West and its regional allies will happily draw out a low-boil War of Attrition in Syria to keep the Syrian regime busy, weakened and defensive, while further seeking to cement their hold on the direction of the “Arab Spring.” They will pull levers to create flare-ups when distractions or punishments are warranted, with nary a care to the lives and livelihoods of the most disenfranchised Syrians whose blood is this conflict’s main currency.

It will never be certain if there was a revolution in Syria in 2011. The country became a geopolitical battleground less than a month after the first small protests broke out in various pockets inside Syria. And it is not over by a long stretch. Syria will continue to be the scene of conflict between two regional blocs until one side wins. This may be a new phase in Syria today where players are converging to “cut some losses,” but be assured that they are merely replenishing and repositioning their reserves for a broader regional fight.

Sharmine Narwani is a commentary writer and political analyst covering the Middle East. You can follow Sharmine on twitter @snarwani [2].

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar’s editorial policy.

Sharmine Narwani
http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/5483

 

Assad’s Frustrated Foreign Enemies

Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)

By: Ibrahim al-Amin [1]

Published Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Various parties have been assessing the outlook for the crisis in Syria based on the evidence on the ground. The domestic scene is set to remain polarized for a long time. National understandings that can restore the country’s political unity and a cohesive national identity cannot be expected any time soon. The external scene has meanwhile become more complicated in light of the intensifying battle between the two camps over who will take hold of Syria, or who will wield the most influence in it.

On the domestic front, sources recently in Damascus say the political split is as sharp as ever. The pro-regime camp is holding together and its members have become more politically hard-line in their intolerance of all moves made by any opposition group. They deem the battle to be one against groups that have been armed – not just militarily but also in the political, propaganda, and economic senses – to target Syria, and not just its regime. They see President Bashar Assad as a symbol, and they want him to make no concessions at present. This loyalty has been accompanied by mobilization which has a minority, sectarian, and confessional dimension, though this is not fully reflected in the big cities.

On the other side, opposition groups loudly trumpet their rejection of any kind of dialogue with the regime. Indeed, they have moved on to refusing to deal with the regime’s institutions, conflating the state with the regime. They have thus started justifying attacks by gunmen on policemen and police stations or public institutions, or the bombing of vital infrastructure, as well as seeking to maximize pressure on the Syrian pound. They have also become increasingly virulent in their verbal attacks on people in the regime, and also on sects and denominations, betraying their need to keep tensions high.

A third group, which grows in size by the day, fears for Syria. This includes people who refuse to be asked where they stand. They are no longer prepared to get into a debate about who is right and who is wrong. Their concern is for the country’s unity and stability, and that priority overrides all others – even while they concur that this view ultimately works to the advantage of the regime at present.

Moreover, many Syrians who used to support the uprising for change have stepped back because of their abhorrence of the behavior of opposition groups – whether the armed groups inside Syria, or the offshore opposition groups that are trying to summon foreign military intervention in the country, without concern for the potentially catastrophic consequences of such a step.

Abroad, meanwhile, one year after the start of the crisis, plans are being reviewed. Miscalculations have been made, especially by those of the regime’s enemies who – with extreme optimism born of chronically deficient political judgement – expected that it would fall in a few weeks or months. Their disappointment and dismay shows, both on their faces and in statements. It is also apparent from the behavior of their diplomats, political allies, media, and security agencies.

This dismay is not only due to the inability of the internal opposition to bring about change within Syria. It is also because of their own failure to devise practical plans capable of achieving their goal of toppling the regime. They can now see in practice that the militarization of the civic protests in Syria created a major public credibility crisis for the opposition, and that going further as in Libya, or even Yemen, would only make people wearier.

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and its leaders have shown no sign of collapse. Despite several months of applying security, media, economic, diplomatic, and political pressure, it is clear to the regime’s enemies that it remains cohesive, as do its military and security forces. Nor have state institutions, for all their weakness, witnessed the kind of collapse that would obviate the regime’s need for them. Moreover, the regime’s enemies can see it has managed to restore control on the ground in many parts of the country, and has dealt powerful blows to its opponents – especially the armed groups which believed in the military overthrow of the regime.

Alongside these developments, the position of Russia and China, along with other regional and world powers, provided the regime with strong support against the foreign adversaries seeking to intervene to overthrow it. This is evident from the discussions currently taking place, and even the resort to the game of envoys and go-betweens, which nobody believes will arrive at any result in the foreseeable future.

All of this further narrows the options available to the Syrian regime’s enemies. But that won’t necessarily make them give up or back down. Rather, their increasingly hostile behavior suggests they are considering other means of achieving their objective.

