Category Archives: Syria

Truth and falsehood in Syria

There are at least 23 reasons why we should be careful about uncritically accepting Western views of the insurrection in Syria, writes Jeremy Salt* in Ankara

As insurrection in Syria lurches towards civil war, the brakes need to be put on the propaganda pouring through the Western mainstream media and accepted uncritically by many who should know better. So here is a matrix of positions from which to argue about what is going on in this critical Middle Eastern country.

1. Syria has been a mukhabarat (intelligence) state since the redoubtable Abdel-Hamid Al-Serraj ran the intelligence services as the deuxième bureau in the 1950s. The authoritarian state which developed from the time former Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad took power in 1970 has crushed all dissent ruthlessly. On occasion it has either been him or them. The ubiquitous presence of the mukhabarat is an unpleasant fact of Syrian life, but as Syria is a central target for assassination and subversion by Israel and Western intelligence agencies, as it has repeatedly come under military attack, as it has had a large chunk of its territories occupied, and as its enemies are forever looking for opportunities to bring it down, it can hardly be said that the mukhabarat is not needed.

2. There is no doubt that the bulk of the people demonstrating in Syria want a peaceful transition to a democratic form of government. Neither is there any doubt that armed groups operating from behind the screen of the demonstrations have no interest in reform. They want to destroy the government.

3. There have been very big demonstrations of support for the government. There is anger at the violence of the armed gangs and anger at external interference and exploitation of the situation by outside governments and the media. In the eyes of many Syrians, their country is once again the target of an international conspiracy.

4. Whatever the truth of the accusations made against the security forces, the armed groups have killed hundreds of police, soldiers and civilians, in total probably close to 1,000 at this stage. The civilian dead include university professors, doctors and even, very recently, the son of the grand mufti of the republic. The armed gangs have massacred, ambushed, assassinated, attacked government buildings and sabotaged railway lines.

5. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has a strong base of personal popularity. Although he sits on top of the system, it is misleading to call him a dictator. The system itself is the true dictator. Deeply rooted power in Syria — entrenched over five decades — lies in the military and intelligence establishment, and to a lesser degree in the ruling Baath Party structure. These are the true sources of resistance to change. The demonstrations were Al-Assad’s opportunity to pass on the message, which he did, that the system had to change.

6. In the face of large-scale demonstrations earlier this year, the government did finally come up with a reform programme. This was rejected out of hand by the opposition. No attempt was even made to test the bona fides of the government.

7. The claim that armed opposition to the government has begun only recently is a complete lie. The killings of soldiers, police and civilians, often in the most brutal circumstances, has been going on virtually since the beginning.

8. The armed groups are well armed and well organised. Large shipments of weapons have been smuggled into Syria from Lebanon and Turkey. They include pump action shotguns, machine guns, Kalashnikovs, RPG launchers, Israeli-made hand grenades and numerous other explosives. It is not clear who is providing these weapons but someone is, and someone is paying for them. Interrogation of captured members of armed gangs points in the direction of former Lebanese prime minister Saad Al-Hariri’s Future Movement. Al-Hariri is a front man for the US and Saudi Arabia, with influence spreading well beyond Lebanon.

9. Armed opposition to the regime largely seems to be sponsored by the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. In 1982, the Syrian government ruthlessly crushed an uprising initiated by the Brotherhood in the city of Hama. Many thousands died, and part of the city was destroyed. The Brotherhood has two prime objectives: the destruction of the Baathist government and the destruction of the secular state in favour of an Islamic system. It is almost palpably thirsting for revenge.

10. The armed groups have strong support from outside, apart from what is already known or indicated. Exiled former Syrian vice-president and foreign minister, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, who lives in Paris, has been campaigning for years to bring down the Al-Assad government. He is funded by both the EU and the US. Other exiled activists include Burhan Ghalioun, backed by Qatar as the leader of the “National Council” set up in Istanbul. Ghalioun, like Khaddam, lives in Paris and like him also, lobbies against the Al-Assad government in Europe and in Washington.

Together with Mohamed Riyad Al-Shaqfa, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, he is receptive to outside “humanitarian intervention” in Syria on the Libyan model (others are against it). The promotion of the exiles as an alternative government is reminiscent of the way the US used exiled Iraqis (the so-called Iraqi National Congress) ahead of the invasion of Iraq.

11. The reporting by the Western media of the situations in Libya and Syria has been appalling. NATO intervention in Libya has been the cause of massive destruction and thousands of deaths. The war, following the invasion of Iraq, is yet another major international crime committed by the governments of the US, Britain and France. The Libyan city of Sirte has been bombarded day and night for two weeks without the Western media paying any attention to the heavy destruction and loss of life that must have followed. The Western media has made no attempt to check reports coming out of Sirte of the bombing of civilian buildings and the killing of hundreds of people. The only reason can be that the ugly truth could well derail the whole NATO operation.

12. In Syria the same media has followed the same pattern of misreporting and disinformation. It has ignored or skated over the evidence of widespread killings by armed gangs. It has invited its audience to disbelieve the claims of government and believe the claims of rebels, often made in the name of human rights organisations based in Europe or the US. Numerous outright lies have been told, as they were told in Libya and as they were told ahead of the attack on Iraq. Some at least have been exposed.

People said to have been killed by state security forces have turned up alive. The brothers of Zainab Al-Hosni claimed she has been kidnapped by security forces, murdered and her body dismembered. This lurid account, spread by the TV channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya amongst other outlets, was totally false. She is still alive although now, of course, the propaganda tack is to claim that this is not really her but a double. Al-Jazeera, the British newspaper The Guardian and the BBC have distinguished themselves by their blind support of anything that discredits the Syrian government. The same line is being followed by the mainstream media in the US. Al-Jazeera, in particular, having distinguished itself with its reporting of the Egyptian revolution, has lost all credibility as an independent Arab world news channel.

13. In seeking to destroy the Syrian government, the Muslim Brotherhood has a goal in common with the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, whose paranoia about Shia Islam reached fever pitch with the uprising in Bahrain. WikiLeaks has revealed how impatient it was for the US to attack Iran. A substitute target is the destruction of the strategic relationship between Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah. The US and the Saudis may want to destroy the Alawi-dominated Baathist regime in Damascus for slightly different reasons, but the important thing is that they do want to destroy it.

