Category Archives: Middle East Geopolitics

The End of Iraq War: A complete neocon defeat

Posted on October 24, 2011 | Comments Off on The End of Iraq War: A complete neocon defeat
Jonathan Steele
Guardian.co.uk  Sunday 23 October 2011

Thanks to the toppling of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s greatest enemy, Tehran’s influence in Iraq is stronger than America’s

The Iraq war is over. Buried by the news from Libya, Barack Obama announced late on Friday that all US troops will leave Iraq by 31 December.

The president put a brave face on it, claiming he was fulfilling an election promise to end the war, though he had actually been supporting the Pentagon’s effort to make a deal with Iraq’s prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to keep US bases and several thousand troops there indefinitely.

The talks broke down because Moqtada al-Sadr’s members of parliament and other Iraqi nationalists insisted that US troops be subject to Iraqi law. In every country where they are based the US insists on legal immunity and refuses to let troops be tried by foreigners. In Iraq the issue is especially sensitive after numerous US murders of civilians and the Abu Ghraib scandal in which Iraqi prisoners were sexually humiliated. In almost every case where US courts tried US troops, soldiers were acquitted or received relatively brief prison sentences.

The final troop withdrawal marks a complete defeat for Bush’s Iraq project. The neocons’ grand plan to use the 2003 invasion to turn the country into a secure pro-western democracy and a garrison for US bases that could put pressure on Syria and Iran lies in tatters.

Their hopes of making Iraq a democratic model for the Middle East have been tipped on their head. The instability and bloodshed which the US unleashed in Iraq were the example that Arabs sought to avoid, not emulate. This year’s autonomous surge for democracy in Egypt and Tunisia has done far more to galvanise the region and undermine its dictatorships than anything the US did in Iraq. And when the Arab spring dawned, the Iraqi government found itself on the defensive as demonstrators took to the streets of Baghdad and Basra to protest against Maliki’s authoritarianism and his government’s US-supported clampdown on trade union activity. Maliki hosted two Syrian government delegations this summer and has refused to criticise Bashar al-Assad’s shooting of protesters.

But the neocons’ biggest defeat is that, thanks to Bush’s toppling of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s greatest enemy, Tehran’s influence in Iraq is much stronger today than is America’s. Iran does not control Iraq but Tehran no longer has anything to fear from its western neighbour now that a Shia-dominated government sits in Baghdad, made up of parties whose leaders spent long years of exile in Iran under Saddam or, like Sadr, have lived there more recently.

The US Republicans are accusing Obama of giving in to Iran by pulling all US troops out. Their knee-jerk reaction is rich and only shows the bankruptcy of their slogans, since it was Bush who gave Tehran its strategic opening by invading Iraq, just as it was Bush in the dying weeks of his presidency who signed the agreement to withdraw all US troops by the end of 2011, which Obama was hoping to amend. But Senator John McCain was right when he said Obama’s announcement would be viewed “as a strategic victory for our enemies in the Middle East, especially the Iranian regime, which has worked relentlessly to ensure a full withdrawal of US troops from Iraq”. A pity that he did not pin the blame on Bush (and Tony Blair) who made it all possible.

The two former leaders’ memoirs show they have learnt no lessons, even though their reputations in history will never be able to shake the disaster off.

Whether the lessons have been taken on board by the current US and British leaders is more important. Nato’s relative success in the Libyan campaign is already being used to draw a veil over the past. Indeed, the fortuitous timing of Gaddafi’s death has knocked the news of the US withdrawal from Iraq almost entirely off the media’s agenda.

But the past is still with us. A key lesson from Iraq is that putting western boots on the ground in a foreign war, particularly in a Muslim country, is madness. That point seemed to have been learnt when US, British and French officials asked the UN security council in March to authorise its campaign in Libya. They promised there would be no ground troops or occupation.

This should also apply to Afghanistan where Obama claims to be fighting a war of necessity, unlike the war in Iraq which he calls one of choice. The distinction is false, and the question now is whether he will pull all US troops out by 2014.

On the pattern of the aborted deal with Iraq, his officials are trying to negotiate an arrangement with the Karzai government which will authorise the indefinite basing of thousands of US troops, to be described as trainers and advisers, after combat forces leave. This would continue the folly of fuelling the country’s long-running civil war. Now that al-Qaida has been driven from Afghanistan, Washington should support negotiations for a government of national unity that includes the Taliban and ends the fighting among Afghans. Iraq is no haven of guaranteed stability but, without the presence of US combat troops for the last 15 months, it has achieved an uneasy peace. If talks in Afghanistan are seriously encouraged, it could go the same way once foreign troops at last withdraw.

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Posted in Iraq, Middle East Geopolitics, US Middle East Politics

The ‘great game’ in Syria

Posted on October 22, 2011 | Comments Off on The ‘great game’ in Syria

By Alastair Crooke

This summer, a senior Saudi official told John Hannah [1], former United States vice president Dick Cheney’s former chief-of-staff, that from the outset of the Syrian upheaval in March, the king has believed that regime change in Syria would be highly beneficial to Saudi interests: “The king knows that other than the collapse of the Islamic Republic itself, nothing would weaken Iran more than losing Syria,” said the official.

This is today’s “great game”: the formula for playing it has changed; the US-instigated “color” revolutions in the former Soviet republics have given way to a bloodier, and more multi-layered process today, but the underlying psychology remains unchanged.

The huge technical requirements of mounting such a complex

game in Syria are indeed prodigious: but in focussing so closely on technique and on coordinating diverse interests, inevitably something important may recede from view, too.

Europeans and Americans and certain Gulf states may see the Syria game as the logical successor to the supposedly successful Libya “game” in remaking the Middle East, but the very tools that are being used on their behalf are highly combustible and may yet return to haunt them – as was experienced in the wake of the 1980s “victory” in Afghanistan.

It will not be for the first time that Western interests sought to use others for their ends, only to find they have instead been used.

In any event, the tactics in Syria, in spite of heavy investment, seem to be failing. Yet Western strategy, in response to the continuing cascade of new events in the region, remains curiously static, grounded in gaming the awakening and tied ultimately to the fragile thread connecting an 88-year-old king to life.

There seems to be little thought about the strategic landscape when, and as, that thread snaps. We may yet see the prevailing calculus turned inside out: nobody knows. But does the West really believe that being tied into a model of Gulf monarchical legitimacy and conservatism in an era of popular disaffection to be a viable posture – even if those states do buy more Western weapons?

What then is the new anatomy of the great game? In the past, color revolutions were largely blueprinted in the offices of the political consultancies of “K” Street in Washington. But in the new format, the “technicians” attempting to shape the region [2] , hail directly from the US government: according to reports by senior official sources in the region, Jeffrey Feltman, a former ambassador in Lebanon, and presently assistant secretary of state, as chief coordinator [3], together with two former US ambassadors, Ron Schlicher and David Hale, who is also the new US Middle East Peace Envoy.

And instead of an operations center established in some phony “Friends of Syria” organization established in Washington, there is a gold-plated operations center located in Doha, financed, according to a number of sources, by big Qatari money.

The origins of the present attempt to refashion the Middle East lie with the aftermath of Israel’s failure in 2006 to seriously damage Hezbollah. In the post-conflict autopsy, Syria was spotlighted as the vulnerable lynchpin connecting Hezbollah to Iran. And it was Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia who planted the first seed: hinting to US officials that something indeed might be done about this Syria connector, but only through using the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, adding quickly in response to the predictable demurs, that managing the Syrian Brotherhood and other Islamists could safely be left to him.

John Hannah noted on ForeignPolicy.com [4] that “Bandar working without reference to US interests is clearly cause for concern; but Bandar working as a partner against a common Iranian enemy is a major strategic asset”. Bandar was co-opted.

Hypothetical planning suddenly metamorphosed into concrete action only earlier this year, after the fall of Saad Hariri’s government in Lebanon, and the overthrow of president Hosni Mubarak in Egypt: Suddenly, Israel seemed vulnerable, and a weakened Syria, enmired in troubles, held a strategic allure.

In parallel, Qatar had stepped to the fore, as Azmi Bishara, a pan-Arabist, former Israeli parliament member, expelled from the Knesset and now established in Doha, architected a schema through which television – as various in the Arabic press have reported [5] – that is, al-Jazeera, would not just report revolution, but instantiate it for the region – or at least this is what was believed in Doha in the wake of the Tunisia and Egyptian uprisings.