Among the options said to be under discussion by these countries – and which other capitals have warned against – is action to persuade senior officers to mount a coup against the regime, or to make them feel personally under threat. It also seems that the insane among the Syrian regime’s enemies have started contemplating insane actions, namely, getting rid of Assad personally.

Do they think assassinating Assad will give them a chance to take hold of Syria?

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Ibrahim al-Amin
Source URL:http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/assad%E2%80%99s-frustrated-foreign-enemies

A dialog of deafs: the different layers of the Syria uprising

10 December 2011-

There are three layers or agendas to the uprising in Syria, a local, regional and international.

This is why it is very difficult to have one position on the subject. Each person gives a priority to one agenda over the others. In addition as these three agendas are imbricated, the conflict is more complex to deal compared with other countries,

The local layer is clear, the political system in Syria is obsolete it needs a serious overhaul . While the socialist Baath ideology is valid for a country like Syria, it has been abused and corrupted. This is what the majority of Syrians believe and some have actively joined protest with the intention of achieving this goal. For them this is the priority of the uprising.

The second layer is regional taking root on the eternal antagonism between Shia and Sunnis. Since the Iran islamic revolution,the Shias who were the poorest and less estimated group in Arab countries have raised their head and do not accept anymore to be treated as second class or persecuted anymore. The Sunnis, with Saudi Arabia leading them, is refusing to allow Iran and all Arab Shias to increase their demand for power sharing and their influence the region. The Sunnis have allied with the western power who, for other reasons, are not in favor of the growth of Iran in the region. This rejection of Shias has motivated many Syrians Sunnis to protest against the Alawites, assimilated to the Shia, who are holding the power in Syria in order to topple the regime and build another one where Sunnis will be in control of the country. They demonstration reflects this ambition and the are financially supported by rich gulf countries and Turkey, another Sunni power.
The third layer is international. The US and some western allies have been adamant in weakening and neutralizing any country opposed to Israel. Two countries in the Arab world are openly at war with Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Therefore there has been a relentless efforts from the US to neutralize both countries.
After repeated failures, like the 2006 war that did not neutralize Hezbollah, the uprising in Syria offered the best opportunity to achieve the destruction of Syria from within. This is why the media campaign, the funding of the opposition and a whole plot was set up to use the two other layers as a launching pad for a total soft war against Syria.
Many Syrians are working consciously or unconsciously toward this plan and their goal is to break the country by removing all possible support it may get from its allies, namely Iran and Lebanon.

Average people will accept of reject the development of the events in Syria according to the priority they give to any of these agendas.
The Syrian government insists on the third one, the international, and would give a less importance and priorities to the two others.
The opposition is divided. The Syrian local oppositions follows the local agenda and would compromise to prevent the second and the third agendas to be executed.
The SNC is following the local and international agenda and while officially rejecting the regional, it is secretly encouraging it. The LCC and the FSA are following the local and regional agendas and ignore the existence of the third one.
Each individual  favors one or more of these agendas and ignores the others. This is why sometimes it looks like a dialog between deafs.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12909&cp=6#comment-287058

The Free Syrian Army: A cover for Turkey or an Islamist false nose?

Published: 02-12-2011 –Le Figaro–
By Georges Malbrunot
After eight months of a bloody crackdown that killed more than 3,500 people, the uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad is now at a crossroads. The revolt was less peaceful and more militarized. “At Homs, Idleb, in three or four cities around Damascus and in some localities near Daraa to the south, there are only armed clashes,” tells us Haytham Mana, the head of the National Coordination, one of Syrian opposition groups in exile. First consequences of this drift: the toll has dramatically risen in recent weeks. To the tortures certainly much more numerous committed by the henchmen of the regime we have now acts of revenge particularly bloody, as the recent attack on a bus driver (7 killed) near Homs. Sectarian clashes also are hardening in the mixed areas, where the seeds of a civil war are the most disturbing.

Second consequence: those responsible for the Coordination and their rivals of the Syrian National Council (SNC) are about to be overtaken by radicals on the ground but also in Turkey, where the Syrian army took refuge free (FSA) consisting of several thousand deserters, who now claims rocket attacks against buildings of the intelligence services of Bashar al-Assad. A delegation of the National Council, headed by its leader, Bouran Ghalioun, went to meet Monday with Colonel Riad al-Assad – no relation with the Syrian Rais, ed – who controls the ASL. But the meeting was rather cold. And it is not clear that the military had agreed to comply with the demands of policy.

Ghalioun, like the National Coordination, object to the ASL attacking the troops still loyal to Assad. For two reasons: it would precipitate a civil war that would benefit the regime, which would use it to crush the dissent. But more because the SNC and Coordination do not want to be overwhelmed by those who, behind the scenes, are pulling the strings behind the Colonel Assad.

