Category Archives: Middle East Geopolitics

Iran to Annan: We’re With You, but Assad Stays

Posted on April 17, 2012 | Comments Off on Iran to Annan: We’re With You, but Assad Stays

By: Elie Chalhoub – Published Tuesday, April 17, 2012-

The Iranians warned the UN-Arab League envoy that Syria’s Arab and Western adversaries were out to foil him and that the consequences of failure would be devastating for Syria and the region.

Iran views Kofi Annan’s plan for Syria as a last chance to resolve the crisis there peacefully and is backing it to the hilt – as long as it provides President Bashar Assad with enough of a chance to enact the political reforms he has promised.

This, according to well-placed Iranian sources, was the message conveyed by Iranian officials to the joint UN-Arab League envoy when he visited Iran last week.

The sources explain that Iran was a “partner” in the formulation of Annan’s plan, and discussed it extensively with both him and the Syrians before Damascus formally signed up to it.

Accordingly, Tehran is committed to the plan’s success, “though we know for certain that there are regional and international parties, which we do not want to name although they are known to all, who want to abort it,” the sources say.

Iran sees the Annan plan as a success both for Iranian diplomacy and “Syrian steadfastness,” in that it seeks to “transfer the crisis from the ground to the negotiating table, and from military resolution to a political solution.” Tehran endorsed it willingly, “whereas others accepted it because they were forced to, and agreed to it reluctantly, because they found themselves bankrupt on the ground and had no more cards to play,” they remark.But Iran’s support for the plan is not unconditional. When Annan was in Tehran, Iranian officials presented him with what the sources describe as a “road map” which they urged him to follow. They stressed to him that this was the “only way” he could produce a successful initiative. Moreover, they offered to assist him in any way he requested provided that he can abide by those terms. They also warned him, according to the sources, that Syria’s adversaries “want you to fail, and are trying hard to turn you into a second Dabi” – a reference to the former head of the short-lived Arab League observer mission to Syria, the Sudanese general Mustafa al-Dabi.

The Iranian “road map” consists of six main points that were impressed on Annan.

1. Assad is a “red line” as far as Iran is concerned, and “the Islamic Republic of Iran will not permit anyone to overthrow the legitimate president of the Syrian Arab Republic.”

2. Any political change in Syria must be initiated, addressed, and carried out within the framework of the reform process begun by Assad, and which it would only be possible to continue under his auspices.

3. Any proposed solution that does not take the above into account, or pursues a “reckless, irrational, and unprincipled” approach to the Syrian crisis, will have destructive implications and consequences through the region.4. Nobody is entitled to disregard the legitimate rights of the Syrian people, but these can only be achieved by giving Assad a sufficient chance to implement the reforms he has promised.

5. There must be an immediate end to interference in the domestic affairs of Syria – including incitement to violence, funding, and fueling of armed conflict, and demanding Assad’s overthrow or resignation – by regional states that have made no secret of their meddling.

6. The only solution to the Syrian question lies in all parties adhering to democratic principles.

In Iran, Annan was received in turn by Deputy Foreign Minister Amir Abdallahian, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, National Security Council chief Saeed Jalili, and finally President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The sources say all of the former UN secretary-general’s interlocutors “made sure to confirm from him that he understood the six points well.” Annan also asked for a meeting with Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, but was told, in effect, that the talks he had held would be sufficient if he were serious about achieving a successful outcome.

Ahmadinejad’s meeting with Annan was held at the airport of the Gulf island of Qeshm, off the port of Bandar Abbas, where the president was visiting at the time. Observers believe this was deliberate, arguing that the Iranian president could have returned to the capital, or Annan’s stay could have been extended by one day. The venue, close to the Strait of Hormuz, may have been chosen to signal to Annan the high regional stakes involved in the Syrian crisis, and that he must not seek to achieve through diplomacy what Syria’s adversaries have failed to by means of their interventions on the ground.

Annan was reportedly pleased with the way his talks with Iranian officials went. He also shared their view of Syria’s geopolitical importance. He even went to the extent of declaring publicly, at the joint press conference he held with Salehi in Tehran, that demands for Assad’s overthrow or resignation are a breach of UN rules, and run counter to the purpose of his mission.

“Tehran considers this to be a final opportunity for all who may want to absolve themselves of responsibility for intensified blood-letting, strife and internal fighting in Syria,” the Iranian sources warn. Having reached this point after many hardships and sacrifices, it provides a chance for a new-look Syria to emerge that “meets the aspirations of the Syrian people and at the same time preserves the state and its resistance and steadfastness.”

To the Iranians’ mind, Syria’s adversaries “from Qatar to Saudi Arabia and France, to the US and Israel, and others, want to plunge this region into the unknown. They want to build their plans on this unknown. But their plans do not meet the aspirations of the Syrian people. On the contrary, they promise them destruction, steal the initiative from them, place them outside the game, and trade in them for other reasons.”However, the same sources say, these players have now fallen “hostage” to the Annan plan, which has become the only one on the table. “If Annan’s mission succeeds, they will have failed. And if he fails, they will also have failed, because they will have been exposed. Annan’s failure can only result from him being debilitated or by the presence of parties that wish him ill,” the sources explain. While the failure of the Arab League initiative on Syria was a failure for its Saudi and Qatari authors, Annan’s plan is the international community’s plan. It remains to be seen, the sources add, whether the world would allow the foiling of his bid to resolve the Syrian crisis and be willing to put up with the consequences.

As for Turkey, the Iranians deny that their diplomatic efforts to lure it out of the anti-Assad camp have failed, as evidenced by renewed talk by Turkish officials of the possibility of establishing an exclusion zone along the border.

“We were not naive enough to hope that Turkey would revert to its honeymoon with Syrians,” the Iranian sources say. “We never expected Turkey to return to its senses fully. We are well aware that it is an inseparable part of NATO, and that it has made a strategic decision and is pursuing it in a manner we disagree with.”

What Iran sought was to prevent Turkey from embarking on an interventionist “adventure” in Syria, the sources explain. “We used advice, persuasion, inducements, threats, warnings, and every possible means to achieve this aim,” the sources say. “It worked, at least so far. We put a halt to its direct interventions in the game. We hope things will continue that way.”

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

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Posted in Iran, Middle East Geopolitics, Russia, Syria, Turkey, United Nations

Turkey cool to UN efforts on Syria

Posted on March 26, 2012 | Comments Off on Turkey cool to UN efforts on Syria

SEMİH İDİZ-

The evolving situation in Syria continues to pose unexpected problems for Turkey. As pointed out in this column before, Ankara never expected Bashar al-Assad to last this long. Without al-Assad absenting himself, in line with Turkish expectations, it appears Ankara may have not only to live with him, but to find ways to cope with him in the future if developments continue as they are.

