From a Blogger in SyriaComment.com
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277507
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277665
1. If Assad were such a reformer, why did he not entertain the idea of a multi-party polity before 2011?
This has been discussed at SyriaComment before. Assad did entertain it on and off over the years. Why didn’t he actually do it? Because he didn’t have to (that’s a non-trivial point). And because it wasn’t entirely clear what the multi-party polity would look like if he created one (it might’ve been dysfunctional in one or more ways; and doubtless he would’ve been unhappy with the whole thing if a religious conservative party won a big share of the vote). Foreign Minister Wallid al-Moallem has said recently that the regime didn’t do it because they were under pressure and distraction the foreigners accusing Syria of murdering Hariri, and other saber-rattling by foreigner powers. I don’t accept that. Presidental Adviser Bouthiana Shaaban said a few months ago that the regime would not have repealed the emergency law, and would not have introduced the reforms of this year, if it hadn’t been for protesters on the streets. The whole country knew that the protesters were unassailably right about the specific things that the regime has now agreed to change.
2. You have made it clear that you would vote for Assad in any future elections (were they to be held). What is it about his ‘manifesto’ that you find so compelling?
See below including point number (10).
3. What significant internal reforms has Assad instigated over the past ten years?
The most significant has been greater opening of the economy to the international marketplace and futher moves away from Statism and socialism. The process is far from finished and is proceeding at a pace of gradual, organic evolution, and certainly not revolution. Ehsani would like it to proceed much faster. There has been a risk that faster pace could cause tumults, dissolutions, hardships, in the economy and then more dangerously in the polity.
# 266 in the previous thread DIGGING FOR GOLD IN BOSRA asks pro-regimers: “Why do you think Assad would win a fair election?
Here’s a list of 16 grounds I have for thinking that the regime will easily win the fair parliamentary elections that are in all likelihood to take place in 2012 — fair except religious and tribal parties are banned. The list is incomplete and off the top of my head, in no particular order, some of it recycled, and I think I could expand it if I spent more time on it.
(1) The overall number of people who accepted the invitation to join anti-regime demonstrations was “small” (though no hard number is available).
(2) The educated classes did not join the anti-regime demonstrations. In every country every winning party needs substantial support from the educated classes. In Syria right now there is only one party that has such support. To illustrate, one of the two key reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood party is so much stronger in Egypt than in Syria is that it has attracted substantial support from the educated classes. You know the other key reason. During the past six months the Syrian educated classes had the opportunity to come out and complain about the latter, and they didn’t take it up.
(3) Most of the religiously conservative classes did not join the anti-regime demonstrations. Neither did the clergy; most of the Sunni clerical leadership went on record as anti-tumult and pro-civil-process. Most of the people who attended the mosque on Friday did not attend an anti-regime demonstration afterwards, not even if there was a demonstration conveniently available and on offer to them at the doorstep. Neighborhoods in Damascus with a high concentration of religiously conservative people had only small, and few, demonstrations over the six months. One of the regime’s core constituencies is people who are less religious or who have a more progressive, less doctrinaire, take on religion. So, it is a very big and important achievement that this regime has been able to maintain its support among most of the religiously conservative. Correcting myself, it is more cautious and prudent to say “the religious conservatives consented to the rule of the regime and did not rise up against the regime” instead of “the regime maintained their support…”. Alright, many of them may vote for another party in the elections. But since most of them don’t express alienation against the regime, you shouldn’t expect them to vote en masse against the regime.
(4) No representatives of agricultural or rural interests having been talking up an alternative to the Assad regime. There was very little or no movement of people from rural areas into the towns and cities to participate in demonstrations (despite some fake boasts from the fake revolutionaries to the contrary). Right now there exists no competitor to the regime for the rural vote.
(5) Once the reforms announced by Assad are completed, there will be no major disagreements between Assad and the general Opposition on the structure of the institutions of the State. On social and economic policies, major disagreements between Assad and the Opposition are confined to wings of the Opposition (such as the MB wing), not the whole Opposition. These various wings are known to have only small and slim political support in Syria. The general Opposition does not have a platform and agenda beyond the reform agenda that the Assad regime itself has declared itself in favour of implementing. That is, the anti-regime protests have not created a policy agenda or alternative forward vision that throws the regime on the defensive in the upcoming election.
