Category Archives: Middle East Geopolitics

Alevi / Alawi, what are the differences?

While there are apparent  similarities, they are quite different in their history and  the details of their doctrine. Like most moslem sects they are very complex to understand and even more difficult to summarize!

Alevis  and Alawis have in common that , to a certain degree they consider themselves to be part of the wider Shi`a movement, who revere Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law) and the Twelve Imams of his house (Ithna’shari).

According to Yaron Friedman, distinct Alawi/Alavi beliefs include the belief that prayers are not necessary, they don’t fast, nor perform pilgrimage, nor have specific places of worship.

1. Syrian Alawis are a prominent mystical and syncretic religious group centered in Syria who are often described as a branch of Shia Islam.  The sect seems to have been organized by a follower of Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who died in Aleppo about 969.  It has integrated doctrines from Ismaili Islam and Christianity ( i.e celebration of Chritsmas …).

A fatwa by Imam Musa al Sadr declares them  Shi’a Muslims, that is Ithna’shari (Twelve Imams). He said: The Alawis are of the Shi’a and the Shi’a are of the Alawis. The most obvious difference between Alawites and Shi’ite Muslims, is that Alawis believe the Sunni Caliph and Shi’ite Imam Ali is an incarnation of one of the persons of God and wholly divine, along with Jesus Christ, The Prophet Muhammad and many other eastern holy men

2. Turkish Alevism’s origin is controversial. It goes back to Shah Ismail (founder of the Safavid dynasty in Azerbajian, Iran). His father Sheikh Haydar was part of a  Sufi order and the leader of the growing Shia community in Azerbajian, the Qizilbash.

The Turkish Alevis ( originally called Qizilbashi )  have complex theological beliefs derived from Shiism but with some particularities, one of them is the belief of the unity of Allah, Mohammad and Ali. They also believe in the Twelve Imams but with a different interpretation of their symbols. They behave more like a Sufi order minus shari’a. There are many branches among them with different doctrines.  Some go to  Qom in Iran to study in Shia religious schools.

Turkish_Alevis_Today.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Turkey’s Elephant in the Room: Religious Freedom.

Osman Orsal/Reuters –

With his triumphant tour of the countries of the Arab Spring this month, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has managed to set up Turkey on the international stage as a role model for a secular democracy in a Muslim .The only trouble is that he has yet to make that happen for Turkey.

The relationship between religion and the state, ever the sore spot of Turkish identity, is one of the most explosive issues of the debate on the new constitution that Mr. Erdogan has pledged to give the country in the new legislative term that opens Saturday.

That debate will have to deal with the elephant in the room: the total control that the state exerts over Islam through its Religious Affairs Department, and the lack of a legal status for all other religions in a predominantly Sunni Muslim society.

“Turkey may look like a secular state on paper, but in terms of international law it is actually a Sunni Islamic state,” Izzettin Dogan, a leader of the country’s Alevi minority, charged at a joint press conference with leaders of several other minority faiths last week in Istanbul.

Mr. Dogan is honorary president of the Federation of Alevi Foundations, which represents many of what it claims are up to 30 million adherents of the Alevi faith, an Anatolian religion close to Sufi Islam but separate and distinct in its beliefs and practices.

“The state collects taxes from all of us and spends billions on Sunni Islam alone, while millions of Alevis as well as Christians, Jews and other faiths don’t receive a penny,” Mr. Dogan said, referring to the $1.5 billion budget of the Religious Affairs Department. “What kind of secularism is that?”

A bureaucratic juggernaut with its own news service and a dedicated trade union, the Religious Affairs Department employs more than 106,000 civil servants, according to its latest annual report, including 60,000 imams and 10,000 muezzins, all of them trained, hired and fired by the state.

At the institution’s ministry-size headquarters in Ankara, state-employed astronomers calculate prayer times around the world, while state-educated theologians pore over the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad in the library and issue the religious rulings known as fatwas.

The department writes the sermons for Friday Prayer in mosques across the country as well as the textbooks for the religious instruction that is mandatory in schools. It publishes books and periodicals in languages including Tatar, Mongol and Uygur, and issues an iPhone app featuring Koranic verses and a prayertime alarm. The department has a monopoly on Koran courses in the country, and it organizes the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, right down to the vaccination of pilgrims.

So centralized is the department’s control that its new president, Mehmet Gormez, is considered innovative for announcing his intention to train preachers to deliver sermons in person, instead of having them piped into the mosque from the department over a public-address system.

“In Turkey, Islam does not determine politics, but politics determine Islam,” Gunter Seufert, a sociologist, concluded in a 2004 study of the department entitled “State and Islam in Turkey.”

“Run by a state agency, religion serves the nation state for the purpose of unifying the nation and Westernizing its Muslims,” he added.

With historical roots in the Ottoman Empire, where state and Islam were linked in the union of sultanate and caliphate, the Religious Affairs Department was founded early in the Turkish Republic, in March 1924, on the day the caliphate was abolished.

Charged by law with managing Islam, the department has been enshrined in the Constitution ever since the country’s first military coup in 1961, with the present Constitution, a relic of the 1982 coup, explicitly charging it with the task of furthering national unity.