That will clearly be a hard one to swallow since Turkey more or less severed all political ties with al-Assad on Monday by recalling its ambassador in Damascus and closing its embassy. All lines of overt diplomatic communication between the two countries have thus been severed for an indefinite period.

But while this was happening, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was continuing with his efforts to bring al-Assad and opposition representatives together, in order to try and end the bloodshed in Syria and find a political settlement to the problem.

The statement adopted last week at the UN Security Council, which was also accepted by Russia and China this time, has also bolstered Annan’s mission by supporting it openly and calling for this track to continue. This, however, is not to Ankara’s liking at all.

That was made amply clear by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan on Saturday in Almati, where his plane did a stopover to refuel before flying off to Seoul for the Nuclear Security Summit. Talking to reporters in the Kazakh city, Erdoğan said they “did not approve of the Security Council statement,” adding, “There is no justice in getting the opposition to sit down with the regime.”

Pointing at the number of civilians killed by the regime, he also expressed displeasure over Kofi Annan’s efforts by pointing out that the former secretary-general has had talks in Damascus without going to the parts of Syria that are suffering under al-Assad’s forces to see for himself what is going on.

Erdoğan also accused Russia, China and Iran indirectly when he said al-Assad was managing to stay in place because of the support he was receiving from these countries. Given that he will be travelling on to Tehran from Seoul later this week, it will be interesting to note the nature of the conversation he will have with Iranian officials, who in turn are not exactly enamored of Turkey’s stand on Syria.

It is clear from Erdoğan’s remarks that Ankara is angry because the Security Council, with pressure from Russia and China, has effectively upgraded al-Assad’s status by accepting him as a potential interlocutor. This is not what Ankara wants. What it wants is al-Assad to go and the regime there to change.

In other words Turkey is in the somewhat contradictory situation of having opposed other countries’ efforts to bring about regime changes in the region in the past, but has now landed itself in the position of wanting regime change in Syria.

Spokesmen for the Syrian opposition continue to insist they will never sit down to talks with al-Assad. But it is not as if the Syrian opposition is an organized and coherent force. If one is to go by press reports there are even serious divisions among Syrians in the refugee camps in Turkey.

This suggests that with Russia pushing from one side and the West from the other, elements of the opposition, if not every one, may in time come around to accepting the notion of negotiating with al-Assad. At any rate what is clear is that developments are not to al-Assad’s disadvantage.

With Russian backing he feels much more secure now. He also is availing of the divisions within the opposition. In addition to this he can use the bombs that have started going off in Damascus to argue that the opposition is nothing but a gang of terrorists. This is no doubt why the opposition is trying to distance itself from those bomb attacks.

All of this is very much out of keeping with how Turkeywants things to go in Syria.

March/27/2012

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-cool-to-un-efforts-on-syria-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=16933&NewsCatID=416

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Posted in Syria, Turkey-Syria, United Nations

Interview: Russian envoy to Lebanon on the Syrian crisis

Posted on March 26, 2012 | Comments Off on Interview: Russian envoy to Lebanon on the Syrian crisis

Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: Alexander Zasypkin–
Sunday 25 March 2012–
By Tha’ir Abbas-