(6) The demonstrators were predominantly from the poorly educated working class. Most of them did not have an agenda beyond wanting Assad to leave and wanting a breath of fresh air in the country of an unspecified kind. The great majority of the poorly educated working class did not join with them in the anti-regime demonstrations, and all those who didn’t join are likely to follow the lead of the educated classes in the elections. The educated folks will be creating and propagating the discourse of the elections contest.
(7) The various Syrian opposition parties are very weak today, their representatives are barely known or entirely unknown to the Syrian public, and I can’t see a route by which they can make themselves a whole lot stronger by election day. The attempt to unconstitutionally overthrow the regime has discredited swathes of opposition, and has increased the regime’s political support among previously neutral people who strongly desire civil process and no violence.
(8) The city Al-Bab, 50 kilometers northwest of Aleppo, is the eight largest city in Syria. The city Al-Safira, 35 kilometers southwest of Aleppo, is the tenth largest city in Syria. (Source). Those two plus Aleppo (all overwhelmingly Sunni in religion, btw) have had essentially or very nearly zero anti-regime demonstrations during this past six months. Opposition to the regime in that part of the country among the poorly educated working class is truly miniscule. Aleppo is Syria’s most populous province. The regime is also very stong in Ladaqia, Tartous and Sweida provinces, and Damascus City. You can appreciate that those regional strengths can be enough to win or nearly win, even if you’re not yet agreeing with a forecast of the regime winning almost everywhere.
(9) Everybody in Syria knows that the anti-regime crowd has been lying about security forces atrocities and that the regime has been telling the truth. (Foreigners don’t know it, since they don’t watch Syrian TV, but foreigners are irrelevant since they won’t be voting). More generally, the regime has been able to use its control over Syrian mass media especially TV news to strong effect. The State-controlled TV news puts out good quality products for the most part, which enjoy good credibility with the Syrian public, and have good market penetration.
(10) The next two numbered points are interrelated but distinct. They are both aspects of the spirit of the nation and nationalism. The first is that there will be people who will be voting not so much for the Assad party as for national unity. They want unity and Assad’s party is by happenstance the embodiment for it. The Assad party’s manifesto is vote for national unity. A vote against Assad’s party is a vote for discord and recrimination. (The Putin|Medvedev party in Russia enjoys a similar sort of status, and it also has to put up with dissidents who despise the basics and atmosphere of the unity).
(11) “Syrian society is nationalistic and the Assad regime has got a bone-crunchingly strong grip over how the nation and nationalism is defined. The definition of the nation that the Syrians are nationalistic about is the one developed and nurtured by the regime over decades. It is unchallenged and unchallengeable, and people are rallying around it at this time of stress.” Nationalism sells well in national elections and no challenger can outdo the regime in selling nationalism.
(12) (a) The regime is actually in touch with the pulse of Syrian sentiment, and makes it its business to be so. (b) The regime in policymaking is non-doctrinaire, and is responsive to popular sentiment.
(13) The regime’s core agenda, modernization, is supported by almost all.
(14) The trade sanctions imposed by the Europeans and Americans have alienated the Syrians, I say, and all winning parties will decry the trade sanctions in the election campaign, and candidates with endorsements from Europe or America won’t have a snowball in hell’s chance of getting elected, and I say more about the political effect of the trade sanctions at http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12429&cp=all#comment-277131
(15) Religious and tribal parties are banned in the elections. The permitted parties will be having to pretty much compete head-to-head against the regime on the regime’s own territory.
(16) Syrian society is dominated by a sociologically broad Establishment that covers all geographic parts of the country, nearly all religious sects, all age groups, all professional occupations, all big private enterprises, and the State. This Establishment has had only one political party for decades. Today it shows no inclination towards internal dissent or devisiveness such as would create two parties within one Establishment (such as the Western countries have).
Footnote: I’ve come across many commentators who think the Assad regime has a “narrow base of political support”. E.g. Joshua Landis thinks that “Syria’s chronic failing is that it lacks a deeply shared sense of political community. This explains why such a narrow regime as that led by the Assads….” In next year’s competitive elections we are going to see who’s right and who’s wrong regarding these two radically different interpretations of the same scene.