Ministering to Sunni Islam of the Halafi school, the department does not recognize non-Sunni communities like the Alevis or Caferis as distinct religious faiths, subsuming them under the common label of “Muslim,” the basis for the depiction of Turkey as a religiously homogenous country that describes its population as “99 percent Muslim.”

While the distribution of believers among the faiths encompassed by that term is contested, a 2007 survey by the Konda institute, a public opinion research company in Turkey, found that 82 percent of Turks describe themselves as Hanafi Sunni Muslims.

The new constitution, Mr. Dogan of the Alevi federation demanded, must do away with their privileged status. “The state must be impartial and treat all religious communities equally and maintain equal distance to all of them,” he said. “These definitions must be written into the new constitution verbatim.”

Mr. Dogan was speaking at the presentation of a report on the “Shared Problems and Demands of Turkey’s Religious Communities,” prepared by Ozge Genc and Ayhan Kaya, political scientists at Istanbul Bilgi University.

The report is based on research in the Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant Armenian communities, the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches as well as the Jewish community and Bahai, Yezidi, Shiite, Alevi, Mevlevi, Caferi and other groups.

As the report underlines, these communities all suffer from lack of legal status in Turkey, which renders it difficult for them to conduct even the most basic affairs and forces them into a shadowy existence at the mercy of political fashions and whims.

The 1,700-year-old Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, for example, has come to the brink of extinction since its seminary in Istanbul was closed down 40 years ago, drying up its source of clergymen. The Patriarchate hopes that the new constitution will “create the conditions for a reopening of the seminary,” its spokesman, Pater Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, said by e-mail this week.

This will require a redefinition of the concept of secularism in Turkey, or simply a definition of the term in the Turkish constitution, as Mustafa Akyol, author of “Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty,” points out.

“The present constitution states that Turkey is laic, secular, but does not define the term,” Mr. Akyol said by telephone this week. The interpretation has been left up to the constitutional court, he said, which has traditionally defined secularism as the complete absence of religion from the public sphere, as seen in its ban on head scarves for university students. It was that ban, among other things, that triggered the current secularism debate in Islamist circles, Mr. Akyol said.

“They began to see nuances in Western secularism. They saw that religious freedoms not available to them in Turkey, like the head scarf or the freedom to join Muslim orders, were available in America and many European countries, excepting France,” he said. “They began to criticize the self-styled Turkish secularism, and to call for a redefinition of secularism.”

While the debate still rages in Turkish society, “I think Erdogan made it clear that he is sincere” in his call for secularism, Mr. Akyol said. “That is how we would like to have it defined in the new constitution,” he added, referring to Mr. Erdogan’s remark that all religions should be equal.

But the Religious Affairs Department may not be so easy to sideline. While most of the proposals for the constitution prepared by nongovernmental organizations for the debate agree that the department cannot continue in its present form, none suggests abolishing it.

Even Tesev, an independent research institute in Istanbul, argues that “dissolving the Religious Affairs Department is not considered possible under present conditions.” It suggests that other religious groups should be given equal status and privileges instead.

Other constitutional proposals suggest that the department’s reach should be extended to include other faiths, an idea unlikely to sit well with all communities.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople, while declining to comment on the proposal, has strenuously resisted previous proposals to incorporate its seminary into the theological faculty of a state university, arguing that it cannot relinquish control over its training.

While the Religious Affairs Department may face change, it is unlikely to be abolished, Mr. Akyol said. “Society is so used to it, so many people work for it,” he said. “I don’t expect it to change with the new constitution.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/europe/turkeys-elephant-in-the-room-religious-freedom.html?pagewanted=all

‘Zero problems’ in Ankara is havoc for the neighbourhood

By Michael Young –Sep 29, 2011–

Much hyperbole has been deployed in describing Turkey’s reorientation towards the Middle East. Partly, this has been the fault of the Turks themselves, who have sought to ride the wave of Ankara’s popularity in the region – primarily a result of its rift with Israel and vocal support for the Palestinian cause. But the reality is considerably more complicated, as Turkey is increasingly drawn into the treacherous byways of Arab and Iranian affairs.

In a much-discussed book he wrote before taking office, Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, enunciated what he called the policy of “zero problems with neighbours”. This has shaped Ankara’s approach to the Middle East in past years. However, today the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan finds itself managing problems – open or more subtly stated – with virtually every country in its perimeter, especially those to the south and east.

This was predictable. For nearly a century Turkey has focused on Europe. Ankara’s renewed attention southwards poses a challenge to Arab states and Iran, which are little prepared to make room for what can come across as an overbearing Turkish government with a tendency to overplay its hand. Arab regimes have publicly embraced Mr Erdogan. But they have also set limits to Turkish actions involving them.

Take Mr Erdogan’s recent visit to Egypt. Although it was hailed as a success, Egypt regards Turkish involvement on the Palestinian front, particularly in the Gaza Strip, as an irritant. Cairo views itself as the interlocutor of choice with the Palestinians, and President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster has not changed that. Anything that strengthens Hamas could have damaging repercussions for Egyptian internal security. The military leadership in Cairo is also watching carefully how the mildly Islamist government in Ankara inspires elements of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which the generals mistrust.