14. The US is doing its utmost to drive Syria into a corner. It is giving financial support to exiled leaders of the opposition. It has tried (and so far failed, thanks to Russian and Chinese opposition) to introduce an extensive programme of sanctions through the UN Security Council. No doubt it will try again, and depending on how the situation develops, it may try, with British and French support, to bring on a no-fly zone resolution opening the door to foreign attack.

The situation is fluid and no doubt all sorts of contingency plans are being developed. The White House and the State Department are issuing hectoring statements every other day. Openly provoking the Syrian government, the US ambassador, accompanied by the French ambassador, travelled to Hama before Friday prayers. Against everything that is known about their past record of interference in Middle Eastern countries, it is inconceivable that the US and Israel, along with France and Britain, would not be involved in this uprising beyond what is already known.

15. While concentrating on the violence of the Syrian regime, the US and European governments (especially Britain) have totally ignored the violence directed against it. Their own infinitely greater violence, of course, in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and other places doesn’t even come into the picture. Turkey has joined their campaign against Syria with relish, going even further than they have in confronting the Syrian regime.

In the space of a few months Turkey’s “zero problem” regional policy has been upended in the most inchoate manner. Turkey eventually lent its support to the NATO attack on Libya, after initially holding back. It has antagonised Iran by its policy on Syria and by agreeing, despite strong domestic opposition, to host a US radar missile installation clearly directed against Iran. The Americans say the installation’s data will be shared with Israel, which has refused to apologise for the attack on the Turkish ship the Mavi Marmara, plunging Israeli-Turkish relations into near crisis. So from “zero problems”, Turkey now has a regional policy full of problems with Israel, Syria and Iran.

16. While some members of the Syrian opposition have spoken out against foreign intervention, the “Free Syrian Army” has said that its aim is to have a no-fly zone declared over northern Syria. A no-fly zone would have to be enforced, and we have seen how this led in Libya to massive infrastructural destruction, the killing of thousands of people and the opening of the door to a new period of Western domination.

17. If the Syrian government is brought down, every last Baathist and Alawi will be hunted down. In a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, the status of minorities and women would be driven back.

18. Through its Syria Accountability Act, and through sanctions which the EU has imposed, the US has been trying to destroy the Syrian government for 20 years. The dismantling of unified Arab states along ethno-religious lines has been an aim of Israel’s for decades. Where Israel goes, the US naturally follows. The fruits of this policy can be seen in Iraq, where an independent state in all but name has been created for the Kurds and where the constitution, written by the US, separates Iraq’s people into Kurds, Sunnis, Shias and Christians, destroying the binding logic of Arab nationalism. Iraq has not known a moment’s peace since the British entered Baghdad in 1917.

In Syria, ethno-religious divisions (Sunni Muslim Arab, Sunni Muslim Kurd, Druze, Alawi and various Christian sects) render the country vulnerable in the same way to the promotion of sectarian discord and eventual disintegration as the unified Arab state the French originally tried to prevent coming into existence in the 1920s.

19. The destruction of the Baathist government in Syria would be a strategic victory of unsurpassed value to the US and Israel. The central arch in the strategic relationship between Iran, Syria and Hizbullah would be destroyed, leaving Hizbullah geographically isolated, with a hostile Sunni Muslim government next door, and leaving Hizbullah and Iran more exposed to a military attack by the US and Israel. Fortuitously or otherwise, the “Arab spring” as it has developed in Syria has placed in US and Israeli hands a lever by which they may be able to achieve their goal.

20. It is not necessarily the case that a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government in Egypt or Syria would be hostile to US interests. Wanting to be seen as a respectable member of the international community and another good example of “moderate Islam”, it is likely and certainly possible that an Egyptian government dominated by the Brotherhood would agree to maintain the peace treaty with Israel for as long as it can (i.e. until another large scale attack by Israel on Gaza or Lebanon makes it absolutely unsustainable).

21. A Syrian government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood would be close to Saudi Arabia and hostile to Iran, Hizbullah and the Shia of Iraq, especially those associated with the Shia leader Muqtada Al-Sadr. It would pay lip service to the Palestine cause and the liberation of the Golan Heights, but its practical policies would be unlikely to be any different from the government it is seeking to destroy.

22. The Syrian people are entitled to demand democracy and to be given it, but in this way and at this cost? Even now, an end to the killing and negotiations on political reform are surely the way forward, not violence which threatens to tear the country apart. Unfortunately, violence and not a negotiated settlement is what too many people inside Syria want and what too many governments watching and waiting for their opportunity also want. No Syrian can ultimately gain from this, whatever they presently think.

Their country is being driven towards a sectarian civil war, perhaps foreign intervention and certainly chaos on an even greater scale than we are now seeing. There will be no quick recovery if the state collapses or can be brought down. Like Iraq, and probably like Libya, looking at the present situation, Syria would enter a period of bloody turmoil that could last for years. Like Iraq, again, it would be completely knocked out of the ring as a state capable of standing up for Arab interests, which means, of course, standing up to the US and Israel.

23. Ultimately, whose interests does anyone think this outcome would serve?

* The writer is an associate professor of Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey.

The Lebanese civil war and the role of Syria

JC 14 october 2011

Depending on whom you talk to, the Lebanese Christians, principally the Maronites allied with pro-Israel Geagea, will tell you the the Syrians massacred them, while the others, Greek orthodox, Armenians and Maronites now allied with Aoun and Frangie will tell you that the Syrian saved them from the Druze, the Sunni militias and the Palestinians.

The civil war in Lebanon was such a messy and complex war that violence, killings and excesses came from all the protagonists independently of their religion and political affiliation.

When the Maronites were on the verge of defeat in front of the Palestinians,the Druze and Sunnis militias, the Maronite Lebanese president Frangie called on Syria to intervene.
“In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm” (wikipedia)

The huge mistake was that the mandate was not limited in time and the Arab league never asked Syria to withdraw its troops.

Therefore the Syrian army “pacified” the country and settled in Lebanon. Some Syrian leaders, like Abdel Halim Khaddam, found that Lebanon was a good place to make money with corrupted Lebanese and intervene in the political directions of the country.
With time, the gratitude faded away and the resentment grew against Syria and the abuses and interference of its representatives in the political life of the country. We know the rest….