This was a new evolution over the old model: Hubristic television, rather than mere media management. But Qatar was not merely trying to leverage human suffering into an international intervention by endlessly repeating “reforms are not enough” and the “inevitability” of Assad’s fall, but also – as in Libya – Qatar was directly involved as a key operational actor and financier.

The next stage was to draw French President Nikolas Sarkozy into the campaign through the emir of Qatar’s expansive nature and ties to Sarkozy, supplemented by Feltman’s lobbying. An “Elysee team” of Jean-David Levite, Nicholas Gallet and Sarkozy, was established, with Sarkozy’s wife enlisting Bernard Henri-Levy, the arch promoter of the Benghazi Transitional Council model that had been so effective in inflating North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into an instrument of regime change.

Finally, President Barack Obama delegated Turkey [6] to play point on Syria’s border. Both of the latter components however are not without their challenges from their own security arms, who are skeptical of the efficacy of the Transitional Council model, and opposed to military intervention.

The Turkish leadership, in particular, is pushed by party pressures in one direction [7] , whilst at another there are deep misgivings about Turkey becoming a NATO “corridor” into Syria. Even Bandar is not without challenges: he has no political umbrella from the king, and others in the family are playing other Islamist cards to different ends.

In operational terms, Feltman and his team coordinate, Qatar hosts the “war room”, the “news room” and holds the purse strings, Paris and Doha lead on pushing the Transitional Council model, whilst Bandar [8] and Turkey jointly manage the Sunni theater in-country, both armed and unarmed.

The Salafist component of armed and combat experienced fighters was to have been managed within this framework, but increasingly they went their own way, answering to a different agenda, and having separate finances.

If the scope of the Syria “game” – for let us not forget the many killed (including civilians, security forces, and armed fighters) make it no game – is on a different scale to the early “color” revolutions, so its defects are greater too. The NTC paradigm, already displaying its flaws in Libya, is even more starkly defective in Syria, with the opposition “council” put together by Turkey, France and Qatar caught in a catch-22 situation. The Syrian security structures have remained rock solid [9] through seven months – defections have been negligible – and Assad’s popular support base is intact.

Only external intervention could change that equation, but for the opposition to call for it, would be tantamount to political suicide, and they know it. Doha and Paris [10] may continue to try to harass the world towards some intervention by maintaining attrition but the signs are that the internal opposition will opt to negotiate.

But the real danger in all this, as John Hannah himself notes on ForeignPolicy.com [11], is that the Saudis, “with their back to the wall”, “might once again fire up the old jihadist network and point it in the general direction of Shi’ite Iran”.

In fact, that is exactly what is happening, but the West does not seem to have noticed. As Foreign Affairs noted last week, Saudi and its Gulf allies are “firing up” the Salafists [12], not only to weaken Iran, but mainly in order to do what they see is necessary to survive – to disrupt and emasculate the awakenings which threaten absolute monarchism.

Salafists are being used for this end in Syria [13] , in Libya, in Egypt (see their huge Saudi flag waving turn-out in Tahrir Square in July ) [14] in Lebanon, Yemen [15] and Iraq.

Salafists may be generally viewed as non-political and pliable, but history is far from comforting. If you tell people often enough that they shall be the king-makers in the region and pour buckets-full of money at them, do not be surprised if they then metamorphose – yet again – into something very political and radical.

Michael Scheuer, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency Bin Laden Unit, recently warned [16] that the Hillary Clinton-devised response to the Arab awakening, of implanting Western paradigms, by force if necessary, into the void of fallen regimes, will be seen as a “cultural war on Islam” and will set the seeds of a further round of radicalization.

Saudi Arabia is America’s ally. The US, as friends, should ask them if the fall of Assad, and the sectarian conflict that is almost certain to ensue, is really in their interest: Do they imagine that their Sunni allies in Iraq and Lebanon will escape the consequences? Do they really imagine that the Shi’ites of Iraq will not put two-and-two together and take harsh precautions?

One of the sad paradoxes to the sectarian “voice” adopted by the Gulf leaders to justify their repression of the awakening has been the undercutting of moderate Sunnis, now caught between the rock of being seen as a Western tool, and the hard place of Sunni Salafists just waiting for the chance to displace them.

Notes
1. See here.
2. See here.
3. See here and here.
4. See here.
5. Qataris seeking alternative for Waddah Khanfar to manage Al-Jazeera, Al-Intiqad, 20 September 2011.
6. See here.
7. See here.
8. See here.
9. See here.
10. See here.
11. See here.
12. See here.
13. See here.
14. See here.
15. See here.
16. See here.

Alastair Crooke is founder and director of Conflicts Forum and is a former adviser to the former EU Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana, from 1997-2003.

(Copyright 2011 Alastair Crooke.)

http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MJ22Ak01.html#.TqFqGuDRsv4.blogger

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Posted in EU-Syria, Iran-Syria, Israel, Middle East Geopolitics, Syria, Syrian Opposition, Turkey-Syria, US Middle East Politics

The Syrian stalemate and the Lebanese (mis)givings

Posted on October 19, 2011 | Comments Off on The Syrian stalemate and the Lebanese (mis)givings

By Scarlett HADDAD | 20/10/2011
(L’Orient-Le Jour- Lebanon Translated from french)

While the mediation of the Arab League is heading for a clinical death, the situation in Syria continues to divide the Lebanese between those who believe that the fall of the regime is inevitable, even imminent, and those who think that Bashar al-Assad almost got over it. The reality, as is often the case elsewhere, however, is between these two extremes.

Back from Syria, visitors report that the regime is in total control of the situation in large cities, particularly Aleppo and Damascus, where incidents occur regularly, but are quickly contained.
In remote areas, the situation is more confused. Small communities have often to deal with robbers and other troublemakers that are not necessarily with the opposition but take advantage of the fact that the police are busy elsewhere.

At present, the real problem for the Syrian authorities is concentrated in Homs where a security chaos is prevailing. In this socially diverse city, the police have no control over entire neighborhoods, which are in the hands of the opposition. But authorities remain broadly confident, preferring to let the opposition exhaust itself or sink into violence, which to them would only serve to discredit them to the people. Besides, everyone (almost) now recognizes that violence is the fact of both sides.

According to many Lebanese figures who visited Syria recently, the regime of Bashar al-Assad is more serene, confident that the situation is bound to evolve in its favor.
It considers itself protected from foreign intervention and sanctions of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Chinese and Russian veto, which is part of the long-term strategy of these two states and is therefore not subject to a sudden change. Similarly, it considers itself protected internally by the strength of its institutions, including the army and security forces that did not suffer from significant defections, seven months after the start of the insurgency.

Turkey, which represented a real threat to the Syrian regime with its plan to create a buffer zone at the border and thus give a bastion to the Syrian opposition, is currently immersed in its own problems with the Kurds but also with the various components of its social fabric.
Spearhead of European-American plan to destabilize Syria, Turkey is now virtually paralyzed, and the harsh statements of its leaders against the Syrian regime and their considerable support for the Syrian opposition do not constitute a real threat to Assad.

As a matter of fact, the real problem of the Syrian regime is elsewhere. It lies mainly in the deepening of the divide between the community components of the Syrian society, especially between Sunnis and Alawites.
Now, members of both communities are openly critical of each others, while for many years, the religious approach was apparently non-existent in Syria. If there is actually a plan of confessional destabilization through the exacerbation of sensitivities between Sunnis and Shiites, as the camp hostile to the Americans believes, it is scoring points in several countries in the region, particularly Syria.
This new reality hinders the process of reforms intended and announced by the Assad regime. Thus, in a climate as exacerbated, if the reforms were to occur through an electoral process, the regime may fall. It’s obviously what it does not want. Therefore it would be in a kind of impasse, convinced of the need for reforms, but reluctant to give them shape and risk its survival.

This allows us to reach the following conclusion: the system is therefore still the reins of the country and is not seriously shaken. But there is no end in sight to the internal crisis.