Turkish spokesmen erred in announcing before the Egypt trip that Mr Erdogan might enter Gaza. Neither Egypt nor the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, relished such a prospect, and ultimately the Turkish prime minister backtracked. Here was a classic example of Mr Erdogan going too far. Mr Abbas opposed a move that would have legitimised Hamas at his expense. The military council in Cairo surely agreed, seeing no reason to hand Turkey a new wedge to insert itself politically on Egypt’s eastern border.

Mr Erdogan justifiably expressed outrage with Israel after its soldiers killed Turkish protesters trying to breach the Gaza blockade in May 2010. Israel’s government refused to apologise, leading Turkey recently to downgrade diplomatic ties. Early on, the Turkish prime minister caught the mood of exasperation with Israel for its intransigence toward the Palestinians, which he has used to his advantage to garner Arab approval.

However, once the indignation is used up, does Turkey really gain from having undermined the mediation role it once could play between Arabs and Israelis? Did Mr Erdogan need to go as far as he did? He has made an apology and the lifting of the blockade of Gaza conditions for the resumption of normal relations with Israel. The first demand is defensible, but is Gaza enough of a Turkish national priority to justify the prime minister’s second, tougher stipulation?

Mr Erdogan’s ability to exploit regional transformations has been neutralised by his outspokenness. A resumption of Arab-Israeli, even Palestinian-Israeli, negotiations is, admittedly, unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, Turkey could have seriously aspired to play a key role in a revived peace process. But today, Israeli ill-feeling against Mr Erdogan, the Palestinian leadership’s refusal to see their position undercut by the prime minister’s demagogical instincts, and international recognition that Turkey is now more a part of the problem than the solution, have effectively sidelined Ankara.

In Syria, Turkey has broken with President Bashar Al Assad’s regime. That was to be expected. But Syria is tricky for the Turks. If the country collapses into civil war, this might not only push Syria’s Kurds, who have no affection for Ankara, to seek autonomy. It might also drive Arab Alawites in Turkey’s Hatay province to assist their Syrian brethren.

At the same time, Mr Erdogan cannot afford to do nothing. The prime minister heads a Sunni Islamist party, a substantial part of whose appeal is that it can build bridges to Arab Islamists. To allow Mr Al Assad to pursue his slaughter of peaceful protesters, many of whom happen to be Sunnis, represents a humanitarian and religious affront to the values Mr Erdogan claims to espouse. More cynically, as the uprising in Syria takes on an overtly sectarian colouring, thanks principally to the brutality of Alawite-dominated security services and military units, Ankara does not want to be on the losing side.

That Mr Erdogan has turned against Mr Al Assad is to his credit. Yet Turkey’s worsening ties with Syria have also heightened tension with Damascus’s ally Iran – which lately has also opposed Turkey’s decision to host a Nato early-warning radar system. Iran and Turkey are vying for regional influence, so they are destined to clash many more times. Not surprisingly, this rivalry has affected Lebanon, where Turkey has invested in predominantly poor Sunni areas. Earlier this year Mr Davutoglu helped Qatar mediate in the Lebanese political crisis. Their efforts were thwarted by Hizbollah and Syria.

As Turkey gets caught up in the Middle East’s contradictions, it can no longer seriously portray itself as being above the fray, on friendly terms with all. Words are cheap, and when Mr Erdogan hears praise he should be wary. No one will give Ankara a free ride in a region that cheerfully grinds down the self-assured.

Sergei Lavrov: Western strategy for Middle East irresponsible

Sep 27, 2011 —

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has criticized a draft UN Security Council resolution on Syria proposed by Western countries, describing it as a provocation with unpredictable consequences.

Mr. Lavrov’s statement came in his interview for the Rossiya 24 TV channel on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York with the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian statehood bid and the developments in Syria high on the international agenda.

Mr. Lavrov made clear that Russia would not support the draft resolution on new sanctions against Syrian leaders, all the more so since the authors of the document acknowledged that they had not calculated further moves, their main aim being to force President Bashar Assad to step down. As for what will happen afterwards, this is something the West prefers not to think about, an approach that cannot be justified. Syria has numerous ethnic and religious communities. The situation in Syria influences neighboring countries, for example Lebanon. Pushing for sanctions and not thinking about the consequences is irresponsible, Mr. Lavrov said:

“The opposition is looking toward the West. Hearing statements that Assad is illegitimate and that he must go, it gets the impression that it needs to hold out just a little bit more, rejecting everything proposed by Assad and relying on Western help. This is a provocation with very harmful and unpredictable consequences. President Assad, thanks to the work conducted by the Russian leadership and the League of Arab States, launched concrete reforms, although somewhat belatedly. The laws on political parties, local self-government and mass media were adopted and all opposition forces were invited to engage in national dialogue.”

Moscow’s position is reflected in an alternative draft resolution on Syria, which calls on the Syrian government and the opposition to abandon violence and begin talks.

The lessons of the Libyan crisis when the Western coalition openly breached the UN Security Council resolution on a no-fly zone over Libya have prompted the UN Security Council to take a cautious stance toward Syria and the Palestinian issue.

On Friday, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas submitted Palestine’s formal bid for statehood to the Security Council despite threats from the United States to veto it. Washington thus got itself in an awkward situation:

“The Americans do not want being forced to use veto. One can understand them. They do not want to appear in the negative light in the eyes of the Arabs and the entire Muslim world. But one can understand the Palestinians either because things have been moving nowhere. The earlier promises, including President Obama’s statement at last year’s General Assembly that we will be admitting Palestine into the UN in a year – remained just words.”