The Syrians responsible of crimes during that war were never indicted. The same applies to Christian Lebanese leaders responsible of horrendous massacres. In addition some of them are shamelessly still active in Lebanese politics. There has not been any thorough judicial investigation of the terrible crimes that happened during and after this war. This is why the murder of Hariri rallied the Lebanese who thought that finally some kind of justice was coming to their country.

Therefore the obituaries presented by Antoine of Christians killed should be completed by the obituaries of the Moslems, Druzes and Syrians soldiers who died during that war.
Then we could have the whole picture of the victims of that dirty war that no Lebanese want to remember.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12492&cp=7#comment-278667

The internal political prospect in Syria: View from a blogger

From  a Blogger in SyriaComment.com
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277507

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277665

1. If Assad were such a reformer, why did he not entertain the idea of a multi-party polity before 2011?
This has been discussed at SyriaComment before. Assad did entertain it on and off over the years. Why didn’t he actually do it? Because he didn’t have to (that’s a non-trivial point). And because it wasn’t entirely clear what the multi-party polity would look like if he created one (it might’ve been dysfunctional in one or more ways; and doubtless he would’ve been unhappy with the whole thing if a religious conservative party won a big share of the vote). Foreign Minister Wallid al-Moallem has said recently that the regime didn’t do it because they were under pressure and distraction the foreigners accusing Syria of murdering Hariri, and other saber-rattling by foreigner powers. I don’t accept that. Presidental Adviser Bouthiana Shaaban said a few months ago that the regime would not have repealed the emergency law, and would not have introduced the reforms of this year, if it hadn’t been for protesters on the streets. The whole country knew that the protesters were unassailably right about the specific things that the regime has now agreed to change.

2. You have made it clear that you would vote for Assad in any future elections (were they to be held). What is it about his ‘manifesto’ that you find so compelling?
See below including point number (10).

3. What significant internal reforms has Assad instigated over the past ten years?
The most significant has been greater opening of the economy to the international marketplace and futher moves away from Statism and socialism. The process is far from finished and is proceeding at a pace of gradual, organic evolution, and certainly not revolution. Ehsani would like it to proceed much faster. There has been a risk that faster pace could cause tumults, dissolutions, hardships, in the economy and then more dangerously in the polity.

# 266 in the previous thread DIGGING FOR GOLD IN BOSRA asks pro-regimers: “Why do you think Assad would win a fair election?

Here’s a list of 16 grounds I have for thinking that the regime will easily win the fair parliamentary elections that are in all likelihood to take place in 2012 — fair except religious and tribal parties are banned. The list is incomplete and off the top of my head, in no particular order, some of it recycled, and I think I could expand it if I spent more time on it.

(1) The overall number of people who accepted the invitation to join anti-regime demonstrations was “small” (though no hard number is available).

(2) The educated classes did not join the anti-regime demonstrations. In every country every winning party needs substantial support from the educated classes. In Syria right now there is only one party that has such support. To illustrate, one of the two key reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood party is so much stronger in Egypt than in Syria is that it has attracted substantial support from the educated classes. You know the other key reason. During the past six months the Syrian educated classes had the opportunity to come out and complain about the latter, and they didn’t take it up.

(3) Most of the religiously conservative classes did not join the anti-regime demonstrations. Neither did the clergy; most of the Sunni clerical leadership went on record as anti-tumult and pro-civil-process. Most of the people who attended the mosque on Friday did not attend an anti-regime demonstration afterwards, not even if there was a demonstration conveniently available and on offer to them at the doorstep. Neighborhoods in Damascus with a high concentration of religiously conservative people had only small, and few, demonstrations over the six months. One of the regime’s core constituencies is people who are less religious or who have a more progressive, less doctrinaire, take on religion. So, it is a very big and important achievement that this regime has been able to maintain its support among most of the religiously conservative. Correcting myself, it is more cautious and prudent to say “the religious conservatives consented to the rule of the regime and did not rise up against the regime” instead of “the regime maintained their support…”. Alright, many of them may vote for another party in the elections. But since most of them don’t express alienation against the regime, you shouldn’t expect them to vote en masse against the regime.

(4) No representatives of agricultural or rural interests having been talking up an alternative to the Assad regime. There was very little or no movement of people from rural areas into the towns and cities to participate in demonstrations (despite some fake boasts from the fake revolutionaries to the contrary). Right now there exists no competitor to the regime for the rural vote.

(5) Once the reforms announced by Assad are completed, there will be no major disagreements between Assad and the general Opposition on the structure of the institutions of the State. On social and economic policies, major disagreements between Assad and the Opposition are confined to wings of the Opposition (such as the MB wing), not the whole Opposition. These various wings are known to have only small and slim political support in Syria. The general Opposition does not have a platform and agenda beyond the reform agenda that the Assad regime itself has declared itself in favour of implementing. That is, the anti-regime protests have not created a policy agenda or alternative forward vision that throws the regime on the defensive in the upcoming election.

(6) The demonstrators were predominantly from the poorly educated working class. Most of them did not have an agenda beyond wanting Assad to leave and wanting a breath of fresh air in the country of an unspecified kind. The great majority of the poorly educated working class did not join with them in the anti-regime demonstrations, and all those who didn’t join are likely to follow the lead of the educated classes in the elections. The educated folks will be creating and propagating the discourse of the elections contest.

(7) The various Syrian opposition parties are very weak today, their representatives are barely known or entirely unknown to the Syrian public, and I can’t see a route by which they can make themselves a whole lot stronger by election day. The attempt to unconstitutionally overthrow the regime has discredited swathes of opposition, and has increased the regime’s political support among previously neutral people who strongly desire civil process and no violence.

(8) The city Al-Bab, 50 kilometers northwest of Aleppo, is the eight largest city in Syria. The city Al-Safira, 35 kilometers southwest of Aleppo, is the tenth largest city in Syria. (Source). Those two plus Aleppo (all overwhelmingly Sunni in religion, btw) have had essentially or very nearly zero anti-regime demonstrations during this past six months. Opposition to the regime in that part of the country among the poorly educated working class is truly miniscule. Aleppo is Syria’s most populous province. The regime is also very stong in Ladaqia, Tartous and Sweida provinces, and Damascus City. You can appreciate that those regional strengths can be enough to win or nearly win, even if you’re not yet agreeing with a forecast of the regime winning almost everywhere.