Beirut, Asharq Al-Awsat- Asharq al-Awsat recently met with the Russian Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, to discuss his country’s position with regards to the ongoing Syrian crisis. During the interview, Zasypkin outlined the principles of Russia’s stance focusing on a political solution in Syria, and what steps are now required in order to implement this. He also dismissed reports of Russian involvement on the ground in support of the al-Assad regime, stressing that his country wholly rejects foreign military interference.
The following is the text of the interview:
[Asharq Al-Awsat] What is Russia’s genuine position towards the current events in Syria?
[Zasypkin] The constants of the Russian stance toward the internal conflict are known, and they have not changed throughout the past incidents. These constants focus on the need for all parties to cease violence, organizing comprehensive national dialogue between the authority and the opposition, and reaching an agreement on all the reforming steps in Syria to attain a democratic regime in this country. We seek to achieve these objectives and need the assistance of the international community to start the political process in Syria.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Can we speak about an “internal crisis” when the opposition is complaining of “violence from one side”, carried out by the authorities through a strong and disciplined army? Is it possible to talk about two kinds of violence?
[Zasypkin] Of course there is the regular Syrian Army, which has the military superiority over the armed groups. At the same time, when we speak about halting violence, this relates to all parties because should the authorities alone stop the violence, then this would lead to armed groups seizing their positions, and this would not calm down the situation.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How can a peace process be reached in Syria in light of the opposition’s strong rejection of dialogue with a regime it considers to be criminal, and due to the brutality of this regime?
[Zasypkin] The opposition should agree to hold dialogue with the regime without preconditions. As for the role of the international community, we view the presidential statement issued by the Security Council yesterday as support for the UN envoy Kofi Annan’s mission, which aims to cease violence and start the political process in Syria. We hope that all the foreign parties will make efforts to influence the parties to the conflict in Syria to sit at the negotiations table.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you mean that foreign parties are having a negative influence on the Syrian issue?
[Zasypkin] Throughout this period, we have been trying to change the situation from a confrontation to a political process. We wanted to benefit from the Arab League’s initiative and the observer mission, but the task of the mission was curtailed soon after it began its work. We consider this as having an adverse impact on the political settlement. The second thing is that we believe that the sanctions are not beneficial because they do not influence the policy of the regime, but they increase the burden on the people. And now when we seek anew to activate a political settlement through Annan’s mission, we hear talk about new sanctions and calls for international and Arab interference and measures such as the recalling of ambassadors. All these things are not beneficial. Anyway, since yesterday, we have taken a concerted stance at the Security Council and we want to rely on it to unify the efforts of the international community.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Russia has directed criticism towards the Syrian authorities. Why was that?
[Zasypkin] Since the beginning, we have been adhering to a balanced and open stance. When the popular protests and peaceful demonstrations took place, we pointed out that the regime’s reactions to these demonstrations were unacceptable. At the same time, we also highlighted the provocative actions of the armed elements, within the context of demonstrators, since April last year.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you think that the policy the authorities are following in terms of confronting the demonstrations and the protests is appropriate?
[Zasypkin] We see mistakes, and at the same time we see the measures that have been taken over the past months, such as the issuance of laws and the holding of municipal elections and the referendum on the constitution, and now there are elections scheduled for the People’s Council, and we consider all these to be positive steps.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you think that the Syrian Government is moving on a positive track then?
[Zasypkin] Once again, I repeat that the reactions represented in the response to the demonstrations and the delayed reforms are unacceptable. At the same time, the reforms that have been implemented are positive steps.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There is talk that Russia is risking its Arab relations as a result of its stance on the Syrian issue?
[Zasypkin] We are very concerned with preserving our traditionally good relations with all the Arab countries. At the same time, in light of the developments taking place at present, we adhere in the first place to the UN Charter and international legitimacy to a great extent, and we consider principles such as the sovereignty of the state and respecting the rights of people to self-determination to be more important than the temporary considerations in the relations with any state in the region. We think that this approach is better than playing for self-interests. The values related to the nature of international relations are more important than passing economic or military interests.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The Russian Foreign Minister yesterday spoke about concerns of “Sunni rule” in Syria. What did he mean by this?
[Zasypkin] We want to keep away from sectarian conflicts, and during the developments taking place in the region, we seek to preserve the fraternal coexistence among all ethnicities and sects in the Middle East. We in Russia give a great attention to this issue because Russia is a country that has multi ethnicities and sects, and we hope that no problems emerge among the sects in Syria or in other countries.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The same as the Christians are the majority in Russia, the Sunnis are the majority in Syria. Is their rule of the country not something normal in any democratic process?
[Zasypkin]We are putting forward a set of principles, including one that says that democracy means respecting the rights of all the sects in this society, and this is the most important thing.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] To what extent Russia is involved in the Syrian issue? We hear talk about shipments of Russian weapons to the regime and military warships paying visits to Syria. To what degree are you ready to defend your stance on the ground?
[Zasypkin] All that has been said about Russian ships calling at Syrian ports to support the regime is untrue. The first ship visited Syria to receive supplies of food and fuel, and the other ship that has recently paid a visit did so for the same purpose. It is participating in an operation against the pirates in the Gulf of Aden along with NATO and European Union. As for Russian weapons, they have been possessed by the Syrian Armed Forces for decades. And as for defending our stance, we rely on political action and no other means.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The Syrian opposition talks about direct Russian support for the regime in terms of training, drones, and other services?
[Zasypkin] All this is talk within the framework of a media war that is taking place at present. We deny such talk on a daily basis and consider it untrue, like the talk about Russian warships.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How do you assess the Lebanese stance toward the Syrian crisis?
[Zasypkin] We are aware of the peculiarity of the Lebanese situation concerning what is going on in Syria. We share the Lebanese officials’ opinion that the Lebanese should as much as possible avoid the negative impacts of the Syrian conflict. We positively appreciate the measures that the Lebanese Government and the commanders of the Lebanese Army are adopting to safeguard Lebanon’s sovereignty and unity. We also believe that the political forces in Lebanon are adhering to the security and stability in the country, and this is positive.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you have information about the smuggling of weapons and fighters from Lebanon to Syria?
[Zasypkin] We have information from various sources that weapons are coming into Syria from the neighboring countries regardless of the stances that the authorities in these countries are adopting and without a decision by them. We know that among the measures adopted by the Lebanese leadership are moves to tighten the monitoring of weapons smuggling, and we are confident that this policy will continue.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] It has been said that Russia has learned from two previous lessons, in Iraq and Libya, and it does not want to lose Syria. Do you seek a price in return for abandoning al-Assad?
[Zasypkin] The main lesson from what happened in Iraq and Libya is that the world should have to witness the tragic results of the occupation of these two countries. Therefore, we do not accept the repetition of the NATO operations or any foreign military interference in Syria, and this is a principled position for Russia. As for the talk about the stance toward the Syrian regime, it has been and continues to be the same. The priority for us in Syria is to cease the fighting and ensure the democratic option for the Syrian people, including selecting a leadership through fair and transparent elections. We do not decide the stance toward the Syrian president and leadership because this is an internal Syrian affair, and it is not the right for any foreign party to try and impose its will on the Syrians.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Who can ensure the integrity of the elections?
[Zasypkin] We are now seeking to arrange dialogue on the steps for reform, including the presidential elections, and this is one clause that the Syrian authorities can agree on with the opposition, so that the dialogue can then focus on the principles and the details. In light of the attention focused on Syria by the international community, it is possible to secure good international monitoring, and there would be no doubts about the results of these elections. I am explaining this subject on an assumption basis because we are now at the beginning of the political settlement. As for these steps, they are going to be followed by other steps later on.

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=28994

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Posted in Iran-Syria, Middle East Geopolitics, Russia, Syria, Syrian Opposition, Turkey-Syria, United Nations

New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit

Posted on March 22, 2012 | Comments Off on New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit

By: Sharmine Narwani [1] –

Published Wednesday, March 21, 2012 –

In recent weeks, there has been a notable shuffle in the positions of key external players in the Syrian crisis. Momentum has quite suddenly shifted from an all-out onslaught against the Assad government to a quiet investigation of exit strategies.

The clashes between government forces and opposition militias in Baba Amr were a clear tipping point for these players – much hinged on the outcome of that battle. Today, the retreat of armed groups from the Homs neighborhood means one thing: the strategy of militarizing the conflict from within is no longer a plausible option on which to hang this geopolitical battle. Especially not in an American or French election year, when anything less than regime change in Syria will look like abject failure.

And so the external players are shifting gears – the more outspoken ones, quietly seeking alternative options. There are two de facto groups that have formed. Group A is looking for a face-saving exit from the promised escalation in Syria. It consists of the United States, European Union and Turkey. Group B, on the other hand, is heavily invested in regime-change at any cost, and includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and some elements of the French, US, British, and Libyan establishments.

Before Baba Amr, these two groups were unified in maximizing their every resource to force regime change in Syria. When the UN Security Council option was blocked by Russia and China, they coalesced around the General Assembly and ad-hoc “Friends of Syria” to build coalitions, tried unsuccessfully to bring a disparate opposition fighting force (Free Syrian Army) under central leadership, pushed to recognize the disunited Syrian National Council (SNC), and eked out weekly “events” like embassy closures and political condemnations to maintain a “perception momentum.”

But those efforts have largely come to a standstill after Baba Amr. A reliable source close to the Syrian regime said to me recently: “The regime eliminated the biggest and most difficult obstacle – Baba Amr. Elsewhere, it [eliminating armed militias] is easier and less costly at all levels. Now both political and military steps can continue.”

Dealmaking Begins in Earnest

The first clear-cut public sign of this new phase was the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN envoy to Syria. Annan is an American “concession” that will draw out this dealmaking phase between the Syrian government, opposition figures and foreign governments potentially until the May 2012 parliamentary elections.

This phase is what the Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and other BRIC countries have sought from the start: the creation of a protective bubble around Syria so that it has the time and space necessary to implement domestic reforms that will not harm its geopolitical priorities.

The European Union (EU) kicked things off in March in a joint foreign ministerial communique rejecting military intervention in Syria. This was swiftly followed by Kofi Annan’s strong warning against external efforts to arm the Syrian opposition, with various Americans making similar soundings in his wake.