If Washington uses the right of veto, the Palestinians will take their bid directly to the General Assembly where they are likely to secure support. But the assembly can only grant Palestine an observer status. Things will become clear when the Security Council meets tomorrow to vote on the issue.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/09/27/56838837.html

Return of the Islamists? A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa

09/28/2011 AM Der Spiegel —
By Clemens Höges and Thilo Thielke–

The autocrats are gone, but who will inherit power in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt? Islamist influence is significant across the region and conservative political groups are flexing their muscles. The coming months will determine just how much democracy North Africa can support.

Ammunition crates, now empty in the wake of recent heavy fighting, are stacked outside the military barracks at the Tripoli airport. One of the victors, wearing military fatigues, is sitting in a luxurious leather armchair inside the building. He presses his combat boots into the thick carpet, his facial features as rigid as if they had been sculpted. The man speaks intently. He wants to make sure that each of his sentences is recorded on video, and that nothing is misunderstood.

For years, American and British intelligence agencies hunted Abdel Hakim Belhaj, the commander of the Libyan rebels’ Tripoli brigade, believing him to be a terrorist and ally of then al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. They also reportedly had him abducted, which led to his being tortured with syringes and ice-cold water. Now though, the West and many in Libya are paying close attention, and are listening to his every word.

“In reality, our group had nothing to do with al-Qaida at the time,” says Belhaj, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan and the former head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which, persecuted by the regime of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, took refuge in Afghanistan for years. Belhaj, the battle-hardened Islamist, is now the commander of all rebel troops in the Libyan capital.

His men drive around in their pickups, outfitted with automatic weapons while the civilian heads of the rebellion seek to map out a path for their country’s future. Belhaj says that the power lies “in the hands of the Libyan people,” and that Libyans can now decide democratically how they wish to live their lives. “We want a secular country,” he adds. But many Libyans don’t believe a word the Islamist is saying.

Deep Differences

There is, after all, more at stake today than merely the question of who is currently in power. It is about shaping Libya’s future. The Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa are over, and in the wake of the change of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, a coalition of Islamists and secular insurgents has emerged victorious in Libya. But now that the war is almost over, the deep differences between the two groups are becoming more apparent.

As in Tunisia and Egypt, it will soon become apparent how democratic the new Libya can be. Will it develop along the lines of the Turkish model, for which Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently campaigned on a celebrated trip through the Arab world? Or, on the other end of the spectrum, will it model itself after the Iranian theocracy?

The old dictators were convenient for the West, because they kept the Islamists under control. But now that the people have liberated themselves, their new freedoms apply to everyone, including the Islamists and jihadists who want to see Sharia law introduced in their respective countries. They are demanding their share of power, which is hardly likely to be small.

The Islamists’ brigades fought well in Libya. Indeed, even decades before the revolutions in North Africa, they were the best-organized opposition in the three countries. Their leaders were locked up, tortured and killed. The Islamists paid a heavy price, which has made their supporters tough. They also have greater financial resources than other opposition groups, partly because of support from Gulf sheikhs like the leader of Qatar.

A constitutional convention is to be elected in Tunisia in four weeks, and polls show that the religious Nahda Party could capture 20 to 30 percent of the vote. This would likely give the Islamists more power than any secular party.

Sizeable Potential

This comes as no surprise, since the Islamists have the largest election campaign war chest, they fund scholarships and social projects, they are omnipresent and preach piety. Women are already complaining about being attacked in broad daylight. When a film critical of religion was shown in Tunis, Islamists stormed out of the theater and physically assaulted the owners.

Observers in Egypt believe that the Islamists there — the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists — hold a similar potential among voters. The Muslim Brotherhood, now calling itself the Freedom and Justice Party, already wants to establish strict rules for foreign women wearing bikinis on Egyptian beaches. Members of the Salafist sect have established a number of different parties.

When the two groups organized a joint rally on Tahrir Square in Cairo, tens of thousands showed up to demonstrate for an Islamic state. Some are blaming the Salafists for a recent rise in arson attacks on Coptic Christian churches in Egypt.

The situation in Libya is much more chaotic than in the two neighboring countries, partly because the rebels are still fighting the last remaining Gadhafi loyalists. Nevertheless, the National Transitional Council, headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and the so-called Executive Committee, under the chairmanship of Mahmoud Jibril, have presented roadmap to democracy which calls for the election of a 200-member national congress in about eight months. Within a year, the congress would draw up a constitution, organize a constitutional referendum and eventually hold free elections.

Military leader Belhaj already feels powerful enough to counter Jibril, who serves as the de facto prime minister. Belhaj, in fact, is trying to oust Jibril from his position.

Charges of Corruption

But the two most influential Libyan Islamists are probably the Salabi brothers. Ismail Salabi commands one of the toughest rebel brigades in Benghazi. His brother Ali, considered one of the country’s religious leaders, travels back and forth between Libya and Qatar, the Arab nation on the Persian Gulf that supplied the rebels with weapons and trained its fighters.

