Category Archives: Syria

Damascus Focuses on Containing Foreign Intervention

Posted on February 22, 2012 | Comments Off on Damascus Focuses on Containing Foreign Intervention
Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)
By: Ibrahim al-Amin [1]
Published Monday, February 20, 2012

The Syrian regime’s military crackdown against armed rebel groups clearly enjoys Russian support. Moscow believes that President Bashar Assad is obliged to carry out this crackdown for a number of reasons, not least to reduce his foreign enemies’ room to maneuver.

The focus is currently on Homs, but that does not mean that there are no plans by the military to extend it to other areas.

The strength of the armed groups in some areas is not the main difficulty facing this campaign. Nor is a lack of local public support, other than in areas such as Zabadani, some villages in the province of Damascus Countryside, and Hama. It is that the Syrian leadership wants the task accomplished with the minimum number of casualties.

That means two types of casualties.

First, the civilians who get caught up in such battles, whatever their politics.

Not that the regime is solely to blame for civilian deaths – which is the impression given by the Arab and Western media outlets engaged in the war to topple the regime. The armed groups have caused the deaths of many civilians as well as military and security personnel. Some have committed atrocities.

The armed groups have become the new regime in some areas where they have succeeding is asserting their control, forcing out all agencies of the state – whether traffic police, security personnel, or public officials. They have violently enforced their dictates, whether for general closures at times of their choosing, or for contributions to the revolution’s coffers.

These demands are presented as religious strictures. One prominent Idlib clergyman tells of being question by locals about their religious obligation to pay money to the armed groups. They asked for his help in ensuring that the regime’s corrupt security agencies are not replaced by these groups that commit clear crimes and seem to include growing numbers of non-Syrians.

The manner in which these groups are dealt with is the regime’s second consideration.

It believes, on the basis of its intelligence assessments, that only about 30 percent of its armed opponents are ideologically-motivated. They appear prepared to fight it to the death, along with their supporters among the population.

The remaining 70 percent are thought to be anti-regime protesters who took up arms, but without training or organization. Some high level officials believe such people acted “impulsively” and can be dissuaded. They favor mediation via their families or other go-betweens, to urge them to surrender themselves and their arms, and benefit from a general amnesty that will be issued as soon as security is restored.

Syrian officials make clear, accordingly, that the military campaign currently underway is not an all-out assault.

They acknowledge that the security forces carried out a harsh crackdown in Damascus Countryside. They argue that it was imperative to prevent any creation of enclaves near the capital.

But they say the army is employing other methods in Idlib and Homs. These are mainly joint security-military operations, based on intelligence gathered about armed groups, to destroy their fortified locations, or launch surprise attacks on their gatherings. The armed forces then withdraw and redeploy.

In other words, military operations in these areas are to be based mainly on “attrition” in confined neighborhoods. They will also be accompanied by attempts to negotiate via intermediaries. Such negotiations have led to the surrender of tens of gunmen in different parts of the country, with the mediation of families or clan elders. These have not been covered by the media.

Media coverage is still not treated as a major part of this battle by Syrian security and military chiefs. Media outlets engaged in the campaign to pressurize Syria are unconcerned about the accuracy of their coverage or the reality of the situation as witnessed by people on the ground. But journalists close to or supportive of the regime complain that it fails to provide them with enough detailed information to help them counter that campaign.

Nevertheless, it is reported that some military units protested against the “new level of constraints” which they have been ordered to observe. These are said to have resulted from consultations with the Russians and Iranians. The thinking is that Assad, while acting to reassert the authority of the state, could not re-consolidate his rule in a country with huge numbers of bereaved families.

The Russians believe they are providing Syria with support it needs to counter attempted external political or other intervention against it. Western diplomats accuse Russia of going further, and providing it with intelligence support to track the movements of armed groups.

Russia has not made any comments on this matter. Its focus now is on how the regime can achieve successes on the ground which would restrict the protests to peaceful demonstrations in areas and districts from where it does not feel threatened. That would better enable it to conduct the political struggle.

Moscow is convinced that the regime must implement its reform program quickly and appoint a new government, even if the opposition does not take part in it. There is a belief there, as in Iran, that applying the reforms would have a tangible effect on the public, and affect attitudes to both the offshore opposition and the question of stability – which is today’s overriding preoccupation for most Syrians.

In the opposing camp, the regime’s foreign enemies appear to be inching closer to a game of Russian roulette. The various means of pressure they have applied to date – propaganda, political, and diplomatic, even meddling on the ground – have failed to achieve the desired outcome. That forces stark choices on them, including to risk a major military or security action, directed either against the army or leading regime figures.

This prospect prompted Russia and Iran to send messages to all parties concerned, notably Turkey, France, and some Arab states. Some of these messages were delivered on the ground, visibly or otherwise.

Moreover, the approach taken to the Syrian crisis by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in his latest speech, implies he is not alone in wanting to stop members of the March 14 coalition from aiding Assad’s opponents, especially his armed opponents.

What is being hatched on borders?

Some time ago, Lebanese security agencies attached to different government ministries gathered intelligence about what was going on at the border. Their work was not fully co-ordinated. The Information Branch did not share its data with Army Intelligence Directorate or the General Security Department.

Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from some of this intelligence by the Lebanese army, and by some political figures, was enough to ring an alarm bell.

Patches of territory along the eastern and northern borders were being turned into military zones and training camps. Many of these lie in barren areas (east of the village of Aarsal in the Bekaa valley), or open country. Some are in villages in the district of Akkar, where “Future Movement Islamists” wield powerful influence.

The reports spoke of cooperation between local smugglers and these armed groups. It also documented people coming and going, while they collected various types of weapons and ammunition to sell to them. The money available seemed to increase by the day. Some operatives based in Beirut and other cities would be tasked with purchasing communications and photographic equipment.

Copies of some of these reports evidently reached Damascus. It cross-checked them with its own intelligence, and put together a dossier, which was then sent to Lebanese officials.