One very prominent Syrian reformist who has remained engaged with both sides of this conflict, confided that the externally-based Syrian opposition are now “looking over each other’s shoulders – none yet dares to speak out.” The fact is, says the source, “they are getting military assistance, but nowhere near enough. They need much, much more that what they are getting, and now the countries backing this opposition are developing conflicting agendas.”

Three high-level defections from the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) were announced within days of that conversation, hinting further at the fundamental policy shifts occurring in all circles, behind the scenes.

The game has changed along Syria’s borders too. Turkey, a ferocious critic of the Assad government this past year, is reconsidering its priorities. A participant in a recent closed meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reveals the emptiness of Turkish threats to form a “humanitarian corridor” or security zone on their Syrian border. Davutoglu, says my source, insisted in private that “Turkey will not do anything to harm Syria’s territorial integrity and unity because that will transfer the conflict into Turkish territory.”

Recent deliberations with Iran also seem to have resonated with the Turks. During Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s January visit to Ankara, a source tells me that an understanding was reached. The Iranian FM is said to have warned Turkish leaders that they were leveraging a lot of goodwill – painstakingly built up in the Muslim/Arab world – in return for “no clear benefit” in Syria. According to my source, the Turks were encouraged to strike a bargain to regain their regional standing – the key concession being that Assad would stay through the reform period.

A Hard Dose of Realpolitik

Although Turkey has backtracked from its belligerent public posture, there are still elements in the country that remain rigid on Syria. The same is true for the US and France. The fact that 2012 is an important election year in both countries plays a part in the strategy shuffle, but there are other pressing concerns too.

One major worry is that there aren’t a lot of arrows left in the quiver to fire at Syria. Without the UN Security Council granting legal authority to launch an offensive against Syria, there are only piecemeal efforts – and these have all been tried, if not yet exhausted: sanctions, demonstrations, arming militias, cyberwarfare, propaganda, diplomatic arm-twisting, and bribing defectors. But a whole year has passed with no major cracks in support from the regime’s key constituencies and that has caused some debate about whether this kind of tactical pressure may ultimately backfire.

In Washington in particular, alarm bells have been ringing since militant Islamists infiltrated the Syrian opposition militias, some pouring in from Iraq where they were only recently targeting American interests. The US has spent the better part of a decade focusing its national security apparatus on the threat from Al Qaeda and militant Islam. The execution of Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda-related figures was meant to put a seal on this problem – at least in the sense that the organization has shriveled in size and influence.

But Syria threatens to blast open a Pandora’s Box of newly-motivated “soldiers of God.” And while sectarian anger may be the fuse, the conflagration will take place on a major geopolitical fault line in the Mideast, at a delicate time, on one of Israel’s borders – and changing winds could fan those flames right back in the direction of the United States and its allies.

That is a red line for the US military and a sizeable chunk of the Washington political establishment. There are other Americans, however, who are unable to view the Syrian crisis outside the prism of Iran and its growing regional influence. US Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, who has spent years now orchestrating the defeat of the Iran-led “Resistance Axis,” is one such player in the capital.

Feltman is part of Group B, alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The battle in Syria has become an existential one for Group B. They have played too hard and revealed too much, to be able to re-assert themselves into any impartial regional role in the future – unless there is a changing of the guard in Syria.

As Group A moves toward a face-saving exit from the crisis, we are going to witness a re-telling of events in Syria. The Western “mainstream media” and major international NGOs, which have served as little more than propaganda tools for various governments seeking to escalate the Syrian crisis and vilify the Assad government, are suddenly “discovering” dangerous elements in the Syrian opposition. This scene-setting is just as deliberate as the false narratives we have witnessed from Group A since the start of the crisis.

Group B, on the other hand, remains unable to take its eye off the Syrian brass ring and may continue to employ increasingly brazen and foolhardy tactics to stimulate chaos inside the country. Syria may be Group B’s graveyard unless they are brought into these deals and promised some protection. I suspect, however, that they will instead be utilized as a valuable negotiating tool for Group A – brought into play if dealmaking is not working to their advantage.

While negotiations plod on over Syria, we can be assured that most external players have little or no consideration for actual Syrians. The regime will be focused on the long haul, which includes ridding the country of armed groups, ensuring that major roadways are free of IEDs and snipers, implementing a watered-down reform program with token opposition members to give lip service to progress, and becoming even more entrenched in the face of regional and foreign threats.

Meanwhile, the West and its regional allies will happily draw out a low-boil War of Attrition in Syria to keep the Syrian regime busy, weakened and defensive, while further seeking to cement their hold on the direction of the “Arab Spring.” They will pull levers to create flare-ups when distractions or punishments are warranted, with nary a care to the lives and livelihoods of the most disenfranchised Syrians whose blood is this conflict’s main currency.

It will never be certain if there was a revolution in Syria in 2011. The country became a geopolitical battleground less than a month after the first small protests broke out in various pockets inside Syria. And it is not over by a long stretch. Syria will continue to be the scene of conflict between two regional blocs until one side wins. This may be a new phase in Syria today where players are converging to “cut some losses,” but be assured that they are merely replenishing and repositioning their reserves for a broader regional fight.

Sharmine Narwani is a commentary writer and political analyst covering the Middle East. You can follow Sharmine on twitter @snarwani [2].

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar’s editorial policy.

Sharmine Narwani
http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/5483

 

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Posted in EU-Syria, Iran, Middle East Geopolitics, Russia, Syria, Syrian Opposition, Turkey-Syria, United Nations, US-Syria

Assad’s Frustrated Foreign Enemies

Posted on March 16, 2012 | Comments Off on Assad’s Frustrated Foreign Enemies
Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)

By: Ibrahim al-Amin [1]

Published Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Various parties have been assessing the outlook for the crisis in Syria based on the evidence on the ground. The domestic scene is set to remain polarized for a long time. National understandings that can restore the country’s political unity and a cohesive national identity cannot be expected any time soon. The external scene has meanwhile become more complicated in light of the intensifying battle between the two camps over who will take hold of Syria, or who will wield the most influence in it.

On the domestic front, sources recently in Damascus say the political split is as sharp as ever. The pro-regime camp is holding together and its members have become more politically hard-line in their intolerance of all moves made by any opposition group. They deem the battle to be one against groups that have been armed – not just militarily but also in the political, propaganda, and economic senses – to target Syria, and not just its regime. They see President Bashar Assad as a symbol, and they want him to make no concessions at present. This loyalty has been accompanied by mobilization which has a minority, sectarian, and confessional dimension, though this is not fully reflected in the big cities.