The Salabis have already tried several times to discredit members of the National Transitional Council with charges of corruption. Ali Salabi claims the council is filled with “radical secularists” who are trying to sideline the religious groups before elections, and that Jibril wants to usher in a “new era of tyranny and dictatorship.”

The Islamists now plan to establish a religious party. If they do not do well in the election, however, says Ali Salabi, they will still respect the will of the people. Salabi insists that he believes in democracy.

But many distrust radicals like the Salabis, especially since the murder of Abdul Fattah Younis. Gadhafi’s former interior minister, Younis joined the rebels days after the rebellion began, and, as their commander-in-chief, developed their army. His was one of three bodies were found near Benghazi on July 28. To this day, it remains unclear who shot Younis and his two companions and then burned the bodies, although suspicions point to the Islamists.

Fathi Bin Issa, editor-in-chief of the new Tripoli newspaper Arus al-Bahr, is sitting in his long, narrow office, a room bathed in cold fluorescent light. The red, black and green flag of the new Libya hangs next to his desk. Bin Issa was the spokesman of the rebels shortly after they captured the capital, and his editors now write regular features about the Islamists. He says that he received several death threats only last week, with callers threatening to blow up his office.

Good Connections and an Agenda
“There are people here who are trying to build a Libyan Hezbollah,” says Bin Issa. “There is a great risk that they will assume power.” In some neighborhoods, says the journalist, religious edicts, or fatwas, have already been issued banning women from going out in public alone. He also says that some beauty salons have been shut down, and that members of a self-proclaimed religious police have started appearing in the streets. “These people have good connections, and they have an agenda. That’s what makes them so dangerous.” In Bin Issa’s opinion, everything now depends on how civilian society reacts to the changes. “If we are unable to repel these people, we could see conditions like those in Iran or under the Taliban,” says Bin Issa.

The supporter of the revolution believes that his fellow Libyans are not in favor of radical Islam. “Here in Libya, women work as pilots and judges, and they have been instrumental in bringing about change. Our Islam is moderate.”

Colonel Ali Ahmed Barathi, 53, is the new chief of the military police in Tripoli. His headquarters once housed the notorious 32nd Brigade, a group that practiced torture and was headed by Gadhafi’s son Khamis. The barracks is on the outskirts of Tripoli, where Colonel Barathi is sitting in his office at an enormous desk. He is wearing the obligatory sunglasses and has the rough hands of a professional soldier, and yet Barathi is soft-spoken.

The officer is from Benghazi, where he joined the rebels immediately. “I stood in front of my unit and said that I intended to switch sides. It was left up to each soldier to decide whether to join us. The entire unit defected.”

Skirmishes with Islamists

Barathi isn’t worried about the Islamists’ activities. “Libyans don’t want to be ruled by these people. Even Belhaj has recognized this and has been reserved in his comments.”

But then he talks about skirmishes with Islamists and says that his men broke apart an entire unit of Islamists at the beginning of the rebellion. “The Islamists were isolated by the tribes, which wanted no part of them. After we had given them the ultimatum to either fight by our sides or lay down their weapons, many turned over their weapons, while others defected.”

The dispute between Islamists and secular Libyans could even have a positive outcome — true pluralism — hopes Aref Nayed, the coordinator of the so-called stability team of the rebel government. A wealthy IT entrepreneur, Islamic scholar and philosopher, Nayed is often found in the lobby of the Hotel Corinthia along the Tripoli shoreline, along with many of the country’s political leaders.

An elegant man with a neatly trimmed beard, Nayed studied in Canada and the United States, and has worked in Italy. He is adept at maneuvering between opposing fronts.

‘Keeping Society Together’

After Pope Benedict XVI incited religious Muslims against the Catholic Church with an awkward speech in 2006, Nayed was one of 138 Muslim scholars to sign a letter initiating reconciliation talks. When Nayed joined the National Transitional Council, the Vatican announced that it was pleased to see that an “old friend” had become a key figure in Libya.

Nayed dreams of a compromise between secular and Islamist Libya, an arrangement that could become a model for the Arab world, one in which Islamists would be recognized as a political force, even while women occupied cabinet posts. None of this, says Nayed, would be contradictory to the tenets of Islam. Council head Abdul Jalil, a very devout Muslim, also supports a compromise. Abdul Jalil envisions a moderate Islamic democracy with a legal system based on Sharia. Besides, says Nayed, it is so much the political leaders but Libya’s tribes “that are keeping society together.”

While he enthusiastically quotes ancient philosophers, the weapon in his waistband slips out from under his expensive jacket. His narrow belt isn’t strong enough to hold the heavy 9-mm piston. “I have no idea how to use it,” Nayed mutters. He says that his bodyguards insisted that he carry the gun, so that he would not be unprotected when going out in public.

A large photo of murdered General Younis hands on Martyr’s Square — known as Green Square until the rebels arrived — in downtown Tripoli. The rebel general knew how to use his weapon, but it didn’t do him any good.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL:

* http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788397,00.html

Turkey and the Syrian Kurds

September 15,  2011

While all eyes are on a likely Turkish land incursion against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, Turkey faces the prospect of another security and ideological challenge in the Kurdish hinterland across its border, this time in Syria.

Syria’s 1.8 million Kurds (10% of the population) have arguably been the most quiescent of the Kurdish populations of the Middle East as a result of the hard hand of the state and the tentacles of its security apparatuses.