This was done either by the Syrian Ambassador in Beirut Ali Abd al-Karim, or the Secretary-General of the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council, Nasri Khoury. They sent copies to the president, prime minister, speaker of parliament, relevant ministers, and military and security chiefs.

The dossiers were accompanied by a formal request from Syria to Lebanon: that it take measures, in accordance with the binding agreements to which it is party, to prevent its territory from being used as a conduit for violent or illegal activity against Syrian territory.

Army commander Jean Kahwaji did not secure clear, official, and full political backing for an extensive military and security operation to secure the border areas in question. He employed other means to disrupt the armed groups, but that fell short of meeting the Syrian demands.

The failure to provide political backing, it is said, was because some in authority feared clashes could result between the army and Lebanese groups allied with the Syrian gunmen. Ominously, some officials quietly suggested to military commanders that the problem could be left for the Syrian army to deal with itself.

It later became apparent that this is precisely what was hoped for by the Arab/Western “operator“ of the political-military assault on Syria. The Syrian army could be lured into a military operation on the Lebanese border, which might force it at some point to advance into Lebanese territory, even if only by a few meters or kilometres. That would be used to justify a diplomatic outcry, aimed at getting UN resolutions issued to extend the mandate of UN forces in the south to cover the northern and eastern borders too.

That would present us with a quite different dossier.

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Ibrahim al-Amin

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Posted in Lebanon, Syria

Bitter Tears for the loss of the Syrian Christian Community

Posted on February 19, 2012 | Comments Off on Bitter Tears for the loss of the Syrian Christian Community

Bitter tears for the loss of the Christians and the minorities

In the middle east where there is variety of religions and ethnicities,  I have observed  that the ruling majority is always suspicious of the minorities’ foreign allegeance and tend to radicalize and often ostracise them. We see that in Iran, in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt,  in Soudan etc..
This is why generally, minorities feel more reassured when the country ruler is also from a minority.
In Lebanon the Christians have managed to obtain some sort of guarantee to keep significant political rights through an unwritten agreement of power sharing. This seem unthinkable for most Moslem Syrians. The fact that the Arab Sunnis will ultimately take the power from a minority will be seen ass  a sign to non-Moslem or non-Arab ethnic minorities that they will become second class citizens with little power, no protection and no guarantees. They will be systematically discriminated.
In these conditions, either they’ll fight back to get their recognition included in the Constitution or through a political agreement like Lebanon or they’ll create an autonomous areas like Iraq Kurdistan or they will leave the country.

Sunnis alone then will be responsible to move Syria into ‘democracy’. As there are no example of Sunni Arab Moslem working democracy, it will be trial and errors and under the advices and financial influence of rich non-democratic countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the GCC and some western-educated expats

Soon the economy will be in shamble, therefore many young educated Christians who could claim to be discriminated, will be welcomed in the Western countries and there will be a real brain drain.
Because the Islamic extremists are also Sunnis, it will be very difficult for a Sunni government to control them and Syria will fall prey to countries that would want to use it for their own interests. Israel will have no incentive to give the Golan back ever.
The loss of the Christian community and the loss of confidence of of the Kurds, the Alawites, the Assyrians in their role in a society from now on dominated by the Sunnis will transform Syria into a monochrome country at the mercy of the rich Sunni Gulf countries and the western countries and therefore,  like Tunisia. will become weak and dependent.
A gloomy future that many Syrians are fighting for.

Bronco on Syriacomment.com

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Posted in Religion, Syria

Syrian Kurd Leader: Revolution Won’t Succeed Without Minorities

Posted on January 28, 2012 | Comments Off on Syrian Kurd Leader: Revolution Won’t Succeed Without Minorities
By Michael Weiss-

Jan 20 2012, 7:15 AM ET-

What Syria’s largest minority means for the uprising, for the opposition leaders, and the country’s future
It’s hard to know just how many Kurds are in Syria. The last census was taken 50 years ago, though demographers today tend to predict that Kurds number between 3.5 million and 4.6 million, or about 15 to 20 percent of Syria’s total population. Anyone with a nodding acquaintance with the struggles and strategies of this nationless people will know that they have been a decisive force in the federalist system of postwar Iraq and an ever-present human rights challenge for Turkey’s hopes for European Union accession. If the revolution in Syria is to have any chance at success, the Syrian Kurds will mostly likely play a major role.

Dr. Abdulhakim Bashar is the Secretary-General of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria — the sister party to Massoud Barzani’s Iraqi counterpart — as well as the Chairman of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a newly formed umbrella organisation representing ten Syrian-Kurdish parties. Bashar was arrested in 2008 before a Kurdish protest slated to take place outside the Syrian parliament in Damascus. He lives in Syria but gave me an hour or so of his time on a weeklong visit to London, where I met him in my office. We talked about minority rights in Syria, Turkey’s role in the Syrian opposition, and the prospect of Western intervention to hasten the end of the Assad regime.

What’s your relationship like with the Syrian National Council [the aspiring government-in-exile]?

I’ve been in contact with [SNC Chairman Burhan] Ghalioun several times, there has been engagement. However, their proposal is still very vague, and doesn’t meet our full demands for participation. For example, the SNC says it endorses lifting the “pressure” on the Kurdish people. What does that mean? We said in the KNC that we advocate lifting all the discriminatory policies that have been applied to the Kurdish people such as the Arabization policies in Syria, the Arabized name changes of existing towns and villages and demographic changes. These were all deliberate policies applied by the Ba’ath Party.

The SNC also offers a “democratic” solution without any clear meaning. What does “democratic” mean?  It might imply private schooling to learn the Kurdish language or opening satellite stations for the Kurds.

Such as Turkey has implemented.

Yes. However, we demand our cultural freedoms categorically.

“The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by sectarian interests”

Do you want to see Syria adopt the Iraq model, a federalist system based on power sharing, with broad autonomy granted to the predominantly Kurdish region? Kurds are more widely distributed throughout Syria than they are in Iraq, so that might be difficult to achieve.We demand the right to self-determination in a form that would be decided in a national Kurdish referendum, but also within the integrity and unity of the Syrian land. When Syria was formed, it was formed by the Sykes-Picot agreement, it wasn’t our choice. But we want to keep the current borders. With a new social contract between ourselves and all the Syrian components.