On the other side, opposition groups loudly trumpet their rejection of any kind of dialogue with the regime. Indeed, they have moved on to refusing to deal with the regime’s institutions, conflating the state with the regime. They have thus started justifying attacks by gunmen on policemen and police stations or public institutions, or the bombing of vital infrastructure, as well as seeking to maximize pressure on the Syrian pound. They have also become increasingly virulent in their verbal attacks on people in the regime, and also on sects and denominations, betraying their need to keep tensions high.

A third group, which grows in size by the day, fears for Syria. This includes people who refuse to be asked where they stand. They are no longer prepared to get into a debate about who is right and who is wrong. Their concern is for the country’s unity and stability, and that priority overrides all others – even while they concur that this view ultimately works to the advantage of the regime at present.

Moreover, many Syrians who used to support the uprising for change have stepped back because of their abhorrence of the behavior of opposition groups – whether the armed groups inside Syria, or the offshore opposition groups that are trying to summon foreign military intervention in the country, without concern for the potentially catastrophic consequences of such a step.

Abroad, meanwhile, one year after the start of the crisis, plans are being reviewed. Miscalculations have been made, especially by those of the regime’s enemies who – with extreme optimism born of chronically deficient political judgement – expected that it would fall in a few weeks or months. Their disappointment and dismay shows, both on their faces and in statements. It is also apparent from the behavior of their diplomats, political allies, media, and security agencies.

This dismay is not only due to the inability of the internal opposition to bring about change within Syria. It is also because of their own failure to devise practical plans capable of achieving their goal of toppling the regime. They can now see in practice that the militarization of the civic protests in Syria created a major public credibility crisis for the opposition, and that going further as in Libya, or even Yemen, would only make people wearier.

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and its leaders have shown no sign of collapse. Despite several months of applying security, media, economic, diplomatic, and political pressure, it is clear to the regime’s enemies that it remains cohesive, as do its military and security forces. Nor have state institutions, for all their weakness, witnessed the kind of collapse that would obviate the regime’s need for them. Moreover, the regime’s enemies can see it has managed to restore control on the ground in many parts of the country, and has dealt powerful blows to its opponents – especially the armed groups which believed in the military overthrow of the regime.

Alongside these developments, the position of Russia and China, along with other regional and world powers, provided the regime with strong support against the foreign adversaries seeking to intervene to overthrow it. This is evident from the discussions currently taking place, and even the resort to the game of envoys and go-betweens, which nobody believes will arrive at any result in the foreseeable future.

All of this further narrows the options available to the Syrian regime’s enemies. But that won’t necessarily make them give up or back down. Rather, their increasingly hostile behavior suggests they are considering other means of achieving their objective.

Among the options said to be under discussion by these countries – and which other capitals have warned against – is action to persuade senior officers to mount a coup against the regime, or to make them feel personally under threat. It also seems that the insane among the Syrian regime’s enemies have started contemplating insane actions, namely, getting rid of Assad personally.

Do they think assassinating Assad will give them a chance to take hold of Syria?

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Ibrahim al-Amin
Source URL:http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/assad%E2%80%99s-frustrated-foreign-enemies

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Posted in EU-Syria, Iran, Middle East Geopolitics, Russia, Syria, Syrian Opposition, Turkey, United Nations, US Middle East Politics, US-Syria

Syria: Regime Reclaiming the Initiative

Posted on March 16, 2012 | Comments Off on Syria: Regime Reclaiming the Initiative

By: Elie Chalhoub -Published Thursday, March 15, 2012-

Insiders say the Syrian regime is confident it is getting a grip on the crisis, but expects no early end to unrest.

It took us more than one hour to pass through the Masnaa border crossing from Lebanon into Syria because of heavy traffic. “Spring” is returning to Syria, as a senior official puts it, while noting that he uses the term literally. “People are tired. There is a great yearning for normal life,” he adds.

Last Saturday, residents of Damascus were out and about in green spaces and on sidewalks.

Sources close to the regime insist that the situation “is better than before.” They add: “This is Damascus and this is Syria. We are not saying that things couldn’t be better. But it is not on the verge of collapse as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya claim. The situation is improving by the day. Even Saudi media admitted defeat: ‘Assad Wins the First Round!’” – a reference to the the title of a recent column in the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat by its former editor Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed.

Diplomatically, Syria remains on the defensive, trying to fend off incessant attacks. The regime had tried to prevent the crisis from being internationalized and to keep it within an Arab framework, but to no avail. Its intention was clear from the way it dealt with various Arab initiatives, last of which was the Observer Mission led by Lieutenant General Mustafa al-Dabi. The Syrian authorities afforded him maximum cooperation, but his report ended up being ignored by the Arab states.

When they brought the Syrian crisis file to the UN Security Council, the Syrian regime decided to confront them in the same arena. Damascus seems comfortable with the framework of the international game and the limits drawn by Russia and China through their decisive vetoes: “no” to any military intervention in Syria, including under the guise of “humanitarian corridors.”

The conversation is a little different behind closed doors. Sources say that the proposal which Annan presented when he met President Bashar Assad was essentially the same as the Arab proposal which Syria rejected – minus the clause requiring Assad to step down. It speaks of a cease-fire, the release of detainees, dialogue under UN auspices in Geneva, and allowing international organizations to transfer relief supplies to Syria and investigate claims of war crimes.

According to the same account, Assad replied to the latter point: “Some disobeyed orders and some made mistakes. We arrested those about whom we received complaints, we carried out investigations and there will be trials. But I ask you Mr. Annan, are you willing to do the same with the other side?”

Assad also said he welcomed all mediation attempts and was willing to engage the opposition in dialogue and reach agreement with it. But he questioned how any agreement could be implemented in the presence of armed groups, asking Annan: “Could you guarantee that these groups would commit to what we agree on?”

Assad also urged Annan to investigate who was funding and arming these groups, remarking that someone must be behind the money and weapons flooding into the country.

According to the same account, Syria is taking its time in responding to Annan’s proposals as it wants to coordinate the details with Russia and is mistrustful of the UN and Annan.

Its suspicions were reinforced by reports that after leaving Damascus, Annan flew to Qatar to meet its Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasem Al Khalifa. Perhaps he considers Qatar part of the war on Syria and went there to engage it in dialogue.

Rewarding Aleppo

Discussions with Syrian officials indicate that after the parliamentary elections scheduled for next May 7, a new “crisis-management” government is expected to be formed. It is likely to be headed by a figure from Aleppo in acknowledgement of the loyalty shown by the city to the regime. Damascenes are also likely to feature prominently in the government, reflecting the regime’s gratitude for their role in protecting it, especially the business and merchant class.

Sources close to Assad revealed that he turned down a suggestion made by his advisers to form a new political party. He told them: “I am a Baathist and I will remain one.”