The agenda of the Brotherhood may differ from that of the seculars

Who are they? “Some members of the Muslim Brotherhood out of Syria, including Turkey, and all those inside no longer believe in peaceful demonstrations and now want to do battle with weapons in hand,” said a member of SNC, who recognizes that they “are becoming more numerous.” The brothers are members of the National Council, but ultimately, their agenda could differ from that of “seculars”, who make up the main organization of the Syrian opposition.

A return to past events is necessary. From June, the first defections in the army led to the creation of the Movement of official free around the Colonel Hussein Harmoush. But from his camp in the Turkish province of Hatay, he refused to pass under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood who had approached him, says Haytham Mana. A few days later, Colonel Harmoush was mysteriously kidnapped by the Syrian intelligence services, thanks to an connection with of Alevis, a close branch to the ruling Alawites in Syria within the Turkish security apparatus. Several opposition leaders Syrian suspect in fact the Turks have simply delivered Harmoush the Syrians to make him pay for his refusal to cooperate with the Islamists. Recognizing their failure, they then turned to the Syrian Army Colonel Assad’s free, weaker, therefore less able to resist pressure.

Riad el-Assad, a blanket used by the Turks

For an official of the CNS, “Assad today is a cover used by the Turkish authorities” that he and his men confined in a base of the province of Hatay bordering Syria. Turkish intelligence service (Milli Istibarat Teşkilat) controls its movements while an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds to interview requests that journalists wish to have with the head of the FSA.

According to French intelligence services, the FSA is strong of 8000 men, but generally not used in combat, often coming from the administration of the army. The majority of its members are actually soldiers that are not returned to their barracks at the end of a permission. Locally, they would rely on militias that have decided to join the protest.

Under these conditions, we understand why the ASL much needs assistance and supervision: its support would be provided by Turkey and other Western countries. Much like the Libyan rebels at the beginning of the revolt against Gaddafi. Except that with Damascus, the risks of retaliation are far more higher than the late Colonel Libyan buffoon.

By Georges Malbrunot

Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East

November 22, 2011

By George Friedman

U.S. troops are in the process of completing their withdrawal from Iraq by the end-of-2011 deadline. We are now moving toward a reckoning with the consequences. The reckoning concerns the potential for a massive shift in the balance of power in the region, with Iran moving from a fairly marginal power to potentially a dominant power. As the process unfolds, the United States and Israel are making countermoves. We have discussed all of this extensively. Questions remain whether these countermoves will stabilize the region and whether or how far Iran will go in its response.

Iran has been preparing for the U.S. withdrawal. While it is unreasonable simply to say that Iran will dominate Iraq, it is fair to say Tehran will have tremendous influence in Baghdad to the point of being able to block Iraqi initiatives Iran opposes. This influence will increase as the U.S. withdrawal concludes and it becomes clear there will be no sudden reversal in the withdrawal policy. Iraqi politicians’ calculus must account for the nearness of Iranian power and the increasing distance and irrelevance of American power.

Resisting Iran under these conditions likely would prove ineffective and dangerous. Some, like the Kurds, believe they have guarantees from the Americans and that substantial investment in Kurdish oil by American companies means those commitments will be honored. A look at the map, however, shows how difficult it would be for the United States to do so. The Baghdad regime has arrested Sunni leaders while the Shia, not all of whom are pro-Iranian by any means, know the price of overenthusiastic resistance.

Syria and Iran
The situation in Syria complicates all of this. The minority Alawite sect has dominated the Syrian government since 1970, when the current president’s father – who headed the Syrian air force – staged a coup. The Alawites are a heterodox Muslim sect related to a Shiite offshoot and make up about 7 percent of the country’s population, which is mostly Sunni. The new Alawite government was Nasserite in nature, meaning it was secular, socialist and built around the military. When Islam rose as a political force in the Arab world, the Syrians – alienated from the Sadat regime in Egypt – saw Iran as a bulwark. The Iranian Islamist regime gave the Syrian secular regime immunity against Shiite fundamentalists in Lebanon. The Iranians also gave Syria support in its external adventures in Lebanon, and more important, in its suppression of Syria’s Sunni majority.

Syria and Iran were particularly aligned in Lebanon. In the early 1980s, after the Khomeini revolution, the Iranians sought to increase their influence in the Islamic world by supporting radical Shiite forces. Hezbollah was one of these. Syria had invaded Lebanon in 1975 on behalf of the Christians and opposed the Palestine Liberation Organization, to give you a sense of the complexity. Syria regarded Lebanon as historically part of Syria, and sought to assert its influence over it. Via Iran, Hezbollah became an instrument of Syrian power in Lebanon.