(9) Everybody in Syria knows that the anti-regime crowd has been lying about security forces atrocities and that the regime has been telling the truth. (Foreigners don’t know it, since they don’t watch Syrian TV, but foreigners are irrelevant since they won’t be voting). More generally, the regime has been able to use its control over Syrian mass media especially TV news to strong effect. The State-controlled TV news puts out good quality products for the most part, which enjoy good credibility with the Syrian public, and have good market penetration.

(10) The next two numbered points are interrelated but distinct. They are both aspects of the spirit of the nation and nationalism. The first is that there will be people who will be voting not so much for the Assad party as for national unity. They want unity and Assad’s party is by happenstance the embodiment for it. The Assad party’s manifesto is vote for national unity. A vote against Assad’s party is a vote for discord and recrimination. (The Putin|Medvedev party in Russia enjoys a similar sort of status, and it also has to put up with dissidents who despise the basics and atmosphere of the unity).

(11) “Syrian society is nationalistic and the Assad regime has got a bone-crunchingly strong grip over how the nation and nationalism is defined. The definition of the nation that the Syrians are nationalistic about is the one developed and nurtured by the regime over decades. It is unchallenged and unchallengeable, and people are rallying around it at this time of stress.” Nationalism sells well in national elections and no challenger can outdo the regime in selling nationalism.

(12) (a) The regime is actually in touch with the pulse of Syrian sentiment, and makes it its business to be so. (b) The regime in policymaking is non-doctrinaire, and is responsive to popular sentiment.

(13) The regime’s core agenda, modernization, is supported by almost all.

(14) The trade sanctions imposed by the Europeans and Americans have alienated the Syrians, I say, and all winning parties will decry the trade sanctions in the election campaign, and candidates with endorsements from Europe or America won’t have a snowball in hell’s chance of getting elected, and I say more about the political effect of the trade sanctions at http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12429&cp=all#comment-277131

(15) Religious and tribal parties are banned in the elections. The permitted parties will be having to pretty much compete head-to-head against the regime on the regime’s own territory.

(16) Syrian society is dominated by a sociologically broad Establishment that covers all geographic parts of the country, nearly all religious sects, all age groups, all professional occupations, all big private enterprises, and the State. This Establishment has had only one political party for decades. Today it shows no inclination towards internal dissent or devisiveness such as would create two parties within one Establishment (such as the Western countries have).

Footnote: I’ve come across many commentators who think the Assad regime has a “narrow base of political support”. E.g. Joshua Landis thinks that “Syria’s chronic failing is that it lacks a deeply shared sense of political community. This explains why such a narrow regime as that led by the Assads….” In next year’s competitive elections we are going to see who’s right and who’s wrong regarding these two radically different interpretations of the same scene.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277507

#142 Syrialover (who sounds like a straight-up anti-Syrian) says: “It’s about the economy, stupid”. It applies every time to every election everywhere, always. It’s also fuelling the Arab Spring uprisings. And if a genuine oppostion uses that slogan in a true election, the Assadists…. [will lose the election].

#157 DFGIB says in a similar vein: “I am sure that when people are presented with a credible plan for getting this country back on track they won’t be voting for Assad.” I’ve already explained why I disagree with that full sentence from DFGIB, but let me reiterate that the sentence’s first half is still very hypothetical. To illustrate:

Date 6 Oct 2011. A organization called “National Coordination Body to the forces of Democratic and National Change in Syria”, in a statement read out by its secretary-general Hassan Abdul-Azim, said it espouses the principle of national democratic change and a transition to a parliamentarian democratic leadership, and has stepped up its demands to topple the “security and tyrant regime.” The statement went on: “It’s too late to talk about reforming the regime due to its insistence since the eruption of the uprising to use violence and security and military solutions… in addition to brutal torture and wide arrests.” Banners inside the meeting hall read, “yes to the collapse of the security tyrant regime,” and “No to foreign military intervention … no to violence and no to sectarianism.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/06/c_131177091.htm

Thus, that organization is (a) still sincerely thinking that ordinary Syrians can be talked into going out onto the streets in very big numbers to chant for unconstitutionally toppling the regime, (b) still not talking about competing in next year’s parliamentary elections, and (c) still not talking about the economy. I say it’s a recepie for total failure.

I also insist, and I trust the regime and its security forces to insist, that the only way we’re going to have “Democratic and National Change in Syria” is by the 2012 parliamentary elections followed by the 2014 Presidential election.

The election is not going to be about the economy because, for one thing, the Opposition is devoid of fresh and saleable economic ideas; and in the unlikely event they did come up with something worthwhile and popular, the regime would appropriate it for itself. On questions of the economy, nearly all of the captains of industry are (and are going to be) supporting the Assad’s party. So are the Trades Unions. When we have the captains of industry, the trades unions and the government all reading out of the same prayer book, and we have an opposition with no real experience in economic development matters, I can’t see how the Assad’s party could get beaten on that issue. But anyway the election is not going to be about the economy. All signs say the Opposition is going to emphasize “tyranny” and “corruption”. (I already posted on this board some months ago about the regime’s exposure to the corruption allegation, but the post does not come up at google search — why not?).

Of the seventeen points I made at #121 above, here’s my favourite:

(17) Syrian society is dominated by a sociologically broad Establishment that covers all geographic parts of the country, nearly all religious sects, all age groups, all professional occupations, all big private enterprises, and the State. This Establishment has had only one political party for decades. Today it shows no inclination towards internal dissent or devisiveness such as would create two parties within one Establishment (such as the Western countries have).

As I see it the parlimentary election campaign will consist of sundry semi-anonymous and semi-disreputable dissent parties campaigning against the Establishment party. With that view, I must expect the Establishment party to win by at least as wide a margin as Mubarak’s party used to win by in Egypt under somewhat similar circumstances.