The authority has shown that its security approach widely criticized has allowed it to remain in place and push the opponents to resort to violence, but has not yet found a solution that allows it to calm the opposition.
Faced with such findings, many Western governments believe that the Syrian crisis would take more time and that its outcome is uncertain.
The Lebanese that are waiting for an early resolution to this crisis will be disappointed, and the Lebanese political class that have been waiting for the evolution of in Syria to move in one direction or the other would need to change its plans and approach.

The Syrian regime seems here to stay, even if it has less time to spend on local developments in Lebanon. It would be a positive development if the Lebanese of all affiliations, stop keeping an eye on Syria before making a decision about them. Not to mention their watches, set permanently on the Syrian hour

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Posted in Lebanon, Syria, Syrian Opposition, Turkey-Syria

The Lebanese civil war and the role of Syria

Posted on October 15, 2011 | Comments Off on The Lebanese civil war and the role of Syria

JC 14 october 2011

Depending on whom you talk to, the Lebanese Christians, principally the Maronites allied with pro-Israel Geagea, will tell you the the Syrians massacred them, while the others, Greek orthodox, Armenians and Maronites now allied with Aoun and Frangie will tell you that the Syrian saved them from the Druze, the Sunni militias and the Palestinians.

The civil war in Lebanon was such a messy and complex war that violence, killings and excesses came from all the protagonists independently of their religion and political affiliation.

When the Maronites were on the verge of defeat in front of the Palestinians,the Druze and Sunnis militias, the Maronite Lebanese president Frangie called on Syria to intervene.
“In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm” (wikipedia)

The huge mistake was that the mandate was not limited in time and the Arab league never asked Syria to withdraw its troops.

Therefore the Syrian army “pacified” the country and settled in Lebanon. Some Syrian leaders, like Abdel Halim Khaddam, found that Lebanon was a good place to make money with corrupted Lebanese and intervene in the political directions of the country.
With time, the gratitude faded away and the resentment grew against Syria and the abuses and interference of its representatives in the political life of the country. We know the rest….

The Syrians responsible of crimes during that war were never indicted. The same applies to Christian Lebanese leaders responsible of horrendous massacres. In addition some of them are shamelessly still active in Lebanese politics. There has not been any thorough judicial investigation of the terrible crimes that happened during and after this war. This is why the murder of Hariri rallied the Lebanese who thought that finally some kind of justice was coming to their country.

Therefore the obituaries presented by Antoine of Christians killed should be completed by the obituaries of the Moslems, Druzes and Syrians soldiers who died during that war.
Then we could have the whole picture of the victims of that dirty war that no Lebanese want to remember.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12492&cp=7#comment-278667

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Tunisia: Islamist Al-Nahda comes to power with ‘modern’ outlook

Posted on October 13, 2011 | Comments Off on Tunisia: Islamist Al-Nahda comes to power with ‘modern’ outlook
 Thursday 13 Oct 2011–
On the eve of elections in Tunisia, Ahram Online spoke to Rashed Al-Ghanoushi, whose Islamist party Al-Nahda appears set to lead the next government.

Ask anyone in Tunisia and they will tell you that Islamists, represented by their largest organisation, Al-Nahda Party headed by Sheikh Rashed Al-Ghanoushi, are going to be partners in ruling the country following the January revolution.

Taxi drivers, who habitually have their radios tuned to the Quran, a station ironically established and owned by businessman Sakhr Al-Matri, son-in-law of deposed President Zein Abidine Ben Ali, average citizens in cafes or on the street, and even politicians and intellectuals agree. Al-Nahda, which was banned since its creation under the name “Islamist Outlook Movement” in 1981, until the revolution of 14 January 2011, will be the leading party in Constituent Council elections on 23 October.

Today, Al-Nahda issues its own weekly newspaper Al-Fajr, and the party’s main headquarters on a side street off Kheireddin Pacha Street in the capital is located in a six-storey building once owned by a wireless telephone company. The front of the building is modern and elegant, the glass covered façade reflects the open space before it. In the entrance lobby is hung a picture of Al-Ghanoushi’s books lined up.

Al-Ghanoushi, 70, studied philosophy at Damascus University and is a prominent thinker of “political Islam” in our times. His books are for the first time being sold in public in Tunisia and with locally printed editions.

Al-Ghanoushi met me in his office. He spoke slowly, as if weighed down by years of exile and travel that lasted 21 years and finally ended in London. He avoided answering direct questions about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, although all his answers, in my opinion, challenged the Brotherhood’s posture and its nascent Justice and Freedom Party.

The founder and leader of Al-Nahda Party (which dropped “Islamist” from its title) began his answers by invoking the religious phrase praising the Prophet Mohammed. Then he said:

“I was honoured to be in Egypt as a young man in my 20s to study in a country that represented the aspirations of the youth in pan-Arabism, authenticity and pride. I emigrated there in 1964 and registered to study at the Agricultural College at Cairo University, but this did not last long because of political circumstances.

“Relations between Abdel-Nasser and Borqeba (Egypt’s and Tunisia’s presidents, respectively, at the time) were tense and we benefited from this dispute, but soon they reconciled and about 40 Tunisian students in Egypt paid the price—and I was one of them. The Tunisian embassy in Cairo asked for the names of students who rebelled against the Westernisation tendencies of the time. Borqeba was keen on sending students to the West not the East, which he viewed as a source of suspicion and revolution. As Tunisian students in Egypt, we found ourselves expelled from university although we were very enthusiastic and greatly admired Nasserist Egypt. Then they began handing us over to the embassy for deportation; some went back while others — like me—fled elsewhere.”

Al-Ghanoushi went to Damascus and studied philosophy, remained a devout Nasserist, and joined a Nasserist group called “The Socialist Union” until it became a political Islamic group after the 1967 defeat, according to his autobiography The Islamist Movement Experience in Tunisia.

When referring to Borqeba you used the term “Westernisation”, but some people in Tunisia do not view him as secular. What’s your opinion and what is your definition of secularism?

Borqeba was a secular fanatic, not a moderate. Secularism does not necessarily mean that it opposes religion, but in many cases it co-exists with religion such as the Anglo-Saxon culture. The French roots of secularism, however, have a heritage in opposition of religion which makes it biased. In such a scenario, the state is not neutral towards religion but in conflict with it. Hence, for example, the hijab problem and banning the head scarf was never an issue in Western secular thought except in France. In Britain, on the other hand, they designed Islamic police uniforms for Muslim female officers.

Borqeba’s secularism was extremist and even fascist; it did not believe in democracy but the dominance of the state over society and dismantling its religious structure and identity. This is completely different from a neutral stance by the state towards religion.

So you believe the state should maintain a neutral position towards religion?

I believe the state should sponsor all religions and express the will of society, and not be a guardian over society.

Did you revise your position regarding your proximity to Ben Ali at the beginning of his rule, as stated in the book by Nicolas Beau and Jean Pierre Tuquoi, Notre ami Ben Ali?

When Ben Ali deposed his boss Borqeba on 7 November 1987, our necks were almost in the noose with 10,000 men behind bars. The country was being led by a senile old man and we were in something similar to a civil war and political life was being strangled. We were among the opposition movements that welcomed change but were more pessimistic than optimistic. We knew that the man had previously served as chief of security and former minister of interior, which meant that he took part in the suppression campaigns of 1978, 1984 and 1987. But he came in declaring there is no presidential term for life and promised to reinstate democracy, pan-Arabism and release political prisoners.

When Ben Ali received me on 6 November 1988, he promised to recognise the Islamist movement but asked for some patience. I believed him until the 1989 elections, and the people began to sympathise with the Islamist movement which threw things off balance — it even took us by surprise. The people punitively voted against the ruling party; we misread that, we admit it. Not only were we mistaken about our optimism about Ben Ali, but we were also mistaken because we did not practice democracy was well as we do today.

I will also add, yes, Ben Ali deceived the Islamist leadership and grassroots.

Your campaign in the Constituent Assembly elections seems more modern and open to society, the world and the age. But my observation of the tone of Al-Nahda leadership is contrary and dissimilar to the beliefs of its base and supporters, some of whom are calling for an Islamist state while others want Friday to be the weekend holiday, not Sunday. How is that?

The modern outlook that you noticed is not a decision by the leadership, but the natural progression of the Islamist Outlook Movement and Al-Nahda Movement. In the founding statement of the Outlook Movement in June 1981, there is a clear position for adopting democracy without discrimination or elimination of any party or trend, including the Communist Party. That was an unusual position for an Islamist group to take in those days.