Second, if we talk about federalism in the Kurdish areas, from the northeastern part of Syria, up to the border with Iraq until Afrin, near where Aleppo is — the Kurds form about 75 percent of the population of that region. That land is the Kurdish land.

I’ve heard Yekiti and Azadi [Syrian Kurdish parties] have pulled out now or are threatening to do.

All Syrian Kurdish groups decided in Irbil in October to freeze any participation of Kurdish groups in the SNC. This applies to all Kurdish parties, from the Damascus Declaration on, and will continue until and unless the SNC listen to our demands. My party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, had an SNC member: we actually froze his membership before the conference in Syria that formed the KNC.

Of course, we cannot stop individual Kurds from participating in the SNC, although I suspect that as time goes on and nothing changes, they too will freeze their membership or quit altogether.

So what are the Kurdish National Council’s preconditions for joining the SNC fully?

 

We have four main demands, and they’re not necessarily all going to be fulfilled: First, political decentralization of the government. Syria is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-ethnic country. If it keeps to the same governing style as now — one central government — there is a possibility of civil war. Second, a secular state. Third, constitutional recognition of the Kurdish issue, a constitutional assurance that the Kurdish people are on their historic land. And the lifting of all discriminatory policies that have been deliberately applied to the Kurdish people. Fourth, the right of self-determination within Syria’s unity and integrity — that’s our condition to remain within Syria.

If the SNC fully recognizes the Kurdish Bill of Rights, we will join the SNC fully. Because we are very concerned that the SNC is so much influenced by Turkey now, they may postpone guaranteeing our rights until after the regime falls. Therefore we ask for a recognition of these rights in order to become a draft for a new constitution.So you want a written guarantee from the SNC?

We want a guarantee written and published internationally. The important thing to realize is that if we get our full rights, Turkey will be obliged to grant full rights to Turkey’s Kurdish population. If the Kurds were to get recognition in the Syrian constitution, Turkey will give similar if not more rights to the Kurds in Turkey. Syria is the key player.

Change in Syria means change in Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran. Iran will be isolated because Iran’s connection with Hezbollah would not be so much facilitated as before [by the Assad regime]. The new Syrian government would not be an ally of Iran.

Ghalioun said this in his interview with the Wall Street Journal two months ago, though he’s gone back and forth on partnering with Hezbollah recently.

Ghalioun wants to be diplomatic. In fact, I believe, the SNC would completely cut ties with Hezbollah.

Recently, university students [in Syria] have said that Lebanese are enrolled in Syrian universities who aren’t of university age. This is from student sources. Students have said that these are Hezbollah members.

The SNC has not been recognized by world governments, apart from Libya’s, as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. If it were, would you be more willing to join?

If the international community recognized the SNC at this stage, that would be a very quick decision. It still represents only one side of the Syrian opposition, it doesn’t include Kurds as Kurds. We are united and we have agreements. If we were to join the SNC fully, we’d do so from a unified political standpoint on this issue.

Is the KNC all in for regime change or are you entertaining a possible reconciliation with the Assad regime?

We are part of this revolution, we are not neutral. One of the main points in the KNC statement is that we don’t want the present dictatorship and we refuse to accept any future dictatorships. We don’t accept an Islamic government or a Muslim Brotherhood-led government. We will refuse that very firmly.

We have also decided not to have any dialog with the regime separately from the Syrian opposition. For example, if the international community decided all the opposition groups had to have a dialog with the regime, we’d support that, in case the current regime asks for negotiations for a transition of power, just like in Yemen. But that’s unlikely.

When I’ve asked SNC members about the poor representation of Kurds as a bloc in the Council, they usually reply by saying something like, “Well, we don’t want to give the Kurds their own bloc as we see the SNC as a non-sectarian political entity. Kurds are fairly represented in strictly political groupings that reserved seats in the Council, such as the Damascus Declaration bloc and the Local Coordination Committees bloc.” Is that just an excuse for exclusion, in your opinion?

Yes. It’s not just about Kurds, however. Arabs, Druze, Ismailis, Alawites, Christians have been ignored by the SNC, which is responsible for these minorities failure to participate as united communities in the revolution. Also, if the SNC says that Local Coordination Committees are very active in the SNC, I’d like to add that the Committees have very little participation of Alawites and Druze; only the elites of these communities are involved in them.

In my opinion, Syrian Alawites would not accept working in a central government with Sunnis because the regime has succeeded in sowing fear amongst [Alawites].

This is why we ask for political de-centralization in Syria. The regime has succeeded in convincing minorities that any change would mean a new Islamic system coming to power and the rights of these minorities would be lost completely. In order for the SNC to convince minorities to take part in the revolution and hasten the fall of the regime, it must send a clear message to these minorities to participate. Transitioning to democracy in such a country is very difficult; it can’t happen in one day. You have to give guarantees and assurances to each minority as these fit their rights and benefits.

You seem to be arguing that the Syrian opposition is doing the regime’s propaganda work for it, by not convincing minorities of the multicultural nature of this revolution.

Yes, exactly. Let me give you an example. In Qamishli [a predominantly Kurdish city in Syria], Assyrians have formed a pro-democracy organization, however they can’t gather even ten people to demonstrate in the Kurdish region. Why? Because the Church is playing a major role in turning Syrian Christians into shabbiha [pro-regime death squad] thugs for the sake for regime preservation.

The French ambassador to Syria has told me personally that he see loads of Christians every day telling him that their lives would be at risk if this regime changed. This is evidence that the SNC is still not able to be clear with other minorities to show their rights will be guaranteed.

The SNC is mainly focusing on things on the ground — the number of people killed, how to topple the regime — but not a political program to address the issue of minorities.

By taking what concrete steps, apart from guaranteeing Kurdish rights as you already discussed?