That reminds me of a totally different point, coming to mind by mention of Mubarak’s Egypt. I assume you know the place the MB and similar parties had in Egypt’s political landscape over the years. I now believe Syria’s political landscape is not going to see the appearance of a similar thing, because the Syrian Establishment — specifically the better educated Sunnis, who are the sole arbiters of this matter, I believe — have “opted for secularism to promote national unity”. A quasi-religious party would lack support from the society’s Establishment and would carry the millstone of sectarianism around its neck. Syria’s Grand Mufti Ahmad Hassoun recently said this year’s new legal ban on religious political parties is harmless to religion, a view with which I fully agree. You may well say that just because the Establishment has accepted that this is going to be Syria’s way, it does not follow that the wider masses have or will accept the same. You could be right. But I believe the masses will follow the Establishment. More fundamentally, I believe an Establishment is established.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277665

Syria: the Local Syrian OppositionTalks view on the expats’ Syrian National Council

Syria’s Manna: On Ghalioun and the Trinity of a Successful Revolt

By: Othman Tazghart [1]

Published Saturday, October 8, 2011

Syrian opposition activist Haytham Manna speaks about the “trinity” of a successful revolution in Syria, his take on the newly formed Syrian National Council and his recent fallout with prominent dissident Burhan Ghalioun.

Othman Tazghart (OT): What are your reservations about the recent Istanbul conference? Why have you refused to join the Syrian National Council formed as a result?

Haytham Manna (HM): This Council is the result of an initiative by a group whose identity is connected to one ideology. It was not authorized by the political opposition or the youth movement inside the country. This group spent 55 days promoting the need for such a council on the basis that it will bring the revolutionary youth out of this crisis, solve all their problems, and facilitate material help, international recognition, a no-fly zone, and so on. Over the last month and a half, there have been repeated attempts to introduce Libyan vocabulary into the Syrian revolution. The people who have done this are professionals, they do not belong to any known political group. They call themselves ‘independents’ or the ‘Independent Islamic Movement.’ This group has sought to impose their plan on everyone else from the beginning and they failed in their first two attempts in Istanbul.

There was a joint attempt by all the major political groups to form a ‘National Syrian Alliance’ that would include the real political forces within the country. But the Istanbul group tried to weaken this alliance by appealing to some of its members to join the National Council instead. They claim that the difficult part is forming the council, after which the world would recognize them and facilitate miracles, allowing the revolution to carry on and succeed, while reinforcing the role of the youth in it. Sale of this illusion went hand in hand with attempts to takeover the unified consensus work being carried out between various political movements. It gave the National Council a specific ideological coloring, where the Islamists were granted 60 percent of council membership, when their real weight within the opposition is a fraction of that.

Moreover, this council lacks modesty, because those who formed it assert that they represent the majority in the revolution, including the coordinating committees. They claim that they will save the revolution and change the course of history. This will certainly reflect negatively on them when people discover their real size, the limits of their representation, and their modest means; with all due respect to some who have supported them.

OT: Do you think that making Dr. Burhan Ghalioun, a man with genuine credibility, the president of the council will help guarantee against such pitfalls as militarization of the uprising or foreign intervention?

HM: I have said several times, particularly during my last visit to Tunisia, that the Tunisian revolution gave us three basic principles. The first is the peaceful nature of the revolution. The second is the absence of the idol. There are no idols or individual leaders, only working groups who offer democratic solutions and think in a collective manner and seek consensus and pluralistic mechanisms that respect the efforts of these people while limiting their power. The third principle is the secular nature of the collective movement. This trinity for me is pertinent when it comes to Syria. I do not believe that any one person, whoever they are, can prevent all mistakes, especially when his position changs several times in the last few days. We want to escape the individual dictatorship of Arab rulers, so it does not make sense to devote our work to dictatorship and individualism.

OT: You have close ties with Dr. Burhan Ghalioun. From the beginning of the protests in Syria you have agreed on the peaceful and secular nature of the revolution. What are the reasons behind the differences that have arisen between you lately?

HM: There were no differences until the last meeting in Berlin. Dr. Ghalioun had promised to attend the meeting of the National Coordination Committee in Berlin and we were waiting for him to arrive. We were surprised to find that he had changed course to Istanbul, with no apology, explanation, or even prior notice. We have not spoken since that day. I think that Dr. Ghalioun owes us an explanation. We need to understand why we should offer all these concessions to the Islamists in Istanbul when we are a country with 26 sects, creeds, and ethnic groups.

This means that this is a country where the relationship between religion and the state cannot be dealt with lightly. The Syrian Revolution of 1925 held that “religion is for God and the homeland is for all.” Today, minorities do not play an effective role, so we need a secular discourse to gain their confidence. The Syrian people are believers, but they don’t want any religious ideology to influence their constitution or their future. I wish that Dr. Ghalioun would not take that line. After the Hama massacre in the 1980s, Said Hawa, a major thinker in the Muslim Brotherhood, tried to explain the failures of The Fighting Vanguard, their military wing. He concluded that “the Syrian people love freedom, the republic, and democracy.” I hope that some people do not forget this lesson.

OT: Some are asking, is your opposition to the National Council because of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in it or because of the size of the representation they were given?

HM: It is well known that I worked hard to rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood with the other political parties in Syria. I facilitated their reconciliation with several political groups. I was one of the most prominent defenders of Islamist prisoners. Therefore, I have no problem with them. I see the Islamists as part of the political geography of all Islamic countries, not just Syria. But I believe that at most, 10 percent of Syrian society supports the Muslim Brotherhood. I do not understand why they are clambering for more representation.

I hope that they will be wise and rational enough to see that it is not in their interest or the interest of the revolution for them to exaggerate their role in the Syrian uprising. It is the dictatorship that is inflating their role to scare off international support. They’re serving this purpose by exaggerating their role at conferences and in the media.

OT: In one of your statements, you described the group who prepared for the Istanbul conference as the “Syrian Washington Club.” There is also talk of American funding of this meeting. What are the motives for this? Is it related to a specific political agenda?

HM: The American administration lost its battle with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with Iran over nuclear power. It is now seeking to turn the Syrian revolution into a sort of proxy war against Iranian influence in the region. It is no secret to anyone that America absolutely does not want to support a revolution which seeks secular democratic change in the Arab world. The democratic Syrian revolution is a true revolution, not a proxy war. There was definitely American funding behind the Istanbul group, official and unofficial. There was also funding from the Arab Gulf states. But I believe that money does not make or break a revolution. It affects revolutions negatively by reinforcing opportunism and conspiracy and weakening the role of the genuine fighters in certain phases. Money cannot change the course of history.