Iran and Syria, therefore, entered a long-term if not altogether stable alliance that has lasted to this day. In the current unrest in Syria, the Saudis and Turks in addition to the Americans all have been hostile to the regime of President Bashar al Assad. Iran is the one country that on the whole has remained supportive of the current Syrian government.

There is good reason for this. Prior to the uprising, the precise relationship between Syria and Iran was variable. Syria was able to act autonomously in its dealings with Iran and Iran’s proxies in Lebanon. While an important backer of groups like Hezbollah, the al Assad regime in many ways checked Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon, with the Syrians playing the dominant role there. The Syrian uprising has put the al Assad regime on the defensive, however, making it more interested in a firm, stable relationship with Iran. Damascus finds itself isolated in the Sunni world, with Turkey and the Arab League against it. Iran – and intriguingly, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki – have constituted al Assad’s exterior support.

Thus far al Assad has resisted his enemies. Though some mid- to low-ranking Sunnis have defected, his military remains largely intact; this is because the Alawites control key units. Events in Libya drove home to an embattled Syrian leadership – and even to some of its adversaries within the military – the consequences of losing. The military has held together, and an unarmed or poorly armed populace, no matter how large, cannot defeat an intact military force. The key for those who would see al Assad fall is to divide the military.

If al Assad survives – and at the moment, wishful thinking by outsiders aside, he is surviving – Iran will be the big winner. If Iraq falls under substantial Iranian influence, and the al Assad regime – isolated from most countries but supported by Tehran – survives in Syria, then Iran could emerge with a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean (the latter via Hezbollah). Achieving this would not require deploying Iranian conventional forces – al Assad’s survival alone would suffice. However, the prospect of a Syrian regime beholden to Iran would open up the possibility of the westward deployment of Iranian forces, and that possibility alone would have significant repercussions.

Consider the map were this sphere of influence to exist. The northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Jordan would abut this sphere, as would Turkey’s southern border. It remains unclear, of course, just how well Iran could manage this sphere, e.g., what type of force it could project into it. Maps alone will not provide an understanding of the problem. But they do point to the problem. And the problem is the potential – not certain – creation of a block under Iranian influence that would cut through a huge swath of strategic territory.

It should be remembered that in addition to Iran’s covert network of militant proxies, Iran’s conventional forces are substantial. While they could not confront U.S. armored divisions and survive, there are no U.S. armored divisions on the ground between Iran and Lebanon. Iran’s ability to bring sufficient force to bear in such a sphere increases the risks to the Saudis in particular. Iran’s goal is to increase the risk such that Saudi Arabia would calculate that accommodation is more prudent than resistance. Changing the map can help achieve this.

It follows that those frightened by this prospect – the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – would seek to stymie it. At present, the place to block it no longer is Iraq, where Iran already has the upper hand. Instead, it is Syria. And the key move in Syria is to do everything possible to bring about al Assad’s overthrow.


In the last week, the Syrian unrest appeared to take on a new dimension. Until recently, the most significant opposition activity appeared to be outside of Syria, with much of the resistance reported in the media coming from externally based opposition groups. The degree of effective opposition was never clear. Certainly, the Sunni majority opposes and hates the al Assad regime. But opposition and emotion do not bring down a regime consisting of men fighting for their lives. And it wasn’t clear that the resistance was as strong as the outside propaganda claimed.

Last week, however, the Free Syrian Army – a group of Sunni defectors operating out of Turkey and Lebanon – claimed defectors carried out organized attacks on government facilities, ranging from an air force intelligence facility (a particularly sensitive point given the history of the regime) to Baath Party buildings in the greater Damascus area. These were not the first attacks claimed by the FSA, but they were heavily propagandized in the past week. Most significant about the attacks is that, while small-scale and likely exaggerated, they revealed that at least some defectors were willing to fight instead of defecting and staying in Turkey or Lebanon.

It is interesting that an apparent increase in activity from armed activists – or the introduction of new forces – occurred at the same time relations between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other were deteriorating. The deterioration began with charges that an Iranian covert operation to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States had been uncovered, followed by allegations by the Bahraini government of Iranian operatives organizing attacks in Bahrain. It proceeded to an International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran’s progress toward a nuclear device, followed by the Nov. 19 explosion at an Iranian missile facility that the Israelis have not-so-quietly hinted was their work. Whether any of these are true, the psychological pressure on Iran is building and appears to be orchestrated.