At the time, we were asked at a news conference what would we do if the Communist Party was elected by the people? We did not hesitate and responded: “We have no other choice but to accept the outcome of the ballot box. Then we will go to the people and ask them to revise their choice in the next elections.”

In reality, since the end of the 1970s, we have been coordinating with the leaders of the opposition, including the communist, socialist and democratic parties. Although we suspended coordination for a while because Ben Ali coerced some secular currents and convinced them to fear what he called “Islamist terrorism”, there is consensus among all Tunisian political hues about the type of society, equality between sexes, pluralism that does not exclude anyone and building a civic state. I believe the moderate Islamist trend in general in Morocco, Algeria and even Egypt is heading in this direction, despite differences between one party and another.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, currently support a civic state.

But some of their leaders are still calling for the application of Sharia.

I believe what they mean is that Sharia is the main source of legislation, but the civic state will issue the laws. After the Brotherhood in Egypt proposed the creation of a body of Al-Azhar scholars to revise laws, they withdrew the idea and adopted the notion of a civic state. This means that the people are represented by members of parliament who will write and debate laws. In all honesty, in Islam there is no authority to govern over the people, which is why Sharia is a philosophical and intellectual source for MPs, thinkers and scholars to rely on, but without the guardianship of any entity.

Your campaign does not mention that Sharia is the source of legislation.

The constitution which Tunisians agree on does not mention a secular state but an Islamic state! The previous constitution (of 1959) states that “Tunisia is a free independent state; Arabic is the official language and Islam is the official religion.” No one wants to change this text. Hence, our constitution states that the state’s religion is Islam; it is not a state without religion, which means that religion is a source of all policies and all cultures.

At the same time, no one has the right to claim he represents religion; neither Al-Nahda nor anyone else. Society, through its own dynamic, is the one to formulate and translate religion into policies, laws and culture. The door for debate remains open when we need legislation or policies. This dynamic continues until there is consensus about the opinion of religion on this issue and that. This is a form of interaction with religion that is open to individuals and groups.

In your writings you make it clearer by stating: “There is no religious state in Islam, but a civic state”.

No one in the Islamist trend, at least among the moderates, is calling for a religious state — namely a state that speaks in the name of God. An Islamic state is not a religious one, meaning that it is the state of a Muslim people who are keen for the policies and laws of the state not to contradict the beliefs and values of the citizens, but enforce them. But no one is saying they can be the sole interpreters, or that they speak in the name of Islam.

Are you satisfied with the transition to democracy since the 14 January revolution?

Tunisians today agree on this path. There is consensus that translating the goals of the revolution requires the election of a Constituent Council to write a new constitution. This body will be formed soon. In the year of independence in 1956, the Tunisian state began its work by electing a constituent assembly, and today we all realise that the path we took since that date [1956] was mistaken, misguided and led us to disaster when it concluded by creating a dictatorship, and even a “mafia” type regime.

When Tunisians realised that conditions were beyond reform they revolted; we needed major surgery to rebuild the state to excise single-handed rule. Al-Nahda believes in a parliamentary regime to avoid the causes that led the independent state to the disaster of single-handed rule, although unfortunately this format is rooted in our heritage.

As for the transition after 14 January, I believe that despite criticism progress is being made towards a bright place and decisive period, the election of the constituent assembly. If we arrive there safely, Tunisians will have successfully passed the test.

What are your predictions about the assembly’s composition?

It will be divided among many forces because of the many differences on the political scene and as a result of the electoral system that encourages that.

How many votes will you receive?

We believe we are undoubtedly the largest party, and everyone agrees. All polls state that. How many votes will we win? That will depend on the reliability of the electoral process.

How many do you deserve, in your opinion?

If elections are honest and according to legal procedures, it is not unlikely that we would win the majority of votes; more than 50 per cent of ballots. How will this be translated into seats, I don’t know. According to the electoral process you might need 80 or 70 or 60 per cent to have 51 per cent of the seats on the constituent assembly.

There is ambiguity about major issues in the political arena. There is almost no discussion so far (end of September) about the outline of the new constitution and how institutions will operate in the second interim phase, which begins after the assembly is elected and the constitution written within one year.

The major political forces signed an agreement called the “roadmap” (the Declaration of the Transitional Path) for 24 October, the day after elections day. According to this document, Interim President Fouad Al-Mobzie will invite the Constituent Assembly to convene, and the assembly will choose its chairman and decide on the new transitional administration for the country. It can also elect a new president or approve the incumbent.

The president would then ask the leader of the majority bloc in the council to form a government that would be presented to the Council and offer its programme there for approval. Within one year, the Constituent Council must conclude its mission [of writing a new constitution] as well as monitoring the government and approving the budget.

What is your vision of the features of the new constitution, institutions and regime, and guarantees for public and individual freedoms?

These are all up to the Constituent Council, and no one in Tunisia is willing to repeat the model of an all-powerful president. The only debate is between those calling for a parliamentary system, like Al-Nahda, and others who want an amended presidential system that guarantees balance between powers.

What will the president’s mandate be during the new interim period?

The state administration decree will decide the outline of this stage. The Constituent Assembly will issue this decree that will feature the mandate of the president and cabinet.

Will you propose any ideas on this topic at this point?

No, but we will not go to the Constituent Assembly on 24 October empty handed or without ideas. We will make proposals and a plan for government policies. I believe the cabinet will be formed on 26 October. Anyone who feels they could win must prepare their vision. Already, dialogue has started about the formation of a coalition government, and we are active in this. We believe the country needs a coalition government led by Al-Nahda Party.

What is the point of convergence or consensus for such a cabinet?

The notion of democracy is unanimous; second, is confronting the unemployment problem. These are two fundamental issues for the country.

Do you believe in a free economy?

We prefer a free economy within a humanitarian social framework. Members of the new government must find common ground in the programmes of the three or four parties that will form the government and draw up a plan.

Concerning regional and international conditions, do you feel that the Tunisian experiment in transitioning to democracy, and participation by Islamists in the regime, could be unsettling? Do you feel any pressure?

I doubt any new cabinet will make any serious changes in foreign policy. The top priority will be to address domestic issues such as unemployment, security and development. No doubt, the government will uphold Tunisia’s international agreements; it might amend some things but this is not a priority in any way. The priority now is creating an investment-friendly environment to attract local and foreign capital, and reassure everyone.

There is a sense that the interests of the Tunisian revolution right now are similar to the interests of foreign powers, including Algeria, where the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the elections in 1991 but the results were voided and the country launched into a long civil war.

Yes, Algeria included. The solution is to stabilise conditions in Tunisia. Stability benefits everyone and there is no alternative or guarantee in the shadow of a police or military state. Stability is the only way to ensure the transition to democracy will be successful. It would be a disaster if the process fails and the state collapses.

Hundreds of thousands of young Tunisians will go to the other bank of the Mediterranean (Europe). This is unacceptable and unbearable. Hence, there is a joint interest for everyone to make the democratic transition in Tunisia a success.

Are there open channels between Al-Nahda and the Algerian authorities?

I visited Algeria in August and met with officials there. I sensed that they keen on making our march to democracy a success.

Will this be reflected in the relationship between the Algerian regime and the banned FIS?

That is up to the Algerians. I told them that the Tunisian revolution is not for export, and even if we were to export it, it wouldn’t be to Algeria because Algerians already have a deep culture of revolution, and they don’t need any more input.

The US is said to have given a green light to Islamists in the region and reached compromises to safeguard its interests.

We don’t need a green light from anyone. In our meetings with the Europeans and Americans we reached a common conviction that making the democratic transition successful is in everyone’s interests. The alternative is disastrous.

When did you realise that the Americans want to have a dialogue with you?

After the revolution the Americans began sending messages and contacts were made. Everyone is betting on democracy.

Did they offer guarantees that they would uphold the outcome of elections?

Everyone said that, and they do not object to anyone who comes to power through the ballot box. There is no doubt, however, that everyone prefers a national coalition government that includes Islamists.

By everyone, you mean the Americans and French as well?