OT: Do you think that the Istanbul meeting and the National Council are in breach of the consensus document signed in Doha?

HM: Istanbul was a complete cancellation of what was agreed upon in Doha. In Doha, it was agreed that the Syrian National Alliance was the prime organizer of all efforts to later set up a Syrian political council. The agreement dictated that leadership for the national alliance should include the most significant political forces, on condition that greater weight be given to the opposition inside the country.

But this was circumvented when the Istanbul meetings were revived, after two failed attempts, by attracting some groups who are poorly represented at home, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Damascus Declaration signatories. The Brotherhood’s role in the revolution has been restricted to media work and sending aid, and the Damascus Declaration is no longer the force it once was. Moreover, the most prominent intellectuals behind the Damascus Declaration are now part of the National Coordination Committee and have not joined the Istanbul group.

OT: Are there differences between the Doha agreement and the Istanbul meeting on the issues of arming the revolution and foreign intervention?

HM: I have always sought to develop basic principles on which all the opposition agrees. We began by announcing the Oath of Dignity and Rights on June 17 as a supra-constitutional text that includes the basic principles of the Second Syrian Republic. This is definitely rejected by a large proportion of the Islamists, which is why this essential text was replaced in the National Council by a loose declaration. The National Council’s declaration is not based on a clear political program. All matters were left ambiguous so that each participant could explain them as they wished. One person speaks of military intervention, the other about humanitarian intervention, and another says no to foreign intervention in any form. For us, our program is clear, our loyalties are clear, and our demand for the downfall of the regime is clear. All these matters had been agreed on and there is no ambiguity or disagreement.

OT: How do you view the position of the opposition now? Do you think that differences within it are a type of democracy? Or do they deepen divisions and undermine the unity of the opposition?

HM: The Algerian Revolution was successful despite the fact that there were two separate liberation movements. This means that unity for unity’s sake is not a logical or rational program for change. We cannot accept agreement on any basis, just to preserve unity. The primary objective is a political program and finding common ground to conduct our work. I do not see this as the problem. It is the right of those who joined the National Council to try. Let them see for themselves how far this experiment can go. As for me, I believe it is my duty today to create a strong, civil, national, democratic axis, as it is the only guarantee for the revolution’s success. If the revolution becomes Islamicized, it will fail; if it becomes sectarian, it will fail; and if it becomes militarized, it will fail.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Othman Tazghart
http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/1015

The Realist Prism: On Syria, Sovereignty Comes First for Southern Democracies

By Nikolas Gvosdev | 07 Oct 2011

The decision this week by Russia and China to veto a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for its use of violence against its domestic opponents has attracted much attention — and opprobrium. What has generated less discussion is the fact that the three states of the IBSA bloc — India, Brazil and South Africa — abstained from the vote. But their unwillingness to support the resolution has clear implications both for the future of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine as well as for America’s own relationships with the rising democracies of the South.

Certainly notions of anti-imperialism and “Third World solidarity” help to provide some context for their decision to abstain. India, which for decades played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement; South Africa, which is ruled by the African National Congress; and Brazil, which is looking to establish its own distinct global presence: None of the three were predisposed to automatically rally behind a resolution sponsored by the Western powers. But these three democracies’ reluctance to sanction an authoritarian regime that is increasingly relying on repressive violence to retain its hold on power has a far deeper root.

China’s distaste for taking action against the Syrian regime, and its willingness to support the Russian position, is explained by Beijing’s own experiences with protesters seeking to change the status quo — notably the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. But New Delhi, Brasilia and Pretoria have similar concerns. India, for instance, is engaged in an ongoing battle with a number of different insurgencies and organized crime groupings across the subcontinent. The Maoist Naxalite insurgency in central and eastern India, which has led to the deaths of thousands of civilians over the past two decades, has been described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.” Brazil has stepped up efforts to regain control of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro and other major cities, especially before the spate of world sporting events the country is scheduled to host later this decade. This has included using the military to take down the gangs that for years have enjoyed sanctuary in these “brown zones,” where the writ of the Brazilian state has been nonexistent.  South Africa has successfully undergone the transition from white minority rule, but significant ethnic and class divisions still percolate and threaten the state’s stability.

All three of these governments are keenly aware of what Max Weber noted was one of the fundamental characteristics of a state: the right to wield a monopoly on violence — and to use force, if necessary, to ensure that its edicts and proclamations were enacted. Establishing that the state — and not local leaders, tribal elders, separatist politicians or organized crime figures — would rule has historically required the use of force and, at times, the spilling of blood.

Yet, when in the early days of the Arab Spring, Western pundits and policymakers began to send the message that the use of lethal force by a state against its citizens ipso facto proved that the regime was illegitimate and had lost its right to govern, it raised the hackles of governments that know that even citizens of democracies at times seek to challenge the authority of the state. What would be the criteria for determining whether a state had crossed the line from its legitimate right to suppress disorder and prevent insurrection, to the illegitimate repression of its population? Though there was justifiable outrage at the idea of military units deployed against unarmed civilians, no clear standards were elucidated.

When it came to Libya, these concerns led Brazil and India to abstain on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing the imposition of a no-fly zone and the use of force to protect civilians. South Africa voted in favor, guided in part by the assessment that Moammar Gadhafi might in fact inflict a major bloodbath to drown the rebellion. Yet the South Africans apparently believed the resolution would hasten a political solution of the crisis by creating “safe areas” for the rebels, similar to what the U.S.-led coalition had done for Iraqi Kurds after 1991.

When the Syrian resolution subsequently came up for a vote, Brazil and India again decided to abstain, but this time they were joined by South Africa. A South African spokesman explained the decision by noting, “We were concerned that this resolution should not be part of a hidden agenda to yet again institute regime change.” Indeed, an IBSA delegation had visited Assad last month to discuss a possible political process to end the violence. In discussing India’s position on the failed resolution, New Delhi’s U.N. ambassador, Hardeep Puri, said, “The resolution does not accommodate our concern about threat of sanctions . . . [n]or does it place any responsibility on the opposition to abjure violence and engage with the Syrian authorities for redress of their grievances through a peaceful political process.”