They have also experienced some of the most restrictions on their political and cultural rights in an Arab nationalist state that denies their identity. At best they are second class citizens, at worst persona non gratis.
Photo: Reuters
However, the general uprising in Syria against the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been a game changer and the Kurds have entered the protests on the side of reform, calling for the ouster of Assad and the recognition of their political and cultural rights.

“The Kurds were the first to demonstrate in 2011, as they have demonstrated in January 25th in Hasakeh and were locked up, while their areas in Aleppo were under heavy military presence,” notes Syrian dissident Ausaman Monajed.

According to Christian Sinclair, Assistant Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona who has studied the Syrian Kurds, “There is a vast network amongst Kurdish youth, connecting them with Arab youth groups, to organize demonstrations. These ‘local coordination committees’ operate clandestinely, and are all over the country. Protests have been a regular feature in Qamishli, Amude, Efrin, etc, for months now.”

However, the Syrian Kurds are divided into over a dozen illegal Kurdish parties that have been unable to organize and agree amongst themselves, much less between a fractured Arab opposition in Syria and the diaspora.

The Assad regime has been able to play the proverbial Kurdish card, stoking fear amongst Arabs of Kurdish separatism while trying to divide the Kurdish opposition. There is even suspicion the regime has infiltrated some of the Kurdish parties.

All this would suggest that just as the Arab street is at the forefront of the protests, so too are their Kurdish counterparts.

“For the moment, at any rate, the Kurdish parties in Syria are on their own. They have before them the task of reconciliation with the Arab opposition, with each other and, most important, with the Kurdish street,” concludes Sinclair in the recently published “The Evolution of Kurdish Politics in Syria.”

The Syrian uprising comes at a particularly difficult juncture in Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. First announced in 2009, the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) “Kurdish Opening” – which aimed to deemphasize the security focus of the state’s Kurdish policy in favor of the expansion of Kurdish political and cultural rights — has come to a standstill.

The government has reached a political impasse with the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) following the June 12th election. The BDP is boycotting parliament over the arrest of six elected MPs for their alleged membership in the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), claimed to be the urban arm of the PKK.

Reinforcing the Turkish state’s security-focused policy towards the Kurds is the rising violence between the PKK and Turkish security forces. This summer the conflict has claimed the lives of over 40 Turkish soldiers, in addition to nearly 160 PKK guerrillas.

All this bodes poorly for the soon-to-open negotiations on writing a new civilian constitution that many observers expect to resolve some of the foundational issues between the state and its Kurdish minority.

In Syria, Ankara is concerned over the PKK and its links to the Syrian Kurds, most notably through the PYD (Democratic Union Party), an offshoot of the PKK in Syria.

“The PKK is active in Syria under the guise of the PYD, with an extensive network and a lot of clout amongst the Kurdish population in Syria. New PKK members are regularly recruited in Syria and then smuggled across the borders [of Iraq and Turkey],” says Sinclair.

Instability in Syrian Kurdistan could open space for the PKK to operate, posing a particularly difficult challenge for Turkey – including the use of the Syrian Kurds or the PKK as proxies in the inter-state rivalries of the region and the struggle for influence in Syria.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Syria was the PKK’s largest patron and harbored the PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan. However, Syria ended its support for the PKK in 1998 following Turkish threats of military intervention. Since then Syria and Turkey have co-operated against Kurdish nationalism,www.ekurd.netdriven in large part by mutual concern that Kurdish political gains in post-Saddam Iraq would have a spill-over effect on their own Kurdish populations.

Indeed, as the pace-setters of Kurdish nationalism the gains of the Iraqi Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq have had an influence on the Syrian Kurds. In 2004, riots broke out between Kurds and Arabs in Qamishli after the Iraqi Kurds declared autonomy. In the ensuing crackdown Syrian security forces killed 34. The regime has since kept a tight lid on all Kurdish political, cultural and social activity.

However, as the Syrian uprising enters its seventh month the lid on the Kurds has boiled over. This has caused concern in Ankara over what the regime’s end-game may look like as well as the nature of a post-Assad Syria and the position of the Syrian Kurds within it.

The problem for Turkey is that the Syrian Kurds, like their brethren in Turkey, demand language rights, constitutional recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic group and, for some, autonomy.

While these demands may have been muted under the iron fist of the Assad regime and the fractured nature of Syrian Kurdish politics, they are now coming to the fore, pitting Syrian Kurds against Arab nationalism, and possibly the Turkish state.

If the Kurds are unable to attain their demands vis-à-vis the Arab opposition this could lead to the conflict the spilling over into Turkey. At the same time, Ankara is especially wary of any kind of autonomy for the Kurds in Syria and how this would influence Turkey’s Kurds. According to Sinclair, rather than “a spill over in the physical sense, there is a concern for any power the Kurds may gain in a new Syria and then the influence of that spilling over.”

http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/09/15/turkey-and-the-syrian-kurds/

The Turco-American duet in the Middle East

Today Zaman —

The rise of Turkey as a key strategic country in American foreign policy traces back to the 1947 Truman Doctrine, when the US decided to help Turkey, and this will be the counterbalancing of the Soviet threat.