On the Offensive

While the defensive diplomatic battle continues, the military and security battle on the ground has seen the regime increasingly take the offensive.

Sources close to the regime confirm that the Syrian army has re-established control over the city of Idlib in the north, and is poised to attack Jabal al-Zawiya. Estimates indicate that the operation there might last many months. However the regime has set itself a target of trying to “win militarily in the main cities and towns before the end of this month,” as well as securing the country’s main highways between population centers, in light of assessments that reasserting full security control “is going to take a long time.”

One hears debates in Damascus about how the issue of armed groups should be dealt with. Some still contend that Assad has been too lenient, and demand that he crack down harder. They argue that if that had happened at Daraa when the unrest began there, the turmoil would not have spread to other provinces.

An informed source says Assad opted for a different approach: “The president was right. The military solution required the correct political circumstances in addition to preparing the Syrian army for this kind of fighting and training it in urban and street warfare.”

According to this source, these tactics were employed in the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr, and “accomplished the mission with the least possible losses. The principle was adopted of controlling the neighborhood one house at a time. The army did not behave like a regular army that enters and establishes centers that turn into targets for gunmen. It used the style of commandos.”

The source indicates that Assad was convinced from the outset that the crisis would have to be dealt with “like a skin rash. In other words it cannot be remedied before it completely plays out. All one can do is reduce it and contain it to prevent it from spreading.”

Sources close to the regime say an effort is underway to restructure the 17 security agencies and place them – depending on the specialization of each – under the control of either the interior ministry, the army command, or the presidency. Combined, they will make up a new National Security Council. Assad wants this council to be truly accountable to the new parliament’s security and intelligence committees, which are to play a full role comparable to that of their counterparts in Western countries.

The sources say Assad is also keen to keep the security forces and the military out of civilian affairs and the media. All military and security personnel have been directed to stop dealing with the media and leave such matters to the relevant civilian officials.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

 

 

 

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Posted in EU-Syria, Syria, Syrian Opposition, United Nations

Is the Arab Spring Bad for Women?

Posted on March 15, 2012 | Comments Off on Is the Arab Spring Bad for Women?

Overthrowing male dominance could be harder than overthrowing a dictator.

BY ISOBEL COLEMAN | DECEMBER 20, 2011

In many ways, 2011 has been the Year of the Arab Woman. From the earliest days of upheaval that started in Tunisia last December, women have been on the front lines of protest, leading public demonstrations, blogging passionately, covering the unrest as journalists, launching social media campaigns, smuggling munitions, and caring for the wounded. This month, when Tawakkol Karman became the first Arab woman to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, she gave an enthusiastic shout-out to her many Arab sisters who have struggled “to win their rights in a society dominated by the supremacy of men.”

Across the region, though, Arab women are grumbling that overthrowing dictators is proving easier than overturning the pervasive supremacy of men. Gamila Ismail, a prominent Egyptian activist and politician, summed it up when she quit Egypt’s parliamentary race in disgust after learning that she would be put third on the list in her district — not a winning position. “We women had a very important role before, during, and after the revolution, and it does not work for us today, to accept this,” she complained in a television interview. (She ran and narrowly lost as an independent candidate.) In Tunisia, disgruntled women activists have formed the October 24 Front to defend women’s rights in the aftermath of the Islamists’ electoral victory there. “We want a constitution that respects women’s rights and doesn’t roll back the advances we’ve made,” said one Tunisian protester.

Arab women are embattled on multiple fronts. First and foremost are the deep-seated patriarchal customs that constrain women. Patriarchy is certainly not unique to Arab lands, but it runs deep. It doesn’t help that for decades, the women’s rights agenda was closely associated with the now-discredited authoritarian regimes: Egypt’s Suzanne Mubarak ran a state-affiliated women’s NGO; Leila Ben Ali, Tunisia’s much-hated hairdresser-cum-first lady, was president of the Arab Women Organization, an intergovernmental body sponsored by the Arab League; and both Syria’s Asma al-Assad and Jordan’s Queen Rania have been active on women’s issues. The rise of politically empowered Islamist parties that contest existing laws for women on religious grounds also pose serious complications for women. Although women’s activism has clearly been important to the Arab revolts, there is no guarantee that women’s rights activists will be able to turn their engagement into longer-term economic, social, and political gains. In fact, in some countries, there is reason for concern that women will see their rights erode.

Libya is a case in point. At the ceremony marking Libya’s official liberation in October, one of the first announcements from Mustafa Abdel Jalil, leader of Libya’s National Transitional Council, was that any laws that contradicted sharia would be annulled. He specifically mentioned that, going forward, polygamy would be legal, drawing cheers and celebratory gunfire from the mostly male crowd. Libyan women expressed surprise and disappointment and wondered why, with all of Libya’s pressing issues, reinstating polygamy should be on the front burner. (NATO leaders wondered the same.) Although polygamy was technically legal under Qaddafi, it was discouraged and today is not practiced widely in Libya, but that could change. Female university students, who largely describe themselves as pious, vow to fight this regression.

In Egypt, a number of developments over the past year underscore women’s rights as a flashpoint in society. The inspirational images of gender solidarity in Tahrir Square in the early days of the revolution quickly gave way to ugly episodes of targeted harassment. A hastily planned demonstration on March 8, International Women’s Day, attracted a few hundred women but was marred by angry men shoving the protesters and yelling at them to go home, saying their demands for rights are against Islam. Around the same time, the Egyptian military rounded up scores of women demonstrators and, in a show of raw intimidation, subjected many of them to “virginity tests.” On the political level, women have been excluded from major decision-making bodies since the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, and it appears that few, if any, will win seats in the ongoing parliamentary elections. Their low success rate was not helped by the military’s decision to eliminate a Mubarak-era quota ensuring women 64 seats. This was a setback for women’s political participation, even though the quota enjoyed little credibility because it had been used to reward Mubarak loyalists.

The strong showing of Islamists parties in the first round of Egypt’s parliamentary elections has women’s groups worried. The ultraconservative Salafi groups, which took a surprising 20 percent of the vote, openly question a modern role for women in society. One Salafi leader refused to appear on a political talk show on television until the female host put on a headscarf. Another denounced the military government’s requirement to include women on electoral lists as “evil,” though Emad Abdel-Ghafour, head of al-Nour, the leading Salafi party, stated that the party does accept women candidates. Yet the Salafi women who did run demurred from showing their pictures on campaign materials, instead replacing their faces with pictures of flowers; moreover, the party deliberately clustered them at the bottom of its lists, making them unlikely to win seats. One Salafi sheikh recently issued an opinion that women should not wear high-heeled shoes in public. Along with Salafi statements of intent to ban alcohol and limit beach tourism, these swipes at women unnerve liberals.