None of the three countries endorse the Syrian regime’s dictatorial practices, but neither do they want to forswear the right of any state to “take appropriate action when militant groups, heavily armed, resort to violence against state authority and infrastructure,” as Puri noted.

This has put the United States, in particular, in a quandary. The window of opportunity for establishing the norm of humanitarian intervention that was opened by Resolution 1973 is now closing shut again. And it is not simply because of authoritarian states on the Security Council, but also due to the continued resistance from Southern democracies. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice complained about just that, observing, “It’s been a very interesting opportunity to see how they respond to the issues of the day, how they relate to us and others, how they do or don’t act consistent with their own democratic institutions and stated values. Let me just say, we’ve learned a lot and, frankly, not all of it encouraging.”

There is an obvious solution: a clear declaration that humanitarian intervention will never be employed against a democratic state that has to resort to force to preserve civil order. But such an explicit guarantee would further solidify the “East versus West” alignment in the Security Council, which in turn could lead to longstanding paralysis in responding to international crises. Beyond that, “democracy” remains very much in the eye of the beholder. One only need observe how, in the past several years, the “inside-the-Beltway” rhetoric on Turkey has changed noticeably. Once lauded as a secular democracy and given a relatively free pass from Washington on how it waged its counterinsurgency campaign against Iraqi-based Kurdish rebels, Turkey is described in far less complimentary terms now that the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pursuing policies that conflict with U.S. interests.

There has always been a good deal of facile rhetoric in Washington about forming a global “association of democracies.” The IBSA group’s abstention on the Syria resolution again reminds us that many governments see themselves as states first, and democracies second.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. His weekly WPR column, The Realist Prism, appears every Friday.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10267/the-realist-prism-on-syria-sovereignty-comes-first-for-southern-democracies

 

 

No Arab Spring, says US intelligence analyst

Barçın Yinanç
ISTANBUL- Hürriyet Daily News
Friday, October 7, 2011

The Arab Spring did not take place, according to a US-based intelligence analyst, who said there has been no regime change in the Middle East except Libya. ‘Not every bid of unrest is a revolution and every revolution is not democratic,’ says George Friedman, adding that Turkey is the leader in the region and old powers don’t like rising powers, and that though the US currently needs Turkey because it leads the region, in the long run Turkey will become more powerful and relations will sour

The Arab Spring did not happen, according to George Friedman, the head of global intelligence firm STRATFOR Institute, because there has been no regime change in the Middle East. Turkey is the leader of the Islamic world but it is still not a mature power, said the author of “The Next 100 years,” in which he predicted that Turkey will rise to be a great power. “Turkey is still very cautious and it is testing its strength,” he told the Daily News during a recent interview in Istanbul.

Q: You recently said Turkey was a power but not a mature one. How so?

A: A mature power has institutions for managing international systems. The U.S., at the outset of World War II, did not have intelligence service [and] very few trained diplomats. Turkey is more advanced than that, but it does not have a diplomatic corps that is matched to Turkey’s responsibilities in the world. It does not have Portuguese speakers, experts on Mexico; it takes a while to develop this. It takes a while to develop intelligence services. The foreign minister said Turkey has opened 21 embassies in Africa, but who mans them? Who are the Africa experts?

Q: You are warning Turkey that it is not rewarding to be a big power.

A: America is the major power. We are not loved, we are resented. It is the fate of countries that take leading roles. They will disappoint some countries, anger other countries. Turkey is not yet experienced with the sense of injustice of trying to do good but being claimed to have done badly.

Q: Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu would have objected to the comparison with the U.S. and said Turkey was out there with the best of intentions. Why shouldn’t we be liked?

A: You will be liked. But it is easy to be liked when Turkey refrains from acting. But when Turkey has to act it does not act because it decides (when) to be an aggressive power. It will be facing a crisis along its southern border, then the crisis will spill over to Turkey; that is just an example.

Q: In the next 100 years, will the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) “zero problem” policy be sustained?

A: It is a transitionary moment. I have always said that Turkey will be a great power; I did not say Turkey is already a great power. AKP has two policies: One is to be a major power in the Islamic world and simultaneously to avoid engagement. This is precisely the foreign policy it should have now. But 10 to 20 years from now, it will not be able to maintain that. Because as you send out your businessmen, you would have to have political influence to guarantee their security, their interests, etc. Soldiers are one way to interfere in a country; businessman can interfere, too. So the process will draw you into engagement. There will be a moment where Turkey’s interests will seriously diverge from those of another country and that will be the time Turkey will have to decide to act or suffer the harm. It will not happen because Turks decide to be aggressive; it will happen because they will be pursuing their interests. And that will lead to criticism; don’t forget that when you act, you make mistakes.

Q: Everyone is criticizing Turkey now for its problems.

A: Problems are not determined by whether Turkey wants to have them; it has to do with the dynamics of the region. These problems arise not because Turkey is creating them. Turkey has a policy of not creating problems.

Q: Looking at your writings, it seems that you are not changing your projections due to Arab Spring.

A: No, because the Arab spring did not happen. No regime fell except Libya and that’s because of NATO. In Egypt, one general is replaced by four generals. In Syria, Bashar al–Assad is still in power. There is tremendous excitement but there is very little action, very little outcome. Not every bit of unrest is a revolution. Every revolution does not succeed. Every revolution is not democratic, and the democratic ones can elect (rulers like) Ayatollah Khomeini. There is talk about massive democratic uprising; first of all it was not massive in Egypt – most of the country was not affected. Second, those who rose up did not have a common idea of what should come next. Third, they did not overthrow the regime. They got rid of Mubarak and that was what the army wanted, too.

Q: You have previously claimed that Turkey should leave its EU bid and lead the Islamic world. You maintain that autocratic regimes will continue in the region but Turkey has opted for democratic change.

A: Unless Turkey wishes to invade countries and impose regimes on it, it will work with the regimes that are there. Turkey would have to be insane to join the EU. It is the leader of the Islamic world. It has the largest Muslim economy, it has by far the largest military force, and its economy is so dynamic that it is creating a vortex in the region. The best thing that happened to Turkey is the fact it was not admitted to the EU.