Yes. Europeans, in general.

http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/24061.aspx

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The Syrian National Council recognition option

Posted on October 11, 2011 | Comments Off on The Syrian National Council recognition option

JC   1 september 2011 —

Recognizing the SNC is an act of war as this opposition is specifically asking the international community to condone the toppling of a government that of is part of the UN.
The TNC in Libya was recognized only by 30 countries only when NATO was appointed to ensure that the intended ‘regime change’ was implemented under a ambiguous agenda of a Human Rights issue by the UNSC resolution.

NATO is reluctant to act without a UNSC resolution and Russia and China are obstinate in rejecting any military action on Syria.
Therefore as long as the international community is not ready for a war, then the SNC will not be recognized, except by some die hard countries like France and some others.

Time is playing against the SNC: If the present Syrian government starts to seriously implement the reforms under Russia and Iran’s extreme pressure and succeeds, the only issue that the SNC could ask for is a human rights condemnation, nothing else.

The first major strategy of the hardline opposition as we are seeing today, after the failure of creating a massive popular uprising is to prevent any reform to be implemented. This is why they are resorting to targeted assassinations to stir the public opinion and exhaust the government to weaken it. Of course using intensively the media to accuse the government of these assassinations.

The second strategy is to create enough fear and confrontation in the villages and towns on the borders to create an influx of refugees in Turkey and Lebanon ( surprisingly there are no refugees reported in Jordan and Iraq). This will provoke a ‘humanitarian crisis’ like Libya and allow the UN to intervene.

The hardline opposition is aware that if the reforms succeed in diverting their calls for a regime change to a negotiation with the present government, they are finished and will need to leave the country in exile or just disappear. So, for them it is life or death issue.
Therefore I expect an increase of targeted killings and a tougher actions from the army as well as terrorists actions in villages on the border with a media campaign accusing the army of shooting at the villagers.
The limit date is the December election.

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The internal political prospect in Syria: View from a blogger

Posted on October 9, 2011 | Comments Off on The internal political prospect in Syria: View from a blogger

From  a Blogger in SyriaComment.com
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277507

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277665

1. If Assad were such a reformer, why did he not entertain the idea of a multi-party polity before 2011?
This has been discussed at SyriaComment before. Assad did entertain it on and off over the years. Why didn’t he actually do it? Because he didn’t have to (that’s a non-trivial point). And because it wasn’t entirely clear what the multi-party polity would look like if he created one (it might’ve been dysfunctional in one or more ways; and doubtless he would’ve been unhappy with the whole thing if a religious conservative party won a big share of the vote). Foreign Minister Wallid al-Moallem has said recently that the regime didn’t do it because they were under pressure and distraction the foreigners accusing Syria of murdering Hariri, and other saber-rattling by foreigner powers. I don’t accept that. Presidental Adviser Bouthiana Shaaban said a few months ago that the regime would not have repealed the emergency law, and would not have introduced the reforms of this year, if it hadn’t been for protesters on the streets. The whole country knew that the protesters were unassailably right about the specific things that the regime has now agreed to change.

2. You have made it clear that you would vote for Assad in any future elections (were they to be held). What is it about his ‘manifesto’ that you find so compelling?
See below including point number (10).

3. What significant internal reforms has Assad instigated over the past ten years?
The most significant has been greater opening of the economy to the international marketplace and futher moves away from Statism and socialism. The process is far from finished and is proceeding at a pace of gradual, organic evolution, and certainly not revolution. Ehsani would like it to proceed much faster. There has been a risk that faster pace could cause tumults, dissolutions, hardships, in the economy and then more dangerously in the polity.

# 266 in the previous thread DIGGING FOR GOLD IN BOSRA asks pro-regimers: “Why do you think Assad would win a fair election?

Here’s a list of 16 grounds I have for thinking that the regime will easily win the fair parliamentary elections that are in all likelihood to take place in 2012 — fair except religious and tribal parties are banned. The list is incomplete and off the top of my head, in no particular order, some of it recycled, and I think I could expand it if I spent more time on it.

(1) The overall number of people who accepted the invitation to join anti-regime demonstrations was “small” (though no hard number is available).

(2) The educated classes did not join the anti-regime demonstrations. In every country every winning party needs substantial support from the educated classes. In Syria right now there is only one party that has such support. To illustrate, one of the two key reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood party is so much stronger in Egypt than in Syria is that it has attracted substantial support from the educated classes. You know the other key reason. During the past six months the Syrian educated classes had the opportunity to come out and complain about the latter, and they didn’t take it up.

(3) Most of the religiously conservative classes did not join the anti-regime demonstrations. Neither did the clergy; most of the Sunni clerical leadership went on record as anti-tumult and pro-civil-process. Most of the people who attended the mosque on Friday did not attend an anti-regime demonstration afterwards, not even if there was a demonstration conveniently available and on offer to them at the doorstep. Neighborhoods in Damascus with a high concentration of religiously conservative people had only small, and few, demonstrations over the six months. One of the regime’s core constituencies is people who are less religious or who have a more progressive, less doctrinaire, take on religion. So, it is a very big and important achievement that this regime has been able to maintain its support among most of the religiously conservative. Correcting myself, it is more cautious and prudent to say “the religious conservatives consented to the rule of the regime and did not rise up against the regime” instead of “the regime maintained their support…”. Alright, many of them may vote for another party in the elections. But since most of them don’t express alienation against the regime, you shouldn’t expect them to vote en masse against the regime.

(4) No representatives of agricultural or rural interests having been talking up an alternative to the Assad regime. There was very little or no movement of people from rural areas into the towns and cities to participate in demonstrations (despite some fake boasts from the fake revolutionaries to the contrary). Right now there exists no competitor to the regime for the rural vote.

(5) Once the reforms announced by Assad are completed, there will be no major disagreements between Assad and the general Opposition on the structure of the institutions of the State. On social and economic policies, major disagreements between Assad and the Opposition are confined to wings of the Opposition (such as the MB wing), not the whole Opposition. These various wings are known to have only small and slim political support in Syria. The general Opposition does not have a platform and agenda beyond the reform agenda that the Assad regime itself has declared itself in favour of implementing. That is, the anti-regime protests have not created a policy agenda or alternative forward vision that throws the regime on the defensive in the upcoming election.

(6) The demonstrators were predominantly from the poorly educated working class. Most of them did not have an agenda beyond wanting Assad to leave and wanting a breath of fresh air in the country of an unspecified kind. The great majority of the poorly educated working class did not join with them in the anti-regime demonstrations, and all those who didn’t join are likely to follow the lead of the educated classes in the elections. The educated folks will be creating and propagating the discourse of the elections contest.

(7) The various Syrian opposition parties are very weak today, their representatives are barely known or entirely unknown to the Syrian public, and I can’t see a route by which they can make themselves a whole lot stronger by election day. The attempt to unconstitutionally overthrow the regime has discredited swathes of opposition, and has increased the regime’s political support among previously neutral people who strongly desire civil process and no violence.

(8) The city Al-Bab, 50 kilometers northwest of Aleppo, is the eight largest city in Syria. The city Al-Safira, 35 kilometers southwest of Aleppo, is the tenth largest city in Syria. (Source). Those two plus Aleppo (all overwhelmingly Sunni in religion, btw) have had essentially or very nearly zero anti-regime demonstrations during this past six months. Opposition to the regime in that part of the country among the poorly educated working class is truly miniscule. Aleppo is Syria’s most populous province. The regime is also very stong in Ladaqia, Tartous and Sweida provinces, and Damascus City. You can appreciate that those regional strengths can be enough to win or nearly win, even if you’re not yet agreeing with a forecast of the regime winning almost everywhere.

(9) Everybody in Syria knows that the anti-regime crowd has been lying about security forces atrocities and that the regime has been telling the truth. (Foreigners don’t know it, since they don’t watch Syrian TV, but foreigners are irrelevant since they won’t be voting). More generally, the regime has been able to use its control over Syrian mass media especially TV news to strong effect. The State-controlled TV news puts out good quality products for the most part, which enjoy good credibility with the Syrian public, and have good market penetration.

(10) The next two numbered points are interrelated but distinct. They are both aspects of the spirit of the nation and nationalism. The first is that there will be people who will be voting not so much for the Assad party as for national unity. They want unity and Assad’s party is by happenstance the embodiment for it. The Assad party’s manifesto is vote for national unity. A vote against Assad’s party is a vote for discord and recrimination. (The Putin|Medvedev party in Russia enjoys a similar sort of status, and it also has to put up with dissidents who despise the basics and atmosphere of the unity).