The SNC should, in my opinion, keep in contact with all the minorities and be positive about their demands within the unity and integrity of Syria. For Christians, the [SNC should emphasize] freedom of religion. It should reassure Alawites, Ismailis and Druze that they are equal in belonging to Islam, they are not outsiders to the faith. There must be a very clear program for each and every ethnic group.

The current path is the one that Islamists are taking in the SNC, not the liberal representatives.

Are there enough liberal representatives in the SNC to alter its approach to the minorities question?

The liberals are not enough to influence the SNC. That’s also our responsibility as Kurds. It’s the international community’s responsibility to pressure the SNC, and the Muslim Brotherhood, to guarantee the rights of minorities. And also — most important — for the international community to pressure Turkey not to take one side of the opposition over all others.

The Kurds are Syria’s largest minority, larger even than the Alawites. Would it be fair to say that there is no Syrian revolution without their full and wholehearted participation?

We are more organized and recognized as a society within Syria and other Arab countries than other minorities. If we do participate more actively, other minorities will feel more assured and follow suit. The regime has tried to convince the world that the conflict is between them and the Arab Sunnis. We want to prove that wrong. The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by sectarian interests.

This article available online at:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/syrian-kurd-leader-revolution-wont-succeed-without-minorities/251660/

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Posted in Religion, Syria

Is anyone in the Syrian leadership brave enough to ask the question?

Posted on January 25, 2012 | Comments Off on Is anyone in the Syrian leadership brave enough to ask the question?

Wednesday 25 January 2012-
By Ali Ibrahim-

According to a news piece carried by the official [Syrian] news agency, an official source reported that the Syrian regime has rejected the new Arab initiative, which had drawn up a roadmap similar to what happened in Yemen to ensure a semi-peaceful transfer of power there. This, however, has caused several questions to be raised, most prominently: What will happen next? Will the next step be an international solution?
Indeed, the Syrian regime’s rejection itself raises questions, firstly: Is this the regime’s final stance? Or will the door be left ajar for negotiations? Based on our experience of Arab initiatives towards Syria so far, the regime in Damascus has been known to adopt contradictory stances. The latest of these initiatives was the Arab observer mission – considered at first [by the Syrian regime] to be a violation of Syrian sovereignty – yet following weeks of inquiries, exchanged messages and replies between Damascus and the Arab League, and following several amendments to the Arab protocol, observers were finally sent to Damascus, and now they themselves are the subject of endless controversy.
It would not be surprising if future events follow a path similar to the Arab initiative that was proposed after the recent Arab ministerial meeting, with the Syrian regime attempting to negotiate, make inquiries and then carry out amendments, as was the case with the observer mission, in a bid to buy time.
Let us be frank here, the decision to accept the Arab observers in Syria was nothing more than al-Assad’s submission to the pressure being mounted upon him, and an attempt to buy more time, hoping that his security apparatus would succeed in quelling the revolution and the numerous hotbeds of unrest. This is clear considering the increasing rate of killings and attacks on cities, which continued to escalate until the death toll in the presence of Arab observes rose to several hundred.
Therefore, we can observe that pressure is a catalyst for action, and the new Arab initiative – which raised the ceiling of Arab mobilization with regards to what is happening in Syria – has mounted further pressure on the al-Assad regime. However, the door has still been left ajar for a safe exit [for Bashar al-Assad] along the lines of what happened to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This was represented by the advice offered by the Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki, during the interview he gave to Asharq al-Awsat, when he touched upon the subject of Syria and al-Assad by saying “we must not put four walls in front of a wounded tiger. There must be a way out for him”. Of course, it is important that this message is taken on board, and that al-Assad understands what is meant by a way out.
We are now facing the final scene of the Syrian revolution, and this has become clear for everyone to see, whether inside Syria or outside, whether as part of the regime or the opposition, the regional parties; Arab and non-Arab, and the international powers. Al-Assad has been given several respites and plenty time, but nevertheless he has failed to present any real solutions. Furthermore, he has failed to destroy a revolution that has broken through the fear barrier, and has now begun to confront the regime’s weapons with arms of its own. Now the situation on the ground is changing but not to the advantage of the regime, which has begun to lose control of entire cities and districts.
It is a fact that no one can know what is happening within the corridors of power, or inside Syria’s governing institutions, but it is also a fact that the Arab initiative has thrown a stone into the ruling regime’s water, and we do not know whether this is stagnant or not. Surely officials and key figures within the regime’s institutions will begin to wonder: Is keeping the President worth the destruction of the country and its institutions, the continual bloodshed, the killings, and the continual divisions within the army and the security apparatus? I hope they will come to the rational answer, provided these officials have a sense of responsibility and the courage to ask themselves such questions.
Is there anyone within the Syrian leadership who can ask such questions? This will become apparent in the days to come.

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=28233

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Posted in Middle East Geopolitics, Syria, Syrian Opposition

Arab plan schedule to Syrian regime change

Posted on January 23, 2012 | Comments Off on Arab plan schedule to Syrian regime change

This is the schedule of events in the Arab plan:

1) Bashar al Assad and the opposition agree to the plan. Would they? how long would it take to get a response? What incentives are they offered to agree?
2) Bashar al Assad opens a dialog with the opposition ‘within two weeks’ ( after they agree, I guess) Would the opposition accept?
3) Within two months, Bashar Al Assad designates a new government including members of the opposition
3) Once done, Bashar al Assad passes his power to the Vice president
4) Three months later: Free elections Presidential? Parlementary? what happened to the Constitution?

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Posted in Syria, Syrian Opposition

Is Zabadani the Syrian Benghazi?

Posted on January 20, 2012 | Comments Off on Is Zabadani the Syrian Benghazi?