Of all the players in this game, Israel’s position is the most complex. Israel has had a decent, albeit covert, working relationship with the Syrians going back to their mutual hostility toward Yasser Arafat. For Israel, Syria has been the devil they know. The idea of a Sunni government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood on their northeastern frontier was frightening; they preferred al Assad. But given the shift in the regional balance of power, the Israeli view is also changing. The Sunni Islamist threat has weakened in the past decade relative to the Iranian Shiite threat. Playing things forward, the threat of a hostile Sunni force in Syria is less worrisome than an emboldened Iranian presence on Israel’s northern frontier. This explains why the architects of Israel’s foreign policy, such as Defense Minister Ehud Barak, have been saying that we are seeing an “acceleration toward the end of the regime.” Regardless of its preferred outcome, Israel cannot influence events inside Syria. Instead, Israel is adjusting to a reality where the threat of Iran reshaping the politics of the region has become paramount.

Iran is, of course, used to psychological campaigns. We continue to believe that while Iran might be close to a nuclear device that could explode underground under carefully controlled conditions, its ability to create a stable, robust nuclear weapon that could function outside a laboratory setting (which is what an underground test is) is a ways off. This includes being able to load a fragile experimental system on a delivery vehicle and expecting it to explode. It might. It might not. It might even be intercepted and create a casus belli for a counterstrike.

The main Iranian threat is not nuclear. It might become so, but even without nuclear weapons, Iran remains a threat. The current escalation originated in the American decision to withdraw from Iraq and was intensified by events in Syria. If Iran abandoned its nuclear program tomorrow, the situation would remain as complex. Iran has the upper hand, and the United States, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia all are looking at how to turn the tables.

At this point, they appear to be following a two-pronged strategy: Increase pressure on Iran to make it recalculate its vulnerability, and bring down the Syrian government to limit the consequences of Iranian influence in Iraq. Whether the Syrian regime can be brought down is problematic. Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi would have survived if NATO hadn’t intervened. NATO could intervene in Syria, but Syria is more complex than Libya. Moreover, a second NATO attack on an Arab state designed to change its government would have unintended consequences, no matter how much the Arabs fear the Iranians at the moment. Wars are unpredictable; they are not the first option.

Therefore the likely solution is covert support for the Sunni opposition funneled through Lebanon and possibly Turkey and Jordan. It will be interesting to see if the Turks participate. Far more interesting will be seeing whether this works. Syrian intelligence has penetrated its Sunni opposition effectively for decades. Mounting a secret campaign against the regime would be difficult, and its success by no means assured. Still, that is the next move.

But it is not the last move. To put Iran back into its box, something must be done about the Iraqi political situation. Given the U.S. withdrawal, Washington has little influence there. All of the relationships the United States built were predicated on American power protecting the relationships. With the Americans gone, the foundation of those relationships dissolves. And even with Syria, the balance of power is shifting.

The United States has three choices. Accept the evolution and try to live with what emerges. Attempt to make a deal with Iran – a very painful and costly one. Or go to war. The first assumes Washington can live with what emerges. The second depends on whether Iran is interested in dealing with the United States. The third depends on having enough power to wage a war and to absorb Iran’s retaliatory strikes, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz. All are dubious, so toppling al Assad is critical. It changes the game and the momentum. But even that is enormously difficult and laden with risks.

We are now in the final act of Iraq, and it is even more painful than imagined. Laying this alongside the European crisis makes the idea of a systemic crisis in the global system very real.

Page Printed from: http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/11/22/syria_iran_and_the_balance_of_power_in_the_middle_east_99768-full.html

The western support for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East

A blogger view about the role of Western countries in the Syrian case.

So I guess you hate Bush, Condoleeza Rice, Cheney and most of the US present Congress and practically the whole western world for the unpunished Gaza crimes on children. And what about Chirac and the other Europeans countries who stood silent when in 2006 children were killed in South of Lebanon? Forgotten?

I condemn western countries that have taken advantages of the inherent flaws and weaknesses in some personalities in the Middle east to manipulate them to reach their own selfish goal.
The Shah, Mobarak, Ben Ali, Saleh, Ataturk were for decades pushed and encouraged by Western countries to oppress their people in the name of ‘fear” either from communism or Islam.
The occupation of Palestine sponsored by western countries has created a generation of Arab and regional authoritarians regime cherished and manipulated by the Western countries.
Syria is the only country that had a leadership opposed to the manipulation by the West, the only “non-puppet” regime in the area.

Just for that, it deserves admiration.

It has been targeted relentlessly to join the cohort of pro-west leaders. While the corruption has been present, the country has had a consistent support of the Palestinian conflict at the core of the whole illness of the region.
With the cost of not developing its economy as fast as other countries fed with millions of dollars for their submission, Syria has stood slow but independent.

The latest attack , using the “arab spring” movement as a cover up is actually an attempt of a coup d’etat. That the government reacts with indiscriminated violence is not justified but understandable when it stands against powerful countries like the US, France, the UK who can manipulate people and media easily.