Since then, the US has kept Turkey as its important ally, so much so that “acting through Turkey” came to be the mental habit of American diplomacy in the Middle East. In its first 50 years, the US was unquestionably the patron in this bilateral arrangement. Turkey was never colonized, but as for its foreign policy, it was certainly “colonized” by the US.

However, Turkey has gradually increased its leverage in the relationship, and a symbiotic model of it emerged after the late ’90s, the US having softened its unilateral “boss” presumption. Turkey’s progress in economic growth and democratization increased its autonomy vis-à-vis the US. Since then, the global economic crisis and developments in the Middle East have made it clear that the US can no longer occupy its former hegemonic position in the region. Accordingly, it has decided on a carefully planned retreat. But, when a hegemonic state retreats, it must leave the territory it vacates to a friendly, at least middle-sized, power, lest rival states move in. Turkey, apparently, is the American choice for the job of substitute power.

This is a wise choice by the US. With US approval, Turkey is confidently declaring itself the new rule maker in the Middle East. But this is consistent with this country’s critical role in the post-Cold War era, and with its participation in all (Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya) NATO-led wars. (I should note that NATO is now the most important instrument of American global hegemony, most importantly, in the Middle East and Europe.) Turkey’s role was again a key one in NATO’s inclusion of Slovenia, Hungary and Poland. The latest additions to NATO, these states became ipso facto the new clients of the US defense industry. Turkey has also done its best in the war on terror. To many people’s surprise, al-Qaeda carried off one of its bloodiest attacks in İstanbul. And although this has not been confirmed officially, it is known that the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program used Turkey as a base during its transporting of “terrorism” suspects. All these facts underline a certain point: Despite attempts to argue the contrary, Turkey has backed the US in all major issues in the post-Cold War era.

Simply, the Turco-American relationship is gaining a new face, and this is a makeover affected by the new configurations of the Middle East. Indeed, this made-over face will generate some serious outcomes: The US will tolerate Turkey’s stand against Israel. Israel should be able to see that Turkey’s worth to the US has changed. Turkey will be less interested in the EU. Heralding this likelihood, Turkey has recently declared that it will not recognize Cyprus as the holder of the rotating EU presidency. This is indeed a strange announcement by any standard of mainstream diplomacy. A candidate country is openly dictating the rules of the game! This suggests that Turkey may even be seeking to freeze its relations with the EU.

The burning question has to be this: What is the estimated lifespan of this new, symbiotic Turkey-US relationship? At the core, Turkey’s dependence on the US originates from three facts: Turkey is about to lose its pro-European vigor. The EU has no clear Turkey agenda, and, if it remains lax on this front, Turkey has only the US option as a guarantor of its global interests. Also, lacking its own military technology, Turkey is dependent on that of the US. And thirdly, the backbone of the Turkish economy is made of small and medium-sized companies. Turkish exports are not high-tech products, but second and third sub-level products, such as machinery and household goods. Such an economic structure makes the US a compulsory option for Turkey, for two reasons: It is only the US that can offer political cooperation, despite the poor economic outlook of the bilateral relations; and, given its economic structure, Turkey cannot realize complex relations with other developed states, like Japan, to increase its global leverage. Therefore, the lifespan of the Turco-American duet will be decided mostly by how these three facts evolve. So long as they exert themselves on Turkey in their present forms, we in the region shall be listening to the music of the Turco-American duet.

http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-257906-the-turco-american-duet-in-the-middle-east.html  —

 

The Greedy Battle For Iraq’s ‘Hearts And Minds’ : NPR

The Greedy Battle For Iraq’s ‘Hearts And Minds’ : NPR.

For years federal auditors have reported that millions of American dollars have been wasted or are unaccounted for in the effort to rebuild and stabilize Iraq.

State Department employee Peter Van Buren gives a ground-level account of that waste and corruption in his book, We Meant Well – How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds off the Iraqi People. Van Buren was a veteran Foreign Service officer who’d spent much of his career in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan when he volunteered for Iraq service in 2009. He was sent to Baghdad as part of a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team, where he was in charge of a group trying to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure and economy. For the next year, he encountered oblivious bureaucrats, comically-misguided projects, greedy contractors, a never-ending cash flow and campaigns aimed at improving the lives of Iraqi people. But many of those campaigns were misguided, says Van Buren, and they often wasted a lot of money.

We Meant Well
We Meant Well

How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People

Van Buren’s book isn’t kind to American policy-makers and he has strong feelings about the futility of his efforts. Fresh Air contacted a spokesman for the State Department, who declined to respond to Van Buren’s book except to say that the author’s views are his own, and not necessarily those of the State Department.

“The State Department is not very happy about what I’ve done,” Van Buren tells Fresh Air‘s Dave Davies. “I was required to submit an early copy of the manuscript to them to determine that I wasn’t releasing classified information … It’s pretty clear that I’m speaking for myself here.”

Van Buren says many of his State Department colleagues who have read the book agree with him in private but have publically shunned him for speaking out about what he saw in Iraq.

“Many of them accused me of picking on them or … blaming them for things that I knew were institutional,” he says. “They didn’t make these decisions because they were stupid. I didn’t make these decisions because I was stupid. We all knew we were told we were do these things and they’re a little angry at me for labeling them as complicit in this when they knew that they weren’t.”