The army is showing strength and restraint. Zabadani as a ‘safe haven’ was a bad choice, it has no future: It is bordering Lebanon whose government officially support Bashar’s regime. The Lebanese will control the passage of people and weapons.
The FSA fighters and their mercenaries are therefore trapped and cannot move to any other place. If the hope that a ‘safe haven’ will encourage soldiers to defect, I doubt any soldier would want to find refuge into a besieged town. I think it may be the other way around.
The SNC was expecting that the death toll of the shelling will create the “Hama’ effect on the international community. It did not happen. In a way, it looks like the regime has been able to neutralize a large part of the armed rebels without killing anyone ( only one death was reported, despite the ‘heavy shelling’). Zabadani is now a prison for the rebels. Their freedom will be the subject of negotiations with their patrons, Turkey, Qatar and the SNC, under the auspices of the AL.

If the FSA/SNC thought they would create a Benghazi, it is a failure.

On Thursday  19 January, the FSA claims that Zabadani is Benghazi.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=13169&cp=3#comment-291833

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Posted in Syria, Syrian Opposition

Shiite Proselytizing in Northeastern Syria Will Destabilize a Post-Assad Syria

Posted on January 17, 2012 | Comments Off on Shiite Proselytizing in Northeastern Syria Will Destabilize a Post-Assad Syria
September 15, 2011 –

Iran’s ties to Syria go beyond the geo-politics of the “Axis of Resistance.” This is evident in the remote, volatile, and oil-rich al-Jazirah region of northeastern Syria, where there has been a noticeable increase in Iranian investment in religious and cultural centers over the last decade. Information gathered from interviews with Arab shaykhs, tribal youth, Kurds and Assyrians from the region suggest that Iranian financed Shi’a proselytizing, including cash handouts for conversion, is having an impact on conversion rates in the region.  Arab shaykhs representing the six largest tribes in the region assert that the Assad government covertly supports a missionary effort that has affected both the Sunni (Arab and Kurd) and Christian (Assyrian) communities. [1]

The Jazirah region encompasses the areas including and surrounding the cities of Hasakah, Raqqah, Qamishli, Deir al-Zawr, Mayadin and Abu Kamal. This region includes the Euphrates River and its major tributary, the Khabour River. Al-Jazirah is considered to be the agricultural “breadbasket” of Syria. It is also the locus of Syria’s oil industry and a major transit point for the entry, whether legal or illegal, of goods and livestock. [2] Arab tribal society is strongest in this region of Syria, which is comprised of tribal and mixed ethnic communities. Approximately 60% of Syria’s Arab tribal population resides in this complex ethno-linguistic zone, which also includes significant numbers of “politically sensitive” (non-Arab) communities of Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians and Turkomans.

Lingering ethnic conflicts and Kurdish nationalism have resulted in an extremely heavy security presence in al-Jazirah.  The Syrian government has historically employed a divide-and-conquer approach that has negatively impacted civil society and social cohesion in the communities of this region. Scores of individuals from al-Jazirah interviewed by the authors assert that the Syrian government is trying to create a pervasive atmosphere of distrust, especially between the Kurds on the one hand, and Arabs and Christians on the other. In addition to the intelligence and informant networks deployed by the regime in the northeast, other tactics to inhibit local level authority and autonomy are also utilized.  These include land nationalization, restrictions on farming and grazing rights and even forced relocation of whole groups of people (e.g. tribal Arabs and Kurds). The Syrian government’s attempts to assert total control over this oil-rich region have included blocking outside aid agencies from bringing relief to the area during the multi-year drought and subsequent famine that began in 2003.

The economic situation in al-Jazirah is dire.  The Hasakah Governorate in particular has been fiercely impacted by the economic crisis, precipitated by a multi-year drought that crippled the local agricultural economy and forced 36,000 families to leave the land they once farmed. Over 1.3 million people have been affected by the drought, and more than 803,000 Syrians have lost their work because of its impact on successive harvests (Executive [Beirut], November 2009). Even the more wealthy shaykhs of northeastern Syria are feeling the economic effects of the drought. Many of them are in debt to either the Ba’ath Party (through government-controlled banks) or to private lenders who cooperate with the Ba’ath Party. Shaykhs who refused to pay the exorbitant fees of the loan sharks were forced to leave thousands of acres of their land uncultivated for the 2009 planting season. [3]

While there are no generally accepted figures for conversion rates to Shi’ism in Syria, information provided to us by local shaykhs is informative. Shaykhs representing the six largest tribes in the region stated repeatedly that Shi’a missionaries were having an impact on Sunni to Shi’a conversion in the region, especially among the economically vulnerable young men forced to seek work outside of al-Jazirah. A Baggara shaykh reported that a Shi’a religious center near Aleppo, for example, sustains young tribesmen who leave al-Jazirah in search of jobs with financial support, information on safe housing and a place of refuge where they can interact with other youth from their home region. When questioned about the financing of the mosques, one local shaykh from the Jabbour tribe became uneasy, and would only state that the mosques were financed by “outsiders,” although he would not state who these outsiders were.

In a 2009 discussion with two tribal leaders, the Baggara shaykh (whose community is based both in al-Jazirah and south of Aleppo) stated that fully 25% of his tribe had converted to Shi’ism. While the second shaykh from the Shammar tribe (whose community is based in Hasakah) concurred with this figure regarding Baggara conversion, he stated that for his own tribe the conversion rate was less than one percent.  He added that the reason the Shammar are largely immune to religious conversion is their very strong adherence to what he termed “traditional Bedu values.”  He went on to explain that the Baggara were never historically “noble” camel herders and thus were “weak” in terms of adhering to traditional Arab tribal or “Bedu” norms.  In an interview that took place in June 2011, a local contact of one of the authors stated that the entire population of Qahtaania (a Baggara village between Qamishli and Malakiyya) has converted to Shi’ism, praying in the Ali ibn Abu Talib mosque built there in 2007. [4]

Conversion to Shi’ism is a contested phenomenon in the region. According to our interview data, the majority of converted Shi’a in al-Jazirah are secretive about their practices, preferring to practice their faith with fellow converts in husseiniya-like study groups in private homes. The main reason for this secrecy is the disapproval of the converts’ families and/or tribes. A contact of one of the authors, a young convert to Shi’ism from the Walde tribe that live near Raqqah, stated in September 2010 that: “There is a problem between the tribes and the Iranians, but between the leader [Bashar Al-Assad] and the Iranians, there is no problem.” Influential Sunni Syrians such as Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni of the Muslim Brotherhood have warned against “Shia-ization” in Syria. In a May 2008 interview, al-Bayanouni stated that: “on the cultural level, the Shi’ite school of Islam is spreading in Syria, funded by Iran and supported by the Iranian regime… This situation is exploited by people who give financial incentives, and pay the salaries of some tribal leaders, imams, and shaykhs, in order to convert these influential people to the Shi’ite school of Islam” (al-Arabiya, May 2, 2008).