Yet liberals have not been stalwarts of women’s rights in Egypt either. The 2000 decision to grant women the right to no-fault divorce (prior to this, they had to jump over the onerous legal hurdle of proving abuse or abandonment) was denounced not only by Islamist groups but by secular ones too — for undermining the family. Other changes to the personal-status laws in the past decade that have benefited women, particularly an expansion of custody rights, are coming under increasing attack. Critics discredit the reforms by derisively calling them “Suzanne’s Laws,” after Suzanne Mubarak. They claim the laws were intended to accommodate the wealthy friends of the former first lady, and they blame those statutes for a rise in the country’s divorce rate. Given the criticism of these laws from all sides of the political spectrum, it is likely that they will be amended by the new parliament, and not to women’s benefit.

Women seem to be faring better in Tunisia. Liberals and secularists have been deeply wary of the rise of al-Nahda, the country’s leading Islamist party, warning that it could mean a reversal of women’s rights. Since the 1950s, Tunisian women have enjoyed the most expansive legal rights in the region, including relatively progressive marriage and divorce laws and access to birth control and abortion. Since returning to Tunisia in the beginning of this year, Rached Ghannouchi, al-Nahda’s leader, has strived to convince Tunisians that his party will not seek to change the country’s personal-status laws. Some, however, have accused al-Nahda of obfuscating its real intentions behind moderate rhetoric — a charge that did not prevent the party from surging to victory with 41 percent of the vote in October’s election. Thanks to electoral rules requiring favorable placement of women on party lists, women gained 23 percent of the seats in parliament, a higher share than in the U.S. Congress. Most of the women are from al-Nahda and will likely reflect their party’s traditional views on women, but their participation in such large numbers at least normalizes an active political role for women. Moreover, Ghannouchi and other al-Nahda leaders so far have been purposefully focused on efforts to jump-start the economy, produce jobs, and reassure foreign investors. Al-Nahda has forged a coalition with liberal parties, and to maintain that coalition, it will have to continue to focus on the economy and human rights rather than getting bogged down in divisive culture wars.

Ghannouchi seems to understand that while rolling back gains for women can score points among Islamic conservatives, ultimately al-Nahda will win or lose on economic grounds, and women are important economic actors. With high rates of literacy and relatively low fertility, women constitute nearly a third of Tunisia’s workforce. Economic reality simply demands a pragmatic approach toward women. Let’s hope that Ghannouchi can get that message through to his Islamist brothers across the region. Otherwise, Arab women might soon be channeling their Iranian sisters, who have complained that Iran’s Islamic

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Kofi Anan visit in Syria’s main objective: A secular Syria

Posted on March 9, 2012 | Comments Off on Kofi Anan visit in Syria’s main objective: A secular Syria

By Bronco
8th March 2012

The fall of Bab Amr, the failure of the Friends of Syria have been signs to the US that it is time to play low key and change the original objectives. The US has been increasingly worried not only about al Qaeda but about Egypt who seems to be antagonizing the USA and whose Moslem Brotherhood seem to present a looming threat to Israel.
I think the US’s priority is now a secular Syria. They don’t want to take the chance that another direct neighbor of Israel become under the influence of MB or salafists. The US is realizing that Syria’s new Constitution actually denies religious parties. It is therefore a  much better guarantee than a “regime change” where religious leaders and movements may take the control (The fall of Iran shah is still in the mind of the US )
Even if Bashar al Assad leaves, the US does not want to see the MB or a religious Sunni majority ruling that they suspect will rapidly fall
under the control of radical Islamists.
The SNC has failed to offer enough guarantees that it will not be taken over by the Moslem Brotherhood. Therefore it has been reduced to just a small parameter of the equation.
I don’t think Anan’s visit has anything to do with Iran. Syria has
become a very weak link and is more of a liability to Iran than a asset.
The mission of Kofi Anan is to make sure that the reforms and especially the new constitution is applied after weapons are silenced, and that the fate of Bashar Al Assad be decided through early elections.
I think the message is clear : The regime must remain secular at all
cost even if it means keeping the old guard with the new constitution
that prevents a religious party taking over, thus guaranteeing the
protection of Israel and balancing the radicalization of the other Arab countries.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=13912&cp=all#comment-299983

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Posted in Middle East Geopolitics, Religion, Syria, United Nations

What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East?

Posted on February 7, 2012 | Comments Off on What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East?
by Patrick Seale Released: 23 Nov 2009

British journalist Brian Whitaker has written a provocative and disturbing book about the Middle East. His title is the one I have put at the head of this article. His book is not kind to the Arabs, since it exposes the profound contradictions and weaknesses in their society. But it should, nevertheless, be translated into Arabic as a matter of urgency and be required reading by Arab elites from the Atlantic to the Gulf.

His aim, he says, is to stimulate debate. If the Arab world is to catch up with the rest of the developed world, it would do well to ponder Whitaker’s conclusions and heed his recommendations.

Whitaker has travelled widely in Arab countries and was Middle East editor of the Guardian newspaper for seven years. He evidently knows the region intimately. His strength, in researching this book, is that he has not restricted himself, as most journalists do, to seeking the views of political leaders and government officials, but has instead moved outside the strictly political sphere to interview a great many thinkers, academics, students, opinion-formers, bloggers, and ordinary people in many countries across the region. He has looked beyond Arab regimes to society as a whole. That is the originality of his book.

So, in a word, what does he say is wrong with the Middle East? In chapter after chapter, he dissects the “stultifying atmosphere where change, innovation, creativity, critical thinking, questioning, problem-solving… are all discouraged.” And that is not the end of it. To this list he adds “systematic denial of rights that impinge on the lives of millions: discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality or family background; inequality of opportunity, impenetrable bureaucracies, arbitrary application of the law; and the lack of transparency in government.”

Whitaker’s first powerful chapter deals with the failure of education in the Arab world — which he says is central to the region’s problems. If change is to be meaningful, he declares, it must begin in people’s heads. He quotes the 2004 Arab Human Development Report in saying that teaching methods in the Arab world — especially rote learning — “do not permit free dialogue and active, exploratory learning and consequently do not open the doors to freedom of thought and criticism.” On the contrary, “the curricula taught in Arab countries seem to encourage submission, obedience, subordination and compliance.”

The result is a “knowledge deficit,” hampering the development of a well-educated, technically skilled workforce.

Whitaker’s recommendation is that “Arab countries need to reform their educational systems and prepare themselves for the future.” But, he adds pessimistically, “the high value placed on conformity in Arab societies is suffocating change.” His controversial conclusion is that “the Arab countries cannot develop knowledge-based societies without radical social and political change.”