Garbage Removal in Baghdad

When Van Buren arrived in Iraq, he tells Dave Davies that he was overwhelmed by the amount of garbage he saw on the street.

“I’ve never seen more trash in one place in my life,” he says. “It was as if the only thing being manufactured in Iraq was garbage.”

The State Department’s reconstruction teams were told that they had to find a way to remove the trash in the street. They enlisted the help of local sheiks who had volunteered to find and pay workers to assist with the garbage removal.

“It was an amazing thing until we found that we were overpaying these people so much that we had distorted the local labor market and several shops had closed down because people found it more profitable to have us pay them to pick up trash than to operate small businesses,” says Van Buren. “And they were temporary jobs in the sense that when [the State Department] got bored with picking up trash or some other shiny object caught our attention, we moved onto a different project.”

Peter Van Buren has contributed to The Nation, American Conservative Magazine, and The Huffington Post.

Torie Partridge/courtesy of the author
Peter Van Buren has contributed to The Nation, American Conservative Magazine, and The Huffington Post.

Van Buren says some projects floundered and others never got off the ground because the thinking about the future of Iraq was never long-term.

“Everyone in Iraq was there on a series of one year tours, myself included,” he says. “Everyone was told that they needed to create accomplishments, that we needed to document our success, that we had to produce a steady stream of photos of accomplishments and pictures of smiling Iraqis and metrics and charts. It was impossible, under these circumstances, to do anything long-term … We rarely thought past next week’s situation update. The Embassy would rarely engage with us on a project that wasn’t flashy enough to involve photographs or bringing a journalist out to shoot a video that looked good. The willingness to do long-term work … never existed in our world.”

Peter Van Buren has served in the Foreign Service for 23 years. He has received awards for his work in Japan and Thailand. He speaks Japanese, Mandarin and some Korean.

 

Are religious ideologies dominating the Middle East?

Countries with strong ideologies aim to export their ideology that they perceive as the ‘best’. Arabs did it with Islam, Europe did it with Christianity, the Soviet Union did it with communism, the USA is doing it with capitalism.
Religious ideologies work the same way. Saudi Arabia tries to expand its Sunni Wahabism and Iran its Shia ideology.
Because Saudi Arabia has no rich history, its ideology is based on the strict application to the Islamic law as a way of life with a capitalistic approach in line with the USA: Malls and Mosques. Iran has a long history of civilization so its ideology is more complex and progressive in the interpretation of Islamic law and contrary to Saudi Arabia, it attributes an importance to art and self-analysis in the social life.
Somehow because of history, Sunnism is viewed as conservative, capitalist and business oriented while Shiism is revolutionary, socialist and intellectual.

Of course these ideologies once exported , are supposed to be adapted to the local customs, yet their “world view” remain the same.

Turkey has more resemblance with Iran for its history and has a good dose of secularism injected by Ataturk but I think Turkey is still a very conservative moslem country in the rural areas. In a way, Turkey is like a wilder Saudi Arabia: Malls, Mosques and…Whisky.

In summary, I think, all countries that consider themselves as powerful would give the first priority to export their ideology and way of life (whether religious or social). This is often done in subtle and insidious ways by using the weaknesses of the target country and many cover ups in order to develop a grassroot that may spread the ideology further. While important to maintain their power, economical relation has less priority for religious ideologies.
I think this subject can be discussed forever…

How long will Iran support Bashar Al Assad regime?

Iran and Turkey support for Syria are the life line of the economic survival of the regime.
Let’s start by Iran. Iran may not see with a good eye the growing ‘moderate’ sunnni influence of Erdogan on Arabs. For them he may be trying to hikjack the ‘arab spring’ to make it a ‘sunni spring’.
He has already hijacked Gaza and Somalia by his very strong criticism at the UN.
Iran also is feeling insulted by the fact Turkey has accepted the NATO defense system on his territory.
I doubt very much they will dump Bashar Al Assad easily. Let us not forget that Hafez Al Assad was the sole Arab leader to support Iran during the 8 years murderous war against Saddam who, remember, was then supported by the whole of the western countries. Also Baath Syria has been a warrant of Hezbollah. Without its support Hezbollah would have lost the 2006 war.
It is also obvious from the western involvement in the opposition that any regime coming after the Assad’s will be pro-western, anti-Iran, which will mean a dangerous weakening of Hezbollah that could become a easy target to Israel seeking revenge.

These are very good reasons for Iran to keep supporting Syria even if they realize there has been excessive injustified deaths during the rebellion.

As for Sunni Arab leaders, I also think that most of them are having a growing resentment toward the Turks taking over the Arab causes as they were their: They all missed Erdogan’s speech in the UN where he talked about Arab issues: Gaza, Palestine, Somalia etc..

Therefore, if Turkey puts sanction on Syria, despite the animosity some Arab countries have against it, they may see it as another arrogant step from Erdogan. They will also see that he is aligning with the USA and Western power’s ‘desire to weaken Syria, while the Arab league and Arab countries have not called for sanctions.

In summary, I tend to believe that the moment Turkey will impose sanctions, some Arab countries and Iran will step in to help Syria, just to let Erdogan know that he should remain in his place and not interfere more than he is doing in Arab affairs.

I may be wrong, the psychology of many Arab leaders is often unpredictable and the geopolitics of the region increasingly complex.