The spread of Shi’ism in al-Jazirah, a majority Arab Sunni tribal region, adds another element of complexity to the dynamics of identity politics and organization of resistance to the regime there. Tribal, ethnic and sectarian differences exacerbated by decades of oppression and years of economic decay and out-migration, now coupled with Iranian cultural penetration through Shi’a missionary work, have destabilized the region and will have an impact on any attempt to form a post-Assad government in Syria.  It is the view of the authors that Iran has “soft” tools or resources in place that it can draw upon in a post- Assad Syria that reach beyond military and political power politics into the sociocultural realm.

Carole A. O’Leary is a Visiting Scholar at the Columbus School of Law’s Program in Law & Religion within the Catholic University of America (CUA).

Nicholas A. Heras is an M.A. Candidate in International Communication at the American University (DC) and a former David L. Boren Fellow.

Notes:

1. This article draws extensively from interviews conducted by the authors in 2008-2011 in Lebanon and Syria. The interview data suggests that there has been an increase in the number of Shi’a Muslim mosques and attendees at these mosques in al-Jazirah over the last decade.

2. See “On the Ground from Syria to Iraq,” Harmony Project. (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: July 22, 2008), p. 86.

3. Information drawn from author interviews. See endnote 1 above.

4. The village of Hatla, near Deir ez Zawr in Hasakah Province, is also described as having been completely converted from Sunni Islam to Shi’ism (Washington Post, October 6, 2006).

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38401

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Posted in Iran, Religion, Syria

A year after Jasmine and Tahrir

Posted on January 14, 2012 | Comments Off on A year after Jasmine and Tahrir

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan- January 14, 2012-
It is still early to come to any conclusion about the dénouement of the churning in West Asia. Things are far from settled.

The euphoria generated by the Jasmine and Tahrir revolutions has all but dissipated during the past year. The unrealistic expectations, the hype built up mainly by the western governments and the media have given way to doubt, disappointment and even despair over the fate of ‘Arab Spring.’ The concern of most observers in the international community is now focussed on the direction in which “people’s movements” in various countries will proceed, and on the loss of lives that occurred in Libya, Yemen and, to a less extent, Egypt, and that is continuing in Syria and can be expected to happen in some other countries in the region in the coming months. It is a sad commentary on the rest of the international community that it unhesitatingly adopts the terminology coined by the West to describe the historic events in West Asia. ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’ is a condescending description; it suggests that the people of West Asia have been sleeping all these decades, not caring for freedoms enjoyed by people elsewhere. The fact is that non-regional governments have been supporting the authoritarian regimes through massive supply of deadly weapons and technology, which were used to suppress the people.

Increased Shia-Sunni tensions

There are some who would like the Egyptians to believe that their revolution would not have happened but for the speech of President Barack Obama in their capital two years ago. The fact is that the people of Tunisia, followed by the people of Egypt, owe their revolutions to no one except themselves; they are the owners of their revolutions. If anything, the intervention of external powers, as in Libya, has complicated matters for the most part, created space for more extreme forms of Islamic thought to gain ascendance and, perhaps unwittingly, greatly accentuated the tensions between Shias and Sunnis. It is still early days to come to any conclusions about the dénouement of the churning in the region. Things are far from settled, except to some extent in Tunisia where it all began a year ago. Some broad trends, however, may be attempted.

Strengthening of Islamist groups

In all countries which have witnessed some degree of protests, Islamist groups have gained significant ground. In Tunisia, a ‘moderate’ Islamic party has won plurality of the vote. In Libya, where regional forces are refusing to give up their arms or disband their militias, hard-line Islamists, including loyalists of the al Qaeda, have secured influential positions. Egypt has surprised most observers, including knowledgeable Egyptians, by giving a huge electoral mandate to the Muslim Brotherhood and, more ominously, to Salafists; together, the two Islamist groups will control about 70 per cent seats in Parliament, to the great disappointment of the ‘secular’ forces. Similarly, in Yemen, the extremists have gained ground and will emerge as the most influential force as and when President Saleh leaves the country. The same phenomenon is evident in Syria in an acuter form. Bahrain is possibly an exception in the sense that the conflict there is between the minority Sunni ruling family and the majority Shia community.

The success of the Islamists by itself need not be seen as a negative outcome, except perhaps by Israel. Their success is an indication of the disillusionment of people with the ‘secular’ authoritarian regimes as well as the reward for the socially useful work they have been doing such as running hospitals and schools. Whatever the nature of the new governments, people will enjoy more freedoms and will have a greater say in running the affairs of the state. The most amazing phenomenon of 2011 is the shedding of fear by the people, first in the Arab world and, subsequently almost everywhere else, including Russia and China. (This does not apply much to India since we always were free and unafraid to protest and demonstrate, although Tahrir Square could have provided some inspiration.) The Time magazine is absolutely right in naming the unnamed ‘Protester’ as the person of the year. This means the Islamists, as and when they occupy positions of power, will not be able to manipulate people in any way they like. In the medium term, the Islamists-led regimes will insist, at the least, on all legislation being compliant with the Sharia, whatever it means in practice.