Another of Whitaker’s targets is asabiyya — solidarity between members of a family, clan or tribe. Such solidarity can provide security and protection for individuals but the reverse of the coin is that (in the words of the Arab Human Development Report) it “implants submission, parasitic dependence and compliance…”

Whitaker argues that the obsession with kinship in the Arab world undermines the principles of meritocracy and equality of opportunity. Nepotism hampers economic development and places Arab countries at a disadvantage in relation to those parts of the world where such practices are less prevalent.

His conclusion is that “Arabs cannot emerge into a new era of freedom, citizenship and good governance while their society continues to be dominated by the obligations of kinship, whether at a family or tribal level…” This, he affirms, is the central challenge the Arabs face today.

Another of Whitaker’s provocative chapters deals with the relationship between citizens and their governments. The typical Arab regime, he declares, is both authoritarian and autocratic — authoritarian because it demands obedience and autocratic because power is highly centralised and concentrated around the head of state.

He acknowledges that there has been much talk of reform and modernisation in Arab countries to keep pace with the rapid world changes, but he remarks gloomily that “actual reform, as opposed to mere talk of it, has been far more limited… Much of what passes for reform is just window-dressing for the sake of international respectability.”

One of Whitaker’s most controversial chapters is entitled “The politics of God,” and deals with the tide of religious fervour that has swept across the Middle East during the last thirty or forty years. Religion, he argues, is one response to what has become known as the “Arab malaise.” For millions of believers, religion provides a comfort zone of certainty and hope in a world of doubt and despair.

He quotes his sources as suggesting that the lurch towards religion began with the Arabs overwhelming defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967. But further impetus to the trend was given by the success of the mujahideen in driving out Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and by the success of Hizbullah in driving Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 after 22 years of occupation. The idea took root that military success was achievable when inspired by religion.

Religion, Whitaker notes, provides a sense of identity, of belonging and of solidarity in the face of threats from outside. But he warns that treating religion as a badge of identity can lead to a heightened emphasis on its outward, physical aspects at the expense of spirituality and ethics.

Moreover, as the religious tide swept across the Middle East, more extreme versions of Islam gained in prominence, more rigid in their interpretations of scripture and less tolerant of alternative views. This has sometimes bred growing intolerance, and even acts of violence like the occasion when, in 1994, the 82-year old Egyptian man of letters, Naguib Mahfouz, was stabbed in the neck outside his house. He survived, but his right arm was partly paralysed.

Equal rights, Whitaker argues, cannot exist without freedom of religion. In the Arab countries, this is probably the biggest single obstacle to positive change. In his view, freedom of religion requires a state which is religiously neutral. Separation of religion and state is therefore essential, he believes, to any serious agenda for reform.

Whitaker’s book contains a lively discussion of corruption and illegal commissions in Arab society, as well as the phenomenon of wasta, that is to say the use of connections, influence or favouritism. There is also a long and well-informed section on the Arabic media, which is too rich to be summarised in a line or two.

Whitaker wants the Arabs to break free from a culture of dependence and helplessness and for westerners, in turn, to break free from their history of colonial rule and military intervention, so that both sides can set their relationship on a productive footing of inter-dependence.

This book will anger some and excite others. It is one of the most ambitious attempts in recent years by a western writer to analyse what is really wrong with the Middle East.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.

Copyright © 2009 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Is anyone in the Syrian leadership brave enough to ask the question?

Posted on January 25, 2012 | Comments Off on Is anyone in the Syrian leadership brave enough to ask the question?

Wednesday 25 January 2012-
By Ali Ibrahim-

According to a news piece carried by the official [Syrian] news agency, an official source reported that the Syrian regime has rejected the new Arab initiative, which had drawn up a roadmap similar to what happened in Yemen to ensure a semi-peaceful transfer of power there. This, however, has caused several questions to be raised, most prominently: What will happen next? Will the next step be an international solution?
Indeed, the Syrian regime’s rejection itself raises questions, firstly: Is this the regime’s final stance? Or will the door be left ajar for negotiations? Based on our experience of Arab initiatives towards Syria so far, the regime in Damascus has been known to adopt contradictory stances. The latest of these initiatives was the Arab observer mission – considered at first [by the Syrian regime] to be a violation of Syrian sovereignty – yet following weeks of inquiries, exchanged messages and replies between Damascus and the Arab League, and following several amendments to the Arab protocol, observers were finally sent to Damascus, and now they themselves are the subject of endless controversy.
It would not be surprising if future events follow a path similar to the Arab initiative that was proposed after the recent Arab ministerial meeting, with the Syrian regime attempting to negotiate, make inquiries and then carry out amendments, as was the case with the observer mission, in a bid to buy time.
Let us be frank here, the decision to accept the Arab observers in Syria was nothing more than al-Assad’s submission to the pressure being mounted upon him, and an attempt to buy more time, hoping that his security apparatus would succeed in quelling the revolution and the numerous hotbeds of unrest. This is clear considering the increasing rate of killings and attacks on cities, which continued to escalate until the death toll in the presence of Arab observes rose to several hundred.
Therefore, we can observe that pressure is a catalyst for action, and the new Arab initiative – which raised the ceiling of Arab mobilization with regards to what is happening in Syria – has mounted further pressure on the al-Assad regime. However, the door has still been left ajar for a safe exit [for Bashar al-Assad] along the lines of what happened to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This was represented by the advice offered by the Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki, during the interview he gave to Asharq al-Awsat, when he touched upon the subject of Syria and al-Assad by saying “we must not put four walls in front of a wounded tiger. There must be a way out for him”. Of course, it is important that this message is taken on board, and that al-Assad understands what is meant by a way out.
We are now facing the final scene of the Syrian revolution, and this has become clear for everyone to see, whether inside Syria or outside, whether as part of the regime or the opposition, the regional parties; Arab and non-Arab, and the international powers. Al-Assad has been given several respites and plenty time, but nevertheless he has failed to present any real solutions. Furthermore, he has failed to destroy a revolution that has broken through the fear barrier, and has now begun to confront the regime’s weapons with arms of its own. Now the situation on the ground is changing but not to the advantage of the regime, which has begun to lose control of entire cities and districts.
It is a fact that no one can know what is happening within the corridors of power, or inside Syria’s governing institutions, but it is also a fact that the Arab initiative has thrown a stone into the ruling regime’s water, and we do not know whether this is stagnant or not. Surely officials and key figures within the regime’s institutions will begin to wonder: Is keeping the President worth the destruction of the country and its institutions, the continual bloodshed, the killings, and the continual divisions within the army and the security apparatus? I hope they will come to the rational answer, provided these officials have a sense of responsibility and the courage to ask themselves such questions.
Is there anyone within the Syrian leadership who can ask such questions? This will become apparent in the days to come.

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=28233

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