(11) “Syrian society is nationalistic and the Assad regime has got a bone-crunchingly strong grip over how the nation and nationalism is defined. The definition of the nation that the Syrians are nationalistic about is the one developed and nurtured by the regime over decades. It is unchallenged and unchallengeable, and people are rallying around it at this time of stress.” Nationalism sells well in national elections and no challenger can outdo the regime in selling nationalism.

(12) (a) The regime is actually in touch with the pulse of Syrian sentiment, and makes it its business to be so. (b) The regime in policymaking is non-doctrinaire, and is responsive to popular sentiment.

(13) The regime’s core agenda, modernization, is supported by almost all.

(14) The trade sanctions imposed by the Europeans and Americans have alienated the Syrians, I say, and all winning parties will decry the trade sanctions in the election campaign, and candidates with endorsements from Europe or America won’t have a snowball in hell’s chance of getting elected, and I say more about the political effect of the trade sanctions at http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12429&cp=all#comment-277131

(15) Religious and tribal parties are banned in the elections. The permitted parties will be having to pretty much compete head-to-head against the regime on the regime’s own territory.

(16) Syrian society is dominated by a sociologically broad Establishment that covers all geographic parts of the country, nearly all religious sects, all age groups, all professional occupations, all big private enterprises, and the State. This Establishment has had only one political party for decades. Today it shows no inclination towards internal dissent or devisiveness such as would create two parties within one Establishment (such as the Western countries have).

Footnote: I’ve come across many commentators who think the Assad regime has a “narrow base of political support”. E.g. Joshua Landis thinks that “Syria’s chronic failing is that it lacks a deeply shared sense of political community. This explains why such a narrow regime as that led by the Assads….” In next year’s competitive elections we are going to see who’s right and who’s wrong regarding these two radically different interpretations of the same scene.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277507

#142 Syrialover (who sounds like a straight-up anti-Syrian) says: “It’s about the economy, stupid”. It applies every time to every election everywhere, always. It’s also fuelling the Arab Spring uprisings. And if a genuine oppostion uses that slogan in a true election, the Assadists…. [will lose the election].

#157 DFGIB says in a similar vein: “I am sure that when people are presented with a credible plan for getting this country back on track they won’t be voting for Assad.” I’ve already explained why I disagree with that full sentence from DFGIB, but let me reiterate that the sentence’s first half is still very hypothetical. To illustrate:

Date 6 Oct 2011. A organization called “National Coordination Body to the forces of Democratic and National Change in Syria”, in a statement read out by its secretary-general Hassan Abdul-Azim, said it espouses the principle of national democratic change and a transition to a parliamentarian democratic leadership, and has stepped up its demands to topple the “security and tyrant regime.” The statement went on: “It’s too late to talk about reforming the regime due to its insistence since the eruption of the uprising to use violence and security and military solutions… in addition to brutal torture and wide arrests.” Banners inside the meeting hall read, “yes to the collapse of the security tyrant regime,” and “No to foreign military intervention … no to violence and no to sectarianism.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/06/c_131177091.htm

Thus, that organization is (a) still sincerely thinking that ordinary Syrians can be talked into going out onto the streets in very big numbers to chant for unconstitutionally toppling the regime, (b) still not talking about competing in next year’s parliamentary elections, and (c) still not talking about the economy. I say it’s a recepie for total failure.

I also insist, and I trust the regime and its security forces to insist, that the only way we’re going to have “Democratic and National Change in Syria” is by the 2012 parliamentary elections followed by the 2014 Presidential election.

The election is not going to be about the economy because, for one thing, the Opposition is devoid of fresh and saleable economic ideas; and in the unlikely event they did come up with something worthwhile and popular, the regime would appropriate it for itself. On questions of the economy, nearly all of the captains of industry are (and are going to be) supporting the Assad’s party. So are the Trades Unions. When we have the captains of industry, the trades unions and the government all reading out of the same prayer book, and we have an opposition with no real experience in economic development matters, I can’t see how the Assad’s party could get beaten on that issue. But anyway the election is not going to be about the economy. All signs say the Opposition is going to emphasize “tyranny” and “corruption”. (I already posted on this board some months ago about the regime’s exposure to the corruption allegation, but the post does not come up at google search — why not?).

Of the seventeen points I made at #121 above, here’s my favourite:

(17) Syrian society is dominated by a sociologically broad Establishment that covers all geographic parts of the country, nearly all religious sects, all age groups, all professional occupations, all big private enterprises, and the State. This Establishment has had only one political party for decades. Today it shows no inclination towards internal dissent or devisiveness such as would create two parties within one Establishment (such as the Western countries have).

As I see it the parlimentary election campaign will consist of sundry semi-anonymous and semi-disreputable dissent parties campaigning against the Establishment party. With that view, I must expect the Establishment party to win by at least as wide a margin as Mubarak’s party used to win by in Egypt under somewhat similar circumstances.

That reminds me of a totally different point, coming to mind by mention of Mubarak’s Egypt. I assume you know the place the MB and similar parties had in Egypt’s political landscape over the years. I now believe Syria’s political landscape is not going to see the appearance of a similar thing, because the Syrian Establishment — specifically the better educated Sunnis, who are the sole arbiters of this matter, I believe — have “opted for secularism to promote national unity”. A quasi-religious party would lack support from the society’s Establishment and would carry the millstone of sectarianism around its neck. Syria’s Grand Mufti Ahmad Hassoun recently said this year’s new legal ban on religious political parties is harmless to religion, a view with which I fully agree. You may well say that just because the Establishment has accepted that this is going to be Syria’s way, it does not follow that the wider masses have or will accept the same. You could be right. But I believe the masses will follow the Establishment. More fundamentally, I believe an Establishment is established.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277665

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Syria: the Local Syrian OppositionTalks view on the expats’ Syrian National Council

Posted on October 9, 2011 | Comments Off on Syria: the Local Syrian OppositionTalks view on the expats’ Syrian National Council

Syria’s Manna: On Ghalioun and the Trinity of a Successful Revolt

By: Othman Tazghart [1]

Published Saturday, October 8, 2011

Syrian opposition activist Haytham Manna speaks about the “trinity” of a successful revolution in Syria, his take on the newly formed Syrian National Council and his recent fallout with prominent dissident Burhan Ghalioun.

Othman Tazghart (OT): What are your reservations about the recent Istanbul conference? Why have you refused to join the Syrian National Council formed as a result?

Haytham Manna (HM): This Council is the result of an initiative by a group whose identity is connected to one ideology. It was not authorized by the political opposition or the youth movement inside the country. This group spent 55 days promoting the need for such a council on the basis that it will bring the revolutionary youth out of this crisis, solve all their problems, and facilitate material help, international recognition, a no-fly zone, and so on. Over the last month and a half, there have been repeated attempts to introduce Libyan vocabulary into the Syrian revolution. The people who have done this are professionals, they do not belong to any known political group. They call themselves ‘independents’ or the ‘Independent Islamic Movement.’ This group has sought to impose their plan on everyone else from the beginning and they failed in their first two attempts in Istanbul.

There was a joint attempt by all the major political groups to form a ‘National Syrian Alliance’ that would include the real political forces within the country. But the Istanbul group tried to weaken this alliance by appealing to some of its members to join the National Council instead. They claim that the difficult part is forming the council, after which the world would recognize them and facilitate miracles, allowing the revolution to carry on and succeed, while reinforcing the role of the youth in it. Sale of this illusion went hand in hand with attempts to takeover the unified consensus work being carried out between various political movements. It gave the National Council a specific ideological coloring, where the Islamists were granted 60 percent of council membership, when their real weight within the opposition is a fraction of that.

Moreover, this council lacks modesty, because those who formed it assert that they represent the majority in the revolution, including the coordinating committees. They claim that they will save the revolution and change the course of history. This will certainly reflect negatively on them when people discover their real size, the limits of their representation, and their modest means; with all due respect to some who have supported them.

OT: Do you think that making Dr. Burhan Ghalioun, a man with genuine credibility, the president of the council will help guarantee against such pitfalls as militarization of the uprising or foreign intervention?