Security forces, the army and police, will continue to wield significant, even decisive, influence in the stability of governments. The Turkish model will not be followed consciously given past history but some variation of it should be expected to emerge at some stage. Libya has to go through the difficult process of creating an army out of disparate armed militias and will take longer to achieve stability. In Egypt, the armed forces, which have been used to wielding power for nearly five decades, will hold on to it for quite some time, especially since they also have significant vested interests in the economy.

More attention on Palestine

The Palestinian issue will receive much more attention and focus from the new regimes, which probably would mean more support for Hamas. Israel, which already feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear programme, will be under increased pressure to suspend settlement building. Israel’s posture will harden and its military spending will increase. The U.S. is in no position to bring effective pressure on Israel, especially in an election year, but it might appeal to Israel to be more reasonable on the Palestinian track in return for tightening the screws on Iran.

Syrian issue

Syria is a complex case but certain facts are clear. (1) There is genuine popular demand for reform. (2) There is repression and use of ruthless force by the regime — at the same time, it continues to enjoy the support of the security forces and significant sections. (3) There is open intervention by external powers and groups such as the Brotherhood as well as elements subscribing to the al-Qaeda ideology, if not the al-Qaeda itself. (4) Many dissident groups are well armed and have killed a number of security forces. (5) Western powers are determined to bring about regime change. (6) Israel is greatly interested in seeing Bashar Assad removed even if the alternative will be a fundamentalist regime. Its priority is Iran and whatever weakens Iran in the region is considered to be in Israel’s interest. Bashar’s removal will greatly diminish the Hezbollah’s ability to threaten Israel and also reduce Hamas’ clout. (7) Unless a solution is found soon, the country will be headed towards a bloody civil war.

The Shia-Sunni tensions and Saudi-Iranian rivalry will intensify. Iraq presents a most discouraging example in this respect. After so many years of American shepherding, society in Iraq remains deeply divided on sectarian fault lines. Prime Minister Maliki, now that he is liberated from whatever moderating influence American presence might have exercised on him, is dealing with the Sunni community in exactly the wrong way. The sectarian violence seems all set to return to the horrors of the 2005-07 period. Iraq’s Sunni neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, will definitely intervene to protect their Sunni brethren across the border. It is not a coincidence that Iraq’s Shia government has been voting against the Arab League’s decisions on the Alawite Shia-led Syrian regime. The Saudi hostility to Damascus has everything to do with the Shia-Sunni divide. Turkey’s current antagonism to Syria has many explanations and the Shia-Sunni factor is one of them. The Turkey-Syria-Iraq triangle offers quite a few fertile grounds for conflict — water, the Kurdish problem, Shia-Sunni hatred, etc. There is a tendency to downplay the Shia-Sunni tension but it is very much a fact of the Muslim life and it is better to recognise it.

In sum, the region is likely to remain unstable for quite some time. It would become destabilised should the Iranian nuclear issue lead to extremely harsh sanctions — and the process has begun — or worse, military action.

Some Indian experts would like India to take a more proactive role on the happenings in West Asia, to be on ‘the right side of the forces of history.’ It is no doubt good to feel self-righteous and earn an occasional pat on the back from the western or any other government. But it is more important to think of our national interests. Compared to our friends in the West, we are more dependent on the energy resources of West Asia. Most importantly, unlike other countries, we have to worry about 6 million of our compatriots who are working there and sending billions of dollars to their families back home. It makes sense to take a cautious stance, make as thorough an analysis as possible of the evolving situation and try to be on the winning side. That is our challenge. That challenge is coming sooner that we would like, in Iran.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2799237.ece

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Posted in Egypt, Religion, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen

The new Crescenters: Turkey and Qatar

Posted on January 10, 2012 | Comments Off on The new Crescenters: Turkey and Qatar

FN-09/01/2012-

Qatar and Turkey are the new Crescenters ( in opposition to crusaders) of the Arab world. They are working to move the whole Arab world into becoming Sunni Islamic republic. They plan to  “moderate” these countries by injecting massive funds in economical investment.
For that, they have the full support of the USA and the western countries tired of fighting against extremists isla, supporting hopeless dictators and facing increased immigration of moslems to their countries.
As for Iran with which Turkey and Qatar enjoy good relationship, they consider that with a few adjustments, ultimately Iran would become another moderate Islamic republic.
Syria, Lebanon and Iraq  are most difficult countries to tackle because they are not homogeneous so the move to a ‘moderate’ Sunni or Shia islamic republic is not as straighforward as Egypt, Libya, Yemen or Tunisia where the religious or ethnic minorities are either unexistant or weak.
At first, Turkey and Qatar thought that Syria that has a majority of sunni will easily replace the alawite regime by a sunni islamic republic. After 10  months, that plan failed because the regime had the support of Iran who refuses to have its allies in Lebanon isolated.
The different strategies are the following 1) Let Lebanon, Syria and Iraq stay under the umbrella of Iran with the hope that Iran will move to a moderate Islamic republic, 2)Let these countries in limbo to find their own balance or 3) Use a military option make the necessary changes.
It seems that the solution 2) is the one being considered by Turkey and Qatar after many attempts to use solution 3)

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Posted in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Middle East Geopolitics, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen

Assessing Assad

Posted on December 21, 2011 | Comments Off on Assessing Assad

The Syrian leader isn’t crazy. He’s just doing whatever it takes to survive.