If you look at it this way, deaths are as much imputable to the Western countries incitations to hatred and to a change of regime that would have made Syria another puppet as to the awkward and excessive methods used by the government on the defense. The government’s aim was to stop and prevent demonstrations that could degenerate into civil war and break the resistance Syria had toward western plans in the region in support of Israel. It was also certainly to keep the power structure intact and in the same hands.

Your hatred is natural but it should also be directed to the countries behind this situation, while you probably believe they are genuinely calling for ‘freedom’ and democracy.

We all care for the lives of children, but foreign policy and greed are cynical, they don’t value human lives.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12558&cp=2#comment-280533

Truth and falsehood in Syria

There are at least 23 reasons why we should be careful about uncritically accepting Western views of the insurrection in Syria, writes Jeremy Salt* in Ankara

As insurrection in Syria lurches towards civil war, the brakes need to be put on the propaganda pouring through the Western mainstream media and accepted uncritically by many who should know better. So here is a matrix of positions from which to argue about what is going on in this critical Middle Eastern country.

1. Syria has been a mukhabarat (intelligence) state since the redoubtable Abdel-Hamid Al-Serraj ran the intelligence services as the deuxième bureau in the 1950s. The authoritarian state which developed from the time former Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad took power in 1970 has crushed all dissent ruthlessly. On occasion it has either been him or them. The ubiquitous presence of the mukhabarat is an unpleasant fact of Syrian life, but as Syria is a central target for assassination and subversion by Israel and Western intelligence agencies, as it has repeatedly come under military attack, as it has had a large chunk of its territories occupied, and as its enemies are forever looking for opportunities to bring it down, it can hardly be said that the mukhabarat is not needed.

2. There is no doubt that the bulk of the people demonstrating in Syria want a peaceful transition to a democratic form of government. Neither is there any doubt that armed groups operating from behind the screen of the demonstrations have no interest in reform. They want to destroy the government.

3. There have been very big demonstrations of support for the government. There is anger at the violence of the armed gangs and anger at external interference and exploitation of the situation by outside governments and the media. In the eyes of many Syrians, their country is once again the target of an international conspiracy.

4. Whatever the truth of the accusations made against the security forces, the armed groups have killed hundreds of police, soldiers and civilians, in total probably close to 1,000 at this stage. The civilian dead include university professors, doctors and even, very recently, the son of the grand mufti of the republic. The armed gangs have massacred, ambushed, assassinated, attacked government buildings and sabotaged railway lines.

5. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has a strong base of personal popularity. Although he sits on top of the system, it is misleading to call him a dictator. The system itself is the true dictator. Deeply rooted power in Syria — entrenched over five decades — lies in the military and intelligence establishment, and to a lesser degree in the ruling Baath Party structure. These are the true sources of resistance to change. The demonstrations were Al-Assad’s opportunity to pass on the message, which he did, that the system had to change.

6. In the face of large-scale demonstrations earlier this year, the government did finally come up with a reform programme. This was rejected out of hand by the opposition. No attempt was even made to test the bona fides of the government.

7. The claim that armed opposition to the government has begun only recently is a complete lie. The killings of soldiers, police and civilians, often in the most brutal circumstances, has been going on virtually since the beginning.

8. The armed groups are well armed and well organised. Large shipments of weapons have been smuggled into Syria from Lebanon and Turkey. They include pump action shotguns, machine guns, Kalashnikovs, RPG launchers, Israeli-made hand grenades and numerous other explosives. It is not clear who is providing these weapons but someone is, and someone is paying for them. Interrogation of captured members of armed gangs points in the direction of former Lebanese prime minister Saad Al-Hariri’s Future Movement. Al-Hariri is a front man for the US and Saudi Arabia, with influence spreading well beyond Lebanon.

9. Armed opposition to the regime largely seems to be sponsored by the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. In 1982, the Syrian government ruthlessly crushed an uprising initiated by the Brotherhood in the city of Hama. Many thousands died, and part of the city was destroyed. The Brotherhood has two prime objectives: the destruction of the Baathist government and the destruction of the secular state in favour of an Islamic system. It is almost palpably thirsting for revenge.

10. The armed groups have strong support from outside, apart from what is already known or indicated. Exiled former Syrian vice-president and foreign minister, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, who lives in Paris, has been campaigning for years to bring down the Al-Assad government. He is funded by both the EU and the US. Other exiled activists include Burhan Ghalioun, backed by Qatar as the leader of the “National Council” set up in Istanbul. Ghalioun, like Khaddam, lives in Paris and like him also, lobbies against the Al-Assad government in Europe and in Washington.

Together with Mohamed Riyad Al-Shaqfa, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, he is receptive to outside “humanitarian intervention” in Syria on the Libyan model (others are against it). The promotion of the exiles as an alternative government is reminiscent of the way the US used exiled Iraqis (the so-called Iraqi National Congress) ahead of the invasion of Iraq.