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277507
#142 Syrialover (who sounds like a straight-up anti-Syrian) says: “It’s about the economy, stupid”. It applies every time to every election everywhere, always. It’s also fuelling the Arab Spring uprisings. And if a genuine oppostion uses that slogan in a true election, the Assadists…. [will lose the election].
#157 DFGIB says in a similar vein: “I am sure that when people are presented with a credible plan for getting this country back on track they won’t be voting for Assad.” I’ve already explained why I disagree with that full sentence from DFGIB, but let me reiterate that the sentence’s first half is still very hypothetical. To illustrate:
Date 6 Oct 2011. A organization called “National Coordination Body to the forces of Democratic and National Change in Syria”, in a statement read out by its secretary-general Hassan Abdul-Azim, said it espouses the principle of national democratic change and a transition to a parliamentarian democratic leadership, and has stepped up its demands to topple the “security and tyrant regime.” The statement went on: “It’s too late to talk about reforming the regime due to its insistence since the eruption of the uprising to use violence and security and military solutions… in addition to brutal torture and wide arrests.” Banners inside the meeting hall read, “yes to the collapse of the security tyrant regime,” and “No to foreign military intervention … no to violence and no to sectarianism.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/06/c_131177091.htm
Thus, that organization is (a) still sincerely thinking that ordinary Syrians can be talked into going out onto the streets in very big numbers to chant for unconstitutionally toppling the regime, (b) still not talking about competing in next year’s parliamentary elections, and (c) still not talking about the economy. I say it’s a recepie for total failure.
I also insist, and I trust the regime and its security forces to insist, that the only way we’re going to have “Democratic and National Change in Syria” is by the 2012 parliamentary elections followed by the 2014 Presidential election.
The election is not going to be about the economy because, for one thing, the Opposition is devoid of fresh and saleable economic ideas; and in the unlikely event they did come up with something worthwhile and popular, the regime would appropriate it for itself. On questions of the economy, nearly all of the captains of industry are (and are going to be) supporting the Assad’s party. So are the Trades Unions. When we have the captains of industry, the trades unions and the government all reading out of the same prayer book, and we have an opposition with no real experience in economic development matters, I can’t see how the Assad’s party could get beaten on that issue. But anyway the election is not going to be about the economy. All signs say the Opposition is going to emphasize “tyranny” and “corruption”. (I already posted on this board some months ago about the regime’s exposure to the corruption allegation, but the post does not come up at google search — why not?).
Of the seventeen points I made at #121 above, here’s my favourite:
(17) Syrian society is dominated by a sociologically broad Establishment that covers all geographic parts of the country, nearly all religious sects, all age groups, all professional occupations, all big private enterprises, and the State. This Establishment has had only one political party for decades. Today it shows no inclination towards internal dissent or devisiveness such as would create two parties within one Establishment (such as the Western countries have).
As I see it the parlimentary election campaign will consist of sundry semi-anonymous and semi-disreputable dissent parties campaigning against the Establishment party. With that view, I must expect the Establishment party to win by at least as wide a margin as Mubarak’s party used to win by in Egypt under somewhat similar circumstances.
That reminds me of a totally different point, coming to mind by mention of Mubarak’s Egypt. I assume you know the place the MB and similar parties had in Egypt’s political landscape over the years. I now believe Syria’s political landscape is not going to see the appearance of a similar thing, because the Syrian Establishment — specifically the better educated Sunnis, who are the sole arbiters of this matter, I believe — have “opted for secularism to promote national unity”. A quasi-religious party would lack support from the society’s Establishment and would carry the millstone of sectarianism around its neck. Syria’s Grand Mufti Ahmad Hassoun recently said this year’s new legal ban on religious political parties is harmless to religion, a view with which I fully agree. You may well say that just because the Establishment has accepted that this is going to be Syria’s way, it does not follow that the wider masses have or will accept the same. You could be right. But I believe the masses will follow the Establishment. More fundamentally, I believe an Establishment is established.
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=12447&cp=all#comment-277665