BY BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, ALASTAIR SMITH | DECEMBER 20, 2011

The assessments of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad following his interview with Barbara Walters in early December all strike a common theme. A U.S. State Department spokesman, for instance, declared that Assad appears to be “utterly disconnected with the reality that’s going on in his country.” One analyst opined, “It’s now clear that Assad meets his own definition of crazy.”What prompted these conclusions was Assad’s answer when Walters asked, “Do you think that your forces cracked down too hard?” He replied, “They are not my forces; they are military forces belong [sic] to the government.… I don’t own them. I am president. I don’t own the country, so they are not my forces.” In a Western democracy, it’s hard to imagine how a leader could so blatantly deny responsibility for the actions taken by his own government. But is it Assad who is out of touch with reality? Or is it us?Following the logic we set out in The Dictator’s Handbook,we believe Assad has been misunderstood and maybe, just maybe, even misjudged. In the book, we argue that no leader — not even a Louis XIV, an Adolf Hitler, or a Joseph Stalin — can rule alone. Each must rely on a coalition of essential supporters without whom power will be lost. That coalition, in turn, counts on a mutually beneficial relationship with the leader. They keep the ruler in office, and the ruler keeps them in the money. If either fails to deliver what the other wants, the government falls.Assad is no exception. Just as he said, it is not his government. He cannot do whatever he wants. He might even be a true reformer, as many in the Western media believed prior to the Arab Spring, or he may be the brute he now appears to be. The truth is, he is doing what he must to maintain the loyalty of those who keep him in power.Assad depends on the backing of key members of the Alawite clan, a quasi-Shiite group consisting of between 12 and 15 percent of Syria’s mostly Sunni population. The Alawites make up 70 percent of Syria’s career military, 80 percent of the officers, and nearly 100 percent of the elite Republican Guard and the 4th Armored Division, led by the president’s brother Maher. In a survey of country experts we conducted in 2007, we found that Assad’s key backers — those without whose support he would have to leave power — consisted of only about 3,600 members out of a population of about 23 million. That is less than 0.02 percent. Assad is not alone in his dependence on a small coalition. Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s coalition is even smaller. His essential supporters include the Revolutionary Guard’s leadership, the economically essential bonyad conglomerates, key clerics, and a smattering of business interests, totaling, according to our survey of Iran experts, about 2,000 in a population of well over 70 million.

Any political system that depends on such a small percentage of the population to sustain a leader in power is destined to be a corrupt, rent-seeking regime in which loyalty is purchased through bribery and privilege. Syria possesses these traits in spades. Transparency International reports in its latest evaluation that Syria ranks in the top third of the world for corruption. So, when Assad says it is not his government, he is right. If he betrays the interests of his closest Alawite allies, for instance by implementing reforms that will dilute their share of the spoils, they will probably murder him before any protesters can topple his regime. Of course, the uprising or international intervention might eventually end his rule. But those possibilities remain potential. Should the loyalty of his 3,600 supporters falter and they stop working to neutralize protest, Assad will be gone immediately. Captive to the needs of his coalition, he ignores the welfare of the 23 million average Syrians and shuns world opinion.

There is, in fact, real evidence that Assad has modest reformist tendencies. During his 11 years in power, he has increased competitiveness in the economy, liberalized — a bit — the banking sector, and did, according to our 2007 survey, expand his Alawite-based winning coalition by about 50 percent when he first succeeded his father (though, having secured his hold on power, he was able to purge some of these surplus supporters and by around 2005 had reduced the coalition’s size back to what it had been under his father). Syria has enjoyed a respectable growth rate under his leadership, though it is also suffering from high deficit spending, deep indebtedness (about 27 percent of GDP), and high unemployment, especially in the countryside and in Damascus’s poverty belt. Although official unemployment figures claim about 8.9 percent unemployment, at least one well-regarded Syrian economist estimates the rate at 22 to 30 percent.

And with the Arab League endorsing stiff economic sanctions, Assad’s regime now risks steep economic decline. With Syrians facing a society in which the rewards go to so few and confronted with the example of the uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, it is little wonder that the people have rebelled. It is equally unsurprising that the privileged few have responded brutally to preserve their advantages.

There are two effective responses to a mass uprising (other than stepping down, of course, which leaders almost never do until all other options have been exhausted): liberalize to redress the people’s grievances or crack down to make their odds of success too small for them to carry on. Leaders who lack the financial wherewithal to continue paying off cronies often choose to liberalize. (Remember South Africa’s F.W. de Klerk, who negotiated a government transition with Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress when economic decline made the apartheid system unsustainable.) Those who can muster the money to sustain crony loyalty do so. This is why the rich oil states to Syria’s south have resisted reform and why, despite its popular uprising, Libya will not become democratic. Here is another case where Assad’s statement that it is not his country is true, but only partially. As president, he could liberalize to buy off those rebelling, but his key backers will almost certainly not allow him to do so as long as there is enough money to keep paying foot soldiers to crack heads. With Syria’s oil wealth in decline and with stiff economic sanctions, the regime’s two choices are to liberalize or to find new sources of money. They have succeeded in the latter pursuit.

Reuters reported on July 15 that Iran and Iraq offered Assad’s regime $5 billion in aid, with $1.5 billion paid immediately. The $5 billion is equal to about 40 percent of Syrian government revenue. Since the announcement of Arab League sanctions, Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela have signed agreements to expand trade and investment in Syria to the tune of more than $7 billion in 2012, including building an oil refinery. That is just what Assad’s political-survival doctor ordered. This injection of cash in the short term is likely to keep the military and security forces on his side. The military core of his coalition is likely to do whatever it takes to keep the president in power as long as that money keeps on flowing. That is the essential synergy of all leader-coalition arrangements.

In the long run, meaning two to five years, reform is likely in Syria, perhaps through internal uprising and perhaps driven by forces outside the country. It could be that Assad will turn out to be the instrument of change, but the process of getting to that point will continue to be ugly, painful, and brutal as long as the likes of Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela care more about currying favor with Assad’s regime than they do about the well-being of the Syrian people.

How long they can do so is open to speculation. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is rumored to be terminally ill. Will his successors care about sustaining the costs of closer ties with Syria? With Iran facing its own economic problems, how long will the Islamic Republic’s regime sacrifice to sustain Assad? If Iran’s regime focuses more of its energy on internal affairs, will Nouri al-Maliki’s Iraqi government, itself likely to face stiff internal resistance, continue to build closer ties with its Syrian neighbor? In each of these cases, we don’t believe the current arrangement will last long. That, in t

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith are professors of politics and director and co-director, respectively, of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University. Their most recent book is The Dictator’s Handbook.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/20/is_assad_crazy_or_just_ruthless?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

 

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Posted in Middle East Geopolitics, Syria