11. The reporting by the Western media of the situations in Libya and Syria has been appalling. NATO intervention in Libya has been the cause of massive destruction and thousands of deaths. The war, following the invasion of Iraq, is yet another major international crime committed by the governments of the US, Britain and France. The Libyan city of Sirte has been bombarded day and night for two weeks without the Western media paying any attention to the heavy destruction and loss of life that must have followed. The Western media has made no attempt to check reports coming out of Sirte of the bombing of civilian buildings and the killing of hundreds of people. The only reason can be that the ugly truth could well derail the whole NATO operation.

12. In Syria the same media has followed the same pattern of misreporting and disinformation. It has ignored or skated over the evidence of widespread killings by armed gangs. It has invited its audience to disbelieve the claims of government and believe the claims of rebels, often made in the name of human rights organisations based in Europe or the US. Numerous outright lies have been told, as they were told in Libya and as they were told ahead of the attack on Iraq. Some at least have been exposed.

People said to have been killed by state security forces have turned up alive. The brothers of Zainab Al-Hosni claimed she has been kidnapped by security forces, murdered and her body dismembered. This lurid account, spread by the TV channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya amongst other outlets, was totally false. She is still alive although now, of course, the propaganda tack is to claim that this is not really her but a double. Al-Jazeera, the British newspaper The Guardian and the BBC have distinguished themselves by their blind support of anything that discredits the Syrian government. The same line is being followed by the mainstream media in the US. Al-Jazeera, in particular, having distinguished itself with its reporting of the Egyptian revolution, has lost all credibility as an independent Arab world news channel.

13. In seeking to destroy the Syrian government, the Muslim Brotherhood has a goal in common with the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, whose paranoia about Shia Islam reached fever pitch with the uprising in Bahrain. WikiLeaks has revealed how impatient it was for the US to attack Iran. A substitute target is the destruction of the strategic relationship between Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah. The US and the Saudis may want to destroy the Alawi-dominated Baathist regime in Damascus for slightly different reasons, but the important thing is that they do want to destroy it.

14. The US is doing its utmost to drive Syria into a corner. It is giving financial support to exiled leaders of the opposition. It has tried (and so far failed, thanks to Russian and Chinese opposition) to introduce an extensive programme of sanctions through the UN Security Council. No doubt it will try again, and depending on how the situation develops, it may try, with British and French support, to bring on a no-fly zone resolution opening the door to foreign attack.

The situation is fluid and no doubt all sorts of contingency plans are being developed. The White House and the State Department are issuing hectoring statements every other day. Openly provoking the Syrian government, the US ambassador, accompanied by the French ambassador, travelled to Hama before Friday prayers. Against everything that is known about their past record of interference in Middle Eastern countries, it is inconceivable that the US and Israel, along with France and Britain, would not be involved in this uprising beyond what is already known.

15. While concentrating on the violence of the Syrian regime, the US and European governments (especially Britain) have totally ignored the violence directed against it. Their own infinitely greater violence, of course, in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and other places doesn’t even come into the picture. Turkey has joined their campaign against Syria with relish, going even further than they have in confronting the Syrian regime.

In the space of a few months Turkey’s “zero problem” regional policy has been upended in the most inchoate manner. Turkey eventually lent its support to the NATO attack on Libya, after initially holding back. It has antagonised Iran by its policy on Syria and by agreeing, despite strong domestic opposition, to host a US radar missile installation clearly directed against Iran. The Americans say the installation’s data will be shared with Israel, which has refused to apologise for the attack on the Turkish ship the Mavi Marmara, plunging Israeli-Turkish relations into near crisis. So from “zero problems”, Turkey now has a regional policy full of problems with Israel, Syria and Iran.

16. While some members of the Syrian opposition have spoken out against foreign intervention, the “Free Syrian Army” has said that its aim is to have a no-fly zone declared over northern Syria. A no-fly zone would have to be enforced, and we have seen how this led in Libya to massive infrastructural destruction, the killing of thousands of people and the opening of the door to a new period of Western domination.

17. If the Syrian government is brought down, every last Baathist and Alawi will be hunted down. In a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, the status of minorities and women would be driven back.

18. Through its Syria Accountability Act, and through sanctions which the EU has imposed, the US has been trying to destroy the Syrian government for 20 years. The dismantling of unified Arab states along ethno-religious lines has been an aim of Israel’s for decades. Where Israel goes, the US naturally follows. The fruits of this policy can be seen in Iraq, where an independent state in all but name has been created for the Kurds and where the constitution, written by the US, separates Iraq’s people into Kurds, Sunnis, Shias and Christians, destroying the binding logic of Arab nationalism. Iraq has not known a moment’s peace since the British entered Baghdad in 1917.