Q: How does Turkey’s present situation fall into the realities of the Arab Spring and the call by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for secularism, for instance?

A: It told us more about Erdoğan and the AKP than the effect it made in North Africa. That he choose to make that statement was important. But there is a huge gap between voicing an opinion and taking an action and responsibility. Turkey is in a position of transitioning from the time when it was a weak power, and all it had was its opinion to offer to a time when its opinion matters because it is followed by the expectation to act.

Q: You also argue that old powers don’t like rising powers. Can we assume therefore that the U.S. doesn’t like Turkey?

A: In the long run there will be bad feelings. But in the short run, the U.S. needs Turkey as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. It no longer wants to play a role for the time being. Turkey also wants stability in the region but does not have the power yet to create that stability, it will reach out to the U.S and we will redefine the relations. But down the road as Turkey becomes more powerful, the U.S. will become more frightened and the relationship will change again.

Q: On strained relations between Israel and Turkey, is it a prelude Turkish-U.S. contention?

A: With Turkey taking on its current position, its relationship with Israel has become a liability. The level of visibility cuts against other interests. But lately we’ve seen signs that Turkey is having closer relations with the U.S. Israel is close to the U.S. therefore Turkish-Israeli relations will be more constrained.

Q: You don’t foresee a conflict between Turkey and Israel?

A: I don’t think it is possible. Turkey does not have the military to project force against Israel. It does not want to be in Syria, let alone engage Israel. And Israel does not want to engage Turkey. You are not in a situation of divorce or hostility. You are in a situation which certain relationships continue, but in which public diplomacy shifts to where Turkey can take advantage of other relationships.

Q: Is Turkey punching above its weight?

A: This government is careful not to do that. One of the reasons it doesn’t engage is because it manages its strength. Turkey is testing its strength. You see that in the case of its policy toward Libya and Syria.

Who is George Friedman?

Dr. George Friedman is the founder and chief executive officer of Stratfor, a global intelligence and forecasting company. He is the author of several books, including New York Times bestsellers, such as “The Next Decade” and “The Next 100 Years,” in which he predicts that Turkey will be a great power; as such, he has advised global players to learn Turkish.

A very popular keynote speaker, Friedman is in high demand at conferences and industry-specific events for private organizations and government agencies. He was recently in Istanbul to moderate the energy simulation of Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) that was also attended by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

“We have taught the same courses,” he said about Davutoğlu, adding that the latter was one of the most interesting of the many foreign ministers that he has met.

Friedman lives in Austin, Texas.

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=no-arab-spring-says-us-intelligence-analyst-2011-10-07

Arab Spring breeze reaching to Islamists

ISTANBUL- Hürriyet Daily News
Monday, October 3, 2011

Islamic movements are softening their tone to avoid scaring off potential voters, with many pointing to Turkey and PM Erdoğan’s ‘neo-

Emerging into the open following the overthrow of authoritarian regimes throughout the Arab world, Islamic movements are now wrestling with the idea of how to apply Islamic precepts to societies that are demanding democracy as one of the fruits of the Arab Spring.

Many such movements, such as the Tunisian Islamist Ennahda Party, are preaching a moderate line in an effort to avoid scaring off parts of society that are wary of parties with Muslim roots.

“We are not cut off from our environment … All the values of democracy and modernity are respected by Ennahda. We are a party that can find a balance between modernity and Islam,” Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda Party, said in a recent interview with Reuters.

Western powers and governments in other Arab states are watching Tunisia’s election closely, worried that democratically elected Islamists might impose strict Islamic law and turn their back on Western allies. But Ghannouchi, who returned to Tunisia from exile in Britain after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s fall, said Western countries and Tunisian liberals had nothing to fear from a victory for his Ennahda party.

Two issues in particular, women’s equality and liberal moral attitudes, are seen by many Tunisians as a litmus test of how tolerant Ennahda will be if it gains power.

Ghannouchi’s remarks offering a more mild form of Islam came on the same day that the former leader of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood said he wanted a “democratic” Syria, not an Islamic state to replace the regime of embattled President Bashar al-Assad, Agence France-Presse reported.

“We support the establishment of a modern, civil, democratic state,” Ali al-Bayanouni told a conference organized by the Brookings Doha center in the Qatari capital.

Before the Arab Spring hit countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, their strongman leaders defended themselves for years as the bulwark preventing their countries from sliding into Islamist hands – an approach which helped them secure baking from Washington and other Western powers wary that their countries could turn into another Iran.

Western powers, however, soon began to support the uprisings and the emergence of a new Arab world. The topic is now dominating talk in Western capitals so much that the European Council’s Parliamentarian Assembly put the Arab Spring at the top of its agenda Monday.

NATO, too, is planning to devote greater attention to the subject, announcing a special summit on the spring on May 21-22 in Chicago.

Indeed, amid growing indications that some in the West are ready to work with the Islamists, one U.S. governmental source said Washington had had limited but direct talks with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and was open to working with them.

Turkey an inspiration

Many in the region are pointing toward Turkey as a model for the Islamist parties in the region. Last month, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is seen as a trailblazer by many Islamists in the region, staged a tour of the three North African Arab Spring states. Striking a moderate chord, Erdoğan emphasized the concept of “neo-laicism,” noting that while individuals could be religious, states should remain secular.

The comments were controversial among some older members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, but his comments were well-received elsewhere by a new generation of pious Muslims who are eager to pursue religious-based politics within a democratic, tolerant and secularist framework.

Ultimately, Islamist leaders in the region are keen to stress the varieties of Islam that could be used as a political model.

“If the Islamic spectrum goes from [assassinated al-Qaeda leader Osama] bin Laden to Erdoğan, which of them is Islam?” Ghannouchi asked in a recent debate with a secular critic. “Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban or the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models, models that combine Islam and modernity?”

In the end, even the hard-line Saudi model appears to be bending under the weight of the Arab Spring. Last week, King Abdullah decreed that women would be able to participate for the first time in the next local elections in 2015, a measure likely aimed at heading off Arab dissent in the kingdom. The same week he has also overturned a court ruling sentencing a Saudi woman to be lashed 10 times for defying the kingdom’s ban on female drivers.

© 2011 Hurriyet Daily News
URL: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=arab-spring-breeze-reaching-to-islamists-2011-10-03