HM: I have said several times, particularly during my last visit to Tunisia, that the Tunisian revolution gave us three basic principles. The first is the peaceful nature of the revolution. The second is the absence of the idol. There are no idols or individual leaders, only working groups who offer democratic solutions and think in a collective manner and seek consensus and pluralistic mechanisms that respect the efforts of these people while limiting their power. The third principle is the secular nature of the collective movement. This trinity for me is pertinent when it comes to Syria. I do not believe that any one person, whoever they are, can prevent all mistakes, especially when his position changs several times in the last few days. We want to escape the individual dictatorship of Arab rulers, so it does not make sense to devote our work to dictatorship and individualism.

OT: You have close ties with Dr. Burhan Ghalioun. From the beginning of the protests in Syria you have agreed on the peaceful and secular nature of the revolution. What are the reasons behind the differences that have arisen between you lately?

HM: There were no differences until the last meeting in Berlin. Dr. Ghalioun had promised to attend the meeting of the National Coordination Committee in Berlin and we were waiting for him to arrive. We were surprised to find that he had changed course to Istanbul, with no apology, explanation, or even prior notice. We have not spoken since that day. I think that Dr. Ghalioun owes us an explanation. We need to understand why we should offer all these concessions to the Islamists in Istanbul when we are a country with 26 sects, creeds, and ethnic groups.

This means that this is a country where the relationship between religion and the state cannot be dealt with lightly. The Syrian Revolution of 1925 held that “religion is for God and the homeland is for all.” Today, minorities do not play an effective role, so we need a secular discourse to gain their confidence. The Syrian people are believers, but they don’t want any religious ideology to influence their constitution or their future. I wish that Dr. Ghalioun would not take that line. After the Hama massacre in the 1980s, Said Hawa, a major thinker in the Muslim Brotherhood, tried to explain the failures of The Fighting Vanguard, their military wing. He concluded that “the Syrian people love freedom, the republic, and democracy.” I hope that some people do not forget this lesson.

OT: Some are asking, is your opposition to the National Council because of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in it or because of the size of the representation they were given?

HM: It is well known that I worked hard to rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood with the other political parties in Syria. I facilitated their reconciliation with several political groups. I was one of the most prominent defenders of Islamist prisoners. Therefore, I have no problem with them. I see the Islamists as part of the political geography of all Islamic countries, not just Syria. But I believe that at most, 10 percent of Syrian society supports the Muslim Brotherhood. I do not understand why they are clambering for more representation.

I hope that they will be wise and rational enough to see that it is not in their interest or the interest of the revolution for them to exaggerate their role in the Syrian uprising. It is the dictatorship that is inflating their role to scare off international support. They’re serving this purpose by exaggerating their role at conferences and in the media.

OT: In one of your statements, you described the group who prepared for the Istanbul conference as the “Syrian Washington Club.” There is also talk of American funding of this meeting. What are the motives for this? Is it related to a specific political agenda?

HM: The American administration lost its battle with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with Iran over nuclear power. It is now seeking to turn the Syrian revolution into a sort of proxy war against Iranian influence in the region. It is no secret to anyone that America absolutely does not want to support a revolution which seeks secular democratic change in the Arab world. The democratic Syrian revolution is a true revolution, not a proxy war. There was definitely American funding behind the Istanbul group, official and unofficial. There was also funding from the Arab Gulf states. But I believe that money does not make or break a revolution. It affects revolutions negatively by reinforcing opportunism and conspiracy and weakening the role of the genuine fighters in certain phases. Money cannot change the course of history.

OT: Do you think that the Istanbul meeting and the National Council are in breach of the consensus document signed in Doha?

HM: Istanbul was a complete cancellation of what was agreed upon in Doha. In Doha, it was agreed that the Syrian National Alliance was the prime organizer of all efforts to later set up a Syrian political council. The agreement dictated that leadership for the national alliance should include the most significant political forces, on condition that greater weight be given to the opposition inside the country.

But this was circumvented when the Istanbul meetings were revived, after two failed attempts, by attracting some groups who are poorly represented at home, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Damascus Declaration signatories. The Brotherhood’s role in the revolution has been restricted to media work and sending aid, and the Damascus Declaration is no longer the force it once was. Moreover, the most prominent intellectuals behind the Damascus Declaration are now part of the National Coordination Committee and have not joined the Istanbul group.

OT: Are there differences between the Doha agreement and the Istanbul meeting on the issues of arming the revolution and foreign intervention?

HM: I have always sought to develop basic principles on which all the opposition agrees. We began by announcing the Oath of Dignity and Rights on June 17 as a supra-constitutional text that includes the basic principles of the Second Syrian Republic. This is definitely rejected by a large proportion of the Islamists, which is why this essential text was replaced in the National Council by a loose declaration. The National Council’s declaration is not based on a clear political program. All matters were left ambiguous so that each participant could explain them as they wished. One person speaks of military intervention, the other about humanitarian intervention, and another says no to foreign intervention in any form. For us, our program is clear, our loyalties are clear, and our demand for the downfall of the regime is clear. All these matters had been agreed on and there is no ambiguity or disagreement.

OT: How do you view the position of the opposition now? Do you think that differences within it are a type of democracy? Or do they deepen divisions and undermine the unity of the opposition?

HM: The Algerian Revolution was successful despite the fact that there were two separate liberation movements. This means that unity for unity’s sake is not a logical or rational program for change. We cannot accept agreement on any basis, just to preserve unity. The primary objective is a political program and finding common ground to conduct our work. I do not see this as the problem. It is the right of those who joined the National Council to try. Let them see for themselves how far this experiment can go. As for me, I believe it is my duty today to create a strong, civil, national, democratic axis, as it is the only guarantee for the revolution’s success. If the revolution becomes Islamicized, it will fail; if it becomes sectarian, it will fail; and if it becomes militarized, it will fail.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Othman Tazghart
http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/1015

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No Arab Spring, says US intelligence analyst

Posted on October 7, 2011 | Comments Off on No Arab Spring, says US intelligence analyst
Barçın Yinanç
ISTANBUL- Hürriyet Daily News
Friday, October 7, 2011

The Arab Spring did not take place, according to a US-based intelligence analyst, who said there has been no regime change in the Middle East except Libya. ‘Not every bid of unrest is a revolution and every revolution is not democratic,’ says George Friedman, adding that Turkey is the leader in the region and old powers don’t like rising powers, and that though the US currently needs Turkey because it leads the region, in the long run Turkey will become more powerful and relations will sour

The Arab Spring did not happen, according to George Friedman, the head of global intelligence firm STRATFOR Institute, because there has been no regime change in the Middle East. Turkey is the leader of the Islamic world but it is still not a mature power, said the author of “The Next 100 years,” in which he predicted that Turkey will rise to be a great power. “Turkey is still very cautious and it is testing its strength,” he told the Daily News during a recent interview in Istanbul.

Q: You recently said Turkey was a power but not a mature one. How so?

A: A mature power has institutions for managing international systems. The U.S., at the outset of World War II, did not have intelligence service [and] very few trained diplomats. Turkey is more advanced than that, but it does not have a diplomatic corps that is matched to Turkey’s responsibilities in the world. It does not have Portuguese speakers, experts on Mexico; it takes a while to develop this. It takes a while to develop intelligence services. The foreign minister said Turkey has opened 21 embassies in Africa, but who mans them? Who are the Africa experts?

Q: You are warning Turkey that it is not rewarding to be a big power.

A: America is the major power. We are not loved, we are resented. It is the fate of countries that take leading roles. They will disappoint some countries, anger other countries. Turkey is not yet experienced with the sense of injustice of trying to do good but being claimed to have done badly.

Q: Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu would have objected to the comparison with the U.S. and said Turkey was out there with the best of intentions. Why shouldn’t we be liked?

A: You will be liked. But it is easy to be liked when Turkey refrains from acting. But when Turkey has to act it does not act because it decides (when) to be an aggressive power. It will be facing a crisis along its southern border, then the crisis will spill over to Turkey; that is just an example.

Q: In the next 100 years, will the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) “zero problem” policy be sustained?