In Syria, ethno-religious divisions (Sunni Muslim Arab, Sunni Muslim Kurd, Druze, Alawi and various Christian sects) render the country vulnerable in the same way to the promotion of sectarian discord and eventual disintegration as the unified Arab state the French originally tried to prevent coming into existence in the 1920s.

19. The destruction of the Baathist government in Syria would be a strategic victory of unsurpassed value to the US and Israel. The central arch in the strategic relationship between Iran, Syria and Hizbullah would be destroyed, leaving Hizbullah geographically isolated, with a hostile Sunni Muslim government next door, and leaving Hizbullah and Iran more exposed to a military attack by the US and Israel. Fortuitously or otherwise, the “Arab spring” as it has developed in Syria has placed in US and Israeli hands a lever by which they may be able to achieve their goal.

20. It is not necessarily the case that a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government in Egypt or Syria would be hostile to US interests. Wanting to be seen as a respectable member of the international community and another good example of “moderate Islam”, it is likely and certainly possible that an Egyptian government dominated by the Brotherhood would agree to maintain the peace treaty with Israel for as long as it can (i.e. until another large scale attack by Israel on Gaza or Lebanon makes it absolutely unsustainable).

21. A Syrian government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood would be close to Saudi Arabia and hostile to Iran, Hizbullah and the Shia of Iraq, especially those associated with the Shia leader Muqtada Al-Sadr. It would pay lip service to the Palestine cause and the liberation of the Golan Heights, but its practical policies would be unlikely to be any different from the government it is seeking to destroy.

22. The Syrian people are entitled to demand democracy and to be given it, but in this way and at this cost? Even now, an end to the killing and negotiations on political reform are surely the way forward, not violence which threatens to tear the country apart. Unfortunately, violence and not a negotiated settlement is what too many people inside Syria want and what too many governments watching and waiting for their opportunity also want. No Syrian can ultimately gain from this, whatever they presently think.

Their country is being driven towards a sectarian civil war, perhaps foreign intervention and certainly chaos on an even greater scale than we are now seeing. There will be no quick recovery if the state collapses or can be brought down. Like Iraq, and probably like Libya, looking at the present situation, Syria would enter a period of bloody turmoil that could last for years. Like Iraq, again, it would be completely knocked out of the ring as a state capable of standing up for Arab interests, which means, of course, standing up to the US and Israel.

23. Ultimately, whose interests does anyone think this outcome would serve?

* The writer is an associate professor of Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey.

Syria: US follows a failed path

5 October 2011

By Ramzy Baroud

United States ambassador to Syria Robert Ford is quite a feisty diplomat. He shows up unannounced and uninvited at various hot spots in the country, greeted with varying degrees of enthusiasm and, oftentimes, anger.

When he made a highly touted appearance in the city of Hama in July, residents reportedly greeted him with flowers. However, his appearance at the home of an opposition figure in Damascus on September 29 earned him a salvo of tomatoes and rocks from angry protesters.

Naturally – and as confirmed by various WikiLeaks cables – American diplomats don’t behave independently from the main organ of US foreign policy in Washington, the State Department. It is also safe to assume that Ford’s alleged solidarity visits

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MJ05Ak01.html

The Syria National Council: Opposition or Resistance ?

JC–  3th October  2011—

Anti-regime activists consider that the president Bashar al Assad, his army and his government occupy Syria illegally or with no legitimacy.

Therefore they see themselves not as a democratic “opposition” but as a “Resistance” movement in exile, like the French Resistance operating from England to liberate France from the German.

Their strategy is to instigate revolts through peaceful local demonstrations or if this fails through a cold war using violence or a real war if they are able to get countries to help them, like what happened in Libya.

There is nothing democratic about their approach and they act from the unproven assumption that all the Syrian people are in agreement with their approach. They get active support for some western countries who have their own agenda in mind.

The “illegality” of the present government has been expressed unilaterally by a couple of Western countries who, for years, have already been sanctioning the Syrian government for its active support of the legitimate resistance of the Palestinians to the Western-supported Israeli occupation. This “deligitimization” is contrary to the chart of the UN and has been rejected by the Arab League, and most countries in the world.
By using videos of violence and demonstrations, the western media has played an important role in trying to convince the international community that the majority of Syrian are violently oppressed and that they all consider the current government as illegitimate.

Yet, unless there is a valid and reliable confirmation that the Syrian people are in majority in support of this so called “resistance’, all its acts are considered illegal and should be condemned as terrorist acts against a state and a government that is recognized and represented at the UN and all international institutions. Embassies of the countries that consider the present government as illegitimate are still in the capital.

I hope it clarifies (?) the situation of the crisis in Syria