A: It is a transitionary moment. I have always said that Turkey will be a great power; I did not say Turkey is already a great power. AKP has two policies: One is to be a major power in the Islamic world and simultaneously to avoid engagement. This is precisely the foreign policy it should have now. But 10 to 20 years from now, it will not be able to maintain that. Because as you send out your businessmen, you would have to have political influence to guarantee their security, their interests, etc. Soldiers are one way to interfere in a country; businessman can interfere, too. So the process will draw you into engagement. There will be a moment where Turkey’s interests will seriously diverge from those of another country and that will be the time Turkey will have to decide to act or suffer the harm. It will not happen because Turks decide to be aggressive; it will happen because they will be pursuing their interests. And that will lead to criticism; don’t forget that when you act, you make mistakes.

Q: Everyone is criticizing Turkey now for its problems.

A: Problems are not determined by whether Turkey wants to have them; it has to do with the dynamics of the region. These problems arise not because Turkey is creating them. Turkey has a policy of not creating problems.

Q: Looking at your writings, it seems that you are not changing your projections due to Arab Spring.

A: No, because the Arab spring did not happen. No regime fell except Libya and that’s because of NATO. In Egypt, one general is replaced by four generals. In Syria, Bashar al–Assad is still in power. There is tremendous excitement but there is very little action, very little outcome. Not every bit of unrest is a revolution. Every revolution does not succeed. Every revolution is not democratic, and the democratic ones can elect (rulers like) Ayatollah Khomeini. There is talk about massive democratic uprising; first of all it was not massive in Egypt – most of the country was not affected. Second, those who rose up did not have a common idea of what should come next. Third, they did not overthrow the regime. They got rid of Mubarak and that was what the army wanted, too.

Q: You have previously claimed that Turkey should leave its EU bid and lead the Islamic world. You maintain that autocratic regimes will continue in the region but Turkey has opted for democratic change.

A: Unless Turkey wishes to invade countries and impose regimes on it, it will work with the regimes that are there. Turkey would have to be insane to join the EU. It is the leader of the Islamic world. It has the largest Muslim economy, it has by far the largest military force, and its economy is so dynamic that it is creating a vortex in the region. The best thing that happened to Turkey is the fact it was not admitted to the EU.

Q: How does Turkey’s present situation fall into the realities of the Arab Spring and the call by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for secularism, for instance?

A: It told us more about Erdoğan and the AKP than the effect it made in North Africa. That he choose to make that statement was important. But there is a huge gap between voicing an opinion and taking an action and responsibility. Turkey is in a position of transitioning from the time when it was a weak power, and all it had was its opinion to offer to a time when its opinion matters because it is followed by the expectation to act.

Q: You also argue that old powers don’t like rising powers. Can we assume therefore that the U.S. doesn’t like Turkey?

A: In the long run there will be bad feelings. But in the short run, the U.S. needs Turkey as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. It no longer wants to play a role for the time being. Turkey also wants stability in the region but does not have the power yet to create that stability, it will reach out to the U.S and we will redefine the relations. But down the road as Turkey becomes more powerful, the U.S. will become more frightened and the relationship will change again.

Q: On strained relations between Israel and Turkey, is it a prelude Turkish-U.S. contention?

A: With Turkey taking on its current position, its relationship with Israel has become a liability. The level of visibility cuts against other interests. But lately we’ve seen signs that Turkey is having closer relations with the U.S. Israel is close to the U.S. therefore Turkish-Israeli relations will be more constrained.

Q: You don’t foresee a conflict between Turkey and Israel?

A: I don’t think it is possible. Turkey does not have the military to project force against Israel. It does not want to be in Syria, let alone engage Israel. And Israel does not want to engage Turkey. You are not in a situation of divorce or hostility. You are in a situation which certain relationships continue, but in which public diplomacy shifts to where Turkey can take advantage of other relationships.

Q: Is Turkey punching above its weight?

A: This government is careful not to do that. One of the reasons it doesn’t engage is because it manages its strength. Turkey is testing its strength. You see that in the case of its policy toward Libya and Syria.

Who is George Friedman?

Dr. George Friedman is the founder and chief executive officer of Stratfor, a global intelligence and forecasting company. He is the author of several books, including New York Times bestsellers, such as “The Next Decade” and “The Next 100 Years,” in which he predicts that Turkey will be a great power; as such, he has advised global players to learn Turkish.

A very popular keynote speaker, Friedman is in high demand at conferences and industry-specific events for private organizations and government agencies. He was recently in Istanbul to moderate the energy simulation of Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) that was also attended by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

“We have taught the same courses,” he said about Davutoğlu, adding that the latter was one of the most interesting of the many foreign ministers that he has met.

Friedman lives in Austin, Texas.

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=no-arab-spring-says-us-intelligence-analyst-2011-10-07

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Posted in Egypt, Libya, Middle East Geopolitics, Syria, Turkey

Tunisian Islamist in favor of mild Shariah

Posted on October 7, 2011 | Comments Off on Tunisian Islamist in favor of mild Shariah

Friday, October 7, 2011–
İPEK YEZDANİ – ipek.yezdani@hurriyet.com.tr
ISTANBUL – Hürriyet Daily News–
Shariah is not something that is alien or strange to Tunisia, Ghannouchi says, adding that Islamic law was already enshrined in his nation’s legal code.

Tunisia’s most important Islamist party would prefer to see a mild form of Shariah law implemented in the North African country rather than the “neo-laicism” promoted by Turkey’s prime minister during a recent visit to Tunis, the party’s leader has said.

“What is meant by secularism is different between the Arab world and Turkey. In the Arab world, secularism has been linked in recent decades with dictatorship and with oppression, whereas secularism in Turkey is linked to democracy and freedom of choice,” Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the front-running Ennahda Party, told the Hürriyet Daily News in an interview on Oct. 7.

“Shariah is not something that is alien or strange to our societies,” Ghannouchi said, adding that Tunisian society was familiar with Shariah law and that some aspects of Islamic law were already enshrined in both Tunisian and Egyptian legal codes. “We don’t see Shariah as intervening in people’s private lives and to their freedom to wear what they want. Personal freedom is very important for us.”

Ghannouchi said there were different types of secularism even in Turkey. “The secularism promoted by Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan, which is close to Anglo-Saxon secularism, respects people’s freedom of choice and is neutral in regards to religion. The other secularism, which is Marxist secularism or French ‘laicite,’ is forced upon people and is anti-religion,” he added.

“There is the Turkish model of bringing together modernity and Islam, and we can have a Tunisian model that may be different in bringing together modernity and Islam. All share the same principles but there might be some differences between them,” Ghannouchi said, adding that they nonetheless believed the Turkish democratic model was very close to the model that they would like to have in Tunisia.

Erdoğan had issued calls for the North African Arab Spring countries of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to adopt “neo-laicism” during his trip to the countries last month. But while Ghannouchi differentiated between Anglo-Saxon and French secularisms, the Turkish prime minister slammed Western secularism.

“[Ours] is not secularism in the Anglo-Saxon or Western sense; a person is not secular, the state is secular,” Erdoğan said, describing Turkey as democratic and secular. “A Muslim can govern a secular state in a successful way. In Turkey, 99 percent of the population is Muslim, and it did not pose any problem. You can do the same here.”

Gender equality in elections

Ultimately, Ghannouchi said his dream was to see Tunisia “free, democratic, developed and at peace with its own identity and at peace with modernity.”

Enhanda is “a moderate party,” he said. “Our party seeks to combine democracy, which is a Western product, with Islam, which is our own heritage.”

The Ennahda leader also said his party supported the principle of establishing a quota for women for parliamentary elections to take place in two weeks’ time.

“According to the new law, 50 percent of the election lists have to have women candidates. Many of our lists are headed by women, [some of whom] don’t wear a hijab. We have challenged many of the parties who claim to be liberal and who claim to respect women,” Ghannouchi said, adding that his party challenged these liberal competitors to name head-scarved women on their lists.

The most important issue is to emphasize the importance of equality between all people and the principle of equal citizenship between men and women, he said. “All people should be treated equally regardless of their faith and regardless of their gender, whether they are male or female.”

Ghannouchi said that although he was the leader of the party, he would not be a candidate in the next elections. “I want to give an opportunity to young people, because this revolution was made by young people.”

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=tunisian-islamist-in-favor-of-mild-shariah-2011-10-07

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Posted in Middle East Geopolitics, Religion, Tunisia, Turkey-Israel